These are the sheets of a presentation on June 8 2018, at the conference of Dutch and Flemish political science. These sheets give an overview, and see "Voting Theory for Democracy" (VTFD) for precision. Arrow's theorem is that four axioms would be reasonable and morally required each by themselves, but together they result into a contradiction. The deduction stands but the interpretation can be rejected. Arrow confuses voting and deciding. The axiom of "pairwise decision making" can be rejected - and Arrow's label "independence of irrelevant alternatives" is distractive. A method that many would find interesting is Borda Fixed Point. ; This is an update of the sheets of my presentation on March 16 2001 for the Social Choice group in Tilburg, The Politicologenetmaal 2018 has this link: https://politicologenetmaal.eu See Voting Theory for Democracy at https://zenodo.org/record/291985
Voting systems aggregate preferences efficiently and are often used for deciding conservation priorities. Desirable characteristics of voting systems include transitivity, completeness, and Pareto optimality, among others. Voting systems that are common and potentially useful for environmental decision making include simple majority, approval, and preferential voting. Unfortunately, no voting system can guarantee an outcome, while also satisfying a range of very reasonable performance criteria. Furthermore, voting methods may be manipulated by decision makers and strategic voters if they have knowledge of the voting patterns and alliances of others in the voting populations. The difficult properties of voting systems arise in routine decision making when there are multiple criteria and management alternatives. Because each method has flaws, we do not endorse one method. Instead, we urge organizers to be transparent about the properties of proposed voting systems and to offer participants the opportunity to approve the voting system as part of the ground rules for operation of a group.
International audience ; Is social justice congruent with democracy? Are utilitarianism and welfare economics compatible with political liberalism? Salient disagreements between welfare economics and political philosophy focus upon the choice of principles of justice in a democratic society, and sustainability thereof remains an open question. Arrow's theorem establishes the impossibility of grounding a social welfare function upon individual preferences. Harsanyi's rule-utilitarianism builds a welfare function upon Bayesian expected utility. Rawls's contractarian theory of justice upholds the priority of the right over the good. Sen's theory of social choice rejects the compatibility of the Pareto principle with political liberalism. ; La justice sociale est-elle congruente avec la démocratie ? L'utilitarisme et l'économie du bien-être sont-ils compatibles avec le libéralisme politique ? Des désaccords saillants entre économie du bien-être et philosophie politique concernent le choix des principes de justice d'une société démocratique, et la pérennité de celle-ci demeure une question ouverte. Le théorème d'Arrow établit l'impossibilité d'une fonction de bien-être social issue des préférences individuelles. L'utilitarisme de la règle d'Harsanyi fonde la fonction de bien-être sur l'utilité espérée. La théorie contractualiste de la justice de Rawls affirme la priorité du juste sur le bien. La théorie du choix social de Sen récuse la compatibilité du principe de Pareto avec le libéralisme politique.
International audience ; Is social justice congruent with democracy? Are utilitarianism and welfare economics compatible with political liberalism? Salient disagreements between welfare economics and political philosophy focus upon the choice of principles of justice in a democratic society, and sustainability thereof remains an open question. Arrow's theorem establishes the impossibility of grounding a social welfare function upon individual preferences. Harsanyi's rule-utilitarianism builds a welfare function upon Bayesian expected utility. Rawls's contractarian theory of justice upholds the priority of the right over the good. Sen's theory of social choice rejects the compatibility of the Pareto principle with political liberalism. ; La justice sociale est-elle congruente avec la démocratie ? L'utilitarisme et l'économie du bien-être sont-ils compatibles avec le libéralisme politique ? Des désaccords saillants entre économie du bien-être et philosophie politique concernent le choix des principes de justice d'une société démocratique, et la pérennité de celle-ci demeure une question ouverte. Le théorème d'Arrow établit l'impossibilité d'une fonction de bien-être social issue des préférences individuelles. L'utilitarisme de la règle d'Harsanyi fonde la fonction de bien-être sur l'utilité espérée. La théorie contractualiste de la justice de Rawls affirme la priorité du juste sur le bien. La théorie du choix social de Sen récuse la compatibilité du principe de Pareto avec le libéralisme politique.
