Suchergebnisse

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The past two years have seen the Congress and DOD take meaningful steps towards addressing long-standing weapon acquisition issues--an area that has been on GAO's high risk list since 1990. This testimony focuses on the progress DOD has made in improving the planning and execution of its weapon acquisition programs and the potential for recent acquisition reforms to improve program outcomes. The testimony includes observations about (1) DOD's efforts to manage its portfolio of major defense acquisition programs, (2) the knowledge attained at key junctures of a subset of 42 weapon programs from the 2009 portfolio, (3) other factors that can affect program execution, and (4) DOD's implementation of recent acquisition reforms. The testimony is based on the results of our annual assessment of weapon programs. To conduct the assessment, GAO analyzed data on the composition of DOD's portfolio of major defense acquisition programs. GAO also collected data from program offices on technology, design, and manufacturing knowledge, as well as on other factors that can affect program execution. GAO has made numerous recommendations on weapon system acquisition in prior work but is not making any new recommendations in this testimony."

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) antiarmor master plan, focusing on: (1) changes in armored threats from 1990 to 1997; (2) comparing the number and makeup of the 1990 antiarmor weapon inventory with those of the 1998 inventory; and (3) funding trends of past and future antiarmor procurements."

"This paper considers incentives for information acquisition ahead of conflicts.
We characterize the (unique) equilibrium of the all-pay auction between two
players with one-sided asymmetric information. The type of one player is
common knowledge. The type of the other player is drawn from a continuous
distribution and is private information of this player. We then use our results to
study information acquisition prior to an all-pay auction. Depending on the cost
of information, only one player may invest in information. If the decision to
acquire information is observable for the opponent, but not the information
received, one-sided asymmetric information can occur endogenously in
equilibrium. Moreover, compared with the first best, information acquisition is
excessive. In contrast, with open or covert information acquisition, the cut-off
values for equilibrium information acquisition are as in the first best." (author's abstract)

U.S. military superiority is at risk due to rapid technological advancements changing the character of war in an increasingly complex global security environment. Department of Defense (DoD) executives fear the DoD has lost its ability to go fast. They stress the need to increase speed and agility in defense acquisition. MITRE researched organizations across the DoD, government, and industry that delivered capabilities faster than comparable organizations to understand their keys to success. Based on this initial research, strategies were identified across five major areas to enable practitioners to accelerate deliveries to the warfighters. These include creating a culture of speed, managing requirements, systems design, program execution, and contracting. ; Naval Postgraduate School Acquisition Research Program