Suchergebnisse

Bu makalenin amacı, ABnin Arap-İsrail Uyuşmazlığının çözümüne yönelik olarak oynadığı üçüncü taraf rolünün değerlendirilmesidir. Bu makale, ABnin Uyuşmazlığın çözümüne yönelik üçüncü taraf rolünün, tarafların uyuşmazlık davranışlarını, teşvik yapılarını değiştirmeye yönelik bir müdahale ile daha uzlaşmacı bir yöne doğru değiştirmeyi amaçlayan bir müdahale tipi olan yapısal müdahale şeklinde olduğu iddiasını ileri sürmektedir. Bu makale kapsamında ABnin Arap-İsrail Uyuşmazlığı kapsamındaki yapısal müdahale faaliyetleri olan 1991 yılında başlayan Madrid Barış Sürecinin çok taraflı müzakerelerinin önemli çalışma gruplarından birinin başkanı olarak oynadığı etkin rol, uyuşmazlığın tarafları arasında diyalog için çok taraflı bölgesel bir forum sağlayan Avrupa-Akdeniz Ortaklığı, ABnin, Filistinin devlet inşasına verdiği teknik ve mali destek, ABnin Filistinin kapasite inşa sürecine destek için başlattığı iki AGSP operasyonu, ABnin, Filistinin sosyo-ekonomik kalkınmasına verdiği destek, ABnin, İsrail ve Filistinli sivil toplum örgütlerinin barışa yönelik ortak projelerine sağladığı mali destek ve cezalandırıcı bir yapısal müdahale davranışı olarak 2006 yı- lında Hamasın uyuşmazlık davranışını değiştirmek amacıyla Hamasa karşı uyguladığı ekonomik ve siyasi yaptırımlar incelenecektir. ABnin yapısal müdahale çerçevesindeki faaliyetlerinin başarısının değerlendirildiği sonuç bölümünde ise, Filistin ve İsrail arasındaki karşılıklı şiddet kısır döngüsünün İsrail-Filistin etkileşiminin temel dinamiği olmasından kaynaklanan, Birliğin yapısal müdahale davranışının tek yönlü doğasından yani ABnin, Filistin tarafı üzerindeki nüfuzunu gerek olumlu gerekse olumsuz teşvikler yoluyla Filistin tarafının uyuşmazlık davranışını değiştirmek için etkili bir şekilde kullanırken bunu İsrail tarafına karşı kullanamamasından ve Hamas örneğinde görüldüğü gibi ABnin doğru müdahale aracını doğru zamanda kullanamamasından kaynaklanan nedenlerle, ABnin yapısal müdahalede öngörüldüğü gibi gerek Filistin gerekse İsrail tarafının uyuşmazlık ...

This article delves into the transformative decade between 1999 and 2009, exploring the intricate web of Jewish-Arab relations in Israel and the consequential impact of Jewish-Arab tensions on Arab politics and Arab voter behavior in Israeli elections. During this decade, internal factors, such as generational shift, leadership changes, and political pluralism, played a pivotal role in reshaping the societal landscape in the Arab sector. On the other hand, external factors, including the collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation process and the eruption of the Second Intifada, intensified the predicament of Israeli citizens of Arab origin, amplifying their national identity dilemma. The primary objective of this study is to analyze voting patterns within the Arab sector during the elections of 1999, 2001, 2003, 2006, and 2009, thereby highlighting the profound political implications of the Jewish-Arab tensions on Arab political engagement and voting behaviors. By doing so, this research provides insights into the changing patterns of Arab votes and their impact on the broader political landscape of Israel. The findings reveal that the growing social marginalization and disconnection from the Jewish sector significantly influenced the Arab sector's electoral participation. This period witnessed a decline in Arab voter turnout and a shift in support from left-wing Jewish-Zionist parties to Arab parties, paradoxically contributing to the electoral performances of both Arab parties and right-wing Jewish-Zionist parties.

