Suchergebnisse

On 1 January 1995 Sweden became member of the European Union. This basic fact is not mentioned in Sweden's fundamental law. Nor does the Swedish constitution have anything to say about the important changes to the practice of public policymaking that have taken place since Sweden joined the EU. At the same time, it is indeed apparent that the basic rules of the political game in Sweden have been transformed dramatically after EU accession. This constitutional change, however has taken place without any substantial changes being made to the wording of the most important of Sweden's four fundamental laws, i.e., the Instrument of Government (regeringsformen). Constitutional change can be brought about in two different ways: Constitutional amendment, or explicit constitutional change, refers to a change of the rules of the game which implies a modified wording of the constitutional text. Constitutional alteration, or implicit constitutional change, means the constitutional document itself remains unaltered while its meaning is changed through judicial interpretation or legislative action. How frequently used are these different methods when it comes to the constitutional changes brought about by EU membership? How can we explain the differences between member states? How can these competing methods for constitutional change be normatively justified? Is one of them to be preferred? The research project "Hur regleras EU-medlemskapet?" seeks to answer these questions in a comparative study on how EU membership regulated in different member states. Adapted from the source document.

Twenty percent of the Swedish laws & amendments are directly governed by binding EC decisions, directives & regulations. Another 10 percent are connected with the EU or the EC. That is the result of a study examining all new laws & amendments passed by the Swedish Parliament during the years 1998-2003. By investigating the government bills behind the 3,449 acts, the researcher has analyzed to what extent the bills are designed to implement binding EC legislation or remove obstacles & conflicts between national & EC law, & to what extent the legislation is in any way influenced by the EU membership. This is one of few studies that make a quantitative survey of the power that the European Union wields over Swedish democratic institutions. After ten years of EU membership, the "power transferred from Stockholm to Brussels" is still a big issue in the domestic debate concerning the European Union. Tables, Figures, References. Adapted from the source document.

The literature highlights how climate change might challenge the definitions of wine geographical indications (GIs) in Europe. The central issue addressed in this thesis is whether European GI viticultural systems could tackle climate change via initiating adaptive institutional change processes to relax the constraints imposed by GI production standards. To do so, drawing from institutional economics theory and literature on cooperatives and collective brand, we developed a novel agent-based model (ABM) representing an abstract GI wine production system in the European Union (EU). Using illustrative data, our model allows testing different impact scenarios driven by climate change, spatial heterogeneity, and alternative institutional settings (i.e., voting mechanism). We used the model to explore individual and collective components of climate resilience and the relationship between economic agents and their environment. We compared the average output of 100 simulations for each of the 12 different climate-landscape-institution scenarios. The inclusion of endogenous institutional change led to considerable variations in all target variables, including the emergence of complex/chaotic behaviours. It enabled the system to reduce farm exits, increase profitability and collective brand value. We showed how landscape heterogeneity has a twofold role in the climate resilience of the system. It increases individual adaptability but obstructs collective adaptive capacity through institutional change. The two different voting mechanisms considered (i.e., relative and absolute majority) did not produce any discernible result. The study highlights the importance of policies oriented to strengthening investments in intangibles and facilitating GI rule amendments, especially in sectors where cooperatives predominate due to poor intangible investments capability and other issues connected to member heterogeneity.