Suchergebnisse

This dissertation interrogates the way Information and Communication Technologies influence the evolution of higher education institutions in the context of an information society coupled with crisis in African higher education. In addition to analysing how the Internet affects the dynamics of these institutions, the author endeavours to understand its socio-cultural consequences. The thesis addresses a number of key issues: the 'developmentalist configuration' in Senegalese higher education; technology and model transfers; innovation in higher education; reforming an institution in crisis; and appropriating the post-colonial higher education institution. Beyond analysing the approaches to ICTs for Education proposed by the Association of Francophone Universities (AUF) and the African Virtual University (AVU), this research aims to define the role of ICTs, and of the Internet, in the reform of higher education institutions. The approaches advocated by the AUF and AVU necessarily impact tertiary education establishments, particularly now that they have their own ICT strategy and distance learning programs. To what extent do these organisations' examples promote innovation in Senegalese higher education? What characterises this technology/model transfer and how might it impact the course of institutional changes already underway? What are the consequences of externally focused technologies on the dynamics of higher education? These are some of the questions this PhD research aims to answer, in order to assess if higher education finally makes sense in senegalese society. ; Cette thèse s'intéresse à la manière dont les Technologies de l'Information et de la Communication (TIC) contribuent à l'évolution de l'université au Sénégal, en plein avènement de la société des savoirs et dans un contexte de crise de l'université. Elle analyse les effets d'internet sur les dynamiques de l'institution universitaire et, plus largement, vise à en comprendre les implications socio-culturelles. Il y est ainsi fait état de ...

Introduction : explaining growth in the Middle East / M. Hashem Pesaran -- Financial development and economic growth in the MENA countries / Magda Kandil -- Labor markets and economic growth in the MENA region / Marie Ange Veganzones-Varoudakis -- Microeconomics of growth in MENA : the role of households / Djavad Salehi-Isfahani -- Sources of economic growth and technical progress in Egypt : an aggregate perspective / Tarek Abdelfattah Moursi -- Sources of growth and the output gap for the Turkish economy / Cagri Sarikaya -- Economic growth and economic policy in Iran : 1950-2003 / Ahmad R. Jalali-Naini -- The political economy of development policy in Tunisia / Sonia Naccache -- Determinants of growth in the MENA countries / Imed Limam -- Algerias macroeconomic performances from 1962 to 2000 / Moataz Mostafa El-Said -- Explaining growth in an oil-dependent economy : the case of the United Arab Emirates / Annas H. Hamed -- Institutions, household decisions, and economic growth in Egypt / Ragui Assaad -- A reexamination of the political economy of growth in the MENA countries / Hadi Salehi Esfahani. - This book is about the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. This region is generally perceived as having experienced the most disappointing growth performance over the last couple of decades of any region in the world with the possible exception of Sub-Sahara Africa. Despite the regions immense endowment of natural resources, its per capita income is often viewed as having stagnated. At the same time, most economies of the region have been characterized by extremely high volatility, a condition only partly attributable to the fluctuating price of oil. MENA region has not been as comprehensively covered as other regions of the world (i.e., Latin America, East Asia, South Asia and Sub-Sahara Africa). The prominence of the MENA region in the global energy markets and the world political system makes this a necessary read. The topics of interest are wide ranging and diverse, ranging from dictatorships, civil wars, terrorism and water shortages, to more economic problems arising from volatile oil prices, barriers to trade and foreign investment, dominance of public enterprises, and low skill work forces

