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This article analyses currency boards from the perspective of new institutionalism, namely historical institutionalism. New institutionalism holds the view that institutions have independent, autonomous effects on the social world. Once established, institutions tend to become stronger over time due to path dependency. At the same time, the new institutionalist literature has been criticized for either ignoring or not being able to properly account for institutional change. This article pays attention to both self-enforcing and self-undermining effects generated by currency boards. Furthermore, the interaction of the currency board regime with other national institutions is analysed. After laying out the theoretical arguments, this article empirically assesses them with the analysis of three cases of currency board regimes in Estonia, Lithuania, and Argentina. One of the findings is that currency boards tend to become more popular over time. This tendency can be explained by several self-enforcing effects related to growing indebtedness in foreign currencies, currency boards' role in ensuring macroeconomic stability as well as emerging ideational consensus supporting the regime. However, currency boards also unleash self-undermining tendencies, primarily related to the increasing general indebtedness and deteriorating competitiveness. The relationship of currency boards with the broader institutional set-up proved to be important. Unlike in Lithuania and especially in Estonia, the national institutional landscape in Argentina was unfavourable for the existence of the currency board regime. This was especially evident during the economic downturn of 1998–2002 when Argentina attempted to implement the internal adjustment strategy in order to safeguard the currency board. Nevertheless, Argentina's inability to quickly adopt a major fiscal consolidation package eventually led to the demise of the currency board regime. In turn, this inability can be attributed to the lack of informal norms of fiscal prudence, decentralized nature of Argentina's political institutions, and the organization of interest groups. The analysis provided in this article thus suggests that, despite important self-enforcing effects of currency boards, they are not sufficient to bring about the major transformation of a generally unfavourable national institutional landscape.

This article analyses currency boards from the perspective of new institutionalism, namely historical institutionalism. New institutionalism holds the view that institutions have independent, autonomous effects on the social world. Once established, institutions tend to become stronger over time due to path dependency. At the same time, the new institutionalist literature has been criticized for either ignoring or not being able to properly account for institutional change. This article pays attention to both self-enforcing and self-undermining effects generated by currency boards. Furthermore, the interaction of the currency board regime with other national institutions is analysed. After laying out the theoretical arguments, this article empirically assesses them with the analysis of three cases of currency board regimes in Estonia, Lithuania, and Argentina. One of the findings is that currency boards tend to become more popular over time. This tendency can be explained by several self-enforcing effects related to growing indebtedness in foreign currencies, currency boards' role in ensuring macroeconomic stability as well as emerging ideational consensus supporting the regime. However, currency boards also unleash self-undermining tendencies, primarily related to the increasing general indebtedness and deteriorating competitiveness. The relationship of currency boards with the broader institutional set-up proved to be important. Unlike in Lithuania and especially in Estonia, the national institutional landscape in Argentina was unfavourable for the existence of the currency board regime. This was especially evident during the economic downturn of 1998–2002 when Argentina attempted to implement the internal adjustment strategy in order to safeguard the currency board. Nevertheless, Argentina's inability to quickly adopt a major fiscal consolidation package eventually led to the demise of the currency board regime. In turn, this inability can be attributed to the lack of informal norms of fiscal prudence, decentralized nature of Argentina's political institutions, and the organization of interest groups. The analysis provided in this article thus suggests that, despite important self-enforcing effects of currency boards, they are not sufficient to bring about the major transformation of a generally unfavourable national institutional landscape.

The study seeks to provide an answer to the following question: why corruption is so resistent despite a convincing progress in adopting good governance institutions worldwide? Four main explanations are discussed. The theoretical discussion is accompanied and expanded by two case studies – Argentina and Chile. Both countries are very similiar regarding their social, economic, and political development. However, the level of corruption is vastly different. The study shows that predominant explanations of corruption, namely the principal-agent model and the cultural-moral argument, do not properly adress the question of individual motivation to act partially or impartially. Thus, they lose the explanatory power. As a result, the institutional design or cultural-moral norms are overestimated, and the illusion of a rapid progress towards corruption-free governance is made. The study aims to fix the latter shortcoming. A stag hunt game is used as a heuristic tool. Game theory and historical institutionalism are combined in it. This strategy is able to show that corruption as well as its contrast – good governance – are very stable equilibria. Both equilibria are maintained through the structure of competition – interaction among individuals. This interaction is a very important part of individual motivation to follow one of the equilibria, because it determines the possibility to overcome the collective action dillema – the central problem of politics. If the mutual expectations predict a fair strategy of the others, then good governance prevails.The opposite case is corruption. However, the most significant value of the study is that it provides concrete examples. The study shows how mutual expectations were influenced by the very first stag hunt – modernization – and how different equilibria have emerged. Using the method of process tracing, the modernization of Argentina and Chile is presented. It specifies how Argentina remained in corruption while Chile reached good governance. Modernization in Chile was gradual and covered heavy industry intensive regions. These circumstances were favourable for the development of right and left wing parties, and soon a genuine party competition emerged. The most significant social groups were represented through parties, and they could cooperate. Incentives for corruption declined. Meanwhile modernization in Argentina was rapid and covered light industry intensive regions. Such modernization prevented right and left forces to organize into parties. The most significant groups remained unrepresented and defended their interests through corruption. Even if this argument suits only Latin America during 1880–1940, it still delivers a clear message. The interaction among individuals is positively influenced by a genuine party competition in which all significant groups participate. Such a competition encourages mutual trust, improves mutual expectations and creates preconditions for a good governance.

