Suchergebnisse

Rarely an economic concept has been so much ill-defined and yet promoted than the concept of competition. Depending on the school of thought, competition means either a dynamic process that creates innovations or a market structure that assures low prices and homogeneous products. But these various conceptions, mutually contradictory, are used together in order to praise the benefits of a norm that makes competition the pivot for a harmonious self-regulation of markets. There is however a clear "impossible trinity" in this vision, as the three objectives of productive emulation, effective self-regulation and consumer maximization appear mutually incompatible. Moreover, clarifying the concept of competition may help to question the Neoclassical conception of markets and its supply curve. ; Rarement concept économique n'a été autant diffusé et autant mal défini que le concept de concurrence. Selon les écoles de pensée la concurrence relève soit d'un processus dynamique porteur d'innovations, soit d'une structure de marché garantissant des prix faibles et des produits homogènes. Or, ces deux visions, contradictoires entre elles, sont utilisées ensemble pour vanter les bienfaits d'une norme qui fait de la concurrence le pivot d'une autorégulation harmonieuse des marchés. Il y a là cependant un véritable " triangle d'incompatibilités ", puisque les trois objectifs assignés à la politique de la concurrence que sont l'émulation productive, l'autorégulation performante et la maximisation du bien-être des consommateurs apparaissent incompa¬tibles entre eux. Aussi la clarification du concept de concurrence pourrait être l'occasion d'une remise en question de la conception néoclassique des marchés et de sa courbe d'offre.

Problem setting. In different epochs, the state-building processes in Ukraine had characteristic features that should be taken into account today. The achievements of the Central Rada, the Hetmanate, the Directory, and the Soviet government in Ukraine reveal the complex external and internal circumstances of state-building. Political leaders of this period pursued their own principles of governance, often ignoring the lessons of the past. Under each government, there were different views among the political electorate on this issue, which did not always reflect the interests of the people of Ukraine, and important decisions were generally made to please Western Europe.Recent research and publications analysis. Historical events of the early XXth century in Eastern Galicia are interesting for researchers of various specialities. In particular, V. Velykochyi, L. Volosianko, Yu. Zaitsev, S. Kobuta, O. Krasivskyi, M. Lytvyn, K. Mytsan, I. Pater, H. Poslavska, O. Rublov, O. Reient, Yu. Slyvka, V. Soldatenko, I. Soliar and others.Highlighting previously unsettled parts of the general problem. Modern problems of state-building in Ukraine and the participation of representatives of national minorities in them need a thorough scientific substantiation. In this regard, the direction of previously unresolved issues concerning the current state-building practices of the past years is singled out.Taking into account the lessons of national history, identifying the relationship between historical experience and modern problems, ensuring certain heredity, combining Ukrainian achievements with the achievements of world practice of state-building determines the topicality of the problem.Paper main body. Meaningful experience of state-building must be taken into account when reforming modern state structures and, in particular, regarding the definition of powers, tasks, cooperation of various branches of government. Nevertheless, the events of 1917 – 1920ies haven't been studied enough, because the understanding of the achievements and miscalculations of Ukrainian state-building of the revolutionary era would help to outline the strategic understanding of Ukraine's tasks at the present stage.In October 1918 after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Ukrainians of Western Ukraine began preparations to create their own independent state. In the western Ukrainian lands, although the state revival took place under the significant influence of the events in the Dnieper region, in almost all aspects the desire of Western Ukrainians to gain state independence was radically different from the attempts of Eastern Ukrainians.In a short time, the West Ukrainian People's Republic managed to create a fairly effective system of public administration, based on the constitutional practice of Austria.Already in the first months in Western Ukraine, central and local public administration bodies were formed: the Ukrainian National Council, the State Secretariat, State Secretaries, County National Councils, County Commissioners, Public and City Councils, and Public and City Commissioners.The courts were independent of other branches of government, according to the law of November 21, 1918, and the Highest State Court in Lviv, following the Austrian model, was the Supreme court institution.The West Ukrainian People's Republic managed to ensure stability and order on its territory, despite the war, and it was even passed the Law on Land (April 14, 1919) and introduced its own currency – hryvnia and karbovantsi. Prompt and effective creation of public administration is a unique achievement in the whole of Eastern Europe. It was an ideal model of a modern European democratic state governed by the rule of law – the result of the propensity of Galicians to social organization, which developed significantly in the pre-war decade.The Act of Unity became a powerful manifestation of the will of Ukrainians to ethnic and territorial consolidation, evidence of their dynamic self-identification, and the formation of a political nation.Conclusions of the research and prospects for further studies. The experience of Ukrainian state-building is important for today, as it makes it possible to anticipate similar situations and avoid mistakes. The West Ukrainian People's Republic has left a noticeable mark in the development of Ukrainian national statehood. For the first time since the Galician-Volyn era, Western Ukrainians gained national independence. Important reforms have been carried out in many spheres of public life. An effective system of central and local authorities and administration, health care, education, publishing, and a capable Ukrainian Galician Army was created.The main achievement of the events of 1917 – 1920 was the revival of the idea of Ukrainian statehood and national-state consciousness of the population of Ukraine, and a new generation of Ukrainian intellectuals picked up the concept of the national-state building. ; Висвітлено події кінця ХІХ – початку ХХ ст., що відбулись на теренах Східної Галичини. Розглянуто становлення держави, законодавче формулювання важливості встановлення меж національного та етнічного структурування населення за відсотковим складом представників національних меншин у Західноукраїнській Народній Республіці (далі – ЗУНР) та юридичне обґрунтування перспектив українського етносу як титульного та національних меншин щодо представництва у структурах державного апарату та місцевого самоврядування. Досліджено, що процеси державoтвoрення ЗУНР початку ХХ ст. переконливо вказують на наявність і готовність українства власними силами будувати свою державу та управлінські структури, які у той період вражали досконалістю.

