The article aims to determine the influence of administrative courts' jurisprudence on planning practice in the field of spatial order protection. This impact was verified from the perspective of two key, practical (used by courts, local government units, participants in the space game), and legal information systems: LEX and Legalis. The jurisprudence theses contained in the systems mentioned above constitute the basis for the judgments and formulation of arguments expressed in subsequent cases. Two key provisions were selected, important from the perspective of the protection of spatial order and the scope of property rights in the spatial management system: Art. 2, point 1, and Art. 6. The results show that in the examined systems, neutral judgments dominate. Nevertheless, the representation of decisions enabling the expansion of development possibilities is forceful. In this context, the key decisions seem to be more precise, defining the spatial order and directly indicating the superiority of the spatial order over the ownership right. Despite the lack of a clear legal basis, administrative courts should pay particular attention to this direction.
In: Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej; The Impact of the Russian Federation upon the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Band 18, Heft 3, S. 93-114
Serbia inherited Yugoslavia's tendency to pursue its foreign policy in terms of "multi-vector" policy and balancing between the West and the East to achieve its own political goals and maintain the attention of other countries. Despite the desire to join the European Union, as officially declared by the state authorities, Serbia also strives to maintain a "strategic partnership" with Russia. This paper presents Russia's interests in the policy towards Serbia in the economic sphere over the years, starting from 1999. It points to the complexity of Serbian-Russian economic relations and their relationship with political issues. Russia, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, can significantly affect Serbia's internal and foreign policy, making it dependent on guarding Serbia's sovereignty and territorial integrity and through the lack of recognition of Kosovo's independence by pursuing its own interests, manifested by an increasing Russian presence in the energy sector.
The author analyses the pattern of governance of the right-wing parties in Poland between 2015 and 2019. It bears many features of a concentration of powers as a method of achieving desired goals in the sphere of political competition and public policy along with the use of informal components. The manifestation of concentration of power is centralisation, understood as the transfer of functions of the state from the lower (in particular local government) levels to the higher, as well as strong interference of the central government in many areas of public life that previously remained apolitical.
The aim of the article is to present the issues of the Russian revolutions, their course and effects in the Polish press published under the partitions, representing various ideological and political trends. Foreign dailies remained the source of information about the revolution. A review of press publications allowed us to determine what information reached the readers of the Polish press. The creators of the Polish press assumed the attitude of observers of political and social life. The influence of revolutionary events on the development of the situation in Poland was discussed. A review of press publications allowed us to determine what information reached the readers of the Polish press. The press content analysis method and qualitative analysis of the presented content were used.
The article aims to look at Russian culture as a soft power through the prism of the large-scale invasion of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and to analyze the changes in its perception that have occurred as a result of these events. Russian culture, especially high culture, is known and appreciated in the world, which gives it the power of attraction and the possibility of exerting influence. At the same time, it is not only a source of prestige and a tool for promoting Russia, but also spreading Russian imperial myths that contributed to the invasion of Ukraine. Moreover, the operation of Russian cultural institutions outside the borders of the Russian Federation is strictly controlled by the authorities, and its popularization is treated as a "special operation". Russian culture imposed imperial optics on the perception of "near abroad", deprived Ukraine of the right to its history, identity and cultural heritage. Due to its colonial nature, it does not perceive the suffering of oppressed nations, and is therefore unable to prevent the tragedy of their destruction, as is the case with Ukraine and its culture. As a result of the initiated war, Russia has embezzled some of its soft power. However, there is no consensus among the international community regarding the imposition of sanctions on Russian culture. Ukrainian cultural activists accuse the international community of hypocrisy because, in defending Russian culture, it does not perceive the deliberate and systematic destruction of Ukrainian culture. Russian culture requires a reinterpretation and unmasking of the imperial optics, as consuming it indiscriminately poses a threat to the national security of the "near abroad" states.
Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie japońskiego soft power, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem kultury jako jednego z czynników soft power. Japońska dyplomacja kulturalna wykorzystująca kulturę popularną jest przykładem zręcznie prowadzonej polityki międzynarodowej. Promowanie pozytywnego wizerunku państwa poprzez soft power na arenie międzynarodowej wzmacnia ekonomiczne oraz polityczne znaczenie państwa. Artykuł skupia się na dwóch kwestiach: historii japońskiego soft power oraz jego praktycznemu zastosowaniu. W podsumowaniu sugeruje się, że japoński soft power nie będzie tak znaczący z racji wzrastającego potencjału Chin.