BACKGROUND: Youth-friendly health services are a key strategy for improving young people's health. This is the first study investigating provision of the Youth Friendly Services programme in South Africa since the national Department of Health took over its management in 2006. In a rural area of South Africa, we aimed to describe the characteristics of the publicly-funded primary healthcare facilities, investigate the proportion of facilities that provided the Youth Friendly Services programme and examine healthcare workers' perceived barriers to and facilitators of the provision of youth-friendly health services. METHODS: Semi-structured interviews were conducted with nurses of all eight publicly-funded primary healthcare facilities in Agincourt sub-district, Mpumalanga Province, South Africa. Thematic analysis of interview transcripts was conducted and data saturation was reached. RESULTS: Participants largely felt that the Youth Friendly Services programme was not implemented in their primary healthcare facilities, with the exception of one clinic. Barriers to provision reported by nurses were: lack of youth-friendly training among staff and lack of a dedicated space for young people. Four of the eight facilities did not appear to uphold the right of young people aged 12 years and older to access healthcare independently. Breaches in young people's confidentiality to parents were reported. CONCLUSIONS: Participants reported that provision of the Youth Friendly Services programme is limited in this sub-district, and below the Department of Health's target that 70% of primary healthcare facilities should provide these services. Whilst a dedicated space for young people is unlikely to be feasible or necessary, all facilities have the potential to be youth-friendly in terms of staff attitudes and actions. Training and on-going support should be provided to facilitate this; the importance of such training is emphasised by staff. More than one member of staff per facility should be trained to allow for staff turnover. As one of a few countrywide, government-run youth-friendly clinic programmes in a low or middle-income country, these results may be of interest to programme managers and policy makers in such settings.

Abstract Background Youth-friendly health services are a key strategy for improving young people's health. This is the first study investigating provision of the Youth Friendly Services programme in South Africa since the national Department of Health took over its management in 2006. In a rural area of South Africa, we aimed to describe the characteristics of the publicly-funded primary healthcare facilities, investigate the proportion of facilities that provided the Youth Friendly Services programme and examine healthcare workers' perceived barriers to and facilitators of the provision of youth-friendly health services. Methods Semi-structured interviews were conducted with nurses of all eight publicly-funded primary healthcare facilities in Agincourt sub-district, Mpumalanga Province, South Africa. Thematic analysis of interview transcripts was conducted and data saturation was reached. Results Participants largely felt that the Youth Friendly Services programme was not implemented in their primary healthcare facilities, with the exception of one clinic. Barriers to provision reported by nurses were: lack of youth-friendly training among staff and lack of a dedicated space for young people. Four of the eight facilities did not appear to uphold the right of young people aged 12 years and older to access healthcare independently. Breaches in young people's confidentiality to parents were reported. Conclusions Participants reported that provision of the Youth Friendly Services programme is limited in this sub-district, and below the Department of Health's target that 70% of primary healthcare facilities should provide these services. Whilst a dedicated space for young people is unlikely to be feasible or necessary, all facilities have the potential to be youth-friendly in terms of staff attitudes and actions. Training and on-going support should be provided to facilitate this; the importance of such training is emphasised by staff. More than one member of staff per facility should be trained to allow for staff turnover. As one of a few countrywide, government-run youth-friendly clinic programmes in a low or middle-income country, these results may be of interest to programme managers and policy makers in such settings.

Background: Youth-friendly health services are a key strategy for improving young people's health. This is the first study investigating provision of the Youth Friendly Services programme in South Africa since the national Department of Health took over its management in 2006. In a rural area of South Africa, we aimed to describe the characteristics of the publicly-funded primary healthcare facilities, investigate the proportion of facilities that provided the Youth Friendly Services programme and examine healthcare workers' perceived barriers to and facilitators of the provision of youth-friendly health services. Methods: Semi-structured interviews were conducted with nurses of all eight publicly-funded primary healthcare facilities in Agincourt sub-district, Mpumalanga Province, South Africa. Thematic analysis of interview transcripts was conducted and data saturation was reached. Results: Participants largely felt that the Youth Friendly Services programme was not implemented in their primary healthcare facilities, with the exception of one clinic. Barriers to provision reported by nurses were: lack of youth-friendly training among staff and lack of a dedicated space for young people. Four of the eight facilities did not appear to uphold the right of young people aged 12 years and older to access healthcare independently. Breaches in young people's confidentiality to parents were reported. Conclusions: Participants reported that provision of the Youth Friendly Services programme is limited in this sub-district, and below the Department of Health's target that 70% of primary healthcare facilities should provide these services. Whilst a dedicated space for young people is unlikely to be feasible or necessary, all facilities have the potential to be youth-friendly in terms of staff attitudes and actions. Training and on-going support should be provided to facilitate this; the importance of such training is emphasised by staff. More than one member of staff per facility should be trained to allow for staff turnover. As one of a few countrywide, government-run youth-friendly clinic programmes in a low or middle-income country, these results may be of interest to programme managers and policy makers in such settings.