Problem setting. In different epochs, the state-building processes in Ukraine had characteristic features that should be taken into account today. The achievements of the Central Rada, the Hetmanate, the Directory, and the Soviet government in Ukraine reveal the complex external and internal circumstances of state-building. Political leaders of this period pursued their own principles of governance, often ignoring the lessons of the past. Under each government, there were different views among the political electorate on this issue, which did not always reflect the interests of the people of Ukraine, and important decisions were generally made to please Western Europe.Recent research and publications analysis. Historical events of the early XXth century in Eastern Galicia are interesting for researchers of various specialities. In particular, V. Velykochyi, L. Volosianko, Yu. Zaitsev, S. Kobuta, O. Krasivskyi, M. Lytvyn, K. Mytsan, I. Pater, H. Poslavska, O. Rublov, O. Reient, Yu. Slyvka, V. Soldatenko, I. Soliar and others.Highlighting previously unsettled parts of the general problem. Modern problems of state-building in Ukraine and the participation of representatives of national minorities in them need a thorough scientific substantiation. In this regard, the direction of previously unresolved issues concerning the current state-building practices of the past years is singled out.Taking into account the lessons of national history, identifying the relationship between historical experience and modern problems, ensuring certain heredity, combining Ukrainian achievements with the achievements of world practice of state-building determines the topicality of the problem.Paper main body. Meaningful experience of state-building must be taken into account when reforming modern state structures and, in particular, regarding the definition of powers, tasks, cooperation of various branches of government. Nevertheless, the events of 1917 – 1920ies haven't been studied enough, because the understanding of the achievements and miscalculations of Ukrainian state-building of the revolutionary era would help to outline the strategic understanding of Ukraine's tasks at the present stage.In October 1918 after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Ukrainians of Western Ukraine began preparations to create their own independent state. In the western Ukrainian lands, although the state revival took place under the significant influence of the events in the Dnieper region, in almost all aspects the desire of Western Ukrainians to gain state independence was radically different from the attempts of Eastern Ukrainians.In a short time, the West Ukrainian People's Republic managed to create a fairly effective system of public administration, based on the constitutional practice of Austria.Already in the first months in Western Ukraine, central and local public administration bodies were formed: the Ukrainian National Council, the State Secretariat, State Secretaries, County National Councils, County Commissioners, Public and City Councils, and Public and City Commissioners.The courts were independent of other branches of government, according to the law of November 21, 1918, and the Highest State Court in Lviv, following the Austrian model, was the Supreme court institution.The West Ukrainian People's Republic managed to ensure stability and order on its territory, despite the war, and it was even passed the Law on Land (April 14, 1919) and introduced its own currency – hryvnia and karbovantsi. Prompt and effective creation of public administration is a unique achievement in the whole of Eastern Europe. It was an ideal model of a modern European democratic state governed by the rule of law – the result of the propensity of Galicians to social organization, which developed significantly in the pre-war decade.The Act of Unity became a powerful manifestation of the will of Ukrainians to ethnic and territorial consolidation, evidence of their dynamic self-identification, and the formation of a political nation.Conclusions of the research and prospects for further studies. The experience of Ukrainian state-building is important for today, as it makes it possible to anticipate similar situations and avoid mistakes. The West Ukrainian People's Republic has left a noticeable mark in the development of Ukrainian national statehood. For the first time since the Galician-Volyn era, Western Ukrainians gained national independence. Important reforms have been carried out in many spheres of public life. An effective system of central and local authorities and administration, health care, education, publishing, and a capable Ukrainian Galician Army was created.The main achievement of the events of 1917 – 1920 was the revival of the idea of Ukrainian statehood and national-state consciousness of the population of Ukraine, and a new generation of Ukrainian intellectuals picked up the concept of the national-state building. ; Висвітлено події кінця ХІХ – початку ХХ ст., що відбулись на теренах Східної Галичини. Розглянуто становлення держави, законодавче формулювання важливості встановлення меж національного та етнічного структурування населення за відсотковим складом представників національних меншин у Західноукраїнській Народній Республіці (далі – ЗУНР) та юридичне обґрунтування перспектив українського етносу як титульного та національних меншин щодо представництва у структурах державного апарату та місцевого самоврядування. Досліджено, що процеси державoтвoрення ЗУНР початку ХХ ст. переконливо вказують на наявність і готовність українства власними силами будувати свою державу та управлінські структури, які у той період вражали досконалістю.

Oswald Menghin, Catedrático de Prehistoria del Hombre de la Universidad de Viena entre 1922-1945, fue partidario de la unidad de Austria con Alemania y simpatizante con ideas del NSDAP sobre la necesidad de evitar una mezcla racial entre arios y judíos. Durante su etapa como Catedrático-Residente en la Universidad de Fouad en El Cairo entre 1930-1933, por contacto con Hermann Junker, radicalizó sus puntos de vista y redactó su libro Espíritu y sangre. Principios básicos de raza, lengua, cultura y nación. Su etapa como Rector en el curso 1935-1936 le catapultó a la política como miembro del consejo directivo del partido fascista austriaco, Vaterländische Front, entre 1936-1937 y su posterior nombramiento como Ministro de Educación entre marzo y mayo de 1938, justo después de la invasión de Hitler de Austria. Siendo Ministro, solicitó su ingreso en el NSDAP, que no se aceptó hasta junio de 1940, por su pertenencia previa a organizaciones católicas secretas. Menghin entró en contacto con Martínez Santa-Olalla, después de la celebración del Jubileo del Instituto de Morfología Cultural de Frankfurt en junio y julio de 1938. A raíz de una estancia de investigación de Almagro Basch en Alemania y Austria en enero y febrero de 1942, y la posterior visita a Barcelona de Menghin en junio de 1942, optó por distanciarse de Martínez Santa-Olalla, no visitando Madrid, cortando la relación epistolar e informando negativamente sobre él a las SS-Ahnenerbe. Prisionero en dos campos de concentración norteamericanos entre mayo de 1945 y febrero de 1947, Menghin huyó a la Argentina en 1948, viajando poco después su mujer y su hija. En Argentina fue apoyado por José Imbelloni, director del Museo Etnográfico de la Universidad de Buenos Aires desde 1947, que lo contrató como investigador sin docencia. También recibió el apoyo de Martínez Santa-Olalla a través del Embajador de España, José María de Areilza, y del profesor de historia