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This paper reviews the contributions of philosophy and the social and behavioral sciences to risk analysis. It concludes that philosophical, social, and behavioral research can contribute to the resolution of complex risk issues in at least four areas: (i) comparative risk analysis; (ii) the use of risk‐related scientific information in the decision‐making process; (iii) risk perception; and (iv) institutional and organizational features of the risk‐management system.

One would expect that so successful and controversial a philosophical school as analytic philosophy would have a clear platform of substantive philosophical views. However, this is not so. For at least 30 years, analytic philosophy has consisted in an increasingly loose and variable amalgam of philosophical topics, views and methods. This state of affairs has led some to claim that, despite its professional entrenchment, analytic philosophy is in a state of crisis. Analytic Philosophy: The History of an Illusion argues that this is so, and that the crisis is deeper and more longstanding than i

Die Reihe präsentiert Monographien und Sammelbände zur österreichischen Philosophie (Bolzano, Brentano, Meinong u.a.) sowie zur Phänomenologie und ihrer Geschichte im Allgemeinen. Phenomenology & Mind bietet darüber hinaus ein Publikationsforum für eine große Bandbreite unterschiedlicher Forschungsansätze zur Philosophie des Geistes.

Cover -- Half Title -- Series Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- List of Contributors -- Acknowledgments -- List of Abbreviations -- Introduction: Wittgenstein in 1929 -- Notes -- References -- Part 1: Mathematics and Thinking the New -- Chapter 1: Wittgenstein's Struggle with Intuitionism -- 1.1 Wittgenstein in 1929 -- 1.2 The Tractatus: Arithmetic as Equations -- 1.3 The Priority of Mathematics over Logic -- 1.4 Weak Counterexamples and the Law of Excluded Middle -- 1.5 Toward a Better Understanding -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 2: The Origins of Wittgenstein's Verificationism -- 2.1 Verificationism in the Tractatus -- 2.2 The Brouwer Lecture -- 2.3 The Origins of Verificationism in MSS 105-107 -- 2.4 Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 3: Searching in Space vs. Groping in the Dark: Wittgenstein on Novelty and Imagination in 1929-1930 -- 3.1 Imagination, Creativity, and Novelty in Wittgenstein's Work -- 3.2 Spatial Imagery -- 3.3 Synthetic A Priori Propositions -- 3.4 Searching for Spaces -- 3.5 Remarks on Ramsey -- Notes -- References -- Part 2: Method and Development -- Chapter 4: The Color-Exclusion Problem and the Development of Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Logic -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 The Tractatus on Logic: Key Commitments -- 4.3 The Color-Exclusion Problem as a Stimulus for Rethinking Logic -- 4.4 "What Becomes of Logic Now?" -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 5: What Would It Look Like? Wittgenstein's Radical Thought Experiments -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Two Contexts, One Method -- 5.3 Visual Space and Absolute Directions: Life at the Telescope -- 5.4 No Subject: The Hanging Eyeball -- 5.5 What Would It Be Like: Your Tooth, My Pain? -- 5.6 The Despot and "I" -- 5.7 Moore's Hinge Sentence and the Limits of Thought -- Notes -- References.

This systematic and historical treatment of Russell's contributions to analytic philosophy, from his embrace of analysis in 1898 to his landmark theory of descriptions in 1905, draws important connections between his philosophically motivated conception of analysis and thetechnical apparatus he devised to facilitate analyses in mathematics

Intro -- Series Editors' Preface -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- Editors and Contributors -- List of Figures -- Introduction -- 1 Beaney, Soames and Rorty on Methodology in the History of Philosophy -- 2 Methodological Pluralism -- 3 The Essays in This Volume -- References -- Part I Aspects of Analytic Philosophy -- The Rise of 'Analytic Philosophy': When and How Did People Begin Calling Themselves 'Analytic Philosophers'? -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Motivations -- 3 When? -- Google Books Data -- Setting the Boundaries: Nagel's Article, the First Textbook, and Anthologies -- Objections and Replies … and Complications -- 4 Contemporaneous Justifications for the Grouping -- Nagel's Justifications -- Second-Phase, Mid-Century Justifications -- 5 Resistance to the Grouping -- Early Cambridge Analysts Explicitly Rejected the Second-Phase Justification for the Grouping -- Why 'Analytic Philosophy' Did not Gain Widespread Currency Until the 1950s -- Why Did the British Eventually Accept the 'Second Phase,' Linguistic Accounts of Philosophy? -- 6 Contrast Class(es) of 'Analytic Philosophy' -- 'Continental Philosophy' -- Earlier Contrast Classes -- 7 Conclusion -- References -- The Dissonant Origins of Analytic Philosophy: Common Sense in Philosophical Methodology -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Current Debates on Philosophical Methodology -- 3 Moore and Russell -- Early Stages -- Kinds of Analysis -- Analysandum -- Conservative vs Transformative/Revisionary Analysis -- 4 Carnap and Strawson -- Explication -- Ordinary Language Philosophy -- Strawson's Critique of Carnapian Explication, and Possible Replies -- 5 Conclusion -- References -- Part II Logic and Language -- Russell's Method of Analysis and the Axioms of Mathematics -- 1 Mathematical Axioms and the Logocentric Predicament -- 2 Early Logicism and the Methods of Science: Jevons and Venn.