Suchergebnisse

This article asks new questions about the U.S.-Australian alliance at the height of the Cold War. Looking at Lyndon B. Johnson's visit to Australia in October 1966 -- the first time a serving U.S. president had set foot in the country -- the article contends that Johnson's presence brought Australian and U.S. approaches to the Cold War into sharp relief, shedding new light on the policies of both countries, especially as they grappled with the ongoing conflict in Vietnam. Although many Australian historians have claimed that this inaugural visit by a U.S. president exposed the alliance between the two countries as that of an imperial power and a colony, a closer look at reactions to the visit reveals a much more complex picture. The article challenges the widely held assumption that Johnson's trip put the final ceremonial gloss on Australia's exit from the bonds of the British Empire and heralded its entry into a U.S.-dominated global order. Adapted from the source document.

This article asks new questions about the U.S.-Australian alliance at the height of the Cold War. Looking at Lyndon B. Johnson's visit to Australia in October 1966—the first time a serving U.S. president had set foot in the country—the article contends that Johnson's presence brought Australian and U.S. approaches to the Cold War into sharp relief, shedding new light on the policies of both countries, especially as they grappled with the ongoing conflict in Vietnam. Although many Australian historians have claimed that this inaugural visit by a U.S. president exposed the alliance between the two countries as that of an imperial power and a colony, a closer look at reactions to the visit reveals a much more complex picture. The article challenges the widely held assumption that Johnson's trip put the final ceremonial gloss on Australia's exit from the bonds of the British Empire and heralded its entry into a U.S.-dominated global order.

This article challenges the widely‐accepted view that Australia's strategic relationship with the USA during the period 1945–69 thwarted the full development of Australian nationhood and, in so doing, formed an obstacle to Australia's accommodation with its region. It argues that the most influential perspectives on the subject place too much emphasis on the 1940s as a watershed in Australian foreign policy history, exaggerate differences between Labor and conservative policies, fail to appreciate that the pursuit of Australian interests was central to Australian policy during this period, and exaggerate the limitations that ANZUS imposed upon Australian freedom of action. Not a thwarted nationalism but flawed understanding of the limitations and possibilities of the US alliance as a vehicle for Australian interests shaped Australian government policies during this period.