Suchergebnisse

The EU has concluded the Association Agreements (AAs) with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. These are very ambitious, complex and comprehensive legal treaties. The AAs have a dual purpose: to enable political cooperation and economic integration with the EU and promote modernization of the partner countries. The key instrument in achieving these goals is the 'export of the acquis': the partner countries have taken on extensive, binding commitments to adopt the vast sways of the acquis. In this paper, however, we argue that the transformative role of the acquis on its own have not been tested and hence should not be overstated ex ante. In our view, for the AAs to achieve their objectives, it is imperative to recognise this underlying challenge and develop strategies to address the fundamental 'commitment-capacity gap' in the partner countries. Against this backdrop, we investigate to what extent EU's strategy focuses on the narrowly defined legal approximation versus broader support for strengthening state capacity. In the empirical part of the paper we examine specific measures adopted to close the 'commitment-capacity' gap of the partner country. Our analyses indicate that only in the case of Ukraine have some deliberate, pro-active adaptations taken place. The dramatic events of 2014 and Russia's punitive measures against Ukraine prompted the EU to provide more tailored and flexible assistance to ensure support for institutional reforms, as a precondition for legal approximation. In Moldova, the EU has confronted the fundamental weakness of the state only as a result of the 2014 banking scandal. In Georgia, it seems that the EU is conducting 'business as usual', although there is some early evidence that it has started to take into account the developmental needs of the partner country. The limited appreciation of the challenges and resulting adaptions so far has implications in terms of the implementation of the AA and, more importantly, the actual transformative power of the EU in the Eastern neighbourhood.

The first attempt to secure an association agreement between the European Union (EU) and the Mercosur ended unsuccessfully in October 2004. In 2010, the EU launched a second attempt to reach an association agreement with Mercosur. This second attempt to secure an association agreement presented new obstacles, including: the current economic crisis; the accession of ten new member state countries; the restrictions Argentina has imposed on EU exports; the lack of progress made in terms of developing Mercosur into an integrated political-economic.This paper argues that the association agreement can more accurately be explained as being the result of Spain and Portugal particular interest, and the use of among other actions the "momentum" created by the Spanish presidency of the EU.

The article focuses on the features of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and the economic consequences of its implementation for Ukraine. The impact on foreign trade, export–import component of trade with the EU, problems and prospects for introducing European standards in Ukraine are determined. The study hypothesises that the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement has worsened the already weak economic situation in Ukraine and led to a reorientation of Ukraine's foreign trade with a simultaneous loss of markets to which Ukraine exported high value-added products and their replacement for EU markets where only raw materials are exported. It also led to a loss of more than a quarter of its own industrial production and the gradual transformation of Ukraine into a raw material appendage of Europe.

Autor reprezentuje opinię, że do czasu rewolucji w Kijowie (Euromajdan) na przełomie 2013/2014 r. Niemcy nie interesowali się Ukrainą. Próby zacieśnienia kontaktów z Kijowem blokowane były przez Moskwę. System oligarchiczny panujący w tym kraju zniechęcał również UE do podejmowania wobec Kijowa daleko idących zobowiązań. Dopiero po zajęciu Krymu przez Rosję Niemcy się uaktywnili i dzięki ich pomocy doszło do zawarcia przez Unię Europejską umowy stowarzyszeniowej z Ukrainą. ; The author represents the opinion that before the revolution in Kiev (Euromaidan) at the turn of 2013/2014 Germany had not been interested in Ukraine. Attempts to establish closer contacts with Kiev were blocked by Moscow. The oligarchic system prevailing in the country discouraged the EU from making solemn commitments to Kiev. It was only after the Russian occupation of Crimea that Germany became more active, and with its help the association agreement between the European Union and Ukraine was concluded.

The Republic of Albania is committed to respect the general principles of democracy and fundamental human rights of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, and itself commits to promote cooperation and good neighbourhood relations with countries of the region, through signing a number of bilateral and multilateral agreements. In the framework of interaction and intensification of relations with the European Union, in view of democratization and transformation of the Albanian society, in accordance with European values and principles, it signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement which clearly determined purposes and priorities that will be kept in mind by the Albanian state on its path towards the European Union. This paper aims to present the approach of the Albanian environmental legislation with EU environmental law framework to identify to what extent this legislation is approximate. The results achieved are that Albania still needs to do more in the process of harmonization of legislation with European legislation and its implementation. Overall, preparations in the field of environment are at an early stage, highlighting the shortcomings of administrative capacity and funds.

This paper examines the prospects and feasibility of using the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU as a roadmap for reorienting the Ukrainian brown economy toward a green economy, making use of green financial instruments in the process. The first chapter is dedicated to the concept of green financial policy as well as its main fiscal and market instruments. The second chapter explores in detail the state of climate-related affairs in Ukraine, the country's commitments to numerous international environmental agreements as well as the role of the EU Association Agreement and its place in the Ukrainian economic context. The third chapter considers the political, economic and social measures required to establish a green financial policy. Our central findings are as follows: (1) Although Ukraine has been making progress towards a green financial policy in recent years, there is no doubt that the country needs technical and financial assistance from its European partners. The Association Agreement between Ukraine and the countries of the European Union provides an essential basis for building a green economy in Ukraine. (2) Despite efforts to mobilise internal green financial resources, the Ukrainian Government is struggling with what has already been achieved and is at a crossroads in moving in a different direction. For this reason, local and even non-governmental organisations in Ukraine today have often a greater direct influence on the process of building a green economy than the government itself. Two promising examples of Ukrainian companies seeking a green reputation are the Ukrainian Green Bank (Ukrgasbank) and the large energy company DTEK.

The recent Association Agreement signed between the European Union and Central American countries contains important intellectual property provisions. Some of these provisions have been inserted in the treaty to meet Central American states' needs, especially with reference to technology transfer issues, the protection of public health and the protection of genetic resources and traditional knowledge.