This Discussion Paper is based on a theoretical exploration of state reconstruction and the prospects for peacebuilding in post-conflict West African countries based on critical reflections on the political thought of Claude Ake, one of Nigeria's foremost political thinkers. Its point of departure is the refutation of the view that the state project in Africa is 'hopeless' or at a dead-end. It therefore revisits the debate on the viability of the state project in the continent, particularly as it relates to those West African states emerging from or affected by violent conflict. While acknowledging the shortcomings of the state-formation project in some post conflict West African countries, the author argues that the state remains a key institutional and social actor that needs to be understood more in terms of its historical moorings, political economy and marginal position in the international order. Drawing on Ake's postulations about the limited autonomy of the state in Africa and its links to political violence and conflict, the author critiques both the hegemonic discourses on the nature of the state in Africa and those relating to post-conflict peacebuilding in the continent. The analysis of the latter focuses on the epistemological groundings of mainstream peacebuilding discourses, and posits that there is no guarantee that such imported models ensure sustainable peace in West Africa. Thus, the paper makes a compelling case for reinventing the state in West Africa based on autochthonous democratic transformation in favour of ordinary people. In this regard, it argues for an endogenous transformation of the state in Africa in ways that can strongly root it in the people as a fundamental step towards sustainable and locally owned participatory peacebuilding. It thereby opens up a new perspective on state reconstruction as a step towards ending violent conflict in the sub-region.

Colonialism destroyed Africa's long-standing intra-African trade. Hence, at independence there was a move for regional integration to diversify Africa's economy. Nigeria had been at the driving seat of Africa's regional integration. In West Africa, Nigeria pioneered the formation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975. Though Africa has 21.2% of the global landmass and 13.7% of world population, its share of global economic activities is a meagre 2.6%. Its intratrade is 12%, paralleled to an average of 53.5% in other regions of the world. However, Nigeria over time has engaged in anti-trade policies like border closure, the latest being on 20 August 2019, three months after signing the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA). This has caused ripples within Nigeria, West Africa and Africa at large. This study interrogates Nigeria's constant border closures, with questions on whether it is in Nigeria's national interest and if its objective were achieved? The study uses the Regional Leader Role framework of analysis, a sub-set of National Role theory (NRC). The study is a qualitative and non-experimental study and is based on the single case ex-post-facto (after-the-fact) design. Documentary method of data collection is used. The study concludes that Nigeria with over 1,499 illegal land routes into the country, cannot even 'close' its border, hence border closure is a lose-lose policy for Nigeria and recommends collaborative actions with her neighbours, the strengthening of border and ports infrastructures as the way forward.