en la Universidad de Buenos Aires, Claudio Sánchez-Albornoz. Menghin no pudo impartir docencia hasta 1953 y solo consolidó su puesto una vez su proceso penal fue cancelado en diciembre de 1956, obteniendo en 1957, con 69 años, el puesto de Profesor Interino de Prehistoria de la Universidad Nacional de La Plata y en 1958, la Cátedra de Prehistoria General y del Viejo Mundo en la Universidad de Buenos Aires, donde se jubiló en 1968, con 80 años ; Oswald Menghin, Professor of Prehistoric Man at the University of Vienna from 1922-45, supported the unity of Austria with Germany, and a sympathizer about the NSDAP ideas on the need to avoid racial mixing between Aryans and Jews. During his time as Professor at the University of Fouad in Cairo from 1930-33 he came into contact with Hermann Junker. This radicalized Menghin's views and, as a result, he wrote his book, Spirit and Blood. The Basic Principles of Race, Language, Culture and Nation. His time as Rector of the University of Viena from 1936 to 1937 catapulted him into politics: he was a board member of the Austrian fascist party, Vaterländische Front from 1936 to 1937 and was appointed Minister of Education between March and May 1938, just after Hitler's invasion of Austria. As Minister, he applied for membership in the NSDAP, but because his prior membership in secret Catholic organizations, it was not accepted until June 1940. Menghin was in contact with Martinez Santa-Olalla, after the celebration of the Jubilee of the Institute for Cultural Morphology at Frankfurt in June and July 1938. After Almagro Basch's research period in Germany and Austria in January and February 1942 and his own visit to Barcelona in June 1942, however, Menghin chose to distance from Martinez Santa-Olalla, not visiting Madrid, cutting the epistolary relationship and reporting negatively about him to the SS-Ahnenerbe After being imprisoned in two American concentration camps between May 1945 and February 1947, Menghin fled to Argentina in 1948, followed shortly afterwards by his wife and daughter. In Argentina Menghin was supported by Jose Imbelloni, director of the Ethnographic Museum at the University of Buenos Aires since 1947, who hired him as a researcher without teaching. He also received support from Martinez Santa-Olalla through the Spanish Ambassador, Jose Maria de Areilza, and from the Professor of History at the University of Buenos Aires, Claudio Sanchez-Albornoz. Menghin was not permitted to give lectures until 1953, and only consolidated his position when his criminal trial was cancelled in December 1956. In 1957 at the age of 69, he obtained the position of Acting Professor of Prehistory at the National University of La Plata. In 1958, Menghin was appointed Professor in General and Old World Prehistory at the University of Buenos Aires, where he retired in 1968, aged 80

Oswald Menghin, Professor of Prehistoric Man at the University of Vienna from 1922-45, supported the unity of Austria with Germany, and a sympathizer about the NSDAP ideas on the need to avoid racial mixing between Aryans and Jews. During his time as Professor at the University of Fouad in Cairo from 1930-33 he came into contact with Hermann Junker. This radicalized Menghin's views and, as a result, he wrote his book, Spirit and Blood. The Basic Principles of Race, Language, Culture and Nation. His time as Rector of the University of Viena from 1936 to 1937 catapulted him into politics: he was a board member of the Austrian fascist party, Vaterländische Front from 1936 to 1937 and was appointed Minister of Education between March and May 1938, just after Hitler's invasion of Austria. As Minister, he applied for membership in the NSDAP, but because his prior membership in secret Catholic organizations, it was not accepted until June 1940. Menghin was in contact with Martinez Santa-Olalla, after the celebration of the Jubilee of the Institute for Cultural Morphology at Frankfurt in June and July 1938. After Almagro Basch's research period in Germany and Austria in January and February 1942 and his own visit to Barcelona in June 1942, however, Menghin chose to distance from Martinez Santa-Olalla, not visiting Madrid, cutting the epistolary relationship and reporting negatively about him to the SS-Ahnenerbe. After being imprisoned in two American concentration camps between May 1945 and February 1947, Menghin fled to Argentina in 1948, followed shortly afterwards by his wife and daughter. In Argentina Menghin was supported by Jose Imbelloni, director of the Ethnographic Museum at the University of Buenos Aires since 1947, who hired him as a researcher without teaching. He also received support from Martinez Santa-Olalla through the Spanish Ambassador, Jose Maria de Areilza, and from the Professor of History at the University of Buenos Aires, Claudio Sanchez-Albornoz. Menghin was not permitted to give lectures until 1953, and only consolidated his position when his criminal trial was cancelled in December 1956. In 1957 at the age of 69, he obtained the position of Acting Professor of Prehistory at the National University of La Plata. In 1958, Menghin was appointed Professor in General and Old World Prehistory at the University of Buenos Aires, where he retired in 1968, aged 80. ; Oswald Menghin, Catedrático de Prehistoria del Hombre de la Universidad de Viena entre 1922-1945, fue partidario de la unidad de Austria con Alemania y simpatizante con ideas del NSDAP sobre la necesidad de evitar una mezcla racial entre arios y judíos. Durante su etapa como Catedrático-Residente en la Universidad de Fouad en El Cairo entre 1930-1933, por contacto con Hermann Junker, radicalizó sus puntos de vista y redactó su libro Espíritu y sangre. Principios básicos de raza, lengua, cultura y nación. Su etapa como Rector en el curso 1935-1936 le catapultó a la política como miembro del consejo directivo del partido fascista austriaco, Vaterländische Front, entre 1936-1937 y su posterior nombramiento como Ministro de Educación entre marzo y mayo de 1938, justo después de la invasión de Hitler de Austria. Siendo Ministro, solicitó su ingreso en el NSDAP, que no se aceptó hasta junio de 1940, por su pertenencia previa a organizaciones católicas secretas. Menghin entró en contacto con Martínez Santa-Olalla, después de la celebración del Jubileo del Instituto de Morfología Cultural de Frankfurt en junio y julio de 1938. A raíz de una estancia de investigación de Almagro Basch en Alemania y Austria en enero y febrero de 1942, y la posterior visita a Barcelona de Menghin en junio de 1942, optó por distanciarse de Martínez Santa-Olalla, no visitando Madrid, cortando la relación epistolar e informando negativamente sobre él a las SS-Ahnenerbe. Prisionero en dos campos de concentración norteamericanos entre mayo de 1945 y febrero de 1947, Menghin huyó a la Argentina en 1948, viajando poco después su mujer y su hija. En Argentina fue apoyado por José Imbelloni, director del Museo Etnográfico de la Universidad de Buenos Aires desde 1947, que lo contrató como investigador sin docencia. También recibió el apoyo de Martínez Santa-Olalla a través del Embajador de España, José María de Areilza, y del profesor de historia en la Universidad de Buenos Aires, Claudio Sánchez-Albornoz. Menghin no pudo impartir docencia hasta 1953 y solo consolidó su puesto una vez su proceso penal fue cancelado en diciembre de 1956, obteniendo en 1957, con 69 años, el puesto de Profesor Interino de Prehistoria de la Universidad Nacional de La Plata y en 1958, la Cátedra de Prehistoria General y del Viejo Mundo en la Universidad de Buenos Aires, donde se jubiló en 1968, con 80 años.

