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Each year, millions of Americans cast votes for specific candidates or on specific ballot measures. Each such vote generates potential "electoral evidence," the admissibility of which may be the subject of dispute in subsequent litigation. The evidence may take various forms, including the marked ballot itself, a voter's testimony regarding her vote, or her written or oral statements regarding her vote. Electoral evidence is most commonly offered in litigation over the election outcome itself, with the parties seeking to determine how certain individuals voted to resolve a close election. However, its potential relevance is not limited to such proceedings. It may also be substantively relevant in a case in which the voter is alleged to have discriminated against someone, or to prove potential juror or witness bias against a party. While election contests for specific candidates only provide insight into a voter's general political leanings that is only marginally relevant to prove discriminatory purpose or bias in most instances, votes cast in recent years on gay and transgender rights, affirmative action, religious freedom, tort reform, and abortion provide insight into a voter's views about discrete categories of persons that is far more probative of such matters. The admissibility of electoral evidence has been given piecemeal consideration in judicial opinions, but has not received comprehensive attention in any judicial opinion or in the scholarly literature. This Article is the first comprehensive examination of the evidentiary issues that arise when a party seeks to offer electoral evidence in judicial proceedings. It identifies three dangers associated with admitting electoral evidence: its trustworthiness; the individual and societal interests in protecting ballot secrecy; and the risk of unfair prejudice. It demonstrates that these dangers are addressed in a fragmentary and incomplete fashion by existing evidentiary rules. Relying on social science research about the veracity of voters in recounting ...

Considers (83) S. 832, (83) S. 2753, (83) S. 3229, (83) H.R. 8649. ; Considers legislation to permit use of electronic surveillance devices by law enforcement officials in national security investigations, and allow admission of evidence obtained by electronic surveillance in Federal court trials involving national security. ; Record is based on bibliographic data in CIS US Congressional Committee Hearings Index. Reuse except for individual research requires license from Congressional Information Service, Inc. ; Indexed in CIS US Congressional Committee Hearings Index Part VI ; Considers (83) S. 832, (83) S. 2753, (83) S. 3229, (83) H.R. 8649. ; Considers legislation to permit use of electronic surveillance devices by law enforcement officials in national security investigations, and allow admission of evidence obtained by electronic surveillance in Federal court trials involving national security. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Cicero's famous words Omnes Legum servi sumus ut liberi esse possimus have stood the test of time. Jean-Jacques Rousseau however writes that Man is born free but everywhere he is in chains, implying that man is constrained both by legal and social forces. This paradox is reflected in the balance between criminal substantive and procedural law on the one hand and the rights of the citizen, including human rights, on the other. The latter can indeed only be enforced and ensured by a derogation therefrom in certain circumstances. The right to liberty, for instance, can only be ensured by restricting the liberty of others, whether in ordinary behaviour or as a punishment for previous conduct. This paradoxical situation is also reflected in rules governing illegally obtained evidence. Should the accused be convicted on the grounds of evidence obtained illegally, against his rights or should his rights be given precedence, excluding the evidence, and in so doing detract from the protection of the rights of others in general? The examples drawn from various jurisdictions vary greatly owing to historical, social and political reasons. ; peer-reviewed

State judges in Tennessee currently consider the results of penile plethysmograph ("PPG") evaluations when sentencing convicted sex offenders. These highly intrusive physical tests purport to identify whether an offender's arousal is considered "deviant" by measuring the change in penis size after viewing various stimuli. Because the results are usually buried in psychosexual evaluations that are part of general presentence assessments of recidivism risk, PPG evaluations suffer from a lack of standardization and little attention under the rules of evidence. Interestingly, PPG testing is similar to polygraphy in a number of ways, although studies have shown that PPG results are more reliable than polygraph tests in determining whether a subject was truthful in reporting. For that reason, and the heightened importance of alternative sentencing decisions that prevent recidivism among individuals who cannot control their deviant sexual arousal, PPG results should be considered by judges only in limited circumstances. This Note provides a new rule of evidence modeled after New Mexico's polygraph- admissibility rule, which provides practical standards to avoid unreliable results, consent requirements to ensure voluntariness, and opportunities to retake poorly conducted evaluations if good cause is shown. The proposed rule strikes a balance between society's interest in safeguarding citizens from potentially dangerous sex offenders and the offender's interests in protections from unwarranted government intrusion.

"This examination of the jurisdiction of international courts and the admissibility of cases before them analyses jurisdictional and admissibility rules in light of the roles assumed by international courts in international life and in light of the roles that jurisdictional and admissibility rules play in promoting the effectiveness and legitimacy of international courts. The theory pursued views jurisdiction as a form of delegation of power (the power to exercise judicial power and decide the law) and regards admissibility as a framework for deciding upon the propriety of exercising such power. On the basis of this theoretical framework, the author critically evaluates the exercise of judicial discretion in the existing case law of a variety of international courts, distinguishing between the category-based case selection implicit in jurisdictional rules and the case-by-case analysis and selection implicit in rules on admissibility"--