Suchergebnisse

This paper explores and explains the EU's use of sanctions in response to the Arab Spring in 13 Middle East and North Africa (MENA) states. A Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) shows that a combination of historical factors and human rights violations contributed to the EU's decision to impose sanctions in Libya and Syria, while transitional void seems to have been the most important trigger for sanctions in Egypt and Tunisia. The absence of both transitional void and historical economic coercion explains why the EU has refrained from imposing sanctions in negative cases such as Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Exposing the complex causality of the EU's Arab Spring sanctions, this paper nuances the EU's self-proclaimed normative foreign policy approach and demonstrates that combinations of factors matter for explaining the EU's decision to invoke sanctions in the MENA region.

Aidan Hehir and James Pattison: Introduction: The Responsibility to Protect after the Arab Spring 141-147. - Jess Gifkins: R2P in the UN Security Council: Darfur, Libya and beyond 148-165. - Aidan Hehir: Assessing the influence of the Responsibility to Protect on the UN Security Council during the Arab Spring166-183. - Luke Glanville: Does R2P matter? Interpreting the impact of a norm 184-199. - Justin Morris: The Responsibility to Protect and the use of force: Remaking the Procrustean bed? 200-215. - Jennifer Welsh: The responsibility to prevent: Assessing the gap between rhetoric and reality 216-232. - Philip Cunliffe: From ISIS to ICISS: A critical return to the Responsibility to Protect report 233-247

Full issue

In 2011, several months after a popular revolt overturned the Gaddafi regime in Libya, Libya's new National Transitional Council announced the discovery of what was later confirmed to be an undeclared stockpile of chemical weapons. This was a startling announcement to many observers, since Libya had publicly renounced its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programmes in 2003 and had apparently dismantled the programmes soon after. Although the Libyan case had repeatedly been referred to as a positive 'model' for nonproliferation-an instance where a country had voluntarily and peacefully rolled back its WMD programs-this recent discovery forces us to wonder whether the Libyan 'model' really was as successful as initially described. This article examines the successes, challenges and lessons that can be learned from the Libyan case of WMD renunciation and verification. As one model of cooperative verification, the Libyan case highlights not only the opportunities afforded by monitoring and verification regimes, but also some of the difficulties that any such regime will encounter in real-world circumstances, however positive. (International Affairs (Oxford) / SWP)