Suchergebnisse

The end of 2010 and the beginning of 2011 in Arab countries marked its place in history as the Arab Spring or the Arab Awakening, since during this period mass social, political and economic protests could be observed in almost all the countries in the region. Due to the nature, dynamics and the issues underlying the Arab-Israeli conflict, each and every material change in Arab countries is and has to be important for Israel and the whole Middle East. Considering the phenomenon being analyzed from the perspective of the Arab-Israeli conflict and Israel's external and internal situation, in my opinion it is particularly important to attempt to answer the following question: Has the Arab Spring changed Israel's strategic situation, and if so, to what extent? Looking at the ensuing situation from the perspective of Israel and also the Arab-Israeli conflict, at the very beginning we can have doubts or an opinion even less optimistic than in Europe about the nature of these changes. The Arab Spring may be regarded by Israel and also by the analysts related with the country as the beginning of the "era of uncertainty". This is mainly connected with the changes regarding political regimes and the possibility of coming to or sharing power with Islamic movements and parties hostile towards Israel. The collapse of political regimes was accompanied by failures of the ruling political parties connected with these regimes.The gap was filled by dozens of new parties, with religious and Islamic parties being particularly strong. Time will show its long-term consequences. Israel cannot afford unjustified optimism and false opinions, and that is why it has to be prepared for negative scenarios since both the country's elites and society are aware of that there may be no second chances in event of failure. ; The end of 2010 and the beginning of 2011 in Arab countries marked its place in history as the Arab Spring or the Arab Awakening, since during this period mass social, political and economic protests could be observed in almost all the countries in the region. Due to the nature, dynamics and the issues underlying the Arab-Israeli conflict, each and every material change in Arab countries is and has to be important for Israel and the whole Middle East. Considering the phenomenon being analyzed from the perspective of the Arab-Israeli conflict and Israel's external and internal situation, in my opinion it is particularly important to attempt to answer the following question: Has the Arab Spring changed Israel's strategic situation, and if so, to what extent? Looking at the ensuing situation from the perspective of Israel and also the Arab-Israeli conflict, at the very beginning we can have doubts or an opinion even less optimistic than in Europe about the nature of these changes. The Arab Spring may be regarded by Israel and also by the analysts related with the country as the beginning of the "era of uncertainty". This is mainly connected with the changes regarding political regimes and the possibility of coming to or sharing power with Islamic movements and parties hostile towards Israel. The collapse of political regimes was accompanied by failures of the ruling political parties connected with these regimes.The gap was filled by dozens of new parties, with religious and Islamic parties being particularly strong. Time will show its long-term consequences. Israel cannot afford unjustified optimism and false opinions, and that is why it has to be prepared for negative scenarios since both the country's elites and society are aware of that there may be no second chances in event of failure.

An American model of peace in the Middle East, which evolved from Kissinger's 'little steps' to the separatist agreements of Camp David, was to serve the purpose of regulating the Arab-Israeli conflict and strengthening Washington's influence. In the address delivered on January 23, 1980 (that provided the foundation for the so called 'J. Carter doctrine') the US President said that every "attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America" and thus it "will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force". The abandonment of the Nasserian tradition did not help A. Sadat to win supporters in internal matters. The protest of Nasserists and the Association of Muslim Brothers against the reconciliation with Israel resulted in a tragic attack against the Egyptian president. A. Sadat's death on October 6, 1981 was a blow for the advocates of the peace process. Whether to continue the separatist policy towards Israel or not was up to the will of the new political authorities in Egypt. ; An American model of peace in the Middle East, which evolved from Kissinger's 'little steps' to the separatist agreements of Camp David, was to serve the purpose of regulating the Arab-Israeli conflict and strengthening Washington's influence. In the address delivered on January 23, 1980 (that provided the foundation for the so called 'J. Carter doctrine') the US President said that every "attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America" and thus it "will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force". The abandonment of the Nasserian tradition did not help A. Sadat to win supporters in internal matters. The protest of Nasserists and the Association of Muslim Brothers against the reconciliation with Israel resulted in a tragic attack against the Egyptian president. A. Sadat's death on October 6, 1981 was a blow for the advocates of the peace process. Whether to continue the separatist policy towards Israel or not was up to the will of the new political authorities in Egypt.