Digital diplomacy, also referred to as e-Diplomacy or Diplomacy 2.0, is a form of public diplomacy that entails the pursuance of foreign policy objectives using the Internet and social media. It is one of the ways that actors in contemporary global politics can exert soft power, thereby shaping a host country's perceptions, agendas, and policies. The increasing use of digital diplomacy exemplifies a shift in diplomatic from purely government-to-government (G2G) relations, to one in which communication is directed towards publics (G2P), and can even encourage citizens to interact with one another (P2P). One actor that has become increasingly active in this area is the European Union (EU). However, unlike a country, the regional bloc is a coalition of twenty-eight member states. Consequently, the challenge for EU digital diplomacy specialists is to represent a group of countries to local audiences. There is minimal literature on this subject, and this paper hopes to contribute to it by presenting a case study of the EU's digital diplomacy initiatives towards Philippines, which are communicated through the popular social networking website, Facebook. This paper argues that the EU exercises its soft power through its social media transmissions it creates. The individuals featured in its online content, the way that the European Union represents itself, and the issues it highlights in its posts are all geared towards shaping the perceptions of Philippine audiences.
China's soft-power practice in its international activity boils down to four areas: culture, education, diplomacy, and economy. The most important element of China's soft-power policy seems to be the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Announced in 2013, the BRI is a complex, long-term and large-scale strategic political and economic project by the Chinese government with an infrastructure character. In this way, China is seeking to invest its capital surpluses in resurrecting the ancient Silk Road to create railroad and maritime networks with its most important trading partner – the European Union. In these circumstances, in September 2015, the presidents of Central and Eastern EU member states announced the establishment of the separate Three Seas Initiative (TSI), a political and economic project bringing together 12 EU states, including 11 'new' members and Austria. These entities constitute an informal bloc of states between the Adriatic, Baltic and Black seas, though without a permanent secretariat but with rotating leadership. In addition to the lack of a formal structure, the TSI region, located mainly in the EU's eastern part, is characterized by a weaker infrastructure network than Western Europe, lower GDP (except Austria), and high dependence on gas supplies from Russia (except Croatia). To overcome these disparities, the TSI has developed a catalogue of 48 investment priorities in three economic areas: energy, transport, and digitalisation. China's soft-power policy towards the 'new' EU members may be decided by the American patronage of the TSI and the fact that one of the flagship projects is the North-South Gas Corridor, which will enable the sale of American LNG in Central Europe, which has been dependent on gas supplies from Russia, China's partner in the BRI. In the context of the US-China trade war, White House planners recognise Central Europe as both a peripheral and key area for their policy and seek to strengthen the Three Seas project, which may lead to limiting areas of cooperation under the '17+1' format, involving CEE countries and China. On the other hand, the development of better energy, transport and digital connections in the EU's east clearly intersects with China's idea of building a New Eurasian Land Bridge under the BRI to connect the most economically developed edges of Eurasia. The new US strategy towards the countries of the CEE seems to boil down to involvement in specific energy-related projects. Instead of blocking or diminishing BRI-related infrastructure projects in China, they seem in fact to complement the Chinese activity in the CEE. Increased investment by American enterprises in the region may allow the administration in Washington to maintain control of Chinese infrastructure investments, and the US involvement may even lead to the participation of American companies in projects originally started by Beijing.
In: Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej; The Impact of the Russian Federation upon the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Band 18, Heft 3, S. 143-171
Most of the previous revolutions in the post-Soviet sphere were concentrated around two dimensions: reluctance to challenge abuses of power and the will to redirect the external trajectory. The Armenian Velvet Revolution marked the change of the axiology of revolution. Civil disobedience was only focused on the corrupt political system based on clientelism and patronage. It was not addressing any issues related to the international situation. In statements, activists avoided references to foreign policy and change of geopolitical direction. The purpose of the paper is to identify convergent and separate features characterizing the Velvet Revolution in comparison with breakthroughs classified as revolutions in the post-Soviet space after 1989. The research question is how the Armenian Velvet Revolution's features stand out from previous revolutionary changes of power in the post-Soviet space, and to what extent they are convergent. The theoretical framework is based on multi-dimensional academic reflection on the factors characterizing particular revolutionary waves in post-Soviet space. Using comparatively the rich achievements of study on the Autumn of Nations, Color Revolutions, and Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity, this essay aims to inscribe the unique and modular factors characterizing the Armenian Velvet Revolution into a broader spectrum of theoretical and practical considerations on political breakthroughs in post-Soviet space.