The spatial distribution of economic activity is unevenly distributed across regions within countries. Regional development policies and the incidence of crime rates, an important aspect of the quality of the local business environment, may both impact spatial disparities in economic activity. This thesis examines the relationship between regional development policy, the quality of local business environment, that is, security or lack thereof, captured by crime incidence, and regional economic outcomes. The study argues that regional development policy incentives such as labour and tax regulations influence the local cost of doing business and hence are an important part of local business environment. In addition, the incidence of violent crime rates such as robbery and murder are an important dimension of the local business environment. Regional development policies and variations in the quality of the local business environment may drive regional inequality within a country through its effects on factors related to economic activity such as firm entry and labour migration. South Africa provides a good opportunity to study the impact of regional policies and local business environment, given the high levels of spatial inequality due to historical factors and the country had the first experience of regional development polices in Sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, the country is characterised by high rates of crime incidence. The first analytical chapter of the thesis examines the relationship between regional development policy incentives and regional disparity in economic activity. Chapters two and three, then examines the impact of crime incidence on various measures of economic activity, captured by firm entry and migration of labour, particularly skilled labour. These three chapters are linked by the focus on the determinants of the spatial distribution of economic activity across local municipalities in South Africa. The first main chapter uses a new dataset on business registrations that spans from 1800 to 2011, to examine the relationship between the creation of Regional Industrial Development Programme zones in 1982 and their removal in 1991, and the spatial distribution of firm entry in South Africa. The creation of these zones marks the introduction of Sub-Saharan Africa's first Special Economic Zones. However, little is known about the effects of such programs. Since incentives in these policies are expected to reduce the costs of registering and doing business to attract industries in targeted regions and create long lasting effects that make the regions economically sustainable, it is expected that the creation of these zones will increase firm entry and the impacts will persist after the removal of policy incentives. Using merged data on the location of Regional Industrial Development Programme zones and the business registration database, empirical results show that the creation of RIDP zones was positively associated with firm entry when the policy incentives were still present, and after the removal of policy incentives, firm entry decreased. However, these results show that in the manufacturing and services sector, the reduction of entry after the removal of RIDP zones did not completely offset the positive effect of the policy on entry. This finding is consistent with the presence of agglomeration economies in the manufacturing sector. Overall, results from this chapter suggests that regional policy incentives were important in encouraging private sector development in marginalised regions of the country, although the policy did not create long-run economic benefits. The second main chapter empirically examines the impact of an important aspect of the local business environment that affect regional economic incentives, that is, crime rates, on entry of firms across local municipalities in South Africa. South Africa's crime rates are high by international standards and surprisingly, little is known about how crime rates affect business activity in the country. Since crime rates increase the fixed costs of entry and the costs of doing business, it is expected that high crime rates in a region will lead to fewer firms entering the market, because only more productive firms will have expected profits high enough to justify paying the entry costs. This chapter merged crime data with the business registration database and found out that crime rates, particularly, property crimes have a deterring effect on firm entry and the effect is large for firms in the wholesale and retail sector. These results are robust to using rainfall shocks as an instrumental variable for crime rates, to control for the fact that crime might be a consequence not a cause of firm activity. The third main chapter empirically examines whether crime rates affect another aspect closely related to firm performance, that is, the availability of labour through migration across local municipalities in South Africa. Since high crime rates increases the costs of living in a region and this will reduce net income and utility associated with living in that region, it is expected that high crime rates will reduce in-migration. The chapter merged crime data used in the previous chapter with migration data created from 2011 population census and showed that contact crime rates reduce migration of labour into municipalities. These results are also robust to using rainfall shocks as an instrumental variable for crime rates, to control for reverse causality. Empirical results also show that the effects of contact crime differ by population group and skill level, with the effects stronger for male, unskilled and black African migrants. Since unskilled and African migrants will have lower expected wages to cover the costs of crime because of lack of high paying work opportunities and labour market discrimination. In addition, it is expected that the effect of crime is high for these population groups compared to skilled and white migrants, who have the income and the mechanisms to mitigate the risks of crime, like picking better neighbourhoods to live in. Estimated results by gender also reveal that the effect of contact crimes is high for male migrants as compared to female migrants suggesting that increases in contact crimes reduces in-migration of male individuals by a higher magnitude as compared to females. This result is consistent with the view that male African workers may be more mobile than females, and most of these migrants are unskilled. Important policy messages from these findings are that any industrial development strategy and economic policy in the country that seeks to create jobs in marginalised municipalities or improve integration of local labour markets should also consider other measures, besides targeting disadvantaged regions with policy incentives. This thesis provides empirical evidence that crime prevention measures are likely to be one of the important tools for industrial policy. This implies that the government should put measures that improve policing and security. In addition, the private sector and international development organisations should continue to engage the government to put in programs and projects that reduce crime rates in the country. These may include, providing support for research that examines the main causes of crime rates in South Africa.

