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"Advancing the state of aviation safety is a central mission of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Congress requested this review of NASA's aviation safety-related research programs, seeking an assessment of whether the programs have well-defined, prioritized, and appropriate research objectives; whether resources have been allocated appropriately among these objectives; whether the programs are well coordinated with the safety research programs of the Federal Aviation Administration; and whether suitable mechanisms are in place for transitioning the research results into operational technologies and procedures and certification activities in a timely manner. Advancing Aeronautical Safety contains findings and recommendations with respect to each of the main aspects of the review sought by Congress. These findings indicate that NASA's aeronautics research enterprise has made, and continues to make, valuable contributions to aviation system safety but it is falling short and needs improvement in some key respects"--Publisher's description

Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Foreword -- Introduction & Acknowledgements -- Chapter 1 Early Days: 1982-1984 -- Chapter 2 Cold War: 1985-1990 -- Chapter 3 Cold War: Hot War 1990-1991 -- Chapter 4 Gulf War: January/February 1991 -- Chapter 5 The New Order: 1991-1995 -- Chapter 6 Operational to the End: 1996-2001 -- Appendix 1 Squadron Markings -- Appendix 2 List of Tornado GR1 Aircraft

Intro -- Contents -- Abbreviations -- Part I Theoretical Foundations of Building of the System for Management of Ecology Safety in Civil Aviation -- 1 Analysis of Compliance of the System for Management of Ecology Safety in Civil Aviation with Modern Requirements -- 1.1 Statement of the Problem and Task of Research -- 1.2 International Requirements for Systems of Management of Ecology Safety -- 1.3 Requirements for Systems of Management of Ecology Safety in the Russian Federation -- 1.4 The System of Management of Ecology Safety for Flight Operations, Technical Service, and Repair -- 1.5 Compliance of the System of Management of Ecology Safety in Civil Aviation with International and Domestic Requirements -- References -- 2 Analysis of Work in the Area of Improving the Requirements to the System of Management of Ecology Safety -- 2.1 Determination of the Factors of Ecology Threats -- 2.2 Analysis of Work in the Area of Improving the Requirements to the System of Management of Ecology Safety in the Russian Federation -- 2.3 Basic Principles of the System of Ecology Safety -- 2.4 Analysis of the Existing System of Management of Ecological Safety in Civil Aviation -- References -- 3 Theoretical Studies of Ways to Improve the Efficiency of the System of Management of Ecology Safety in Civil Aviation -- 3.1 Development of a Mathematical Model of System Management for Ecological Safety in Civil Aviation -- 3.1.1 Mathematical Model of System Management for Ecological Safety -- 3.1.2 The Model of the Production System of Aircraft Repair -- 3.2 Approximate Analysis of the Directions of Improving the Efficiency of System Management for Ecological Safety in Civil Aviation -- 3.3 Structural Optimization of the System of Management of Ecology Safety in Civil Aviation -- 3.3.1 Threat and Risk Assessment at Enterprises.

