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'Die Operation Althea in Bosnien und Herzegowina ist der bisher anspruchsvollste militärische Einsatz unter Führung der EU. Er stellt den vorläufigen Höhepunkt der Kooperation von NATO und EU im Krisenmanagement dar. Die Untersuchung der Zusammenarbeit beider Organisationen in der Vorbereitungsphase von Althea und im ersten Jahr des Einsatzes ergibt unter anderem, dass die Beziehungen von NATO und EU den vereinbarten Grundsätzen der 'strategischen Partnerschaft' nur zum Teil gerecht werden. Die größten Defizite bestehen bei der Kooperation der politischen Gremien von NATO und EU. Da für alle Entscheidungen ein Konsens in beiden Organisationen erforderlich ist, sind hier angesichts der gewachsenen Mitgliederzahl Probleme zu erwarten. In der Vorbereitung der Operation Althea waren unterschiedliche Vorstellungen und divergierende Interessen Ursache für verzögerte Entscheidungen. Was die militärische Ebene betrifft, so wurden die Vereinbarungen zwischen NATO und EU effektiv und professionell genutzt. Althea hat jedoch auch Grenzen deutlich werden lassen: Wegen der Komplexität der Regelungen und langer Vorbereitung wird ihre Anwendung wohl auf die Nachfolge von NATO-Operationen beschränkt bleiben. Insgesamt hat es bei der Zusammenarbeit von NATO und EU im Krisenmanagement in den vergangenen Jahren Fortschritte gegeben, doch sollten nun Maßnahmen ergriffen werden, um diese Tendenz zu verstetigen. So sollte der strategische Dialog zwischen beiden Organisationen intensiviert und bei heraufziehenden Krisen frühzeitig gemeinsam über die Lage, Zielvorstellungen und mögliche Maßnahmen gesprochen werden.' (Autorenreferat)

Die Operation Althea in Bosnien und Herzegowina ist der bisher anspruchsvollste militärische Einsatz unter Führung der EU. Er stellt den vorläufigen Höhepunkt der Kooperation von NATO und EU im Krisenmanagement dar. Die Untersuchung der Zusammenarbeit beider Organisationen in der Vorbereitungsphase von Althea und im ersten Jahr des Einsatzes ergibt unter anderem, dass die Beziehungen von NATO und EU den vereinbarten Grundsätzen der "strategischen Partnerschaft" nur zum Teil gerecht werden. Die größten Defizite bestehen bei der Kooperation der politischen Gremien von NATO und EU. Da für alle Entscheidungen ein Konsens in beiden Organisationen erforderlich ist, sind hier angesichts der gewachsenen Mitgliederzahl Probleme zu erwarten. In der Vorbereitung der Operation Althea waren unterschiedliche Vorstellungen und divergierende Interessen Ursache für verzögerte Entscheidungen. Was die militärische Ebene betrifft, so wurden die Vereinbarungen zwischen NATO und EU effektiv und professionell genutzt. Althea hat jedoch auch Grenzen deutlich werden lassen: Wegen der Komplexität der Regelungen und langer Vorbereitung wird ihre Anwendung wohl auf die Nachfolge von NATO-Operationen beschränkt bleiben. Insgesamt hat es bei der Zusammenarbeit von NATO und EU im Krisenmanagement in den vergangenen Jahren Fortschritte gegeben, doch sollten nun Maßnahmen ergriffen werden, um diese Tendenz zu verstetigen. So sollte der strategische Dialog zwischen beiden Organisationen intensiviert und bei heraufziehenden Krisen frühzeitig gemeinsam über die Lage, Zielvorstellungen und mögliche Maßnahmen gesprochen werden. (SWP-Studie / SWP)

This paper evaluates the planning capacity of two Common Security and Defence (CSDP) missions (EULEX Kosovo and EUFOR Althea) in order to assess the effectiveness of CSDP planning process. Both missions suffer due to partial interests within the EU and low positioning of CSDP on political agendas of the member states. Compared to NATO, EU missions' political control is more much detailed once the mission is deployed. CSDP planning architecture has been considerably reformed since the inception of the first missions in 2003, however the supervision by the member states is still present in all phases of restructuring and implementation. EULEX planning process includes a well elaborated lessons learnt process, however the implementation of the findings on the operational level is rather weak whereas EUFOR Althea profited mostly from the access to NATO planning assets. CSDP missions are political missions and their effectiveness seems to be of secondary importance to the EU member states.

