Suchergebnisse

The official atheism of Soviet times prevented any abuse of religion for political reasons; perestroika opened the gates; and as soon as the Soviet Union fell apart, its neighbors, Turkey among them, had the opportunity to put pressure on the post-Soviet expanse. The Turkish political community, which promptly recognized the Soviet Union's disintegration as a chance to establish Turkey's domination in neighboring post-Soviet regions, was euphoric. "The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new Turkic-Muslim republics opened up a chain of possibilities for Turkey to play an important role in the Caucasus and in Central Asia." The religious factor became as important as political, economic, and other factors. Turkish-Georgian relations, which have demonstrated a lot of dynamism in the post-Soviet period (approximately since the mid-1990s when Georgia froze its ethnopolitical conflicts, stabilized its domestic political expanse to a certain extent, and became involved in large-scale energy-communication projects), have not always been that good. The still unsettled and controversial issue of the status of Ajaria with its large Islamic population has been revealing itself during the crises which accompanied the emergence of Georgia's statehood. Igor Muradyan has written the following on that score: "Between 1992 and 2003 Turkey, concerned about infringement on Ajaria's rights, interfered in Georgia's domestic affairs three times." While Aslan Abashidze was in power, Turkey competed with Russia in that part of the Caucasus; as soon as the Russian military base was pulled out of Batumi and relations between Moscow and Tbilisi deteriorated, Turkey became one of the key foreign policy actors in Ajaria. During the Tbilisi-Batumi confrontation triggered by the Rose Revolution, Turkey warned Tbilisi, in so many words, that it was closely following the slightest shifts in the border regions. On 17 March, 2004, Ambassador of Turkey to Azerbaijan Unal Chevikoz declared that, under the Treaty of Kars of 1921, Ankara could move its troops into Ajaria in the event of a crisis. In this way, Turkish diplomats responded to the statement Georgian Ambassador to Russia Konstantine Kemularia made on 16 March to the effect that the Treaty of Kars, under which Batumi was transferred to Georgia, had become and void. On 18 March, 2004, Yaşar Yakiş, former foreign minister of Turkey, who headed a Turkish delegation to Georgia, refuted Chevikoz's statement by saying that his country had no right to interfere in the developments around Ajaria and "had no such intention." Ankara obviously wanted much stronger influence in the region; the autonomous status of Ajaria, a republic with a large Muslim population, offers certain opportunities. On the eve and immediately after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Georgia paid, and continues to pay, much attention to Christian Orthodoxy in Ajaria; its further spread is invariably treated as a political issue; the Georgian Orthodox Church, likewise, attaches much importance to Orthodoxy in Ajaria. Here I am going to write about Orthodox Christians and Muslims, the two groups bearing the main responsibility for maintaining the religious balance in the Ajarian Autonomy and wielding a lot of political and other influence.

Introduction : war and peace in the Caucasus -- Setting the stage : the past, the nation, and the state -- Making sense : conflict theory and the Caucasus -- Wars over Chechnya -- Wars in Georgia -- The war over Karabakh -- Wars that did not happen : Dagestan and Ajaria -- Conclusion : post-Soviet wars and theories of internal wars

Based on field research and interviews conducted in both Ajaria and Tbilisi, this article focuses on the different interpretations of the conversion of ethnically Georgian Muslim Ajarians to Orthodox Christianity. It is argued that Orthodox Christianity is an important aspect of self-identification and the national narrative of all Georgians. For many Muslim Ajarians, conversion appears to be a pragmatic act, with the ultimate goal of being recognised as 'fully Georgian' by both state and society.

AbstractThis article examines conflicts in the South Caucasus with a view towards means for their interdependent resolution. It begins by reviewing briefly in succession situations in Georgia: Abkhazia, Ajaria, Javakhetia, and Tskhinvali (South Ossetia). A comparative qualitative analysis then follows that is heuristic rather than definitive. The situation in Mountainous Karabagh is juxtaposed to this, and complicating factors are identified. On that basis, a policy initiative for the South Caucasus is described, building upon the extensive considerations previously elaborated on in a report by the Centre for European Policy Studies. A focus on nongovernmental actors in particular leads to reflections on how to create potential transgovernmental and transsocietal sociopolitical coalitions for conflict reduction and prevention. Specifically, possibilities are considered for moving toward an institution such as a transnational Assembly for Regions and Peoples of the South Caucasus. Issues of institutional design are considered and assessed on the basis of existing comparative work on international parliamentary formations.

The clashes in the ethnic regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia are not only about Georgia's territorial integrity. Moreover, when analyzed from a different perspective, it becomes clear that the ethnic problems in the region are not only an issue between the ethnic groups and the central government. The ethnic problems in Georgia also depend on a change in the perception of the external actors' interests. This means that when the solution to problems coincided with the interests of the international actors, Georgia was able to solve the problem, as in the case of Ajaria. However, when the solution contradicted the interests of the international actors the clashes could not be resolved and the Georgian government was ineffective, as in the cases of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The clashes determined not only the domestic policy of the Georgian government and the country's social and economic development, but also Georgia's foreign policy. Consequently, in order to strengthen its position and maintain its territorial integrity, Georgia shifted to the EU-U.S. axis in order to counterbalance Russia, which supported the ethnic minorities in the region. So it was argued that the democratic breakthrough in Georgia in 2003 happened because the local activists appealed to EU norms and standards and because they received strong support from the EU and its member states. Moreover, the EU supported the multilateral efforts to constrain the use of force through arms control and disarmament initiatives and provided financial and technical assistance to projects aimed at combating the accumulation and spread of small arms in Georgia and South Ossetia. The EU set up a rule-of-law operation in Georgia, the EUJUST Themis operation (July 2004), which was not a military mission. Georgia views its relations with the EU as an economic and political partnership that will culminate in EU membership in due course. In 2004, the EU and NATO expanded into the former Soviet expanse. The Russians regarded NATO membership of the Baltic countries as an encroachment on the country's traditional periphery. The Russian leadership was alarmed by the West's active support of the regime change in Georgia. The West was keenly interested in Russia's own neighborhood. As the primary Western security organization, NATO epitomizes Russia's insecurities. The first part of the study describes the theoretical framework of governance and explains the management, coordination, and regulation procedures practiced by the security-related international institutions. The second part discusses the Georgian crisis and its historical background, to provide a better understanding of the crisis, and analyzes the interests of the international actors that triggered the crisis. The third part takes a look at the programs being implemented by international institutions with respect to Georgia. The concluding part evaluates the roles and impact of the international institutions during the crisis.