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Den här artikeln identifierar och analyserar tre olika reaktioner, i artikeln benämnda »strategisk respons», på amerikansk strategisk återhållsamhet sedan 2017 och mot bakgrund av Brexit: »Liberal övervintring», »Ett starkare Europa» och »En bredare koalition». Analysen kopplar strategisk respons, strategiskt aktörskap och strategisk autonomi och leder till två slutsatser: För det första att Brexit snararare har gynnat än hindrat det europeiska säkerhets- och försvarssamarbetet, såväl inom ramen för EU som mellan EU och stater som står utanför EU, däribland Storbritannien. För det andra att den framväxande säkerhetsordningen innebär nya och annorlunda förutsättningar för det säkerhets- och försvarspolitiska samarbetet i Europa, inte minst i Norden.
Abstract in English:American Strategic Restraint and European Strategic Response: Three Forms of Strategic Response Post-BrexitThis paper describes and analyses three types of European strategic response since the year 2017 by European governments and the EU in response to US strategic restraint and conditioned by Brexit. The three types of response we label "liberal wintering", "a stronger Europe" and "a broader coalition". The paper links strategic response to strategic agency and strategic autonomy leading on to two main conclusions: First, that Brexit has done more to promote than to restrain the development of European common security and defence, both within the EU and when involving nations outside of the EU, such as the UK. Second, that the new broader European security and defence structures open the door to new forms of cooperation, for example between the Nordic countries.

Det som ofte har manglet i forskningslitteraturen om miljø- og klimautfordringer i Arktis, er undersøkelser av hva som betinger innflytelsen av vitenskapelig kunnskap i reguleringer av relevans for Arktis. I denne artikkelen er målet å analysere forholdet mellom arktisk kunnskapsproduksjon (inkludert policy anbefalinger) og norsk forvaltning (herunder Miljødirektoratet og Klima- og miljødepartementet). I artikkelen ser vi nærmere på tre av arbeidsgruppene i Arktisk råd. 1) Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), 2) Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) og 3) Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME). Fokus er på kunnskapsstatus, grad av økonomisk og politisk kontrovers innenfor de gitte feltene, betydningen av offentlig og politisk oppmerksomhet og forvaltningsdesign.
Abstract in English:The Arctic Council Between Science, Managment and PolicyWhat has often been lacking in the scholarly literature on environmental and climatic changes in the Arctic are analyses addressing what determines the influence of scientific knowledge on regulations of relevance to the Arctic. The purpose of this article is to analyse the relationship between the production and systematisation of knowledge (including policy recommendations arising from this work) on Arctic issues and the Norwegian management system (overseen by, among other bodies, the Norwegian Environment Agency and Ministry of Climate and Environment). The article focuses on three of the Arctic Council's working groups. 1) Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP); 2) Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF); and 3) Protection of Arctic Marine Environment (PAME). The focus is on state of knowledge, degree of political and economic controversy in the issue area, the importance of the matter in public opinion and among policy makers, and management design.

Tre tiår etter det ble etablert, står Barentssamarbeidet overfor en politisk kontekst preget av økende spenning og et Russland i krig. Ved starten i 1993 signaliserte det en ny politisk linje i Arktis, Nordområdene og norsk Russland-politikk. I et område som utgjorde Vestens nordligste grense mot Sovjetunionen under den kalde krigen og der militariseringen var sterk, skisserte Norge sammen med Finland, Sverige og Russland et felles utenrikspolitisk engasjement der fred og stabilitet stod øverst på agendaen. Utviklingen bidro til nye internasjonale roller og aktiviteter for regionale og lokale aktører. I denne artikkelen har vi deres erfaringer i fokus når vi undersøker legitimeringspraksiser. Vi spør: Hvordan har legitimeringen av Barentssamarbeidet blitt påvirket av endringer i det sikkerhetspolitiske klimaet? Ved å fremheve lokale aktører i Barentssamarbeidet tar vi et steg inn i et utenrikspolitisk felt preget av politiske spenninger, ulike argumenter og et mangfold av meninger. Vi har en diskursanalytisk og praksisorientert tilnærming når vi identifiserer tre legitimeringsdiskurser: en geopolitisk oppdatert legitimering, en motvekt til dominerende representasjon av Russland, og en representasjon av aktøregenskapene til Barentssamarbeidet i lys av framtidig norsk-russiske relasjoner.
Abstract in EnglishThe Barents Cooperation Amid Geopolitical Tensions: A Discourse Analysis of Norwegian ExperiencesBack in 1993 the formalization of the Barents-cooperation signaled a new political approach in the Arctic region, High North, and Norwegian Russia-policy. In the area where militarization was strong and which formed the Wests northernmost border with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, Norway, together with Finland, Sweden and Russia, outlined a joint foreign policy engagement where peace and stability were at the top of the agenda. Today, almost 30 years later, the Barents-cooperation is surrounded by growing geopolitical tension – especially highlighted in the period after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. In this article we try to answer the question: What is the Barents-cooperation in the context of today's international political situation? By emphasizing the voices of the actors in the cooperation, as this article does, we take a step into a field characterized by political tensions, by arguments, and a diversity of opinions within the Norwegian foreign policy field. Based on interviews with actors from the Barents-cooperation, the article presents three different discourses: a geopolitically updated legitimization; a counterweight to the dominant representation of Russia; and a representation of the agency of the Barents-cooperation in light of future Norwegian-Russian relations.

