Arrow's Theorem
In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics
"Arrow's Theorem" published on by Oxford University Press.
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In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics
"Arrow's Theorem" published on by Oxford University Press.
In: Journal of the history of economic thought, Band 15, Heft 1, S. 54-71
ISSN: 1469-9656
Professor Kenneth Arrow has now added his views to the current Ricardian controversy in a provocative survey of alternative judgments regarding David Ricardo's contribution (Arrow 1991). Arrow's primary thesis appears to be that "the main thrust of Ricardo's system is a bold attempt to determine values independent of demand considerations" (Arrow 1991, p. 75), a position which has already come under attack (Caravale 1991; Hollander 1991). Our aim, however, is not to examine Ricardo's treatment of demand directly, but to question the fundamental suppositions upon which Arrow's analysis rests and the resulting conclusion that emerges.
In: Working Papers on the Profitable Economics No. 341
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Working paper
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 173, Heft 2, S. 199-210
ISSN: 1573-0964
This paper studies the relationship between the theory of distributive justice based on the concept of envy-freeness and Arrovian social choise theory. We define two conditions of No-envy and study their relationship with Arrow' scondition of independence of irrelevant alternatives, a weakening of this condition called Personal States Independence and the condition of Minimal Equity, that says that each individual must have the power to veto (in a limited sense) at least one alternative (presumably, one alternative which is particularly unfair to him).
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In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 191, Heft 8, S. 1847-1856
ISSN: 1573-0964
In: Economica, Band 38, Heft 152, S. 413
In: Behavioral science, Band 32, Heft 4, S. 267-273
In: British journal of political science, Band 46, Heft 1, S. 1-9
ISSN: 1469-2112
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and Sen's Minimal Liberalism example impose 'impossibility' roadblocks on progress. A reinterpretation explained in this article exposes what causes these negative conclusions, which permits the development of positive resolutions that retain the spirit of Arrow's and Sen's assumptions. What precipitates difficulties is surprisingly common, and it affects most disciplines. This insight identifies how to analyze other puzzles such as conflicting laws or controversies over voting rules. An unexpected bonus is that this social science issue defines a research agenda to address the 'dark matter' mystery confronting astronomers.
In: Journal of social philosophy, Band 25, Heft 1, S. 144-159
ISSN: 1467-9833
In 1951, Kenneth Arrow published his now celebrated book Social Choice and Individual Values. Although not the first book to be written on social choice, Arrow's work ushered in a voluminous literature mostly produced by economists but by philosophers and political scientists as well. Arrow's chief result was a proof of the impossibility of a social welfare function (hereafter "SWF"). He showed that there could be no decision procedure for aggregating individual preference orderings into a grand, overall social preference ordering. The result has been hailed by some as a sort of Godel Theorem of economics. It has seemed to many to have, if not the complexity of the Godel Theorem, at least the same astonishing counter‐intuitiveness. On the other hand, some social choice theorists, while conceding the validity of the Arrow Theorem, have challenged its soundness by quarreling with one or more of its presuppositions.
In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics, Band 21, Heft 1, S. 347-354
ISSN: 1935-1704
Abstract
Arrow (1950) famously showed the impossibility of aggregating individual preference orders into a social preference order (together with basic desiderata). This paper shows that it is possible to aggregate individual choice functions, that satisfy almost any condition weaker than WARP, into a social choice function that satisfy the same condition (and also Arrow's desiderata).
In this essay, we contest one of the main arguments for restricting corporate board voting to shareholders. In justifying the limitation of the franchise to shareholders, scholars have repeatedly turned to social choice theory—specifically, Arrow's theorem—to justify the exclusive shareholder franchise. Citing to the theorem, corporate law commentators have argued that lumping different groups of stakeholders together into the electorate would result in a lack of consensus and, ultimately, the lack of coherence that attends intransitive social choices, perhaps even leading the corporation to self-destruct. We contend that this argument is misguided. First, we argue that scholars have greatly overestimated the relative likelihood of cyclical outcomes with an expanded electorate. Second, even if a nascent intransitivity were to occur, there is almost no chance that it would manifest itself in inconsistent corporate decisions, much less ones that would cause a firm to self-destruct. Moreover, the exclusive shareholder franchise, like any other preference aggregation system, may avoid violating one of the conditions of Arrow's theorem only by violating another—a tradeoff that has never been explicitly acknowledged or defended. Ultimately, we argue that Arrow's theorem fails to support the limitation of corporate voting rights to shareholders.
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In: Mathematics of Social Choice, S. 83-91