This paper evaluates the planning capacity of two Common Security and Defence (CSDP) missions (EULEX Kosovo and EUFOR Althea) in order to assess the effectiveness of CSDP planning process. Both missions suffer due to partial interests within the EU and low positioning of CSDP on political agendas of the member states. Compared to NATO, EU missions' political control is more much detailed once the mission is deployed. CSDP planning architecture has been considerably reformed since the inception of the first missions in 2003, however the supervision by the member states is still present in all phases of restructuring and implementation. EULEX planning process includes a well elaborated lessons learnt process, however the implementation of the findings on the operational level is rather weak whereas EUFOR Althea profited mostly from the access to NATO planning assets. CSDP missions are political missions and their effectiveness seems to be of secondary importance to the EU member states.

States have different strategic cultures when it comes to legitimating the use of military force and its relation with other foreign policy instruments. However, increasingly, military operations are conducted in multilateral forums; EU military operations are one of the most notable examples of this development. While some claim that these operations reflect power relations between nations with different strategic cultures, others argue that these common missions involve states in a process of collective learning and convergence of interests. Drawing upon an advocacy coalition approach, this paper confronts the competing hypotheses in the case of European Union Force (EUFOR) Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), as the EU's longest running military operation (since 2004). On the basis of policy documents and semi-structured interviews with policymakers and politicians, this paper concludes that the evolution of EUFOR Althea has been primarily the result of the power politics of different coalitions, but there have also been a few instances of learning.

Operation Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been the most demanding military operation led by the EU. It represents the high point of NATO-EU cooperation in crisis management to date.However, relations between NATO and the EU only partly live up to the agreed principles of "strategic partnership" - this is one finding of an analysis of the two organisations' cooperation in the preparatory phase of Althea and the first year of the operation. The greatest deficits exist between the political committees of NATO and the EU. Since all decisions require consensus in both organisations, and the number of members has increased, it is here that problems are most likely to occur. Different ideas and divergent interests delayed decisions in the lead-up to Operation Althea. At military level the agreements between NATO and the EU have been utilised effectively and professionally. But Althea has also showed up limitations: the complexity of the arrangements and the long preparation time mean that their application will be limited to NATO-successor operations. General progress has been made in recent years in crisis-management cooperation between NATO and the EU, but measures should now be taken to help consolidate this development - strategic dialogue should be intensified, and when crises are looming the two organisations should meet at an early stage to discuss the situation, common goals and possible measures. (SWP-Research Papers / SWP)

On December 2, 2004, the European Union took over from NATO the main peacekeeping forces that had been deployed in Bosnia-and-Herzegovina since the signature of the Dayton Accords. The launch of EU military operation Althea was presented by its supporters as a major test for the ESDP, especially as it pertained to a wider Europeanization of post-conflict management in Bosnia. Against this background, Althea provides a fruitful locus to assess one of the EU's most frequent claims - that it possesses a specific know-how when it comes to combining the military and the civilian aspects of post-conflict management. In this study, Althea is primarily approached through the way it is viewed by both its participants and by Bosnians. Several issues are addressed: First, how do historical legacies of the international presence in Bosnia weigh upon the very definition of mission Althea, its implementation and its local receptions? Second, coordination of the various European actors present on the field has emerged as one of the major challenges the EU needs to face. Third, the study draws attention to the possible discrepancy between various understandings (among Althea personnel and Bosnian people) of what a European military mission entails. Last but not least, the study highlights complex rationalities at work when phasing out an operation like Althea. EU exit strategies seem to derive rather from bureaucratic logic than objective assessment of stability in Bosnia ; Le 2 décembre 2004, dans le cadre de l'opération militaire multinationale Althea, l'Union européenne a pris la relève des forces déployées en Bosnie-Herzégovine par l'OTAN après la signature des Accords de Dayton. Ce déploiement militaire européen, présenté par ses initiateurs comme un test majeur pour la PESD, s'inscrit dans une dynamique d'européanisation des dispositifs internationaux déployés dans le pays. A travers l'analyse d'Althea, il s'agit de réfléchir ici à l'émergence de savoir-faire européens en matière de gestion militaire et civile des sorties ...

