Suchergebnisse

Following the 1948 Bucarest resolution of the COMINFORM, better known as Information Office (TI) the situation between Yugoslavia and the neighbouring peoples" democracies dramatically worsened. However secret data collection and network organisation between the opposing parties started much earlier. Tito was in an advantageous position concerning intelligence because in the framework of the Allied Control Commission he had a military mission working in Hungary. The representatives of the mission had fruitful relationship with important Hungarian political and military personalities. After the acceptance of the Soviet dictate mapping the foreign relationships, internal situation, industrial capacity, stocks of raw materials, and military preparedness of the country led by Tito the "main evil", the "dog of the imperialists" had an important place in the activities of the secret services of the peace camp.

The Repatriation Campaigns of People's Democracies 1954–1956 During the Cold War the intention to gain political influence over migrant groups (and to entice them to come home), or to retain it (and to successfully integrate them into society) was part of the foreign-policy struggle between the two opposing power blocks. The Post-Stalin Soviet foreign policy has thrown itself into this political struggle with a remarkably flexible institutional and political-ideological aim. The Eastern European small and medium allies have followed the example of "the big brother" within their own capacities. The Hungarian foreign policy was particularly adept in this at the time whose technics of temptation to lure migrants home from abroad formed the basis of the similar or renewed effort of the Kádár government from the end of 1956 onward. ; The Repatriation Campaigns of People's Democracies 1954–1956 During the Cold War the intention to gain political influence over migrant groups (and to entice them to come home), or to retain it (and to successfully integrate them into society) was part of the foreign-policy struggle between the two opposing power blocks. The Post-Stalin Soviet foreign policy has thrown itself into this political struggle with a remarkably flexible institutional and political-ideological aim. The Eastern European small and medium allies have followed the example of "the big brother" within their own capacities. The Hungarian foreign policy was particularly adept in this at the time whose technics of temptation to lure migrants home from abroad formed the basis of the similar or renewed effort of the Kádár government from the end of 1956 onward.

In 1988-1989 a stream of East Germans sought refugee in Hungary at the Embassy of West Germany in Budapest. The three countries taking part in the issue made different solutions to deal with the increasing problem. The East German leadership tried to call back the refugees and calm down the emigration process, but it had lost its confidence. West Germany tried to solve the problem not only on the level of consulship but exten-sively, in part with recognizing the status those waiting for West German citizenship and those for refugee status - without any success. In the interest of the resolution and bring the Hungarian leadership to their point of view, they tried to make use of the international organizations. However, the Hungarian leadership made efforts to stay out of the issue to get the two German states make an agreement. But there was no chance for that so Buda-pest gave up its quasi neutrality and tried to solve the problem opening the border by avoiding Hungary to turn into a refugee camp of the region. Besides making this ad hoc arrangement, the whole issue needed more radical crisis management, not only in Hungary.