Adopting Most Advantageous Tender (MAT) for the government procurement projects has become popular in Taiwan. As time pass by, the problems of MAT has appeared gradually. People condemn two points that are the result might be manipulated by a single committee member's partiality and how to make a fair decision when the winner has two or more. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem proposed that the best scoring method should meet the four reasonable criteria. According to these four criteria this paper constructed an "Illegitimate Scores Checking Scheme" for a scoring method and used the scheme to find out the illegitimate of the current evaluation method of MAT. This paper also proposed a new scoring method that is called the "Standardizing Overall Evaluated Score Method". This method makes each committee member's influence tend to be identical. Thus, the committee members can scoring freely according to their partiality without losing the fairness. Finally, it was examined by a large-scale simulation, and the experiment revealed that the it improved the problem of dictatorship and perfectly avoided the situation of cyclical majorities, simultaneously. This result verified that the Standardizing Overall Evaluated Score Method is better than any current evaluation method of MAT.
This study provides a critical review of the literature on public choice economics by highlighting some of its intriguing complexities to include issues like market failure and government intervention, rent-seeking activities with individual and collective interest, and Arrow's impossibility theorem. The review of existing literature shows that even when a collective goal seems to bind up the general public, individual interests might jeopardize the actualization of such goals and in some cases, certain individuals may devise means to exploit private gains from the privileges of public offices in a situation that is commonly referred to as rent-seeking. Furthermore, Arrow's impossibility theorem argues that collective interest cannot be taken as a mere aggregation of individual interest thus providing an important basis upon which various contributions in the field of public choice economics are founded. The theorem is important for the realization of today's democratic function without creating government failures and thereby helping to contribute to the reform of what the relations between the state and the economy should be for the future vis-à-vis the decision-making mechanism among political parties, voters, and the election process itself. Therefore, this present study provides an understandable review of the Arrow theorem from a futuristic perspective. ; Bu çalışma, piyasa başarısızlığı, devlet müdahalesi, bireysel ve kolektif ilgi ile rant kollama faaliyetleri ve Arrow'un imkânsızlık teoremi gibi konuları içerecek şekilde ilgi çekici bazı karmaşıklıklarını vurgulayarak kamu tercihi ekonomisi hakkındaki literatürün eleştirel bir incelemesini sunmaktadır. Mevcut literatür, bir toplumu genel olarak ilgilendiren kolektif bir hedef olsa bile, bireysel çıkarların bu kolektif hedeflerin gerçekleşmesini tehlikeye atabileceğini göstermektedir. Ayrıca bazı durumlarda; bazı bireyler, genel olarak rant kollama olarak adlandırılan bir faaliyet aracılığıyla kamu ofislerinin ayrıcalıklarıyla özel kazançlar elde etmek için araçlar yaratmaya çalışmaktadırlar. Ek olarak, Arrow'un imkânsızlık teoremi, kolektif çıkarların, sıradan anlamda varsayılabileceği gibi, sadece bireysel çıkarların salt bir toplamı olarak kabul edilemeyeceğini savunur ve bu teoremin, kamu tercihi ekonomisi alanında birçok önemli katkının üzerine kurulduğu devasa bir temel sağlamıştır. Arrow teoremi kişisel çıkarlar ile toplumsal çıkarlar arasındaki uyumsuzluklar ve kamu ekonomisinin karar alma süreçlerinde siyasi tercihlerle belirlenen isleyiş mekanizması, dolayısıyla siyasi partiler-seçmenler-seçimler çerçevesinde ortaya çıkan çelişkileri tanımlamaktadır. Arrow teoremi; günümüz demokrasi işleyişinin, kamu başarısızlıklarına yol açmaksızın gerçekleştirilmesi açısından önem taşımakta ve gelecek açısından ekonomi-devlet ilişkilerinin reform edilmesine katkı sunmaktadır. Bu nedenle amacı, gelecek perspektifinde anlaşılabilir bir Arrow teoremi eleştirisini ortaya koyabilmektir.
