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The article proposes a set of tax administration performance measures and contrasts them with measures actually used by the Chilean tax administration agency. The goals assumed for the tax administration agency (TA) are to maximize tax revenue collection and provide quality services to taxpayers. Ideal performance measures (PMs) would measure the deviation of actual outcome from a best-practice standard, given the value of all variables affecting organisation performance that are outside management control. The key challenge is to build and calculate these best-practice outcomes. In Chile the PM in use, for the first goal, is the ratio of actual to potential tax revenue collection. This PM does adjust revenue collection for variations in the tax structure and rate, but it fails to control other variables that affect performance such as the TA budget and per capita income. The PM in use, for the second goal, is taxpayer satisfaction measured through sample surveys. This seems the appropriate PM, as quality of taxpyer services depends directly on the TA efforts to improve them. (InWent/DÜI)

Kritik an der geplanten Restrukturierung des Rundfunks sowie an der Aufnahme von Mitgliedern verschiedener Nachrichtendienste in die hierfür eingesetzte Untersuchungskommission. Nach Meinung des Autors will die Regierung nur ihre Kontrolle über den Rundfunk verstärken. Auflistung der Forderungen und Vorschläge des ANC. (DÜI-Med)

Als die NRM-Regierung 1986 an die Macht kam, stand eine Reform der politischen Institutionen, die auf eine rechtschaffene Ausübung ihrer Aufgaben ("accountability") verpflichtet werden sollten, ganz oben auf der Agenda. Die Verfassung von 1995 sollte so u.a. der Korruptionsbekämpfung dienen. Der Autor stellt die Diskussion um die Stärkung der öffentlichen Institutionen in einen historischen und theoretischen Kontext und analysiert vor diesem Hintergrund die Vorschläge zur Verfassung sowie die sich in ihr schließlich durchsetzenden Interessen. Er diskutiert abschließend die Frage, welche Wirkung die Konstitutionalisierung von Anti-Korruptionsvorkehrungen in der Verfassung auf die ugandische Ökonomie hat. (DÜI-Sbd)

This paper models the process of regulatory agency design, focusing on the role of credibility. The government is constrained in the sense that it must create regulatory institutions that allow it to commit to not administratively expropriate investors. The model explains both the preference of the agency head chosen by the government as well as the optimal level of statutory control. The authors argue that in Brazil this trade-off between credibility and control of the agencies is key to understanding the specific regulatory institutions that have been chosen. Comparative static results are derived to examine how changes in some key variables affect the design of the agencies, providing us with a set of hypotheses for comparing the design of five different agencies created to regulate industries with very different characteristics. Although these agencies were initially created under very similar designs, they are expected to evolve in ways that accord with the theory of the authors. (Rev Econ Polit/DÜI)