In 2009–2017, the European Union continued its prior policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Nonetheless, taking into consideration the rapidly changing internal and international situation, this policy is becoming increasingly less effective. Problems confronting the European Union and its member states over the recent years, Brexit, the destabilization of North Africa and the Middle East, the Ukrainian crisis, the redistribution of power in the world system, to name a few – are the most significant determinants of the current EU policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Compared to other actors, the role of the European Union in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been decreasing. ; W latach 2009–2017 Unia Europejska kontynuowała swoją dotychczasową politykę wobec konfliktu izraelsko-palestyńskiego, jednak w obliczu dynamicznie zmieniających się uwarunkowań wewnętrznych i międzynarodowych polityka ta staje się coraz mniej efektywna. Problemy, z jakimi Unia Europejska i jej państwa członkowskie borykają się od kilku lat – Brexit, destabilizacja obszaru Afryki Północnej i Bliskiego Wschodu, kryzys ukraiński, zmieniający się układ sił w świecie – to najważniejsze determinanty obecnej polityki UE wobec konfliktu izraelsko-palestyńskiego. W ich wyniku rola Unii Europejskiej w rozwiązywaniu konfliktu izraelsko-palestyńskiego, na tle innych aktorów, maleje.

W latach 2009–2017 Unia Europejska kontynuowała swoją dotychczasową politykę wobec konfliktu izraelsko-palestyńskiego, jednak w obliczu dynamicznie zmieniających się uwarunkowań wewnętrznych i międzynarodowych polityka ta staje się coraz mniej efektywna. Problemy, z jakimi Unia Europejska i jej państwa członkowskie borykają się od kilku lat Brexit, destabilizacja obszaru Afryki Północnej i Bliskiego Wschodu, kryzys ukraiński, zmieniający się układ sił w świecie to najważniejsze determinanty obecnej polityki UE wobec konfliktu izraelsko-palestyńskiego. W ich wyniku rola Unii Europejskiej w rozwiązywaniu konfliktu izraelsko-palestyńskiego, na tle innych aktorów, maleje. ; In 2009–2017, the European Union continued its prior policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Nonetheless, taking into consideration the rapidly changing internal and international situation, this policy is becoming increasingly less effective. Problems confronting the European Union and its member states over the recent years, Brexit, the destabilization of North Africa and the Middle East, the Ukrainian crisis, the redistribution of power in the world system, to name a few are the most significant determinants of the current EU policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Compared to other actors, the role of the European Union in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been decreasing.

Unia Europejska odgrywa na arenie międzynarodowej wiele ról, a jednym z priorytetowych kierunków w jej polityce zagranicznej jest region śródziemnomorski. Od połowy lat 90. XX wieku UE stara się odgrywać jednocześnie kilka ról wobec państw w nim położonych. Najważniejszymi z nich są role: aktywnego aktora w rozwiązywaniu konfliktu arabsko-izraelskiego; promotora środków budowy zaufania, partnerstwa, bezpieczeństwa i rozbrojenia; promotora reform rynkowych i zrównoważonego rozwoju; propagatora demokracji i praw człowieka oraz dialogu międzykulturowego.Efektywność ról międzynarodowych, analizowana na przykładzie unijnej polityki śródziemnomorskiej, jest jednak niska, ze względu na konflikt między rolami deklarowanymi, rzeczywistymi i oczekiwanymi. W konsekwencji region śródziemnomorski nie został przekształcony w obszar pokoju, stabilności, dobrobytu i porozumienia międzykulturowego, co od 1995 roku było deklarowanym przez Unię Europejską celem. ; The European Union acts in numerous capacities on the international arena, and one of its priorities in foreign policy involves the Mediterranean. Since the mid-1990s, the EU has been trying to play several roles in its relations with countries in this region, the most significant being: an active participant in solving the Arab-Israeli conflict; a promoter of measures to build trust, partnership, security and disarmament; a promoter of market reforms and sustainable development; an advocate of democracy and human rights as well as cross-cultural dialogue.Assessed on the basis of its Mediterranean policy, the efficiency of the EU's international roles, however, is poor, on account of the conflict between the roles the EU declares to be playing, and its actual and expected roles. As a consequence, the Mediterranean has not transformed into the area of peace, stability, welfare and cross-cultural understanding which has been declared as the EU's objective since 1995.