LGBT/Q film festivals are an integral part of the social practice of queer film culture. They are places where social, political and economic discourses intersect and where LGBT/Q identities, representation through film, definitions of queer cinema, community and global queer politics are negotiated. The festivals themselves are constantly responding to the changing surroundings and demands from stakeholders such as their audience base, the communities they want to serve, and economic and political stakeholders. The versatile, ever evolving form of the festival speaks to its performative formation. Therefore, the concepts of performativity, the performative and performance lend themselves to the analysis of the mechanisms and processes at play there. This study, situated at the intersection of film and media studies, sociology and queer theory, builds its arguments on the interdisciplinary field of film festival studies, and sets out to argue for the value of applying the concepts of the performative, performativity and performance to the study of film festivals in general, and LGBT/Q film festivals in particular. As the discussion of the concepts in chapter 1 show, the performative as developed by Austin in language philosophy and its further transposition to performativity in the theorizations of philosophy and literature by Derrida, for gender/queer theory by Butler, and performance for ethnography by Turner, and in theater/performance studies by Fischer-Lichte and McKenzie provides a versatile analytical arsenal for the analysis of film festivals. At the same time it is highly compatible with other existing concepts and theorizations such as event, public sphere, and networks and flows that have already been canonically applied to festival studies. In chapter 2, I mobilize the historical dimension of the performative to discuss the formation of LGBT/Q film festivals and their circuit. There, I sketch out the historical development of the LGBT/Q film festival while paying attention also to the larger social, political, geographic, and economic contexts. The discursive historiography is accompanied by an empirical one, where I analyze the growth pattern and global spread of the LGBT/Q film festival circuit. Along with the global perspective, a discussion of US-American (Frameline, NewFest, MIX NYC), German (Lesbisch Schwule Filmtage Hamburg, Verzaubert, Berlinale Teddy Award) and Austrian (identities) case studies provides further depth in understanding the evolution of the festivals and the circuit. Having drawn a broad picture of the circuit in chapter 3, I zoom in to look at a number of specific incidents of disruption and boycotts as case studies to unravel the different layers in which LGBT/Q film festivals as instances of queer film culture are performed (or failed). In this chapter I mobilize mainly perspectives of performativity and performance from ethnography and performance studies. These are put in synch with concepts such as public spheres, audience address, and event culture in three steps: selection, exhibition, and reception. Under the heading of selection, I discuss the performance of queer cinema as it becomes visible in the practices of selection of films and their programming at LGBT/Q film festivals. There I discuss various processes involved in programming, ranging from pre-selection, to screening committees, to programming strategies. Two historical incidents from the history of Frameline, the "Lesbian Riot" and the "Genderator" incident, serve as examples of how programming directly interrelates with identity negotiations. In the section on exhibition, I turn to the performative architecture of an LGBT/Q film festival by shedding light on the event itself, which follows specific scripts and rituals. In the last section on reception, I look at the corresponding side of these processes and look at the audience. Here, I discuss the formation of a counterpublic sphere, audience address, and the specific reception context of a festival. Two further festival boycotts are presented to analyze how LGBT/Q film festivals operate as queer counterpublic spheres that activists utilize for political intervention. The last section discusses the communal experience of collective viewing and the impact on the formation of a festival community. With this take on audiences, community and reception contexts, the chapter returns to the question of how LGBT/Q film festivals are an integral part of the practices of queer film culture, which was raised in the introduction. In the concluding outlook to the study I propose three further research trajectories. While the study mostly relied on conceptions of performativity and performance in the sense developed in ethnography, gender/queer theory and performance studies, another aspect of performance can be productively brought to bear on the subject of (LGBT/Q) film festivals: performance in the economic sense of efficiency and achievement.