The topic of middle class in Africa though broadly discussed, still faces significant gaps in terms of empirical data, especially from sub-Saharan countries. It has been well-established that measures such as income and consumption power are insufficient to assess middle classness. Everyday habits and how these relate to status and prestige have been increasingly used in a number of disciplines as a better gauge. Specific political and historical contexts have also been considered key to better understand how people navigate classes. This study aims to explore the concept of middle class in Mozambique, by trying to answer three main questions: 'How do women entrepreneurs in Maputo perceive middle classness?'; 'What are the views of today's women entrepreneurs in Maputo about changing class ambitions and expressions?'; and 'How can (female) entrepreneurship impact on social mobility?'. Here, entrepreneurship is specifically regarded as formal entrepreneurship carried out by women in Maputo, Mozambique. To answer these questions, life story interviews were conducted with women entrepreneurs from Maputo and complemented by field observations and a review of relevant literature. The findings suggest that Maputo middle class, as perceived by women entrepreneurs, is moving away from traditional privileged and state dependent elites towards a more independent group of society, characterised by their ambitions of self-fulfilment and the quest of a better life. Furthermore, entrepreneurship is seen as a desirable option for social upward mobility, but its success is highly dependent on factors such as socioeconomic backgrounds and the individual character. ; O tema da classe média em África, embora amplamente debatido, apresenta ainda lacunas empíricas significativas, especialmente nos países da África Subsaariana. O rendimento e o poder de consumo foram já considerados insuficientes para determinar a classe média, tendo os hábitos quotidianos e a sua relação com estatuto e prestígio sido gradualmente utilizados em várias disciplinas como um melhor indicador. As conjunturas políticas e históricas também se revelaram fundamentais para uma melhor compreensão da mobilidade entre classes. O presente estudo visa explorar o conceito de classe média em Moçambique, procurando responder a três perguntas centrais: "Quais as perceções das mulheres empreendedoras em Maputo relativamente à classe média?"; "Qual a visão das mulheres empreendedoras de hoje, em Maputo, sobre as mudanças nas ambições e expressões de classe?"; e "De que forma o empreendedorismo (feminino) pode ter impacto na mobilidade social?". Aqui, considera-se especificamente o empreendedorismo formal exercido por mulheres em Maputo, Moçambique. Para responder a estas questões, foram realizadas entrevistas de história de vida com mulheres empreendedoras de Maputo, complementadas por observações de campo e uma revisão da literatura relevante. As conclusões sugerem que a classe média de Maputo, segundo a perceção das interlocutoras, está a afastar-se das tradicionais elites privilegiadas e dependentes do Estado e a transformar-se num grupo mais independente, caracterizado pelas suas ambições de autorrealização e pela luta por uma vida melhor. Além disso, o empreendedorismo é visto como uma boa opção para a mobilidade social ascendente, porém o sucesso depende grandemente de fatores como os contextos socioeconómicos e o carácter individual.

Maize lethal necrosis is a disease of maize caused by the combination of maize chlorotic mottle virus (mcmv) and any of the viruses belonging to the potyviridae family. Maize lethal necrosis was first identified on the african continent in kenya in 2012 (wangai et al. 2012), and subsequently in rwanda (adams et al. 2014), and the democratic republic of congo (lukanda et al. 2014). In africa, maize lethal necrosis symptoms have been associated with mcmv and sugarcane mosaic virus (scmv). In july 2014, maize plants exhibiting severe yellowing and chlorotic mottle symptoms were observed in the upper awash valley of ethiopia. From a survey of 12 farms in the central rift valley, 126 samples were collected from maize (100 samples) and other grass species (26 samples, including johnsongrass, couch grass, unidentified grass sp., Digitaria sp., sedge, sorghum, setaria spp., and sugarcane), and either with symptoms or without virus symptoms. Samples were analyzed for the presence of scmv and mcmv using enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (elisa) with polyclonal antibodies produced against the east african strains of mcmv and scmv. Of the nonmaize samples, mcmv was detected in johnsongrass, digitaria sp., sedge, setaria sp., sugarcane, and an unidentified grass species, whereas scmv was detected only in setaria sp. To confirm elisa results, greenhouse-grown maize plants were mechanically inoculated with sap extracted from eight mcmv-positive maize samples. Chlorotic mottle symptoms were observed, and the presence of mcmv confirmed by elisa. Maize plants inoculated with sap extracted from mcmv-positive digitaria sp. developed typical mcmv symptoms, and the presence of mcmv confirmed by elisa. Plants inoculated with sap extracted from scmv-positive samples developed mild to severe mosaic symptoms and tested positive for scmv. None of the plants inoculated with sap extracted from johnsongrass, sedge, or sugarcane samples tested positive for mcmv. To establish the genetic affinity of the ethiopian strains to those previously described in kenya and rwanda, whole virus genomes were sequenced from six samples using illuminamiseq (2 samples) and illuminahiseq (4 samples) as described by adams et al. (2014). All the six samples contained mcmv and three samples had scmv. Phylogenetic tree constructed based on the complete genomes of mcmv showed that the isolates found in ethiopia were highly similar (>99% identity) to those found previously in east africa (adams et al. 2013, 2014). In contrast, phylogenetic tree constructed using coat proteins of the sequenced scmv isolates from ethiopia were found to be similar to each other and to those found in rwanda (adams et al. 2014) with 96% identity, but relatively distant from those originally found in kenya (adams et al. 2013). To our knowledge, this is the first report of mcmv and maize lethal necrosis on maize in ethiopia, as well as mcmv in some alternate poaeceae family hosts. The results illustrate the need for further studies to identify alternate hosts for maize lethal necrosis-causing viruses, investigate the role of seed transmission of scmv and mcmv, create awareness among the stakeholders about maize lethal necrosis, and strengthen diagnostic and surveillance capacity in sub-saharan africa to minimize further spread of the disease.