On December 2, 2004, the European Union took over from NATO the main peacekeeping forces that had been deployed in Bosnia-and-Herzegovina since the signature of the Dayton Accords. The launch of EU military operation Althea was presented by its supporters as a major test for the ESDP, especially as it pertained to a wider Europeanization of post-conflict management in Bosnia. Against this background, Althea provides a fruitful locus to assess one of the EU's most frequent claims - that it possesses a specific know-how when it comes to combining the military and the civilian aspects of post-conflict management. In this study, Althea is primarily approached through the way it is viewed by both its participants and by Bosnians. Several issues are addressed: First, how do historical legacies of the international presence in Bosnia weigh upon the very definition of mission Althea, its implementation and its local receptions? Second, coordination of the various European actors present on the field has emerged as one of the major challenges the EU needs to face. Third, the study draws attention to the possible discrepancy between various understandings (among Althea personnel and Bosnian people) of what a European military mission entails. Last but not least, the study highlights complex rationalities at work when phasing out an operation like Althea. EU exit strategies seem to derive rather from bureaucratic logic than objective assessment of stability in Bosnia ; Le 2 décembre 2004, dans le cadre de l'opération militaire multinationale Althea, l'Union européenne a pris la relève des forces déployées en Bosnie-Herzégovine par l'OTAN après la signature des Accords de Dayton. Ce déploiement militaire européen, présenté par ses initiateurs comme un test majeur pour la PESD, s'inscrit dans une dynamique d'européanisation des dispositifs internationaux déployés dans le pays. A travers l'analyse d'Althea, il s'agit de réfléchir ici à l'émergence de savoir-faire européens en matière de gestion militaire et civile des sorties ...

On December 2, 2004, the European Union took over from NATO the main peacekeeping forces that had been deployed in Bosnia-and-Herzegovina since the signature of the Dayton Accords. The launch of EU military operation Althea was presented by its supporters as a major test for the ESDP, especially as it pertained to a wider Europeanization of post-conflict management in Bosnia. Against this background, Althea provides a fruitful locus to assess one of the EU's most frequent claims - that it possesses a specific know-how when it comes to combining the military and the civilian aspects of post-conflict management. In this study, Althea is primarily approached through the way it is viewed by both its participants and by Bosnians. Several issues are addressed: First, how do historical legacies of the international presence in Bosnia weigh upon the very definition of mission Althea, its implementation and its local receptions? Second, coordination of the various European actors present on the field has emerged as one of the major challenges the EU needs to face. Third, the study draws attention to the possible discrepancy between various understandings (among Althea personnel and Bosnian people) of what a European military mission entails. Last but not least, the study highlights complex rationalities at work when phasing out an operation like Althea. EU exit strategies seem to derive rather from bureaucratic logic than objective assessment of stability in Bosnia ; Le 2 décembre 2004, dans le cadre de l'opération militaire multinationale Althea, l'Union européenne a pris la relève des forces déployées en Bosnie-Herzégovine par l'OTAN après la signature des Accords de Dayton. Ce déploiement militaire européen, présenté par ses initiateurs comme un test majeur pour la PESD, s'inscrit dans une dynamique d'européanisation des dispositifs internationaux déployés dans le pays. A travers l'analyse d'Althea, il s'agit de réfléchir ici à l'émergence de savoir-faire européens en matière de gestion militaire et civile des sorties ...