Much of the scholarly literature on peacekeeping focuses on particular peacekeeping operations, or on the political bargaining between peacekeeping participants at both the institutional and national levels. However, there is very little published research on why nations commit forces to peacekeeping operations. As Sandra Whitworth noted in a book review of six books on peacekeeping in the International Journal, "the important political questions thus far have not been asked: who benefits, who pays, and who is excluded?". This book addresses that need.The authors focus specifically on the political and economic motivations that influence the decision to participate in peacekeeping. They consider how definitions of national interest frame the political debate, and what the reasons are for the military support or opposition for peacekeeping operations. They also explore the role of inter-agency politics, the role of public opinion in peacekeeping decisions, and the influence of pressure from other nations and non-nation actors to commit peacekeeping forces. Each chapter includes several recent cases of national peacekeeping to illustrate how national political debates framed their country's political decisions on the commitment of peacekeeping forces. The countries chosen for analysis are Australia, Argentina, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, the United States, Nigeria, Canada, India, and Austria.?The ContributorsAlan James Bullion has a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Southampton; and is currently Associate Lecturer/Research Associate in Politics, The Open University, UK (1992–). His current research interests include Sri Lanka, India, UN peacekeeping, Tamil nationalism, and Asian agriculture.Mary N. Hampton is an Associate Professor of Political Science from the University of Utah, and was in residence at Air War College during 2000– 2003 as a visiting professor in the International Security Studies Department. Her areas of research and teaching include international relations theory, international security issues, German/European foreign and security policy, and US foreign and security policy. She has published numerous articles and written or co-edited two books. Her most recent publications include 'Eagle in the Field of Blackbirds: U.S. Military Lessons Learned and Applied in Bosnia and Kosovo', a chapter in Lily Gardner-Feldman (ed.), Cooperation or Competition?; ' ''The Past, Present, and the Perhaps'': Is Germany a ''Normal'' Power?', in Security Studies (winter 2000); and 'Kosovo: Boom or Bust for the trans-Atlantic Relationship?', co-authored with Heiko Borchert in Orbis (spring 2002). Herbert M. Howe is Research Professor of African Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. He is the author of Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), as well as articles on African militaries in such journals as The Journal of Modern African Studies and International Security.Alexander Ramsbotham heads the UN and Con.ict Unit at United Nations Association-UK. He previously edited the International Peacekeeping News and its successor the Con.ict Resolution Monitor, publications produced by the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, and continues to edit the 'Digest' and 'Documentation' sections of the Frank Cass journal International Peacekeeping. He is co-author, with David J. Francis, Mohammed Faal and John Kabia, of The Dangers of Codeployment: UN Co-operative Peacekeeping in Africa (Ashgate, forthcoming) and regularly comments on UN and related affairs in the British media.David Rudd served in the Canadian military between 1985 and 1990. He holds a graduate degree in international relations from Dalhousie University in Halifax, Nova Scotia, and has been the Executive Director of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies (CISS) since 1998. He is a regular contributor to print and electronic media analyses of Canadian defence and security issues.Erwin A. Schmidl is head of the Section of Contemporary History at the Austrian Defence Academy in Vienna (Institute of Strategy and Security Policy). He has worked and published on various aspects of peace operations for the past 12 years. Also, he has served as desk of.cer for peacekeeping in the Foreign Ministry's UN Department in 1991–92, and was UN observer in South Africa in 1994. Hugh Smith is Associate Professor in the School of Politics, University College, University of New South Wales, at the Australian Defence Force Academy in Canberra and was Founding Director of the Australian Defence Studies Centre at the College from 1987 to 1991. He has edited several books on peacekeeping and has published widely on armed forces and society, including topics such as of.cer education, conscientious objection, recruitment, women in combat, and reserve service. His most recent publication is an edited collection entitled The Strategists, published by the Australian Defence Studies Centre.David S. Sorenson is Professor of International Security Studies at the US Air War College. He previously served on the faculty at Denison University, and was Senior Research Associate at the Mershon Center at Ohio State University. He has a Ph.D. from the Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, and has published books and articles on American national security issues.Cynthia A. Watson is Associate Dean for Curriculum and Faculty Development at the National War College, Washington, DC, where she has been a faculty member since 1992. She writes extensively on militaries and security issues in the former 'Third World', focusing particularly on Argentina, China, and Colombia. She is on the Editorial Board of Third World Quarterly, and is currently completing a book on the collapse of Colombia. She has an MA in Latin America Studies and Economic History from the London School of Economics and earned her Ph.D. in International Studies from the University of Notre Dame.Pia Christina Wood is Director of International Studies and Associate Professor of Political Science at Wake Forest University. She has published articles and book chapters on French foreign policy, the politics of the European Union, and Franco-German relations. Her forthcoming book is entitled French Foreign Policy toward the Arab–Israeli Conflict from Charles de Gaulle to Jacques Chirac: The Search for Influence.Tom Woodhouse holds the Adam Curle Chair in Conflict Resolution at the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK. He was the founding director of the department's Centre for Con.ict Resolution and has written widely on con.ict analysis and conflict resolution. He edited the special issue of the journal International Peacekeeping, entitled Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution, published by Frank Cass (spring 2000). He has recently completed a report on con.ict prevention and the war on terror, entitled 'Building the Democratic Peace' (IDEA, Stockholm).

The book "Themes and Portraits of Music in Istria from 16th to 19th Centuries" is a revised collection of essays previously published in Italian, Croatian and Slovenian. It can offer a comprehensive survey on various aspects of music history of Istria between 16th and 19th century. In a wider sense, it considers the role of music in different contexts examining the patronage of churches, academies and noblemen within the frame of a multilingual area, in which Italian and Slavic cultures co-existed, Divided between Venice and Habsburg government, and now between Slovenia, Croatia and Italy (with the small town of Muggia), the peninsula, till today, represents an unsolved issue if the historians watch to Italian music as the unique "national" model of music art. On the contrary, until 19th century Italian music was a supranational/cosmopolitan phenomenon that covered both the coastal towns, namely inhabited by Italians, and the inner cities, where Slovenians and Croats settled. The first chapter is devoted to Gabriello Puliti, a Tuscan friar appointed organist and chapel master in Trieste, Muggia, Koper, Piran, Labin, Pula. Puliti, the most representative composer who increased the 17th-century monody in Istria, worked as a protégé of some local noblemen and the Habsburgs, as Ferdinand archduke of Graz. His three voices "mascherate" ("Ghirlanda odorifera", 1612), composed in honour of Tranquillo Negri, a nobleman