The study seeks to provide an answer to the following question: why corruption is so resistent despite a convincing progress in adopting good governance institutions worldwide? Four main explanations are discussed. The theoretical discussion is accompanied and expanded by two case studies – Argentina and Chile. Both countries are very similiar regarding their social, economic, and political development. However, the level of corruption is vastly different. The study shows that predominant explanations of corruption, namely the principal-agent model and the cultural-moral argument, do not properly adress the question of individual motivation to act partially or impartially. Thus, they lose the explanatory power. As a result, the institutional design or cultural-moral norms are overestimated, and the illusion of a rapid progress towards corruption-free governance is made. The study aims to fix the latter shortcoming. A stag hunt game is used as a heuristic tool. Game theory and historical institutionalism are combined in it. This strategy is able to show that corruption as well as its contrast – good governance – are very stable equilibria. Both equilibria are maintained through the structure of competition – interaction among individuals. This interaction is a very important part of individual motivation to follow one of the equilibria, because it determines the possibility to overcome the collective action dillema – the central problem of politics. If the mutual expectations predict a fair strategy of the others, then good governance prevails.The opposite case is corruption. However, the most significant value of the study is that it provides concrete examples. The study shows how mutual expectations were influenced by the very first stag hunt – modernization – and how different equilibria have emerged. Using the method of process tracing, the modernization of Argentina and Chile is presented. It specifies how Argentina remained in corruption while Chile reached good governance. Modernization in Chile was gradual and covered heavy industry intensive regions. These circumstances were favourable for the development of right and left wing parties, and soon a genuine party competition emerged. The most significant social groups were represented through parties, and they could cooperate. Incentives for corruption declined. Meanwhile modernization in Argentina was rapid and covered light industry intensive regions. Such modernization prevented right and left forces to organize into parties. The most significant groups remained unrepresented and defended their interests through corruption. Even if this argument suits only Latin America during 1880–1940, it still delivers a clear message. The interaction among individuals is positively influenced by a genuine party competition in which all significant groups participate. Such a competition encourages mutual trust, improves mutual expectations and creates preconditions for a good governance.

The study seeks to provide an answer to the following question: why corruption is so resistent despite a convincing progress in adopting good governance institutions worldwide? Four main explanations are discussed. The theoretical discussion is accompanied and expanded by two case studies – Argentina and Chile. Both countries are very similiar regarding their social, economic, and political development. However, the level of corruption is vastly different. The study shows that predominant explanations of corruption, namely the principal-agent model and the cultural-moral argument, do not properly adress the question of individual motivation to act partially or impartially. Thus, they lose the explanatory power. As a result, the institutional design or cultural-moral norms are overestimated, and the illusion of a rapid progress towards corruption-free governance is made. The study aims to fix the latter shortcoming. A stag hunt game is used as a heuristic tool. Game theory and historical institutionalism are combined in it. This strategy is able to show that corruption as well as its contrast – good governance – are very stable equilibria. Both equilibria are maintained through the structure of competition – interaction among individuals. This interaction is a very important part of individual motivation to follow one of the equilibria, because it determines the possibility to overcome the collective action dillema – the central problem of politics. If the mutual expectations predict a fair strategy of the others, then good governance prevails.The opposite case is corruption. However, the most significant value of the study is that it provides concrete examples. The study shows how mutual expectations were influenced by the very first stag hunt – modernization – and how different equilibria have emerged. Using the method of process tracing, the modernization of Argentina and Chile is presented. It specifies how Argentina remained in corruption while Chile reached good governance. Modernization in Chile was gradual and covered heavy industry intensive regions. These circumstances were favourable for the development of right and left wing parties, and soon a genuine party competition emerged. The most significant social groups were represented through parties, and they could cooperate. Incentives for corruption declined. Meanwhile modernization in Argentina was rapid and covered light industry intensive regions. Such modernization prevented right and left forces to organize into parties. The most significant groups remained unrepresented and defended their interests through corruption. Even if this argument suits only Latin America during 1880–1940, it still delivers a clear message. The interaction among individuals is positively influenced by a genuine party competition in which all significant groups participate. Such a competition encourages mutual trust, improves mutual expectations and creates preconditions for a good governance.