Norge har samarbeidet tett med EU om utenriks-, sikkerhets- og forsvarspolitikk siden slutten av 1990-tallet. Det er naturlig å se på dette samarbeidet som supplement til – eller spin-off av – EØS-avtalen. Når dette feltet nå er i endring med nye ambisiøse initiativer, samt at EUs forhold til tredjeland generelt vil revurderes som følge av brexit, vil dette få konsekvenser for Norges tilknytning til EU på dette området. Blant annet ser vi antydninger til det vi her kaller en mulig «EØS-ifisering» av dette feltet. Fokusbidraget analyserer tre utviklingstrekk og mulige konsekvenser av disse for Norge. Det første omhandler EUs beslutninger om det som skjer innenfor EU, nemlig PESCO og beslutningen om å styrke det felles europeiske forsvarsmarkedet. Det andre omhandler initiativer utenfor EU, som det franske europeiske intervensjonsinitiativet (EI2), som må ses i sammenheng med det første. Det tredje er brexit, som etter planen skal ta Storbritannia inn i «tredjelandsklubben», der Norge er en sentral aktør i dag. Hvilke konsekvenser får de nye initiativene tatt innenfor og utenfor EU, for Norge, og hva gjør brexit med Norges handlingsrom som utenriks-, sikkerhets- og forsvarspolitisk samarbeidspartner med EU?
Abstract in English:Spin-off of the EEA? Norway and the European Foreign, Security and Defense PolicyNorway has cooperated closely with the EU on foreign, security and defense policy since the late 1990s. It seems fitting to look at this cooperation as a supplement to – or spin-off of – the EEA agreement. As this field is now changing, with new ambitious initiatives, and that the EU's relations with third countries will generally be reassessed as a result of Brexit, this will have consequences for Norway's relations with the EU in this area. Among other things, we see trends towards what we label a possible "EEA-isation" of this field. This focus article analyses three developments and potential consequences for Norway. The first concerns EU decisions on what is happening within the EU, namely PESCO and the decision to strengthen the common European defense market. The second concerns initiatives outside of the EU, such as the French European Intervention Initiative (EI2), which must be seen in relation to the first. The third is Brexit, which is an attempt to take the UK into the "third country club" where Norway so far has been the key player. What are the consequences of the new initiatives taken within and outside the EU for Norway, and what does Brexit do to Norway's agency as a partner to the EU in the area of foreign, security and defense policy?

Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "capturing", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization-focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they collaborate in peace and friendliness. So far, the IR liberalism discourse has set the trend of the Russian policy carried out in relation to the Arctic. Thus, it has primarily been the Russian Foreign Ministry and, above all, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov that have drawn the overall lines of the Arctic policy, well aided by the Transport Ministry and the Energy Ministry. On the other side are the Russian national Security Council led by Nikolai Patrushev and the Russian Defence Ministry headed by Sergey Shoygu, which both have embedded their visions of Russia and the Arctic in the IR realism/geopolitical discourse. Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, does the same. Nevertheless, he has primarily chosen to let the Foreign Ministry set the line for the Arctic policy carried out, presumably out of a pragmatic acknowledgement of the means that have, so far, served the Russian interests best. Moreover, it is worth noting that both wings, even though they can disagree about the means, in fact are more or less in agreement about the goal of Russia's Arctic policy: namely, to utilize the expected wealth of oil and natural gas resources in the underground to ensure the continuation of the restoration of Russia's position as a Great Power when the capacity of the energy fields in Siberia slowly diminishes – which the Russian Energy Ministry expects to happen sometime between 2015 and 2030. In addition to that, Russia sees – as the polar ice slowly melts – great potential for opening an ice-free northern sea route between Europe and Asia across the Russian Arctic, with the hope that the international shipping industry can see the common sense of saving up to nearly 4,000 nautical miles on a voyage from Ulsan, Korea, to Rotterdam, Holland, so Russia can earn money by servicing the ships and issuing permissions for passage through what Russia regards as Russian territorial water. The question is whether Russia will be able to realize its ambitious goals. First, the Russian state energy companies Gazprom and Rosneft lack the technology, know-how and experience to extract oil and gas under the exceedingly difficult environment in the Arctic, where the most significant deposits are believed to be in very deep water in areas that are very difficult to access due to bad weather conditions. The Western sanctions mean that the Russian energy companies cannot, as planned, obtain this technology and know-how via the already entered-into partnerships with Western energy companies. The sanctions limit loan opportunities in Western banks, which hit the profitability of the most cost-heavy projects in the Arctic. However, what hits hardest are the low oil prices – at present 50 dollars per barrel (Brent). According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the fields in the Arctic are not profitable as long as the oil price is under 120 dollars per barrel. Whether Russia chooses to suspend the projects until the energy prices rise again – and until it has again entered into partnerships that can deliver the desired technology and know-how – or whether the Russian state will continuously pump money into the projects is uncertain. The hard-pressed Russian economy, with the prospects of recession, increasing inflation, increasing flight of capital, rising interest rates and a continuously low oil price, provides a market economic incentive for suspending the projects until further notice. Whether the Kremlin will think in a market economic way or a long-term strategic way is uncertain – but, historically, there has been a penchant for the latter. One of the Kremlin's hopes is that Chinese-Russian cooperation can take over where the Western-Russian cooperation has shut down. Russia has long wanted to diversify its energy markets to reduce its dependence on sales to Europe. At the same time, those in the Kremlin have had a deeply-rooted fear of ending up as a "resource appendix" to the onrushing Chinese economy, which so far has been a strong contributing reason for keeping the Russian-Chinese overtures in check. The question now is whether the Western sanctions can be the catalyst that can make Russia overcome this fear and thus, in the long term, support the efforts to enter into a real, strategic partnership with China. ; Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, Russia have an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "exploring", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization- focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they cooperate peacefully.