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"This book focuses on the theory and practice of maritime strategy and operations by the weaker powers at sea. Illustrated by examples from naval and military history, the book explains and analyses the strategies of the weaker side at sea in both peacetime and wartime; in defense versus offense; the main prerequisites for disputing control of the sea; and the conceptual framework of disputing control of the sea. It also explains and analyses in some detail the main methods of disputing sea control -- avoiding/seeking decisive encounters, weakening enemy naval forces over time, counter-containment of enemy naval forces, destroying the enemy's military-economic potential at sea, attacks on the enemy coast, defense of the coast, defense/capturing important positions/basing areas, and defense/capturing of a choke point. A majority of the world's navies are currently of small or medium-size. In the case of a war with a much stronger opponent, they would be strategically on the defensive, and their main objective then would be to dispute control of the sea by a stronger side at sea. This book provides a practical guide to such a strategy. This book would be of much interest to students of naval power, maritime security, strategic studies and military/naval history."--Provided by publisher

"This book focuses on the theory and practice of maritime strategy and operations by the weaker powers at sea. Illustrated by examples from naval and military history, the book explains and analyses the strategies of the weaker side at sea in both peacetime and wartime; in defense versus offense; the main prerequisites for disputing control of the sea; and the conceptual framework of disputing control of the sea. It also explains and analyses in some detail the main methods of disputing sea control -- avoiding/seeking decisive encounters, weakening enemy naval forces over time, counter-containment of enemy naval forces, destroying the enemy's military-economic potential at sea, attacks on the enemy coast, defense of the coast, defense/capturing important positions/basing areas, and defense/capturing of a choke point. A majority of the world's navies are currently of small or medium-size. In the case of a war with a much stronger opponent, they would be strategically on the defensive, and their main objective then would be to dispute control of the sea by a stronger side at sea. This book provides a practical guide to such a strategy. This book would be of much interest to students of naval power, maritime security, strategic studies and military/naval history."--Provided by publisher.

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been able to deploy its considerable military capacity to operational theatres unopposed, and once in theatre has faced little if any opposition in key areas of its own asymmetric advantage, such as air and space power, and the ability to engage targets with precision weaponry at extended ranges. However, the Department of Defense (DoD) has recognised since the late 1990s that freedom of manoeuvre cannot be assumed indefinitely. An erosion of the previously overwhelming US technological edge compounds this challenge. Recent doctrinal and equipment developments demonstrate the Pentagon's focus on countering what it calls anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, which threaten to restrict US and allied forces' movement to and within potential theatres. Anti-ship missiles, submarines, mines and cyber capabilities are high among US armed forces' concerns regarding the inventories of potential adversaries. The Pentagon has to address these issues, and adopt new strategies, while undergoing what Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey has called three transitions: firstly, a move from a military 'generally focused on deploying for combat into one that can perform missions besides counterinsurgency'; secondly, a transition in personnel strength, with notable reductions in the US Army and Marine Corps; and thirdly, doing this within an increasingly tight fiscal environment. Adapted from the source document.

This special issue aims to foster new thinking into the Russian strategic and military challenge in the Baltic Sea region. The ultimate aim of this scholarship is not to promote offensive actions, such as the further expansion of NATO's sphere of influence or any interference in Russian internal affairs. Rather, the hope is that Russia and NATO will be able avoid further escalation of tensions that could lead to war.

In the past two decades, Vietnam's military investment has manifested a strategic shift of national interest from land to the maritime sphere, especially since 2000. This evolution reflects the country's altered external environment and its economic transformation. During the Cold War, Hanoi focused on land warfare. Despite the existence of a small navy since the 1960s, land warfare represented the main security issue for Vietnamese decision makers, whether it concerned the Vietnam War against the United States and its allies, military intervention in Cambodia, or border defense against China.

From its inception, the U.S. military has continuously adapted itself to meet evolving threats. At its core, the Air-Sea Battle Concept is about reducing risk and maintaining U.S. freedom of action and reflects the Services' most recent efforts to improve U.S. capabilities. Similar to previous efforts, the Concept seeks to better integrate the Services in new and creative ways. It is a natural and deliberate evolution of U.S. power projection and a key support component of U.S. national security strategy for the 21st century. ; https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/csf/1000/thumbnail.jpg

The article explores the implications of the rise of Russian anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities for NATO's Eastern Frontier, especially the broader Black Sea region. The reality is indicative of a broader global trend where assertive revisionist powers are not only questioning the post-1989 rules-based international order but are also developing the antidotes to the so-called American Way of War, one that largely shapes the NATO operational profile. This type of ecosystem is at the forefront of what Russia has been doing over the past few years in Kaliningrad and Crimea - developing concepts of operations, especially the A2/AD component, that challenge NATO's way of reassuring its frontline allies. The problem is that the NATO caucus in the Black Sea remains highly fragmented in its threat perception. Increasingly close economic and political ties to Russia combined with diplomatic discord concerning the US and NATO makes Turkey a less reliable ally. Meanwhile, Bulgaria's long tradition of close cultural and economic ties to Russia remains concerning. At the same time, NATO needs to do more. The West must understand that its smaller allies don't have the luxury of time or economic power and must adapt its approach accordingly to credibly reassure its Black Sea allies.