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International audience ; Is social justice congruent with democracy? Are utilitarianism and welfare economics compatible with political liberalism? Salient disagreements between welfare economics and political philosophy focus upon the choice of principles of justice in a democratic society, and sustainability thereof remains an open question. Arrow's theorem establishes the impossibility of grounding a social welfare function upon individual preferences. Harsanyi's rule-utilitarianism builds a welfare function upon Bayesian expected utility. Rawls's contractarian theory of justice upholds the priority of the right over the good. Sen's theory of social choice rejects the compatibility of the Pareto principle with political liberalism. ; La justice sociale est-elle congruente avec la démocratie ? L'utilitarisme et l'économie du bien-être sont-ils compatibles avec le libéralisme politique ? Des désaccords saillants entre économie du bien-être et philosophie politique concernent le choix des principes de justice d'une société démocratique, et la pérennité de celle-ci demeure une question ouverte. Le théorème d'Arrow établit l'impossibilité d'une fonction de bien-être social issue des préférences individuelles. L'utilitarisme de la règle d'Harsanyi fonde la fonction de bien-être sur l'utilité espérée. La théorie contractualiste de la justice de Rawls affirme la priorité du juste sur le bien. La théorie du choix social de Sen récuse la compatibilité du principe de Pareto avec le libéralisme politique.

International audience ; Is social justice congruent with democracy? Are utilitarianism and welfare economics compatible with political liberalism? Salient disagreements between welfare economics and political philosophy focus upon the choice of principles of justice in a democratic society, and sustainability thereof remains an open question. Arrow's theorem establishes the impossibility of grounding a social welfare function upon individual preferences. Harsanyi's rule-utilitarianism builds a welfare function upon Bayesian expected utility. Rawls's contractarian theory of justice upholds the priority of the right over the good. Sen's theory of social choice rejects the compatibility of the Pareto principle with political liberalism. ; La justice sociale est-elle congruente avec la démocratie ? L'utilitarisme et l'économie du bien-être sont-ils compatibles avec le libéralisme politique ? Des désaccords saillants entre économie du bien-être et philosophie politique concernent le choix des principes de justice d'une société démocratique, et la pérennité de celle-ci demeure une question ouverte. Le théorème d'Arrow établit l'impossibilité d'une fonction de bien-être social issue des préférences individuelles. L'utilitarisme de la règle d'Harsanyi fonde la fonction de bien-être sur l'utilité espérée. La théorie contractualiste de la justice de Rawls affirme la priorité du juste sur le bien. La théorie du choix social de Sen récuse la compatibilité du principe de Pareto avec le libéralisme politique.

An important objection to preference-satisfaction theories of well-being is that they cannot make sense of interpersonal comparisons. A tradition dating back to Harsanyi (J Political Econ 61(5):434, 1953) attempts to solve this problem by appeal to people's so-called extended preferences. This paper presents a new problem for the extended preferences program, related to Arrow's celebrated impossibility theorem. We consider three ways in which the extended-preference theorist might avoid this problem, and recommend that she pursue one: developing aggregation rules (for extended preferences) that violate Arrow's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives condition.

An important objection to preference-satisfaction theories of well-being is that they cannot make sense of interpersonal comparisons. A tradition dating back to Harsanyi (J Political Econ 61(5):434, 1953) attempts to solve this problem by appeal to people's so-called extended preferences. This paper presents a new problem for the extended preferences program, related to Arrow's celebrated impossibility theorem. We consider three ways in which the extended-preference theorist might avoid this problem, and recommend that she pursue one: developing aggregation rules (for extended preferences) that violate Arrow's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives condition.

AbstractThis paper has two objectives. The first is to review and address concerns raised by Hazelrigg that Arrow's impossibility theorem prevents the selection of rational aggregation methods for use in engineering trade studies. In addressing these concerns, the work of Saari is cited to establish the fact that the Borda count is the only 'non‐dictatorial' positional voting method that satisfies the criteria for a rational decision procedure while using complete information. Hence, the resulting rank ordering of the alternatives is the most reliable outcome. Several previous studies that use other aggregation methods are critiqued, and Borda is applied to examples to illustrate the differences in the outcomes. The second objective is to extend the applicability of Borda to include attributes such as cost, schedule duration, and certain technical and performance measures that are generally more reasonably described as correlated random variables. Exact Probabilities by Simulation with Borda, a method introduced by Hulkower that improves a technique by Book for determining which candidate in a trade study is the probable lowest‐cost alternative, is generalized to include multiple correlated criteria, each of which is expressed as a random variable and thus incorporates probabilistic uncertainty. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Introduction -- Part I: Rational choice as rationalizable choice. Introduction to Part I ; Essay 1. Rational choice and revealed preference ; Essay 2. Houthakker's Axiom in the theory of rational choice ; Essay 3. Suzumura-consistent rationalizability ; Essay 4. Revealed preference and choice under uncertainty -- Part II: Social choice and welfare economics. Introduction to Part II ; Essay 5. Impossibility theorems without collective rationality ; Essay 6. Remarks on the theory of collective choice ; Essay 7. Arrovian aggregation in economic environments: how much should we know about indifference surfaces? ; Essay 8. A characterization of Suzumura-consistent collective choice rules -- Part III: Equity, efficiency, and intergenerational justice. Introduction to Part III ; Essay 9. On pareto-efficiency and the no-envy concept of equity ; Essay 10. The informational basis of the theory of fair allocation ; Essay 11. Ordering infinite utility streams ; Essay 12. Multi-profile intergenerational social choice -- Part IV: Individual rights and social welfare. Introduction to Part IV ; Essay 13. On the consistency of libertarian claims ; Essay 14. Liberal paradox and the voluntary exchange of rights exercising ; Essay 15. Individual rights revisited ; Essay 16. Welfare, rights, and social choice procedure: a perspective -- Part V: Consequentialism versus nonconsequentialism. Introduction to Part V ; Essay 17. Consequences, opportunities, and procedures ; Essay 18. Characterizations of consequentialism and nonconsequentialism ; Essay 19. Consequences, opportunities, and generalized consequentialism and nonconsequentialism ; Essay 20. Welfarist-consequentialism, similarity of attitudes, and Arrow's General impossibility theorem.