The study seeks to provide an answer to the following question: why corruption is so resistent despite a convincing progress in adopting good governance institutions worldwide? Four main explanations are discussed. The theoretical discussion is accompanied and expanded by two case studies – Argentina and Chile. Both countries are very similiar regarding their social, economic, and political development. However, the level of corruption is vastly different. The study shows that predominant explanations of corruption, namely the principal-agent model and the cultural-moral argument, do not properly adress the question of individual motivation to act partially or impartially. Thus, they lose the explanatory power. As a result, the institutional design or cultural-moral norms are overestimated, and the illusion of a rapid progress towards corruption-free governance is made. The study aims to fix the latter shortcoming. A stag hunt game is used as a heuristic tool. Game theory and historical institutionalism are combined in it. This strategy is able to show that corruption as well as its contrast – good governance – are very stable equilibria. Both equilibria are maintained through the structure of competition – interaction among individuals. This interaction is a very important part of individual motivation to follow one of the equilibria, because it determines the possibility to overcome the collective action dillema – the central problem of politics. If the mutual expectations predict a fair strategy of the others, then good governance prevails.The opposite case is corruption. However, the most significant value of the study is that it provides concrete examples. The study shows how mutual expectations were influenced by the very first stag hunt – modernization – and how different equilibria have emerged. Using the method of process tracing, the modernization of Argentina and Chile is presented. It specifies how Argentina remained in corruption while Chile reached good governance. Modernization in Chile was gradual and covered heavy industry intensive regions. These circumstances were favourable for the development of right and left wing parties, and soon a genuine party competition emerged. The most significant social groups were represented through parties, and they could cooperate. Incentives for corruption declined. Meanwhile modernization in Argentina was rapid and covered light industry intensive regions. Such modernization prevented right and left forces to organize into parties. The most significant groups remained unrepresented and defended their interests through corruption. Even if this argument suits only Latin America during 1880–1940, it still delivers a clear message. The interaction among individuals is positively influenced by a genuine party competition in which all significant groups participate. Such a competition encourages mutual trust, improves mutual expectations and creates preconditions for a good governance.

The transformation process of political system occures in today's world, too. It can be illustrated by the Color or Flower Revolutions in post-communist states. During those revolutions the authoritarian political system is changed into democratic political system. The alternation of political system shows that society is not contented with present government which is realized as corrupt and repressive. Such political transformations occured in the South America in 1970s- 1980s. During this transformations the political system of the South American countries was changed into democratic ones. But those democratic systems are not very stable and credible in nowadays like democracys in the Europe because the South American countries have many internal problems like big poverty, unstable economical situation, criminality, government corruption and etc. In this work is analysed Argentina's and Brazil's political systems transformations and influence of international actors in transformation process. Till 1980s both countries were ruled by military juntas. The rule of military governments were not stable because there were disagreements inside military juntas how to rule the countries. The permanent alternation of governments was the main reason for unstable political system and for distrust of foreign countries in Argentina and Brazil. Futhermore, there were frequent economical crises, large-sized repressions. The authoritarian regimes collapsed when in the countries started mass protests against military juntas. Those protests were strongly supported by international actors like the human rights organizations, the United Nations, by the international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In Argentina very important were international political parties, too. The democratization processes was supported by the USA although her role was very ambiguous because in 1960s-1970s the USA supported authoritarian governments. The USA was afraid of the spread of socialism ideas in the South America. The political system change in Argentina and Brazil is linked with the third wave of democratization in the world especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The most important factors in the transformation processes of political systems in both countries were internal factors like disagreements inside military juntas, social movements which were strongly supported by international actors.

The transformation process of political system occures in today's world, too. It can be illustrated by the Color or Flower Revolutions in post-communist states. During those revolutions the authoritarian political system is changed into democratic political system. The alternation of political system shows that society is not contented with present government which is realized as corrupt and repressive. Such political transformations occured in the South America in 1970s- 1980s. During this transformations the political system of the South American countries was changed into democratic ones. But those democratic systems are not very stable and credible in nowadays like democracys in the Europe because the South American countries have many internal problems like big poverty, unstable economical situation, criminality, government corruption and etc. In this work is analysed Argentina's and Brazil's political systems transformations and influence of international actors in transformation process. Till 1980s both countries were ruled by military juntas. The rule of military governments were not stable because there were disagreements inside military juntas how to rule the countries. The permanent alternation of governments was the main reason for unstable political system and for distrust of foreign countries in Argentina and Brazil. Futhermore, there were frequent economical crises, large-sized repressions. The authoritarian regimes collapsed when in the countries started mass protests against military juntas. Those protests were strongly supported by international actors like the human rights organizations, the United Nations, by the international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In Argentina very important were international political parties, too. The democratization processes was supported by the USA although her role was very ambiguous because in 1960s-1970s the USA supported authoritarian governments. The USA was afraid of the spread of socialism ideas in the South America. The political system change in Argentina and Brazil is linked with the third wave of democratization in the world especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The most important factors in the transformation processes of political systems in both countries were internal factors like disagreements inside military juntas, social movements which were strongly supported by international actors.