В статье рассматриваются вопросы исследования проблем эффективности и справедливости избирательных систем в контексте современной доктрины избирательного права. Рассмотрены попытки определения функции социального благосостояния, учитывая ограничения, отражающие основные этические аксиомы (ценностные установки участников демократического процесса), что привели Эрроу к формулировке теоремы невозможности (невозможности демократии). Рассмотрено единое правило построения коллективных решений, отвечающее четырем условиям К.-Дж. Эрроу. Отмечено, что вопросы теоремы невозможности Эрроу, а также теории социального выбора имеют методологический характер для выяснения средств избирательной инженерии при выборе определенных моделей избирательных систем, структуризации политической системы общества, обеспечение принципа конституционного государства (эффективного и справедливого управления демократического государства, связанного правом, предоставляющим доступные управленческие услуги населению). ; The article examines the research problems of efficiency and fairness of the electoral systems in the context of the modern doctrine of suffrage. Considered attempts to define the social welfare function, given the constraints that reflect the basic ethical axioms (value system participants in the democratic process) that led to the formulation of Arrow's impossibility theorem (the impossibility of democracy). Considered a single rule for constructing collective solutions corresponding to four conditions K.-Dzh. Arrow. Noted that Arrow's Impossibility Theorem questions, as well as social choice theory have to clarify the methodological nature of election engineering when specific models of electoral systems, political structuring of society, ensuring the principles of the constitutional state (the efficient and equitable management of a democratic state that is associated typically provides affordable management services to the population).
An important objection to preference-satisfaction theories of well-being is that they cannot make sense of interpersonal comparisons. A tradition dating back to Harsanyi (J Political Econ 61(5):434, 1953) attempts to solve this problem by appeal to people's so-called extended preferences. This paper presents a new problem for the extended preferences program, related to Arrow's celebrated impossibility theorem. We consider three ways in which the extended-preference theorist might avoid this problem, and recommend that she pursue one: developing aggregation rules (for extended preferences) that violate Arrow's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives condition.
An important objection to preference-satisfaction theories of well-being is that they cannot make sense of interpersonal comparisons. A tradition dating back to Harsanyi (J Political Econ 61(5):434, 1953) attempts to solve this problem by appeal to people's so-called extended preferences. This paper presents a new problem for the extended preferences program, related to Arrow's celebrated impossibility theorem. We consider three ways in which the extended-preference theorist might avoid this problem, and recommend that she pursue one: developing aggregation rules (for extended preferences) that violate Arrow's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives condition.
Kenneth Arrow is a founder of the social choice theory as well as a main developer of modern theories of market economies. Moral obligations and social norms are at the core of Arrow's ethical considerations to understand and overcome his well-known impossibility theorem of preference aggregation. Interestingly, he thinks that moral obligations and social norms are very important to overcome failures of market economies. Also, he proposed some interaction between public policies and evolution of social norms. Here, we can find a consistent and systematic thinking of Arrow's ethical considerations, which might be overlooked in spite of its importance. We believe that Arrow has political philosophy (or a theory of justice), which is quite useful to understand recent developments of behavioral economics and theories of non-market economies. Arrow's thought is totally different from Amartya Sen and John Rawls, which are dominant in modern theories of justice. Arrow's approach can shed some new lights on the subject of social justice.
Kenneth Arrow is a founder of the social choice theory as well as a main developer of modern theories of market economies. Moral obligations and social norms are at the core of Arrow's ethical considerations to understand and overcome his well-known impossibility theorem of preference aggregation. Interestingly, he thinks that moral obligations and social norms are very important to overcome failures of market economies. Also, he proposed some interaction between public policies and evolution of social norms. Here, we can find a consistent and systematic thinking of Arrow's ethical considerations, which might be overlooked in spite of its importance. We believe that Arrow has political philosophy (or a theory of justice), which is quite useful to understand recent developments of behavioral economics and theories of non-market economies. Arrow's thought is totally different from Amartya Sen and John Rawls, which are dominant in modern theories of justice. Arrow's approach can shed some new lights on the subject of social justice.
