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Arrow's Theorem with Weak Independence
In: Economica, Band 38, Heft 152, S. 413
Arrow's theorem under fuzzy rationality
In: Behavioral science, Band 32, Heft 4, S. 267-273
Arrow's theorem with social quasi-orderings
In: Public choice, Band 42, Heft 3, S. 235-246
ISSN: 1573-7101
Arrow's Theorem with Social Quasi-Orderings
In: Public choice, Band 42, Heft 3, S. 235
ISSN: 0048-5829
Arrow's theorem: unusual domains and extended codomains
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 3, Heft 1, S. 79-89
Arrow's Theorem: The Paradox of Social Choice
In: The Economic Journal, Band 91, Heft 361, S. 262
Some Implications of Arrow's Theorem for Voting Rights
In: 47 Stan. L. Rev. 295 (1994-1995)
SSRN
An infinite version of arrow's theorem in the effective setting
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 16, Heft 1, S. 41-48
A note on introducing a "zero‐line" of welfare as an escape route from Arrow's theorem
In: Pacific economic review, Band 6, Heft 2, S. 223-238
ISSN: 1468-0106
Since Sen's insightful analysis of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, Arrow's theorem is often interpreted as a consequence of the exclusion of interpersonal information from Arrow's framework. Interpersonal comparability of either welfare levels or welfare units is known to be sufficient for circumventing Arrow's impossibility result. But it is less well known whether one of these types of comparability is also necessary or whether Arrow's conditions can already be satisfied in much narrower informational frameworks. This note explores such a framework: the assumption of (ONC + 0), ordinal measurability of welfare with the additional measurability of a "zero‐line", is shown to point towards new, albeit limited, escape routes from Arrow's theorem. Some existence and classification results are established, using the condition that social orderings be transitive as well as the condition that social orderings be quasi‐transitive.
Arrow's Theorem: The Paradox of Social Choice. A Case Study in the Philosophy of Economics
In: The Canadian Journal of Economics, Band 15, Heft 1, S. 179
Arrow's Theorem: The Paradox of Social ChoiceAlfred F. MacKay New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980, pp. ix, 143
In: Canadian journal of political science: CJPS = Revue canadienne de science politique, Band 14, Heft 2, S. 442-443
ISSN: 1744-9324
WHY ARROW'S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM IS INVALID
In: Journal of social philosophy, Band 25, Heft 1, S. 144-159
ISSN: 1467-9833
In 1951, Kenneth Arrow published his now celebrated book Social Choice and Individual Values. Although not the first book to be written on social choice, Arrow's work ushered in a voluminous literature mostly produced by economists but by philosophers and political scientists as well. Arrow's chief result was a proof of the impossibility of a social welfare function (hereafter "SWF"). He showed that there could be no decision procedure for aggregating individual preference orderings into a grand, overall social preference ordering. The result has been hailed by some as a sort of Godel Theorem of economics. It has seemed to many to have, if not the complexity of the Godel Theorem, at least the same astonishing counter‐intuitiveness. On the other hand, some social choice theorists, while conceding the validity of the Arrow Theorem, have challenged its soundness by quarreling with one or more of its presuppositions.