and poet of Labin, are compared to the carnival masquerades described by the chorographer Giacomo Filippo Tomasini (cf. the 17th-century manuscript "Commentari storici-geografici della provincia dell'Istria"). The primary poetic source of "Ghirlanda" is Giulio Cesare Croce's "Le ventisette mascherate piacevolissime" (1603), and the theatrical suggestion in these "Ghirlande" is frequently emphasised by the openings of the poems where the characters are represented by the motto "Noi siamo". They represent an imaginary gallery of the Italian comedy based on parodies of several dialects and languages. Puliti's approach to this genre is linked in various ways to musical painting. Almost every piece is marked by some distinctive features, whose purpose is to depict the characters in a very refined manner. To this end Puliti resorts to three different degrees of mimesis: onomatopoeic sounds, the imitation of human voices, and the abstract imitation of words through mensuration and the intensive use of the "coloured" notes ("Augenmusik"). Probably Puliti entered to the Palladia Academy of Capodistria (now Koper) with the nickname "Accademico armonico detto l'Allegro". This academy was an important circle of intellectuals that in seventy years of activity (from 1567 to 1637) promoted some pastoral plays with music (cf, "Filliria" 1585, "Selve incoronate" 1590 and other pastorals) and published an important treatise titled "Dieci de' cento dubbi amorosi" (posthumous, 1621). To demonstrate the extraordinary effect of music in human behaviour, this platonic dialogue contains a series of references drawn from Plato, Horace, Macrobius, Boetius, Ficino and Jewish theologians collected in Francesco Zorzi's "Harmonia mundi" (1525). In choosing different sources from the classic and medieval philosophies, Giambattista Zarotti, one of the authors of the dialogue, exceeds the lavish quotations, which are used as a tool for a new proposal. He aimed at giving a modern commentary on the debate on music and feelings, evaluating the ancient theories on the basis of modern music. Another study focuses on the unknown book "Ghirlande conteste" (1588), a set of intermedi staged in the island of Cres and published by Stefanello de Petris in honour of Sebastiano Quirini. These mythological spectacles, with chorus, consort and singers, exalt the benefits in behalf of the island, given generously by the cleaver count Quirini. The accuracy of description lets us acquire a detailed reconstruction of the sceneries and performances of musicians, even though, as it is custom in theatre, the score was not printed. The following chapters deal with Antonio Tarsia's monodies written for the Koper's cathedral, which are compared with the contemporaneous work of Giovanni Legrenzi, and two treatises written by Gianrinaldo Carli during his stay in Padua (1740/50), on the concepts of genius and "sentimental music" applied to Giuseppe Tartini's instrumental works ("Dell'indole del teatro tragico", "Osservazioni sulla musica antica e moderna"). Influenced by the English Enlightenment, on the example of Richardson's "Pamela", Carli developed a revolutionary idea of "sentimental theatre and music" inspired by nature. He promoted both a simple music and a simple stage upon realistic performances, without any implication with the cultivated tragedies of the conservative Italian writers of his time. Finally, the author analyses the operas "Pittori fiamminghi" (1893) and "Nozze istriane" (1895) of Antonio Smareglia, in which the technique of the Wagnerian leitmotif appears. Smareglia, educated in Milan and Vienna, as an Italian-Croatian-German speaking rejected the national ideas of his time. Involved in the cosmopolitan atmosphere of Central Europe, he did not accept the fall of the Habsburg Monarchy and, as a consequence, he developed a special feeling for a supranational drama based on the Italian librettos translated into German. Alike some artists and writers, after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Smareglia experienced and shared the unhappiness of the so-called "Austrians without Austria".

Military symbols of Ukraine rightfully became the subject of attention of historical science, because it has its own very rich history and tradition. The degree of development of military symbolism scientific topics and its source base proved insufficient and fragmented study the problem of the formation and development of military symbols of Ukraine, which further confirms its relevance. In historical science confirmed the view that symbolism in one form or another form appears at the peniaeb of the emergence of stable social groups. One of the brightest pages of national history is the Scythian period. Researchers touched one another on symbolism troops Scythians. Their works can show scattered descriptions of folk customs and traditions, formed the basis of the Scythian military symbols. Scythian army attributes were intended to symbolize the position of military officers in the military organization. The symbol of the various levels of government were specific headwear, pectoral or rate, precious axes, maces and shestoper. The main axes could be a sign of power or sticks commanders. Clubs and shestoper played sacral and representative role. They were a symbol of high social status of their owners. At the Scythians brought the sword oath. Scythian military badges on long poles were used to control the units in battle. So, the Scythians used in its military activities symbolism, based on their perception of the construction world. Actually most characters are taken from the life of the Scythians and inscribed in the traditions and customs. They have functional character. Use symbols to denote troops observe in times ancient. Increasing the number of sources, both written and archaeological, allow you to more fully reflect the symbolism reconstruct this historical period. At its core lay princely signs that they did in the arms, flag, stamps, Pasach, pendants men, pottery, household items stock, minted on coins and more. Princely characters played the role of individual characters of a particular ruler, and at the same time, tribal representatives dynasty emblems, signs of ownership, and in a sense – and attribute authority or government emblems. At the military symbolism of Ancient important place was given to the flag. Military flags in IX-th century performed a number of important functions. They were used primarily as symbols: the rule of the country, capture the fortress or city, location commander. Flags were of great importance in all phases of military operations. Further development of the Ukrainian symbolism associated with the period of stay of the former territory of ancient in the Grand Duchy Lytovment and the Kingdom of Poland and later – under the authority of the united PolishLithuanian Commonwealth – Commonwealth. No wonder the mid XIV century development of Ukrainian symbolism underwent major influences Lithuanian and Polish heraldic traditions. A new stage in the development of Ukrainian military symbolism is closely linked with the emergence of the Cossacks and his military and political organization – Zaporizhzhya Sich national liberation struggle of the Ukrainian people and the emergence of Cossack state in the middle of the XVII century. By Cossack watches kleynod , it characters troops belonging to the regimental flags and Centesimal icons hetman horsetail , military music – drums and attributes of power Cossack – mace captains , colonels pernachi , canes military judges, clerks ink. Among the Cossack watches kleynod prominently occupied with military flags. Prapornytstvo of the Zaporizhzhya and Zaporizhzhya Sich was difficult path of evolution. Originally symbolism of flags was the basis of heraldic symbols of the Polish- Lithuanian Commonwealth – Commonwealth. Later, the Russian Cossack banners appear, Austrian, Turkish state symbols. Only after the final transition of Ukrainian Cossacks under Russian rule in the eighteenth century developed a mostly well-established symbols of flags. Thus, it should be noted that the symbols of Ukrainian Cossacks objectively dependent on socio-political processes taking place in the territory of contemporary Ukraine. It is closely linked to the cultural traditions and religious preferences of Ukrainian Cossacks and people in general, basically reflecting the