Suchergebnisse

Both NATO & Turkey are going through considerable changes regarding their place in the world. The former is in the process of defining a New Strategic Concept, whilst undertaking its most demanding military operation to date, in Afghanistan. The latter is redrawing its map of alliances, strategic partnerships & overall foreign policy priorities, in both its neighborhood & among the new international emerging powers. It is under this context of mutual changes that this article proposes to analyze the relationship between NATO & Turkey. Adapted from the source document.

This article focuses on the strategic consequences of the terrorist events of 9/11, which include the new dimension of the transnational terrorism and its feature as a global threat; the end of US's "saintliness"; the increasing importance of the asymmetric conflicts; the changing of the dissuasion concept; the Importance of strategy; the changing in the Middle East balance and the consequences of the Afghanistan war. Adapted from the source document.

The "Global War on Terror" has now become the "Long War." Lessons learned in Afghanistan & Iraq & the evolution of GWOT have led Washington back to multilateral realism. Central Asia & Africa are good examples of the new policies that have developed the Greater Central Asia concept & created AFRICOM. However those adjustments will not change the main priorities of GWOT & of the Grand Strategy that was defined by the present administration. Adapted from the source document.

This interview with Fred Halliday, Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics, covers a wide-ranging series of international issues. Topics surveyed include the prospects for a conciliatory foreign policy in George W. Bush's second term, the prospects for further preemptive action on the part of the US within the context of the prevailing difficulties in Iraq, the expectations for the upcoming elections in Iran, the strong presence of Islamic extremists in Yemen, the threat of civil war in Afghanistan, the nature & motivations of Al Queda, & the growing economic might of China. The balance of the interview is devoted to political conditions in Europe, particularly in regards to the growing presence of radical Islamic groups. R. Young

This paper offers an analysis of the illiberal practices and discourse of the Global War on Terror (GWoT) and demonstrates how the United States of America used the liberal argument as a qualitative metric of its success and failure in the GWoT. I argue that 'the othering' of Salafi Jihadists as well the full military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq were both philosophically rooted in the liberal thinking of Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill, which have traditionally guided US foreign policy. More significantly, these liberal philosophies of history and international relations hold within them the seeds of illiberalism by depicting non-liberal, undemocratic societies/organisations as 'barbaric' – and as such prime candidates for intervention and regime change. Predicated upon this logic, the discourse of the GWoT framed Al Qaeda as a key existential threat to not only the United States but also the 'civilised world' in general and one which required a 'liberal defensive war' in response. It was the successful securitisation of Al Qaeda that essentially enabled the United States to adopt deeply illiberal policies to counter this so-called existential threat by using any means at its disposal.