Suchergebnisse

Why do some states agree to suspend their weapons programs in exchange for compensation while others fail to come to terms? I argue that the changing credibility of preventive war is an important determinant of arms construction. If preventive war is never an option, states can reach mutually preferable settlements. However, if preventive war is not credible today but will be credible in the future, a commitment problem results: the state considering investment faces a "window of opportunity" and must build the arms or it will not receive concessions later on. Thus, agreements fail under these conditions. I then apply the theoretical findings to the Soviet Union's decision to build nuclear weapons in 1949. War exhaustion made preventive war not credible for the United States immediately following World War II, but lingering concerns about future preventive action induced Moscow to proliferate. (International Interactions (London)/ FUB)

It is widely assumed that weak economic performance in the Soviet Union provides motivation for Soviet leaders to pursue arms negotiations in good faith. This paper argues that the reality is quite the opposite. For both political and economic considerations, the weak economy of the Soviet Union generates incentives for the Soviets to use arms control negotiations to achieve military advantages rather than to limit arms.

Theorists debate whether symmetry or asymmetry of the power balance can help bring about bargaining success. Arbitration is difficult because the 'Symmetry Theory' accepts Structuralist theoretical conventions, while the 'Asymmetry Theory' rejects such conventions. This article employs a 'Nuclear Weapons Addendum' to strengthen the Asymmetry Theory by allowing it to explain bargaining results in symmetric and asymmetric cases without dismissing Structuralist assumptions. We analyze comparative case studies of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty to argue that this modified Asymmetry Theory provides a more convincing narrative that should be considered in Structuralist discussions of international negotiation.

IF YOU CONSIDER WHY WE HAVE AN ARMS RACE AND WHY NEGOTIATIONS OVER ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT FAIL, YOU CAN TRACE THE TROUBLE TO ONE PRECEPT OF STRATEGY THAT IS COMMONLY ACCEPTED WITHOUT QUESTION: THAT THE WAY TO KEEP THE PEACE IS TO MAINTAIN A MILITARY BALANCE VIS-A-VIS YOUR POTENTIAL OPPONENT. THERE FOLLOWS FROM IT THE BELIEF THAT THE WAY TO IMPROVE STABILITY AND TO CHECK THE ARMS RACE IS TO SEEK BALANCED CONSTRAINTS ON ARMS BY NEGOTIATION. THIS PAPER EXAMINES THESE BELIEFS, WHAT IS WRONG WITH THEM AND WHAT SHOULD BE PUT IN THEIR PLACE. THE CONCLUSION REACHED IS THAT IF THE POLITICAL AIM IS THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE, THE APPROPRIATE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE, NOT BALANCE, BUT 'SUFFICIENCY' IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND 'DEFENSIVE SUPERIORITY' IN NON-NUCLEAR FORCES, TWO CONCEPTS THAT ARE DEVELOPED IN THE ANALYSIS. THE WAY TO ACHIEVE THESE AIMS AND EASE THE ARMS RACE IS BY INDEPENDENT CHANGES IN STRATEGY. CONSULTATION AND DEBATE WITH YOUR OPPONENT TO PERSUADE HIM THAT HE TOO SHOULD CHANGE STRATEGY MAY HELP TO IMPROVE SECURITY AND EASE THE LEVEL OF ARMS. NEGOTIATION OF CONDITIONAL CHANGES CAN BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE AND IS APPROPRIATE ONLY IN SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES. A BASIC PRINCIPLE ARRIVED AT IS THIS: IF THERE IS A CHANGE IN THE LEVEL OR CHARACTER OF YOUR FORCES THAT WOULD HELP YOU ATTAIN NUCLEAR SUFFICIENCY OR NON-NUCLEAR DEFENSIVE SUPERIORITY, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER YOUR OPPONENT MADE A SIMILAR MOVE, THERE ARE NO GROUNDS FOR SEEKING RECIPROCITY THROUGH NEGOTIATION. IT WILL PY: 1986