Suchergebnisse

Tijdens de Eerste Wereldoorlog pleegden de oorlogvoerenden op grote schaal inbreuk op de rechten van neutrale partijen zoals die waren vastgesteld in internationale verdragen. Zowel de Geallieerden als de Centrale mogendheden oefenden druk uit op de neutralen om hun beleid te hunner gunste aan te passen. In de ruim vier jaar die de oorlog duurde, nam die druk zo sterk toe, dat de neutralen zich met handen en voeten gebonden voelden. Ruim vijftig jaar geleden stelde Nils rvik dat deze minachting van het internationale recht, gecombineerd met de betrekkelijke zwakte van de Europese neutrale staten, het einde betekende van de traditionele politieke neutraliteit, een begrip dat hij gelijkstelde met niet-gebondenheid en afzijdigheid. Dit boek bespreekt die stelling in het licht van nieuw vergelijkend onderzoek in Scandinavië, Nederland, Spanje, Argentinië en de VS. Het resultaat is de eerste Engelstalige vergelijkende studie naar neutraliteit tijdens WWI. De opstellen behandelen niet alleen meerdere landen, maar ook meerdere aspecten van het neutraliteitsconcept

The subject of this study is the strategic cooperation of the permanent members in the Security Council in the period 1946 2000. Because of their right of veto the cooperation of the permanent members has a significant influence on the functioning of the Council. The most important aspects of the cooperation that were investigated are the intensity of the cooperation and the ef-fectiveness of this cooperation in preventing and ending wars. To investigate these aspects, for both the intensity and the effectiveness measuring instruments were constructed. These measuring instruments were based on comprehensive sets of so-called 'leading indicators' and statistical methods and techniques. The intensity of the cooperation increased gradually from 1946 until 1990 (the end of the Cold War). Then it started to increase rapidly until 1996. From 1996 a slight decrease can be discer-ned. The strong increase in the strategic cooperation of the permanent members in the security Council can be established in all the majors forms of cooperation in the Council: the numbers of adopted strategic resolutions and presidential statements, the numbers of employed means (like peacekeeping missions and enforcement actions) and the amounts of money that were spent on peacekeeping activities. Further it was established that the response times of the Council regarding potential and waged wars dropped significantly since the end of the Cold War. The effectiveness of the cooperation of the permanent members in the Council was, insofar this was measurable with the applied method, not good for many years, but after the Cold War a clear improvement can be discerned. This goes for the prevention of wars, as well as for post war peacebuilding and the ending of wars. Also the numbers of potential and waged wars in which the Council not intervened dropped significantly since the end of the Cold War, as well as the use of vetoes. The large number of potential and waged wars in which the Council did not intervene during the Cold War was nearly exclusively caused by 'non decisions' (the non placing of wars on the agenda), and not by the use of vetoes by permanent members, as is often assumed in literature. Further, a comparison of two phase classifications of the Cold War showed that the great powers, even when there are great tensions among them, are prepared to cooperate in the Security Council to resolve strategic matters, if they consider this in their interest. Analyses of the adopted strategic resolutions during the Cold War revealed that cooperation here was nearly exclusively limited to issues that were not core issues of the Cold War. From this it can be concluded that cooperation against third party states was a basis of cooperation of the great powers in the Security Council. Finally, the results of this study show clearly that the Security Council was regarded and used to a large extent by the permanent members in the period 1946 2000 as an instrument of foreign policy to pursue their national interests, and not as an instrument of the world community to prevent and end wars.