Unia Europejska odgrywa na arenie międzynarodowej wiele ról, a jednym z priorytetowych kierunków w jej polityce zagranicznej jest region śródziemnomorski. Od połowy lat 90. XX wieku UE stara się odgrywać jednocześnie kilka ról wobec państw w nim położonych. Najważniejszymi z nich są role: aktywnego aktora w rozwiązywaniu konfliktu arabsko-izraelskiego; promotora środków budowy zaufania, partnerstwa, bezpieczeństwa i rozbrojenia; promotora reform rynkowych i zrównoważonego rozwoju; propagatora demokracji i praw człowieka oraz dialogu międzykulturowego. Efektywność ról międzynarodowych, analizowana na przykładzie unijnej polityki śródziemnomorskiej, jest jednak niska, ze względu na konflikt między rolami deklarowanymi, rzeczywistymi i oczekiwanymi. W konsekwencji region śródziemnomorski nie został przekształcony w obszar pokoju, stabilności, dobrobytu i porozumienia międzykulturowego, co od 1995 roku było deklarowanym przez Unię Europejską celem. ; The European Union acts in numerous capacities on the international arena, and one of its priorities in foreign policy involves the Mediterranean. Since the mid-1990s, the EU has been trying to play several roles in its relations with countries in this region, the most significant being: an active participant in solving the Arab-Israeli conflict; a promoter of measures to build trust, partnership, security and disarmament; a promoter of market reforms and sustainable development; an advocate of democracy and human rights as well as cross-cultural dialogue. Assessed on the basis of its Mediterranean policy, the efficiency of the EU's international roles, however, is poor, on account of the conflict between the roles the EU declares to be playing, and its actual and expected roles. As a consequence, the Mediterranean has not transformed into the area of peace, stability, welfare and cross-cultural understanding which has been declared as the EU's objective since 1995. ; 8 ; 49 ; 61 ; 4 ; Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej

The foreign policy of Israel towards Iran relies on the shared understanding of the leadership and the public in Israel of the reality, and hence agreement is also built regarding the steps that should be undertaken regarding Iran and its nuclear program. Through research of the social representations, it will be possible to identify the core images and bases of agreement of society in Israel and to identify the existence of alternative understanding of subgroups, which exist in parallel in the society. The findings indicate that the heterogeneity in Israeli society is expressed also in the collection of images and explanations regarding the nature of the State of Israel and re¬garding the Iranian threat. In the Jewish group it is possible to identify two systems of core repre¬sentations: the first is collection of images of the Holocaust and the second is images of the Israeli-Arab conflict. In the Arab group differences among its sub-groups was found. Groups whose sons serve in the Israeli military created discourse similar to the Jewish group, and the other Arabs formed images around the status as a minority in the Jewish nation state. ; Polityka zagraniczna Izraela wobec Iranu opiera się na założeniu, że Iran stanowi zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa także ze względu na program atomowy. W ramach badań nad społeczną reprezentacją w Izraelu, postrzeganie Iranu jest różne tak, jak heterogeniczne jest społeczeństwo izraelskie. W ustaleniach badawczych w grupie żydowskiej można wyróżnić dwa podstawowe czynniki wpływające na postrzeganie zagrożenia ze strony Iranu. Są nimi doświadczenie Holocaustu oraz konfliktów arabsko-izraelskich. W grupie arabskich mieszkańców Izraela występują poważniejsze różnice w postrzeganiu Iranu. W pierwszej podgrupie, w której synowie służą w armii izraelskiej występuje dyskurs podobny do grupy żydowskiej, natomiast w drugiej wyobrażenia o Iranie uformowane zostały z perspektywy mniejszości znajdującej się w żydowskim państwie narodowym.