During the last two decades, women politicians have emerged as female democratisation agents, i.e. change agents who actively lobby, struggle and organize for a pro-democracy regime change and a subsequent functioning democratic system, often with a (or the only) mass following – whose personal sacrifices, political contributions and legacies arelargely overlooked or contested in related democratisation and gender studies. This article aims to critically assess in how far democratisation and gender studies have systematically studied and analysed the contributions towards democratisation and the consolidation of democracy made by women as head of state or government. It is argued, that there is a strong research desideratum with regard to this phenomenon despite statistical evidence in Latin America, Europe, sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. An overview of different case studies of women heads of state and government in Southern and Eastern Europe, Latin America, South and Southeast Asia is presented, outlining the career paths, political agenda and democratisation record of the respective female democratisation agents. Nevertheless, systematic and substantial research needs to be conducted to allow a profound and appropriate assessment of the political performance and legacies of female democratisation agents at the top echelons of political power. These studies can contribute to a better understanding of the nexus of gender and democratisation, gender and politics as well as to enlarge the explanatory strength of democratisation theories in general.Durante las dos últimas décadas, las mujeres políticas han emergido como agentes femeninos de democratización, es decir agentes de cambio como grupos de presión activos, que luchan y se organizan en pro de un cambio hacia el régimen democrático y al subsiguiente funcionamiento del sistema, a menudo con el seguimiento de las masas (incluso el único) – quienes con sus sacrificios personales, contribuciones políticas y sus legados, son enormemente pasadas por alto o refutadas en cuanto a democratización y estudios de género se refiere. Este artículo intenta evaluar de forma crítica hasta dónde los estudios de género han estudiado y analizado las contribuciones para con la democratización y la consolidación de la democracia llevada a cabo por mujeres como cabezas de Estado o de gobierno. Se sostiene que hay un fuerte desideratum respecto a América Latina, Europa, África Subsahariana y Asia. Una mirada a los diferentes estudios de casos de mujeres jefas de Estado y de gobierno en América Latina, Europa, África Subsahariana, y Sur y Sudeste de Asia se presentan como un esbozo del camino de la carrera, la agenda política y la relación de democratización de los respectivos agentes femeninos de la democratización. Sin embargo, una investigación sistemática y sustancial necesita ser realizada para permitir una profunda y apropiada valoración del cambio político y legado de los agentes femeninos de democratización en el último escalón del poder político. Estos estudios pueden contribuir a un mejor entendimiento entre los nexos de género y democratización, género y política mejor así como también a extender la solidez explicativa de las teorías democráticas en general.

