Suchergebnisse

This study presents the policy of Arabization in Tunisia as an example of language planning which has been used to pursue and maintain power. It argues that Arabization has been promoted only to the extent that it served the interests of the politico-economic ruling elite. After reviewing the relevant literature, the study evaluates the language situation in Tunisia in terms of the degree of implementation of Arabization in three domains: 1) education; 2) government administration; 3) the media and general use. The study shows that the official authorities have been quite inconsistent in promoting Arabization, and that they have encouraged bilingualism (Arabic and French) and biculturalism (Arab-Islamic and Western European, mainly French) much more consistently. In this light, the study analyzes the attitudes and objectives of the authorities, who represent the influential elites, as they interact with other competing elites in order to maintain power.

For centuries Islam in Asia was renowned for its adaptability to local practices and tolerance of other religions. Over the past three decades, however, fundamentalists have tried to homogenize Islam, introducing new tensions. More than any other factor, what has fuelled conflicts and divided Muslims and others in otherwise tolerant and harmonious plural societies of Asia, is the slow but steady process of the transformation of Islam in the region, from a syncretic and inclusive Islam to a puritanical and exclusivist one under the influence of ideas, norms, practices, and finances flowing from the Arab world. The 'Islam of the desert' has made inroads across the Indian Ocean. This process of homogenization and regimentation—a process I would like to call the 'Arabization' of Islam—puts greater emphasis on rituals and codes of conduct than on substance, through the Wahhabi and Salafi creeds, a rigidly puritanical branch of Islam exported from, and subsidized by, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The internationalization of Islam drew Asian Muslims to the desert and brought the desert to them. Such 'globalization of political Islam' could threaten stability throughout Asia and the world. Unfortunately, too many proponents of any form of fundamentalism rely on it as a tool, not for inspiring spirituality, but for acquiring economic or political power.

This article describes the progressive depopulation of the Arab neighborhoods of West Jerusalem following the outbreak of the fighting in late 1947. By the time the State of Israel was proclaimed on 15 May 1948, West Jerusalem already had fallen to Zionist forces. Quoting from eyewitness accounts, the author recounts the widespread looting that followed the Arab evacuation and the settlement of Jewish immigrants and Israeli government officials in the Arab houses. By the end of 1949, all of West Jerusalem's Arab neighborhoods had been settled by Israelis.

Representatives of one of the world's largest Muslim organizations, the Indonesian Nandlatul 'Ulama (NU), propagate an "Islam of the archipelago" (Islam Nusantara) that harmonizes Islamic practices and local culture. They paint a picture of a pluralist and inclusive Indonesian Islam that accommodates diverse local cultures, contrasting it with a potentially homogenizing "Arabization" - a term used in reference to the perceived ideological radicalization of Islamic lifestyle. Strikingly, in Madura, a region that is considered a stronghold of the NU, there is an affinity to "Arabness" that is not primarily dedicated to questions of the right interpretation of Islam but rather to local hierarchies, social life, political influence, and economic activities. Madurese engagement with cultural markers that are labelled as "Arab" is relatively ambivalent in nature. On the one hand, the Madurese treat "Arabness" as a symbol of Islamic piety that illustrates a special connection to the Holy Land, access to religious learnedness, and the power of blessings. On the other hand, the Madurese can be critical of Arabic culture and customs, especially Wahabist ideology. In the context of pilgrimage to the holy Muslim sites of Mecca and Medina, Madurese Muslims newly imagine and localize "Arabness". By transferring Arabic cultural markers into economic, cultural, social, and symbolic capital, Madurese Muslims make "Arabness" meaningful beyond debates about Islam Nusantara and Arabization. (Asien/GIGA)

Representatives of one of the world's largest Muslim organizations, the Indonesian Nahdlatul 'Ulama (NU), propagate an "Islam of the archipelago" (Islam Nusantara) that harmonizes Islamic practices and local culture. They paint a picture of a pluralist and inclusive Indonesian Islam that accommodates diverse local cultures, contrasting it with a potentially homogenizing "Arabization" - a term used in reference to the perceived ideological radicalization of Islamic lifestyle. Strikingly, in Madura, a region that is considered a stronghold of the NU, there is an affinity to "Arabness" that is not primarily dedicated to questions of the right interpretation of Islam but rather to local hierarchies, social life, political influence, and economic activities. Madurese engagement with cultural markers that are labelled as "Arab" is relatively ambivalent in nature. On the one hand, the Madurese treat "Arabness" as a symbol of Islamic piety that illustrates a special connection to the Holy Land, access to religious learnedness, and the power of blessings. On the other hand, the Madurese can be critical of Arabic culture and customs, especially Wahabist ideology. In the context of pilgrimage to the holy Muslim sites of Mecca and Medina, Madurese Muslims newly imagine and localize "Arabness". By transferring Arabic cultural markers into economic, cultural, social, and symbolic capital, Madurese Muslims make "Arabness" meaningful beyond debates about Islam Nusantara and Arabization.