Arabska Wiosna nie zakończyła się po zmianach politycznych jakie miały miejsce w wielu państwach Afryki Północnej w roku 2011. Przedstawiona analiza odnosi się bezpośrednio do roku 2012 oraz początków 2013, wskazuje na dynamiczny charakter procesów z nią związanych, zarówno w odniesieniu do całego regionu, jak i poszczególnych państw. W artykule szczególnym obszarem analizy jest Izrael oraz jego sąsiedzi, a także inni ważni gracze na scenie politycznej Bliskiego Wschodu – Arabia Saudyjska, Iran, Rosja, Turcja, USA oraz Unia Europejska. Najbardziej dramatyczny charakter ma w chwili oddawania tego materiału do druku, krwawa wojna domowa w Syrii, która jest strategicznym sąsiadem Izraela. ; The Arab Spring did not end after the political transformations that occurred in numerous North African states in 2011. The analysis presented here refers directly to 2012 and early 2013 indicating the dynamic character of the processes related to the Arab Spring, both in respect of the entire region and individual states. Particular attention in the analysis is devoted to Israel and its neighbors, as well as other important actors on the Middle Eastern political stage, namely Saudi Arabia, Iran, Russia, Turkey, the US and the European Union. At the time this paper is being submitted for print, the most dramatic events are taking place in Syria, a strategic neighbor of Israel, where a bloody civil war is ongoing.

Wbrew nadziejom Palestyńczyków wybuch Arabskiej Wiosny, zamiast przyśpieszyć pozytywne przemiany doprowadził do pogorszenia sytuacji w regionie i samej Autonomii Palestyńskiej. Zostały zatrzymane oczekiwane procesy gospodarcze. Doszło do kilku dewastujących Strefę Gazy operacji militarnych Izraela. Pogłębiły się podziały – na Zachodni Brzeg rządzony przez OWP oraz Hamas kontrolujący Strefę Gazy. Pogorszeniu uległy nastroje społeczne wśród Palestyńczyków. Wobec pojawienia się w regionie tzw. Państwa Islamskiego, wspólnota międzynarodowa, w szczególności USA, straciły zainteresowanie trudnym do rozwiązania konfliktem bliskowschodnim. Ciosem dla Palestyńczyków było przeniesienie przez Donalda Trumpa, w maju 2018 r., ambasady USA w Izraelu z Tel Awiwu do Jerozolimy. Wobec pogłębiających się problemów w Autonomii Palestyńskiej, w tym utraty zaufania do Palestyńczyków ze strony Izraela, kwestionowana zaczęła być w Izraelu idea rozwiązania dwupaństwowego, to jest przyszłego pokojowego współistnienia żydowskiego Izraela i arabskiej Palestyny. Połowiczny sukces, jaki osiągnęli Palestyńczycy uzyskując w 2012 r. statusu państwa obserwatora w ONZ nie równoważy strat, dla sprawy palestyńskiej z lat 2011–2018. Wiele wskazuje, że Palestyńska Władza Narodowa znajduje się dziś w przededniu przeobrażeń, które będą musiały uwzględnić niekorzystne zmiany, które zaszły w ostatnich latach. Słowa kluczowe: Arabska Wiosna, Palestyńczycy, OWP, Hamas, operacje militarne, konflikt bliskowschodni, rozwiązanie dwupaństwowe, ONZ ; Despite the hopes of the Palestinians, the outbreak of the Arab Spring, instead of accelerating positive changes, led to a signifi cant deterioration of the situation in the region and in the Palestinian Authority itself. Positive economic processes have been stopped. Successive Israeli military operations devastated the Gaza Strip. The divisions on the West Bank ruled by the Palestine Liberation Organization and Hamas controlling the Gaza Strip deepened. Social sentiment among Palestinians has deteriorated. In view of the emergence of the so-called Islamic State in the region, the international community, in particular the US, lost interest in resolving the Middle Eastern conflict. The moving of the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, in May 2018, was a blow to the Palestinians. But what's the worst, is the loss of Israeli trust to the Palestinians, especially the fact that the idea of a two-state solution has been questioned in Israel. The partial success that the Palestinians achieved by obtaining the status of an observer in the United Nations in 2012 does not balance the losses that the 2011–2018 period brought to the Palestinian cause. There are many indications that the Palestinian National Authority is at a crossroad, on the eve of changes that will have to take into account the changes that have taken place in recent years. Key words: Arab Spring, Palestinians, PLO, Hamas, military operations, Middle East conflict, two-state solution, UN