The transformation process of political system occures in today's world, too. It can be illustrated by the Color or Flower Revolutions in post-communist states. During those revolutions the authoritarian political system is changed into democratic political system. The alternation of political system shows that society is not contented with present government which is realized as corrupt and repressive. Such political transformations occured in the South America in 1970s- 1980s. During this transformations the political system of the South American countries was changed into democratic ones. But those democratic systems are not very stable and credible in nowadays like democracys in the Europe because the South American countries have many internal problems like big poverty, unstable economical situation, criminality, government corruption and etc. In this work is analysed Argentina's and Brazil's political systems transformations and influence of international actors in transformation process. Till 1980s both countries were ruled by military juntas. The rule of military governments were not stable because there were disagreements inside military juntas how to rule the countries. The permanent alternation of governments was the main reason for unstable political system and for distrust of foreign countries in Argentina and Brazil. Futhermore, there were frequent economical crises, large-sized repressions. The authoritarian regimes collapsed when in the countries started mass protests against military juntas. Those protests were strongly supported by international actors like the human rights organizations, the United Nations, by the international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In Argentina very important were international political parties, too. The democratization processes was supported by the USA although her role was very ambiguous because in 1960s-1970s the USA supported authoritarian governments. The USA was afraid of the spread of socialism ideas in the South America. The political system change in Argentina and Brazil is linked with the third wave of democratization in the world especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The most important factors in the transformation processes of political systems in both countries were internal factors like disagreements inside military juntas, social movements which were strongly supported by international actors.

The war found J. Kekstas in Vilnius. In March 1940, the Soviet authorities arrested him and deported to hard labors in Kirov region. Having been released as a Polish citizen in a year and a half, J. Kekstas joined the army led by gen. V. Anders and moved to Persia. Subsequently he reached Iran, Iraq, Palestine, and Egypt, took part in the military campaigns and battles, and composed poems overflowing with nostalgia for his homeland. Having been injured, he was cured in South Italy. Afterwards he experienced hardships of emigration to Argentina. In 1957, the poet became seriously ill and was half-paralyzed. Thanks to the efforts of Polish writers, he moved to Poland in 1959. J. Kekstas died in April 16, 1981 and was buried in Warsaw.

The war found J. Kekstas in Vilnius. In March 1940, the Soviet authorities arrested him and deported to hard labors in Kirov region. Having been released as a Polish citizen in a year and a half, J. Kekstas joined the army led by gen. V. Anders and moved to Persia. Subsequently he reached Iran, Iraq, Palestine, and Egypt, took part in the military campaigns and battles, and composed poems overflowing with nostalgia for his homeland. Having been injured, he was cured in South Italy. Afterwards he experienced hardships of emigration to Argentina. In 1957, the poet became seriously ill and was half-paralyzed. Thanks to the efforts of Polish writers, he moved to Poland in 1959. J. Kekstas died in April 16, 1981 and was buried in Warsaw.

The war found J. Kekstas in Vilnius. In March 1940, the Soviet authorities arrested him and deported to hard labors in Kirov region. Having been released as a Polish citizen in a year and a half, J. Kekstas joined the army led by gen. V. Anders and moved to Persia. Subsequently he reached Iran, Iraq, Palestine, and Egypt, took part in the military campaigns and battles, and composed poems overflowing with nostalgia for his homeland. Having been injured, he was cured in South Italy. Afterwards he experienced hardships of emigration to Argentina. In 1957, the poet became seriously ill and was half-paralyzed. Thanks to the efforts of Polish writers, he moved to Poland in 1959. J. Kekstas died in April 16, 1981 and was buried in Warsaw.

The war found J. Kekstas in Vilnius. In March 1940, the Soviet authorities arrested him and deported to hard labors in Kirov region. Having been released as a Polish citizen in a year and a half, J. Kekstas joined the army led by gen. V. Anders and moved to Persia. Subsequently he reached Iran, Iraq, Palestine, and Egypt, took part in the military campaigns and battles, and composed poems overflowing with nostalgia for his homeland. Having been injured, he was cured in South Italy. Afterwards he experienced hardships of emigration to Argentina. In 1957, the poet became seriously ill and was half-paralyzed. Thanks to the efforts of Polish writers, he moved to Poland in 1959. J. Kekstas died in April 16, 1981 and was buried in Warsaw.