traditions of Orthodoxy. The need for a revived Ukrainian symbolism emerged during the national liberation revolution of 1917-1918. Have three etapy process of elaboration and development of civil and military symbols. The first – period Tsentralnoyi Rady from 20 november in 1917 to 29 April 1918. This chas changes in military form are neznachni. The second etapy – Hetmanat P.Skoropadskoho period from 29 April to 14 December 1918 was work major efforts to create a uniform for Ukrainiane army. This period was actually processed awarding system Ukrainian state. In the third period – the period Directoria (end of 1918-1920) Main characteristic of this period is the elaboration and implementation of military awards military flags military units. During the domination of the Soviet Ukraine, actually for Ukrainian national character symbolism in general, and the military in particular, have evolved abroad. First, in the camps of the army soldiers interned Ukrainian People's Republic and later in areas where Ukrainian in exile. On the territory of Ukraine, which was under the rule of the Soviets, was devoid of symbols of national colors. Another period of Ukrainian military symbolism falls on the Second World War. In 1938 appears Carpathian Ukraine and its military force Carpathian Sich. The system of military symbolism Ukraine story symbolism of the military establishment is as important as providing an explanation of the origin and traditions of the use of such elements as the Ukrainian military costume hat mazepynka, cotillion and others. Also during World War II and until 1956 operated Ukrainian Insurgent Army. The basis of its symbolism was taken trident symbol as the emblem of the state and the yellow – blue armbands flag colors , ie symbols of Ukrainian statehood. However, the colors of the flag of the army were red and black. These colors were the basis of awards UPA. ; Статья посвящена историческим аспектам развития военной символики Украины. Рассматриваются культорологические, мировоззренческие и религиозные основы символики в контексте исторических трансформаций общества, в частности Древних времен и Средневековья. Утверждается непрерывность народных традиций в выборе символов Украинского государства и его вооруженных сил. Анализируется историография и источниковая база темы научного исследования. Доказывается, что в разработке символики Вооруженных сил и других военных формирований Украины за основу были взяты классические законы геральдики, специальных исторических дисциплин, лучшие образцы культуры украинского народа. ; Стаття присвячена історичним аспектам розвитку військової символіки України. Розгля- даються культурологічні, світоглядні та релігійні основи символіки у контексті історичних трансформацій суспільства, зокрема Стародавньої доби та Середньовіччя. Стверджується непе- рервність народних традицій у виборі символів Української держави та її війська. Дається характе- ристика історіографії та джерельної бази теми наукового дослідження. Доводиться, що за основу в опрацюванні символіки Збройних сил та інших військових формувань України бралися класичні за- кони геральдики та спеціальних історичних дисциплін, кращі зразки минулого, які відповідають ста- родавнім корінням українського народу.

The American Civil War is one of the defining events in American history. Abundant studies cover every aspect of the conflict, from strategic analysis to the material culture of uniforms. Even with thousands of academic studies, each adding a new interpretation, there remains still unexplored territory. This study's objective is to expand upon and connect these previous interpretations to produce another tier in understanding a specific chapter of the war. The question posed centers on not the Confederate strengths but the Federal weaknesses. Research shows how the failure and limitations of Union strategy, policy, and the inability to logistically sustain massive offensives opened the way for the Confederacy to capitalize on, and turn the tide of the war. Furthermore, how did the Confederate strategies both militarily and politically have the greatest success and influence on the Kentucky and Maryland Campaigns and the overall outcome of the war? ; Master of Arts in Military History ; Capstone Autumn 1862 The High Tide of the Confederacy Colin E. Zimmerman A paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts in Military History Norwich University MH562 Capstone Paper Dr. Wesley Moody 23-August-2020. 2 Thesis: The American Civil War is one of the defining events in American history. Abundant studies cover every aspect of the conflict, from strategic analysis to the material culture of uniforms. Even with thousands of academic studies, each adding a new interpretation, there remains still unexplored territory. This study's objective is to expand upon and connect these previous interpretations to produce another tier in understanding a specific chapter of the war. The question posed centers on not the Confederate strengths but the Federal weaknesses. Research shows how the failure and limitations of Union strategy, policy, and the inability to logistically sustain massive offensives opened the way for the Confederacy to capitalize on, and turn the tide of the war. Furthermore, how did the Confederate strategies both militarily and politically have the greatest success and influence on the Kentucky and Maryland Campaigns and the overall outcome of the war? It will be necessary to answer this question through a multilayered approach. Instead of viewing the Kentucky and Maryland campaigns on the tactical level, which has already consumed most of the historiography on the topic, this study will instead find an explanation to this question through political, logistical, organizational, leadership personalities, and economic components and how they dictated the overall strategic picture and framework. When synthesizing all these components together, one potential answer generates: the grand Confederate offensive in the autumn of 1862, a direct result of botched Federal strategic measures and limitations, divided political policies, and the Union's struggling logistical capabilities; indicated the high tide of the Confederacy. Through battlefield victories and seizing the initiative in direct and indirect courses, Confederate leadership allowed the Southern field armies to exploit the Federal weaknesses culminating in the Kentucky and Maryland campaigns. 3 These campaigns offered the Confederacy its only realistic chance of ending the war on political and strategic terms that favored the South. An examination of each specific component and its relation to the Confederate high tide's theory is therefore essential to back this new interpretation. Political Factors of the North, South, and Europe; and its Benefit to the Confederacy in 1862: All wars, especially civil wars, are political in their foundation, influence, and execution. In "On War," Carl von Clausewitz states that "the political object, as the original motive of the War, will be the standard for determining both the aim of the military force and the amount of effort to be made." 1 This axiom applies to events in the autumn of 1862 since political factors dominated the motivation of strategy. The Confederacy's legitimacy resided within its field armies continued existence. Their ability to gain military victories that supported both the strategic and political realms was the essential component that needed to be sustained if the South was to remain independent. The North was in a completely different predicament, as the rival political factions, Republican's and Democrat's, each with its own opinion on the objective goals and the conduct of the war, could not in the early phase of the war come to common ground as to what the specific nature, cause, plan, and purpose of the Civil War was. The North was a nation at war without complete unification of mind, and purpose, which presented a weakness that could ultimately undo its efforts. Complicating matters for President Abraham Lincoln, and his party's agenda, was the fact the Northern Democratic party held just over 45% of the popular vote of free and border states in the 1860 election. 2 In short, the President and his administration existed only in a 1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Translated by Colonel J.J. Graham. New York, NY: Barnes & Noble, 2004. 