Suchergebnisse

The question is examined of what personal income distribution will be brought about by the institutions of a political democracy, assuming these institutions have the power to determine this. It has been assumed that an egalitarian income distribution would result. The ideas of Hans van den Doel (Democracy and Welfare Economics, Cambridge, 1979) offer an alternative model. The majority of individuals would not seek radical leveling down of incomes for several reasons: concern for economic growth & employment, & the hope of the poor to become rich. Also, if a majority sought radical leveling down, & the measures were not rigorously enforced, a Prisoner's Dilemma would result for each individual; but if they were rigorously enforced, a situation of collective intransitivity would emerge, making the decision subject to cycling. Resolution of this problem would likely leave median income voters in a strong position that they could use to benefit themselves at the expense of the poor. These findings are consistent with the finding of R. W. Jackman (Politics and Social Equality: A Comparative Analysis, New York, 1975) that political equality does not play an important role in increasing equality of material rewards. 4 Tables, 5 Figures. Modified HA.

Women; Emancipation - De serie 'Voorstudies en achtergronden' omvat werkstukken die in het kader van de werkzaamheden van de WRR tot stand zijn gekomen en naar zijn oordeel van zodanige kwaliteit en betekenis zijn, dat publicatie gewenst is. De verantwoordelijkheid voor de inhoud en de ingenomen standpunten berust bij de auteurs.