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I argue that individuals may be as problematic political agents as groups are. In doing so, I draw on theory from economics, philosophy, and computer science and evidence from psychology, neuroscience, and biology. If successful, this argument undermines agency-based justifications for embracing strong notions of individual rights while rejecting the possibility of similar rights for groups. For concreteness, I critique these mistaken views by rebutting arguments given by Chandran Kukathas in his article `Are There Any Cultural Rights?' that groups lack the temporal coherence, political independence, and indivisibility of individuals. I also show how formal critiques of group agency from social science (in particular, Arrow's Impossibility Theorem) can be applied as reasonably to individuals as groups. Because these symmetries between groups and individuals undermine common implicit assumptions in political philosophy, I argue that they may have broader implications for liberal political theory, as they emphasize the importance of intrapersonal justice.

AbstractThis study investigates Suzumura consistency as a condition for the rationality of social preferences. A preference is said to be Suzumura-consistent when all preference cycles include only indifference relations. This condition is equivalent to transitivity in the presence of completeness, but, in general, it is substantially weaker than transitivity when preference is incomplete. Notably, Suzumura consistency is especially significant for a preference because it is necessary and sufficient for the existence of an ordering (transitive and complete preference) that is compatible with the original preference. This coherency property can be regarded as a requirement for potential rationality. In this study, we examine the implications of shifting from actual rationality to potential rationality in collective decision-making. We introduce the concept of an alternative-dependent coherent collection in order to obtain a representation of a class of Suzumura-consistent collective choice rules that satisfy the axioms imposed in Arrow's impossibility theorem. This demonstrates that the power structure to determine social choice can be alternative-dependent.

A contribution to a symposium, "Ten Years from Now," argues that International Organizations (IOs) like the World Bank & the International Monetary Fund will continue to fall short of their development goals over the next 10 years. Theoretical arguments that explain why IOs fail to alleviate poverty are examined, including Kenneth Arrow's (1951) impossibility theorem, & hypotheses related to coalition size, the misappropriation of resources, & the link between political reforms & development programs. Attention is also given to the impact of organizational structure within IOs on the success/failure of development programs. Although IOs produce plans for policy reforms, little is done to evaluate why previous plans were never implemented, & most IOs do not have the leverage to persuade leaders to introduce important political reforms that have the potential to jeopardize their tenures in office. It is concluded that the well-intentioned programs of IOs often "help maintain the very political regimes whose policies produce poverty" & suggested that IOs should do less rather than more over the next decade. 9 References. J. Lindroth

Recently, C. R. Plott & A. K. Sen have introduced axioms on choice functions which are necessary & sufficient for a rational choice function (alternatives are chosen as if there were maximal alternatives of a binary relation) to have a quasitransitive rationalization. The relationship of Plott's & Sen's axioms & other axioms on choice functions to quasitransitivity are shown. There are many axioms that characterize quasitransitive rationality for rational choice functions. Plott's axiom of path independence ("Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice," Econometrica, 1973, 41, 1075-1091) is characterized by Sen's "alpha" axiom ("Choice Functions and Revealed Preference," Review of Economic Studies, 1971, 38, 307-318) & an axiom introduced here. The results are applied to the question of social choice. If ethical conditions like K. J. Arrow's (see SA 0508/B6797) are placed on the social choice function in a binary form, then the impossibility theorem still obtains even if the choice function is not rational, but does satisfy Plott's condition of quasitransitivity. But if the ethical conditions are not binary in form, then ethical social choice is possible. Modified AA.

AbstractThis paper has two objectives. The first is to review and address concerns raised by Hazelrigg that Arrow's impossibility theorem prevents the selection of rational aggregation methods for use in engineering trade studies. In addressing these concerns, the work of Saari is cited to establish the fact that the Borda count is the only 'non‐dictatorial' positional voting method that satisfies the criteria for a rational decision procedure while using complete information. Hence, the resulting rank ordering of the alternatives is the most reliable outcome. Several previous studies that use other aggregation methods are critiqued, and Borda is applied to examples to illustrate the differences in the outcomes. The second objective is to extend the applicability of Borda to include attributes such as cost, schedule duration, and certain technical and performance measures that are generally more reasonably described as correlated random variables. Exact Probabilities by Simulation with Borda, a method introduced by Hulkower that improves a technique by Book for determining which candidate in a trade study is the probable lowest‐cost alternative, is generalized to include multiple correlated criteria, each of which is expressed as a random variable and thus incorporates probabilistic uncertainty. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.