The end of 2010 and the beginning of 2011 in Arab countries marked its place in history as the Arab Spring or the Arab Awakening, since during this period mass social, political and economic protests could be observed in almost all the countries in the region. Due to the nature, dynamics and the issues underlying the Arab-Israeli conflict, each and every material change in Arab countries is and has to be important for Israel and the whole Middle East. Considering the phenomenon being analyzed from the perspective of the Arab-Israeli conflict and Israel's external and internal situation, in my opinion it is particularly important to attempt to answer the following question: Has the Arab Spring changed Israel's strategic situation, and if so, to what extent? Looking at the ensuing situation from the perspective of Israel and also the Arab-Israeli conflict, at the very beginning we can have doubts or an opinion even less optimistic than in Europe about the nature of these changes. The Arab Spring may be regarded by Israel and also by the analysts related with the country as the beginning of the "era of uncertainty". This is mainly connected with the changes regarding political regimes and the possibility of coming to or sharing power with Islamic movements and parties hostile towards Israel. The collapse of political regimes was accompanied by failures of the ruling political parties connected with these regimes.The gap was filled by dozens of new parties, with religious and Islamic parties being particularly strong. Time will show its long-term consequences. Israel cannot afford unjustified optimism and false opinions, and that is why it has to be prepared for negative scenarios since both the country's elites and society are aware of that there may be no second chances in event of failure. ; The end of 2010 and the beginning of 2011 in Arab countries marked its place in history as the Arab Spring or the Arab Awakening, since during this period mass social, political and economic protests could be observed in almost all the countries in the region. Due to the nature, dynamics and the issues underlying the Arab-Israeli conflict, each and every material change in Arab countries is and has to be important for Israel and the whole Middle East. Considering the phenomenon being analyzed from the perspective of the Arab-Israeli conflict and Israel's external and internal situation, in my opinion it is particularly important to attempt to answer the following question: Has the Arab Spring changed Israel's strategic situation, and if so, to what extent? Looking at the ensuing situation from the perspective of Israel and also the Arab-Israeli conflict, at the very beginning we can have doubts or an opinion even less optimistic than in Europe about the nature of these changes. The Arab Spring may be regarded by Israel and also by the analysts related with the country as the beginning of the "era of uncertainty". This is mainly connected with the changes regarding political regimes and the possibility of coming to or sharing power with Islamic movements and parties hostile towards Israel. The collapse of political regimes was accompanied by failures of the ruling political parties connected with these regimes.The gap was filled by dozens of new parties, with religious and Islamic parties being particularly strong. Time will show its long-term consequences. Israel cannot afford unjustified optimism and false opinions, and that is why it has to be prepared for negative scenarios since both the country's elites and society are aware of that there may be no second chances in event of failure.

Middle East; Palestinian question; Turkey; politics and government

Likud Partisi'nin 1977 seçimleriyle iktidara gelmesi İsrail siyasi tarihinde dönüm noktası olarak görülmüş ve bu değişimin İsrail dış politikasında ve siyasi kültüründe ortaya çıkardığı politik, sosyal ve askeri dönüşümler 'İkinci İsrail' değerlendirmelerine yol açmıştır. Tezin temel iddiası Likud Partisi'nin ideolojisinden, liderlerine ve tabanına kadar partiyi var eden faktörlerin Arap-İsrail sorununa yönelik İsrail dış politikasını etkilediği ve sorunun kronikleşmesinde ve derinleşmesinde Likud'un ilk iktidar döneminin (1977-1992) etkili olduğudur. Tezde Likud Partisi'nin genelde İsrail dış politikasında özelde ise Arap-İsrail sorunundaki etkisi Neoklasik Realizm çerçevesinde analiz edilmiştir. Maddi kapasite ve güç dağılımı unsurlarının uluslararası ilişkilerde nedensel üstünlüğe sahip olduğunun altını çizen Neoklasik Realizm, bunun yanında ara değişken olarak kodladığı lider algısı, ideoloji, devlet-toplum ilişkisi, stratejik kültür ve yerel kurumlar gibi faktörlerin de karar alma süreçlerinde önemli rol oynadığını vurgulamaktadır. Bu anlamda Likud Partisi'nin Filistin'in bir bütün olarak İsrail'e ait olduğu inancı, güvenliğin askeri kapasiteyle sağlanabileceği yaklaşımı, uzlaşı karşıtlığı, barışa olan güvensizliği ve agresif yerleşim politikası; İsrail'i dış politikada ideolojik aidiyeti önceleyen ve sertlik yanlısı politikalara yönlendirmiştir. Nitekim girişilen tüm müzakare çabalarını sonuçsuz bırakan Likud Partisi; Golan Tepeleri'nin ilhakı, Kudüs'ün başkent yapılması, Irak Osirak saldırısı, Lübnan işgali, Filistinlilerin ulusal haklarının inkârı ve yasadışı yerleşimlere öncelik veren politikalarıyla sorunların daha da derinleşmesine ve hatta kronik hale dönüşmesine yol açmıştır. Likud Partisi'nin dış politikasının temel parametrelerini oluşturan bu faktörler İsrail siyasetinde ve İsrail'in Arap-İsrail çatışmasına ve Filistin sorununa yönelik politikasında çok ciddi dönüşümler yaratmış ve bugün dahi geçerliliğini koruyan sertlik yanlısı, tavizsiz ve tek taraflı yaklaşımların referans noktasını oluşturmuştur. --- Likud Party came to power in 1977, was seen as a turning point in the Israeli political history. The political, social and military transformations that caused in Israel's foreign policy and political culture labelled as "Second Israel". The main claim of the thesis is that the factors that created the party in the first ruling period of Likud (1977-1992) such as ideology, leader perception and voters profile, affected the Israeli foreign policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict which led to the chronicization and deepening of the conflict. Neoclassical Realism is selected as the theory for the examination of these policies. Neoclassical Realism gives priority to the material capacity and power distribution elements in international relations, however, it emphasizes that factors such as leader perception, ideology, state-society relationship, strategic culture, and local institutions, which they considered as intervening variables, plays an important role in decision-making processes. The policies that Likud Party pursued during its government, which idea of Palestine belongs to Israel as a whole, security can be provided with military capacity, mistrust of negotiation and aggressive settlements activities, has led Israel Foreign Policy to the acquired harsh and strict ideological position regarding Arab-Israeli conflict. As a matter of fact, Likud Party has caused the conflict to deepen and led chronicity of problem as it turned all negotiation efforts down, the annexation of the Golan Heights, change the status of Jerusalem, the Iraq Osirak attack, the Lebanese occupation, the denial of Palestinians' national rights and policies that prioritize illegal settlements. In this respect, these main parameters of the foreign policy of the Likud Party are the main reference point of uncompromising, unilateral approaches, and hawkish approaches that dominated even today's Israeli politics.