Intro -- Preface -- Contents -- Abbreviations -- 1 Concept of Risk and Safety: Analysis of Aviation Safety Regulations -- 1.1 Safety in the Context of National Safety Policy -- 1.2 Comparative Estimation of Safety Situation in the Russian Federation and in the World -- 1.2.1 Comparison of Safety Levels in the Russian Federation and in the USA -- 1.2.2 Comparison of Safety Situation in the Russian Federation and in the Member States of the ICAO -- 1.3 Analysis of National and International Regulations Requirements to the Flight Operations Safety Management Systems -- 1.3.1 ICAO, IATA, and EASA Standards and Recommended Practices -- 1.3.2 Standards, Regulations, and Guidances of Several States -- 1.4 Description of the Current Situation in the National Safety Program and in the Flight Operations Safety Management System of the Russian Federation -- 1.5 Safety Risk and Its Acceptable Level -- 1.5.1 Analysis of Different Approaches to Risk Definition -- 1.5.2 Application of Fuzzy Sets and "Soft Estimation" -- 1.5.3 Concept of Acceptable Risk -- References -- 2 Analysis of Navigational and Meteorological Risks that Influence Civil Aviation Safety -- 2.1 Classification of Emergency, Critical, and Failure Situations in Aviation Enterprise -- 2.2 Analysis of Possible Unauthorized Actions on the Navigation System of Civil Aircraft -- 2.2.1 Classification of Possible Radio-Electronic Attacks on the Navigation System of Civil Aircraft -- 2.2.2 Possibility of Intentional Interference for the Purpose of the Total or Fragmentary Destruction of Navigation Information -- 2.2.3 Energy Analysis of Intentional Interference Possibility in GPS and GLONASS -- 2.2.4 System Vulnerability Analysis for Navigation Systems of Civil Aircraft -- 2.3 Analysis of Meteorological Risks in Aviation Enterprise Operation -- 2.3.1 Air Temperature -- 2.3.2 Air Humidity.

Intro -- Foreword -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- Abbreviations -- Contents -- About the Author -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- 1.1 Historical Retrospective -- 1.1.1 Overview -- 1.1.2 Development of Mobile Radiocommunications -- 1.1.3 Evolution of Satellite Communications -- 1.1.4 Experiments with Active Communications Satellites -- 1.1.5 Early Progress in Mobile Satellite Communications and Navigation -- 1.2 Development of Global Mobile Satellite Systems (GMSS) -- 1.2.1 Definition of Global Mobile Satellite Communications (GMSC) -- 1.2.2 Definition of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) -- 1.2.3 Network Architecture of GMSC -- 1.2.3.1 Space Segment and Configuration of MCS Links -- 1.2.3.2 Ground Segment and Networks -- 1.3 GMSC Applications -- 1.3.1 Maritime Mobile Satellite Communications (MMSC) -- 1.3.2 Land Mobile Satellite Communications (LMSC) -- 1.3.3 Aeronautical Mobile Satellite Communications (AMSC) -- 1.3.3.1 Development of AMSC -- 1.3.3.2 Present Status of Aeronautical Communications -- 1.3.3.3 Aeronautical Transportation Augmentation System (ATAS) -- 1.3.3.4 Service for AMSC Users -- 1.4 Definition of Satellite Communication, Navigation, and Surveillance (CNS) -- 1.4.1 Satellite Communication System (SCS) for CNS -- 1.4.2 Satellite Navigation System (SNS) for CNS -- 1.4.3 Satellite Surveillance System (SSS) for CNS -- 1.5 International Coordination Organizations and Regulatory Procedures -- 1.5.1 International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and Radio Regulations -- 1.5.2 International Maritime Organization (IMO) and Regulations -- 1.5.3 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and Regulations -- 1.5.4 International Air Transport Association (IATA) -- 1.5.5 International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) -- 1.5.6 World Meteorological Organization (WMO) -- 1.5.7 Mobile Satellite Users Association (MSUA).