Based on several field studies since 2004, our research outlines the reversibility of the migratory phenomenon. A study of recent migration in Mauritania should take into account the different phases and its transformations over time. Three entangled temporalities can be underlined: long standing immigration in Mauritania, the transit period (2004- 2008) and the present-day post-transit situation. Historically, in this area, migratory flows are tied to job offers. Since its independence in 1960, Mauritania has offered interesting opportunities in the fishing, trading and mining sectors for the West African workforce. Mauritanian people admit readily "foreigners have built the country." In 2001, the discovery of oil reinforced this historical pull effect. Yet, in 2005 and 2006, the media focused overwhelmingly on the transit phenomenon and emphasized the "illegal flows" towards Europe (Haas 2007). They presented all sub-Saharan people in Nouadhibou as "potential illegal migrants," even before they tried to cross or thought of doing so. Moreover, they ignored the fact that regional migrations played a central role in the national economy and that most of the sub-Saharan people had been living and working there for a long time. Thirdly, as the European Union's policies are tougher than ever, migrants are getting stuck in Nouadhibou and Nouakchott (the capital city). In these cities, they live with working immigrants who arrived a long time ago. Obviously, the "transit phenomenon," that has drawn media attention, is the shortest of the three migratory temporalities (before, during and after the transit). As migrants get stuck in Mauritanian cities, it is currently interesting to pay attention to the spatial and social changes engendered by the arrival of migrants and their long-term settlement, especially in urban contexts. Thus, our chapter also sheds light on the social impacts of this "post-transit situation." We start the chapter by recalling the transit and post-transit phases. Secondly, we will describe and analyse migrants' everyday life in Nouadhibou and Nouakchott and their interactions with local society, highlighting how spaces and social relations are divided. Thirdly, we will stress the fact that Mauritanian migratory policies lead to the criminalisation of migrants and compound their difficulties. This new "post-transit" stage gives rise to a new geopolitical order characterized by a spatial reversal (with the definition of bad places where are living migrants), increasing controls and fuels xenophobic comments from those who define themselves as "autochthons" towards the others they consider as "foreigners". Therefore, migration is an important issue for a country characterized by identity conflicts between Arab Africans (the Moors) and black Africans (Halpulaar, Wolof, Soninke).

Based on several field studies since 2004, our research outlines the reversibility of the migratory phenomenon. A study of recent migration in Mauritania should take into account the different phases and its transformations over time. Three entangled temporalities can be underlined: long standing immigration in Mauritania, the transit period (2004- 2008) and the present-day post-transit situation. Historically, in this area, migratory flows are tied to job offers. Since its independence in 1960, Mauritania has offered interesting opportunities in the fishing, trading and mining sectors for the West African workforce. Mauritanian people admit readily "foreigners have built the country." In 2001, the discovery of oil reinforced this historical pull effect. Yet, in 2005 and 2006, the media focused overwhelmingly on the transit phenomenon and emphasized the "illegal flows" towards Europe (Haas 2007). They presented all sub-Saharan people in Nouadhibou as "potential illegal migrants," even before they tried to cross or thought of doing so. Moreover, they ignored the fact that regional migrations played a central role in the national economy and that most of the sub-Saharan people had been living and working there for a long time. Thirdly, as the European Union's policies are tougher than ever, migrants are getting stuck in Nouadhibou and Nouakchott (the capital city). In these cities, they live with working immigrants who arrived a long time ago. Obviously, the "transit phenomenon," that has drawn media attention, is the shortest of the three migratory temporalities (before, during and after the transit). As migrants get stuck in Mauritanian cities, it is currently interesting to pay attention to the spatial and social changes engendered by the arrival of migrants and their long-term settlement, especially in urban contexts. Thus, our chapter also sheds light on the social impacts of this "post-transit situation." We start the chapter by recalling the transit and post-transit phases. Secondly, we will describe and analyse migrants' everyday life in Nouadhibou and Nouakchott and their interactions with local society, highlighting how spaces and social relations are divided. Thirdly, we will stress the fact that Mauritanian migratory policies lead to the criminalisation of migrants and compound their difficulties. This new "post-transit" stage gives rise to a new geopolitical order characterized by a spatial reversal (with the definition of bad places where are living migrants), increasing controls and fuels xenophobic comments from those who define themselves as "autochthons" towards the others they consider as "foreigners". Therefore, migration is an important issue for a country characterized by identity conflicts between Arab Africans (the Moors) and black Africans (Halpulaar, Wolof, Soninke).