An American model of peace in the Middle East, which evolved from Kissinger's 'little steps' to the separatist agreements of Camp David, was to serve the purpose of regulating the Arab-Israeli conflict and strengthening Washington's influence. In the address delivered on January 23, 1980 (that provided the foundation for the so called 'J. Carter doctrine') the US President said that every "attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America" and thus it "will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force". The abandonment of the Nasserian tradition did not help A. Sadat to win supporters in internal matters. The protest of Nasserists and the Association of Muslim Brothers against the reconciliation with Israel resulted in a tragic attack against the Egyptian president. A. Sadat's death on October 6, 1981 was a blow for the advocates of the peace process. Whether to continue the separatist policy towards Israel or not was up to the will of the new political authorities in Egypt. ; An American model of peace in the Middle East, which evolved from Kissinger's 'little steps' to the separatist agreements of Camp David, was to serve the purpose of regulating the Arab-Israeli conflict and strengthening Washington's influence. In the address delivered on January 23, 1980 (that provided the foundation for the so called 'J. Carter doctrine') the US President said that every "attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America" and thus it "will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force". The abandonment of the Nasserian tradition did not help A. Sadat to win supporters in internal matters. The protest of Nasserists and the Association of Muslim Brothers against the reconciliation with Israel resulted in a tragic attack against the Egyptian president. A. Sadat's death on October 6, 1981 was a blow for the advocates of the peace process. Whether to continue the separatist policy towards Israel or not was up to the will of the new political authorities in Egypt.

In 2009–2017, the European Union continued its prior policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Nonetheless, taking into consideration the rapidly changing internal and international situation, this policy is becoming increasingly less effective. Problems confronting the European Union and its member states over the recent years, Brexit, the destabilization of North Africa and the Middle East, the Ukrainian crisis, the redistribution of power in the world system, to name a few – are the most significant determinants of the current EU policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Compared to other actors, the role of the European Union in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been decreasing. ; W latach 2009–2017 Unia Europejska kontynuowała swoją dotychczasową politykę wobec konfliktu izraelsko-palestyńskiego, jednak w obliczu dynamicznie zmieniających się uwarunkowań wewnętrznych i międzynarodowych polityka ta staje się coraz mniej efektywna. Problemy, z jakimi Unia Europejska i jej państwa członkowskie borykają się od kilku lat – Brexit, destabilizacja obszaru Afryki Północnej i Bliskiego Wschodu, kryzys ukraiński, zmieniający się układ sił w świecie – to najważniejsze determinanty obecnej polityki UE wobec konfliktu izraelsko-palestyńskiego. W ich wyniku rola Unii Europejskiej w rozwiązywaniu konfliktu izraelsko-palestyńskiego, na tle innych aktorów, maleje.