Intro -- Preface -- References -- About This Book -- Introduction -- References -- Contents -- Abbreviations -- 1 Assessing the System Safety Using Reliability Theory and PSA Methods -- 1.1 Formation of Methods for Ensuring Reliability and Safety of Equipment as Quality Characteristics -- 1.2 Basic States of Facilities in the Reliability and Safety Analysis -- 1.3 Interrelationship Between the Categories of Reliability, Efficiency, and Safety of Complex Technical Systems in the Classical Reliability Theory -- 1.4 Structurally Complex Diagrams of the Technical System and Minimal Cut Sets of Failures -- 1.4.1 Methods for Assessing Reliability and Quality of Systems -- 1.4.2 Constructing a "Failure Tree" -- 1.5 Basic Principles of Ensuring Safety of Technical Systems Based on the Classical RT Methods -- 1.5.1 Use of Safety Barriers to Ensure Safety of Potentially Hazardous Facilities -- 1.5.2 Place and Role of Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) in the RT -- 1.5.3 Identification of Risk Factors -- 1.5.4 International Standards in the Field of Safety Analysis and Evaluation (PSA) and Comments on Discrepancies in Language -- 1.5.5 Identification of Main Tasks of Probabilistic Safety Analysis -- 1.6 Analysis of Emergency Sequences When Assessing the Safety Level of Systems Using the PSA Method in the RT -- 1.6.1 Construction of "Event Trees" in the RT -- 1.6.2 Calculation of Risks in the RT as the Probability of Occurrence of a Negative Event -- 1.6.3 Analysis of the Results of Risk Calculation in the PSA Method -- 1.7 Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) -- 1.7.1 General Provisions of Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis for System Element Failures -- 1.7.2 Effect of the Failure Criticality on the Safety State of the System Processes -- 1.7.3 Examples of Known Catastrophes -- 1.8 Conclusions -- References.

Intro -- Acknowledgments -- Availability -- Foreword -- Revision History -- Major Enhancements to Version FAA-S-ACS-6B -- Table of Contents -- Introduction -- Airman Certification Standards Concept -- Using the ACS -- I. Preflight Preparation -- Task A. Pilot Qualifications -- Task B. Airworthiness Requirements -- Task C. Weather Information -- Task D. Cross-Country Flight Planning -- Task E. National Airspace System -- Task F. Performance and Limitations -- Task G. Operation of Systems -- Task H. Human Factors -- Task I. Water and Seaplane Characteristics, Seaplane Bases, Maritime Rules, and Aids to Marine Navigation (ASES, AMES) -- II. Preflight Procedures -- Task A. Preflight Assessment -- Task B. Flight Deck Management -- Task C. Engine Starting -- Task D. Taxiing (ASEL, AMEL) -- Task E. Taxiing and Sailing (ASES, AMES) -- Task F. Before Takeoff Check -- III. Airport and Seaplane Base Operations -- Task A. Communications, Light Signals, and Runway Lighting Systems -- Task B. Traffic Patterns -- IV. Takeoffs, Landings and Go-Arounds -- Task A. Normal Takeoff and Climb -- Task B. Normal Approach and Landing -- Task C. Soft-Field Takeoff and Climb (ASEL) -- Task D. Soft-Field Approach and Landing (ASEL) -- Task E. Short-Field Takeoff and Maximum Performance Climb (ASEL, AMEL) -- Task F. Short-Field Approach and Landing (ASEL, AMEL) -- Task G. Confined Area Takeoff and Maximum Performance Climb (ASES, AMES) -- Task H. Confined Area Approach and Landing (ASES, AMES) -- Task I. Glassy Water Takeoff and Climb (ASES, AMES) -- Task J. Glassy Water Approach and Landing (ASES, AMES) -- Task K. Rough Water Takeoff and Climb (ASES, AMES) -- Task L. Rough Water Approach and Landing (ASES, AMES) -- Task M. Forward Slip to a Landing (ASEL, ASES) -- Task N. Go-Around/Rejected Landing -- V. Performance and Ground Reference Maneuvers -- Task A. Steep Turns.