Based on several field studies since 2004, our research outlines the reversibility of the migratory phenomenon. A study of recent migration in Mauritania should take into account the different phases and its transformations over time. Three entangled temporalities can be underlined: long standing immigration in Mauritania, the transit period (2004- 2008) and the present-day post-transit situation. Historically, in this area, migratory flows are tied to job offers. Since its independence in 1960, Mauritania has offered interesting opportunities in the fishing, trading and mining sectors for the West African workforce. Mauritanian people admit readily "foreigners have built the country." In 2001, the discovery of oil reinforced this historical pull effect. Yet, in 2005 and 2006, the media focused overwhelmingly on the transit phenomenon and emphasized the "illegal flows" towards Europe (Haas 2007). They presented all sub-Saharan people in Nouadhibou as "potential illegal migrants," even before they tried to cross or thought of doing so. Moreover, they ignored the fact that regional migrations played a central role in the national economy and that most of the sub-Saharan people had been living and working there for a long time. Thirdly, as the European Union's policies are tougher than ever, migrants are getting stuck in Nouadhibou and Nouakchott (the capital city). In these cities, they live with working immigrants who arrived a long time ago. Obviously, the "transit phenomenon," that has drawn media attention, is the shortest of the three migratory temporalities (before, during and after the transit). As migrants get stuck in Mauritanian cities, it is currently interesting to pay attention to the spatial and social changes engendered by the arrival of migrants and their long-term settlement, especially in urban contexts. Thus, our chapter also sheds light on the social impacts of this "post-transit situation." We start the chapter by recalling the transit and post-transit phases. Secondly, we will describe and analyse migrants' everyday life in Nouadhibou and Nouakchott and their interactions with local society, highlighting how spaces and social relations are divided. Thirdly, we will stress the fact that Mauritanian migratory policies lead to the criminalisation of migrants and compound their difficulties. This new "post-transit" stage gives rise to a new geopolitical order characterized by a spatial reversal (with the definition of bad places where are living migrants), increasing controls and fuels xenophobic comments from those who define themselves as "autochthons" towards the others they consider as "foreigners". Therefore, migration is an important issue for a country characterized by identity conflicts between Arab Africans (the Moors) and black Africans (Halpulaar, Wolof, Soninke).

Based on several field studies since 2004, our research outlines the reversibility of the migratory phenomenon. A study of recent migration in Mauritania should take into account the different phases and its transformations over time. Three entangled temporalities can be underlined: long standing immigration in Mauritania, the transit period (2004- 2008) and the present-day post-transit situation. Historically, in this area, migratory flows are tied to job offers. Since its independence in 1960, Mauritania has offered interesting opportunities in the fishing, trading and mining sectors for the West African workforce. Mauritanian people admit readily "foreigners have built the country." In 2001, the discovery of oil reinforced this historical pull effect. Yet, in 2005 and 2006, the media focused overwhelmingly on the transit phenomenon and emphasized the "illegal flows" towards Europe (Haas 2007). They presented all sub-Saharan people in Nouadhibou as "potential illegal migrants," even before they tried to cross or thought of doing so. Moreover, they ignored the fact that regional migrations played a central role in the national economy and that most of the sub-Saharan people had been living and working there for a long time. Thirdly, as the European Union's policies are tougher than ever, migrants are getting stuck in Nouadhibou and Nouakchott (the capital city). In these cities, they live with working immigrants who arrived a long time ago. Obviously, the "transit phenomenon," that has drawn media attention, is the shortest of the three migratory temporalities (before, during and after the transit). As migrants get stuck in Mauritanian cities, it is currently interesting to pay attention to the spatial and social changes engendered by the arrival of migrants and their long-term settlement, especially in urban contexts. Thus, our chapter also sheds light on the social impacts of this "post-transit situation." We start the chapter by recalling the transit and post-transit phases. Secondly, we will describe and analyse migrants' everyday life in Nouadhibou and Nouakchott and their interactions with local society, highlighting how spaces and social relations are divided. Thirdly, we will stress the fact that Mauritanian migratory policies lead to the criminalisation of migrants and compound their difficulties. This new "post-transit" stage gives rise to a new geopolitical order characterized by a spatial reversal (with the definition of bad places where are living migrants), increasing controls and fuels xenophobic comments from those who define themselves as "autochthons" towards the others they consider as "foreigners". Therefore, migration is an important issue for a country characterized by identity conflicts between Arab Africans (the Moors) and black Africans (Halpulaar, Wolof, Soninke).