The paper discusses the parliamentary systems of selected Arab and Muslim countries in the Middle East and North Africa at the turn of the 1960s.The analysis concerns a document drawn up for executives in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in late 1972, with an attachment discussing the parliamentary systems of the countries of primary importance for the goals and interests of Poland. As concerns the Middle East, the parliamentary systems of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, Iran and North and South Yemen were described. In North Africa, the analysis encompassed the Maghreb region: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and the Mashrek region: Egypt, Libya and Sudan.The paper concludes with a statement that the document was an accurate and faithful presentation of the parliamentary systems of representative states. Political relations in this region were developing dynamically at that time, military coups and coups d'état occurred, some states were leaning towards socialism, while maintaining their family or religious structures, while others were only just gaining their full sovereignty and independence. The situation of Israel continued to be complicated, as the state remained highly confrontational towards Arab countries. This last issue was the reason for Poland's failing to achieve the strategic goals of its foreign policy in the Middle East and North Africa. Another Israeli-Arab war in October 1973 made Polish decision makers realize how fragile the foundations of states in the region were, preventing Poland from becoming fully involved in Arab and Muslim countries. ; The paper discusses the parliamentary systems of selected Arab and Muslim countries in the Middle East and North Africa at the turn of the 1960s.The analysis concerns a document drawn up for executives in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in late 1972, with an attachment discussing the parliamentary systems of the countries of primary importance for the goals and interests of Poland. As concerns the Middle East, the parliamentary systems of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, Iran and North and South Yemen were described. In North Africa, the analysis encompassed the Maghreb region: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and the Mashrek region: Egypt, Libya and Sudan.The paper concludes with a statement that the document was an accurate and faithful presentation of the parliamentary systems of representative states. Political relations in this region were developing dynamically at that time, military coups and coups d'état occurred, some states were leaning towards socialism, while maintaining their family or religious structures, while others were only just gaining their full sovereignty and independence. The situation of Israel continued to be complicated, as the state remained highly confrontational towards Arab countries. This last issue was the reason for Poland's failing to achieve the strategic goals of its foreign policy in the Middle East and North Africa. Another Israeli-Arab war in October 1973 made Polish decision makers realize how fragile the foundations of states in the region were, preventing Poland from becoming fully involved in Arab and Muslim countries.

The conflict in Syria that started in 2011 has quickly evolved from a local uprising inspired by the events of the so-called "Arab Spring" into a multidimensional and complicated conflict of a civil war character, with many diverse participants and a very significant religious factor apart from political and socioeconomic reasons. Furthermore, the conflict has become internationalized: more and more external parties have gotten involved in it with a view to furthering or safeguarding their own interests. A vast majority of these actors were states (as far as legal entities are concerned). In the context of their activity, operations of non-state entities, such as international organizations, were rather limited and focused on social and humanitarian issues. This also pertains to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Evolving from a typical defensive alliance towards a security organization and, since the end of the Cold War, consistently operating outside the area covered by the Treaty (understood as the territories of member states), NATO as an autonomous entity has not taken any consistent, coordinated, or decisive actions during the first years of the Syrian conflict. This is due to both the specific features of this international organization and the determinants of the international environment with their dynamics.