Kenneth Arrow is a founder of the social choice theory as well as a main developer of modern theories of market economies. Moral obligations and social norms are at the core of Arrow's ethical considerations to understand and overcome his well-known impossibility theorem of preference aggregation. Interestingly, he thinks that moral obligations and social norms are very important to overcome failures of market economies. Also, he proposed some interaction between public policies and evolution of social norms. Here, we can find a consistent and systematic thinking of Arrow's ethical considerations, which might be overlooked in spite of its importance. We believe that Arrow has political philosophy (or a theory of justice), which is quite useful to understand recent developments of behavioral economics and theories of non-market economies. Arrow's thought is totally different from Amartya Sen and John Rawls, which are dominant in modern theories of justice. Arrow's approach can shed some new lights on the subject of social justice.
Kenneth Arrow is a founder of the social choice theory as well as a main developer of modern theories of market economies. Moral obligations and social norms are at the core of Arrow's ethical considerations to understand and overcome his well-known impossibility theorem of preference aggregation. Interestingly, he thinks that moral obligations and social norms are very important to overcome failures of market economies. Also, he proposed some interaction between public policies and evolution of social norms. Here, we can find a consistent and systematic thinking of Arrow's ethical considerations, which might be overlooked in spite of its importance. We believe that Arrow has political philosophy (or a theory of justice), which is quite useful to understand recent developments of behavioral economics and theories of non-market economies. Arrow's thought is totally different from Amartya Sen and John Rawls, which are dominant in modern theories of justice. Arrow's approach can shed some new lights on the subject of social justice.
VOTING THEORY FOR DEMOCRACY provides the concepts and tools for democratic decision making. Voting is used not only in politics and government, but also in business - and not only in the shareholders' meetings but also in teams. Voting however can suffer from paradoxes. In some systems, it is possible that candidate A wins from B, B from C, and C from A again. This book explains and solves those paradoxes, and thereby it gives a clarity that was lacking up to now. The author proposes the new scheme of 'Pareto Majority' which combines the good properties of the older schemes proposed by Pareto, Borda and Condorcet, while it adds the notion of a (Brouwer) 'fixed point'. Many people will likely prefer this new scheme over Plurality voting which is currently the common practice. The literature on voting theory has suffered from some serious miscommunications in the last 50 years. Nobel Prize winning economists Kenneth Arrow and Amartya Sen created correct mathematical theorems, but gave incorrect verbal explanations. The author emphasises that there is a distinction between 'voting' and deciding. A voting field only becomes a decision by explicitly dealing with the paradoxes. Arrow and Sen did not solve the paradoxes and used them instead to conclude that it was 'impossible' to find a 'good' system. This however is a wrong approach. Once we understand the paradoxes, we can find the system that we want to use. This book develops the theory of games (with Rasch - Elo rating) to show that decisions can change, even dramatically, when candidates or items are added to the list or deleted from it. The use of the fixed point criterion however limits the impact of such changes, and if these occur, they are quite reasonable. Groups are advised, therefor, to spend time on establishing what budget they will vote on. You can benefit from this book also when you do not have the software. However, with the software, you will have an interactive environment in which you and your group can use the various voting schemes, or test ...
The memo consists of six papers on a common theme: applying economic analysis to subjects at the time, 1972, considered non-economic. The first paper considers changes in preferences. The second considers strategies of a regime and its opposition. The Third discusses collective decision making in the light of Arrow's possibility theorem and the voting paradox. The fourth discusses some problems of inefficiency in modern industrialised societies, and the consequences on the welfare of the population. The fifth discusses some aspects of redistributive policies, and the sixth various instances of the conflict between individual and collective rationality, particularly in the case of environmental and population policies.