Intro -- Preface -- Introduction -- Acknowledgments -- Record of Changes -- Table of Contents -- Chapter 1: Defining Elements of Risk Management -- Introduction -- Hazard -- Risk -- Managing Risks -- Chapter Summary -- Chapter 2: Human Behavior -- Introduction -- Chapter Summary -- Chapter 3: Identifying Hazards and Mitigating Risk -- Introduction -- P = Pilot in command -- The Pilot's Health -- Stress Management -- A = Aircraft -- V = Environment -- Weather -- Terrain -- Airport -- Airspace -- Nighttime -- Visual Illusions -- E = External Pressures -- Chapter Summary -- Chapter 4: Assessing Risk -- Introduction -- Quantifying Risk Using a Risk Matrix -- Likelihood of an Event -- Severity of an Event -- Mitigating Risk -- Chapter Summary -- Chapter 5: Aeronautical Decision-Making: A Basic Staple -- Introduction -- History of ADM -- Analytical Decision-Making -- Automatic Decision-Making -- Operational Pitfalls -- Scud Running -- Get-There-Itis -- Continuing VFR into IMC -- Loss of Situational Awareness -- Flying Outside the Envelope -- 3P Model -- Rate of Turn -- Radius of Turn -- Perceive -- Process -- Perform -- Chapter Summary -- Chapter 6: Single-Pilot Resource Management -- Introduction -- Recognition of Hazards -- Use of Resources -- Internal Resources -- External Resources -- SRM and the 5P Check -- Plan -- Plane -- Pilot -- Passengers -- Programming -- Chapter Summary -- Chapter 7: Automation -- Introduction -- Cockpit Automation Study -- Realities of Automation -- Enhanced Situational Awareness -- Autopilot Systems -- Familiarity -- Respect for Onboard Systems -- Reinforcement of Onboard Suites -- Getting Beyond Rote Workmanship -- Understand the Platform -- Flight Management Skills -- Automation Management -- Information Management -- Risk Management -- Chapter Summary -- Chapter 8: Risk Management Training -- Introduction

In May 1996, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) announced a new and innovative approach to reach the goal of "zero accidents," known as the Global Analysis and Information Network (GAIN). This is envisaged as a privately owned and operated international information infrastructure for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of aviation safety information that would involve the use of a broad variety of worldwide aviation data sources, coupled with comprehensive analytical techniques, to facilitate the identification of existing and emerging aviation safety problems. In support of this effort, the objective of the research project described in this paper is to assist the FAA in developing aviation system safety performance measures that can utilize the automated operational data that is available in the aviation system, such as digital flight recorder data and air traffic control (ATC) system data, to monitor trends in the operation of the aviation system and anticipate problems before they lead to incidents and accidents. For this to be done, it will be necessary to develop effective techniques to manage the vast amounts of data involved and appropriate analytical techniques to sort through these data and apply formal models to identify situations of interest. The goal of the current phase of the research is to review the available data sources and the techniques that have already been developed by the airlines and FAA, in order to provide the FAA Office of System Safety with a roadmap of what could be done to utilize these data sources to develop safety performance measures and what additional resources this would require. During the course of the research, discussions were held with some 25 people representing a broad range of FAA offices and industry organizations, including the FAA Office of System Safety, Office of Aviation Research, Air Traffic Service, Flight Standards Service, Office of System Capacity and the William J. Hughes Technical Center. Site visits were made to gather information on the FAA Airport Movement Area Safety System, and the NASA Aviation Performance Measuring System and Surface Movement Advisor program. Information was assembled on existing sources of operational data and data analysis tools, including those developed to support Flight Operations Quality Assurance programs. Development of the type of system safety performance measures discussed in this concept paper offers the potential to provide three useful contributions to improving aviation safety. The first is to provide a means to monitor progress toward achieving the FAA goal of reducing the fatal aviation accident rate by 80% by 2007. Since aviation accidents, particularly for commercial airline operations, are relatively rare events, it will take many years of data before any change in the underlying accident rate can be established with any confidence, much less the effect of any particular set of measures to improve the level of safety. Therefore, what are needed are performance measures that are responsive to procedural and technology changes, and measure events that occur much more frequently but reflect situations that those operating the system agree they wish to avoid, as well as conditions that aviation safety experts agree could be indicators of potentially hazardous situations. The second contribution is to provide a means for managers and supervisors to assess the effectiveness of operational changes, to identify locations or procedures that appear to generate a high number of undesired situations, and to tailor the training of flight crews and controllers to help them improve their performance. The third contribution is to provide an early warning indicator of problems that may be emerging from the introduction of new technology, new procedures, and the growth in traffic levels. For this to be achieved, it will be necessary to develop the appropriate performance measures in close collaboration with those involved in operating the system on a day-to-day basis, and to encourage a thoughtful debate on how to measure safety within the NAS and how to improve it. The operational aspects of computing appropriate performance measures are likely to be at least as difficult as deciding what to measure. Fortunately, there already exists considerable experience working with aircraft flight recorder data, and specialized analysis tools have been developed and continue to be developed, by both commercial vendors and government agencies. There is also considerable experience within the FAA and other organizations in working with radar flight track data. Experience in applying these and similar techniques to the development of system safety performance measures will determine what is useful, and whether the effort involved is justified by the results. Therefore it is proposed that a limited number of proof of concept studies should be undertaken as soon as possible to gain experience in developing appropriate analysis tools and techniques, as well as to begin involving the operating community in the process. One such study has already been proposed by researchers at NASA Ames Research Center to explore the application of concepts and techniques developed under the NASA Aviation Performance Measuring System to air traffic control system data. This has been jointly funded by the NASA Aviation Safety Program and the FAA, and is about to commence. The study would utilize the Performance Data Analysis and Reporting System, that is currently under development, to examine routine operational data in order to identify exceedances from normal operations. While the development of a comprehensive approach to measuring system safety performance needs to integrate all available information, including that derived from monitoring aircraft flight operations, as well as the operation of the ATC system, there are immediate opportunities to identify and track safety performance measures using ATC system data. Developing and implementing these measures can not only provide near-term indicators of system performance, but in the longer term can provide a consistent data stream that can be integrated into a more comprehensive framework as the other elements of this framework are implemented. It is recommended that at least two other studies be initiated addressing this aspect of the system, one focusing on terminal airspace operations and the other on airport surface operations. The first study would utilize existing tools, such as those being developed under the NASA Aviation Safety Program, to analyze radar track and system message data for a Terminal Radar Approach Control facility to identify situations that represent a departure from normal operations, including atypical controller intervention to maintain separation, unstabilized approaches, and Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance (TCAS) alerts. The second study would explore how to effectively utilize the available sources of data on aircraft movement on the airport surface to implement safety performance measures, and would develop algorithms for extracting and analyzing data on the aircraft paths on the taxiway and runway system. The scope and level of effort of these studies could be tailored to the available resources, but it is envisaged that each of these studies would last between six months and a year, and would require between one and two person-years of effort.

Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Dedication -- Contents -- List of Figures and Tables -- List of Abbreviations -- About the Authors -- Acknowledgments -- Foreword -- Preface to the First Edition -- Preface to the Second Edition -- Preface to the Third Edition -- Prologue: Quest Airlines -- Chapter 1: Introduction to SMS -- Chapter 2: History and Evolution of Safety -- Chapter 3: Safety Culture -- Chapter 4: Principles of Quality Management -- Chapter 5: Accident Investigation and SMS -- Chapter 6: Hazards -- Chapter 7: Risks -- Chapter 8: Controls -- Chapter 9: Taxonomies -- Chapter 10: Process-Based Safety Risk Management/Safety Assurance -- Chapter 11: Managing the SMS -- Chapter 12: Tools and Analysis Methods -- Chapter 13: SMS Effectiveness -- Chapter 14: Concluding Thoughts on the Future of SMS -- Epilogue: Quest Airlines Story -- Index.

Intro -- FrontMatter -- Preface -- Acknowledgment of Reviewers -- Contents -- Summary -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Current and Future Cybersecurity Landscape for the Federal Aviation Administration -- 3 Managing the Career/Employee Lifecycle for a Diverse Cybersecurity Workforce -- 4 Additional Employee and Organizational Considerations -- 5 Key Challenges and Opportunities -- Appendixes -- Appendix A: Committee Meeting Agendas -- Appendix B: Committee Biosketches.