Ostatnia dekada przyniosła zmiany społeczne, polityczne i gospodarcze zarówno w samym Izraelu, jak i na Bliskim Wschodzie. Ewoluowały także charakter i skala zaangażowania mocarstw światowych w regionie. Celem artykułu jest stwierdzenie, czy zmiany zachodzące w środowisku Izraela od 2011 r. są na tyle silne, aby w znaczący sposób przekształcić bliskowschodnią strategię tego państwa. W pierwszej części, zarysowane zostaną najważniejsze nowe uwarunkowania zewnętrzne i wewnętrzne izraelskiej polityki zagranicznej. W drugiej, dokonana zostanie analiza głównych kierunków tej polityki w ostatnich latach: 1. zwalczania zagrożeń dla bezpieczeństwa narodowego, 2. współpracy z bliskowschodnimi aktorami międzynarodowymi, 3. reagowania i wpływania na aktywność mocarstw światowych w regionie. Słowa kluczowe: Izrael, Bliski Wschód, strategia, polityka zagraniczna, mocarstwa, państwa arabskie ; Social, political and economic changes have taken place both in Israel and the Middle East in the last decade. Also the scope and character of great powers' engagement in this region have evolved. The aim of this paper is to determine if Israel's environment transformation from 2011 is signifi - cant enough to induce a major change in the Middle Eastern strategy of this state. In the fi rst part, the main new determinants (on national and international level) of the Israeli foreign policy are depicted. In the second part, the key features of this policy in the recent years are analysed. The analysis focuses on: 1. combating threats to the national security, 2. cooperation with the regional actors, 3. reacting and infl uencing great powers' actions in the region. Key words: Israel, Middle East, strategy, foreign policy, world powers, Arab states

Proces zmian w państwach arabskich, którego początek wyznaczyły protesty w Tunezji na przełomie 2010 i 2011 r., stanowił zaskoczenie nie tylko dla szeroko definiowanej społeczności międzynarodowej, ale także dla najważniejszych graczy w regionach Bliskiego Wschodu oraz Afryki Północnej. Bez wątpienia do tej grupy zaliczyć należy Turcję. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest analiza wpływu procesu zmian w państwach arabskich po 2010 r. na politykę zagraniczną Turcji. Szczegółowej analizie zostały poddane przede wszystkim podstawowe założenia polityki zagranicznej Turcji przed 2010 r. oraz ich późniejsza, ewentualna modyfikacja w obliczu zmian politycznych w świecie arabskim. Na podstawie analizy, autor za nieaktualne uznał dwa z regionalnych celów polityki zagranicznej Turcji: eliminację problemów z państwami w regionie oraz niemożność pełnienia funkcji państwa mediatora w regionie. Konflikt wewnętrzny w Syrii stał się bez wątpienia jednym z przykładów niepowodzenia polityki zagranicznej Turcji. Istotną wadą tureckiej polityki zagranicznej po 2002 r. stanowiło oparcie stosunków na bliskich, osobistych relacjach tureckich polityków z niektórymi autorytarnymi przywódcami państw arabskich. Paradoksalnie, wsparcie procesu przemian w Egipcie, może zagrozić regionalnym aspiracjom Turcji. Pytanie dotyczące atrakcyjności tak zwanego modelu tureckiego dla państw arabskich pozostaje pytaniem otwartym. Chociaż można wskazać przykłady nawiązywania do politycznych doświadczeń Turcji w takich państwach jak Tunezja, Maroko czy Egipt, jest to jeszcze zbyt mało, by można mówić o politycznej miękkiej sile Turcji w regionie. ; The process of political changes in the Arab states, which began in Tunisia in 2010, came as a complete surprise not only to international community, but also to all key players in the Middle East and in North Africa. Undoubtedly, Turkey was one of them. The main aim of this article is to analyze influence of the process on the foreign policy of Turkey after 2010. In order to do that, the author analyzes fundamental objectives of the Turkish foreign policy before and after 2010. He argues that two of them, namely zero problems with neighbors policy as well as a role of a mediator in the Middle East, are not valid anymore. Moreover, the internal conflict in Syria became a symbol of a failure of zero problems with neighbors policy. One of the weaknesses of the Turkish foreign policy was its dependence on personal relations between Turkish politicians and authoritarian leaders in the Arab states. Paradoxically, although Turkey supports changes in Egypt, this state can become its biggest regional rival in the nearest future. Last but not least, the author tries to find out whether so-called Turkish political model is attractive to the Arab states. He claims that although we can find some examples how Arab politicians follow the Turkish example in Tunisia, Morocco or Egypt, it is still not enough to assert that these states have already adopted the Turkish model.