10. 2 James McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. 506. 4 narrow margin and needed to conduct the war in a way suitable to keep the two very different mindsets exhibited by both the Republicans and Democrats in agreement. The Kentucky and Maryland campaigns occurred while changing Republican ideas on the persecution of the war and mid-term congressional elections, which proved to be a significant juncture in Northern and foreign politics. To be sure, the summer and fall of 1862 were extremely delicate times for Lincoln and the Republicans, and they could not afford any negative setbacks. Lacking any precedent to draw on, the Lincoln Administration delicately approached the rebellion by seeking the destruction of Confederate armies and exempting the Southern population from the burdens of war by respecting the civilians' constitutional rights and property. Historian Mark Grimsley captured the conviction of the policy by pointing out that the Lincoln administration renounced any intention of attacking slavery; and the government's assumption that most white Southerners were lukewarm about secession, and if handled with forbearance, would withdraw their allegiance from the Confederacy once Union armies entered their midst. 3 This policy known as conciliation, therefore, served as the beat to which Union forces marched off to war. Not all Northern generals and radical Republicans embraced this; however, the policy served as the first step in an evolutionary process that would eventually culminate in "hard-war." The effects of conciliation created favorable conditions for the Confederacy from which they were able to exploit the "limited war" shortcomings of the Union and surge forward into the fall offensive and their high tide. These shortcomings manifest in several different forms: leadership, strategic limitation, and foreign and domestic political pressure. Unfortunately for the 3 Mark Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 3. 5 Union, the combination of these factors exposed themselves in a negative light nearly all simultaneously, creating a perfect opportunity for the Confederates to take advantage of the drawbacks and pursue victory. Fueling the fire was the Lincoln Administration's policy regarding the appointment of military governors in captured territory. The issue arose when these cities, such as Nashville, were turned into massive supply centers for Union armies, resulting in intense rivalries between city and country, neighboring communities, and whites and blacks as they competed for jobs and dominance. 4 Henry Halleck, George McClellan, Don Carlos Buell, the key leaders of the Federal armies in 1862, generated the most immediate consequences stemming from the shortcomings of conciliation from as these three adherents to firm Democratic principles and military strategy are most responsible for creating the opportunity for a Confederate offensive. Generals Halleck, McClellan, and Buell are often portrayed by historians as lacking the "killer instinct," especially when compared to Ulysses S. Grant, William T. Sherman, and Phil Sheridan. However, a more accurate analysis finds them as men who followed the conciliation policy almost to the letter for political, personal, or logistical reasons. Halleck himself wrote the Elements of Military Art and Science, where he harped on the capture of strategic points, incurring the least number of casualties and damage as possible as the primary strategy of winning a war. Ironically, Halleck, the most influential Union general in 1862, believed that warfare was unjustifiable in most cases and should only be conducted with the utmost caution. 5 As General in Chief, Halleck had a significant influence on the conduct of operations of the Union forces. Each of these three 4 Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War, 35-36; Scott Nelson and Carol Sheriff, A People of War: Civilians and Soldiers in America's Civil War, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 88. The reference to negative leadership refers to the actions of Nathaniel Lyon and Francis Blair; who introduced "harsh" measures in 1861 prematurely which led to a brutal guerilla war and other political ramifications. 5 Henry Wagner Halleck, Elements of Military Art and Science: Course of Instruction in Strategy, Fortification, Tactics of Battle, Embracing the Duties of Staff, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, and Engineers, Adapted to the Use of Volunteers and Militia, Third Edition, New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1862. 7-9. 6 commanders prescribed to similar variants of Halleck's theory, whose universal core value of caution above all else acted as the catalyst to create the conditions for the Confederacy to crest in the fall of 1862. While the reigns of military success were in McClellan's and Buell's hands during the Maryland and Kentucky campaigns; Halleck made two major errors in 1862 that are directly responsible for igniting the Confederate offensives. The first was his overabundance of caution in taking Corinth, allowing the Confederates to slip away and then failing to retain the initiative by pushing to Vicksburg while simultaneously failing to capture Chattanooga. The second major failure was his inability to harness his granted power and force McClellan to speedily and effectively send his army to the aid of John Pope, eliminating any opportunity for a combined assault on Lee's smaller army. 6 The Democratic principles these generals prescribed to differed in many respects from Lincoln and the Republican agenda on the idea of the war. Each strongly believed in the preservation of the Union yet favored winning the war by the least drastic measures, the least number of casualties, and on a platform acceptable to their Democratic party beliefs. 7 For instance, McClellan wrote Buell, upon the latter's elevation to command of the Army of the Ohio: "bear in mind that we are fighting only to preserve the integrity of the Union and to uphold the power of General Government….be careful so to treat the unarmed inhabitants as to contract, not widen, the breach existing between us & the rebels." 8 Additionally, Generals Pope, Grant, and Rosecrans, who likely weren't as politically polarized as the former three, contributed to the growing political dissension in 1862 in their own right. Therefore, by their actions, federal military leadership did more to subvert the Union military from ending the war quickly and 6 Russel F. Weigley, A Great Civil War: A Military and Political History, 1861-1865, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2000. 135-136. It is arguable whether or not the Army of the Potomac could have arrived in its entirety rapidly enough to join with Pope. However, personal and in-house political agendas did not move the efficiency along any faster. 7 Weigley, A Great Civil War, xix-xxi. 8 Grimsley, 64. 7 dividing political tension based on faction theology more than any other public figures in 1862. One of the more notable incidents that fit into the framework of subversion was Grant's debacle at Shiloh, which brought strong opposition from anti-war Democrats, causing cautious leaders such as Halleck and McClellan to tighten their grip and fear repeat attacks. Most detrimental in this respect was the administration's and Halleck's decision to temporarily bench Grant during the Corinth episode, then subsequently leaving him in a position where he could not act with his usual aggressiveness against Stirling Price and Earl Van Dorn. Before his removal as General in Chief, George McClellan wrote Halleck then in charge of western forces, "The future success of our cause demands that proceedings such as Grant's should at once be checked. Generals must observe discipline as well as private soldiers. Do not hesitate to arrest him at once if the good of service requires it, & place CF Smith in command." 9 Grant's "recklessness" at Shiloh created quite the stir on the home front, which as a result, political rivals of the Lincoln Administration, sought to break down Grant as a way to spread discontent and fit the anti-war platform. They harped on the high number of casualties, the surprise of the Confederate attack, and the black eye to the seemingly unstoppable Union war machine. The backlash reached Washington, prompting a response from the Administration. In a telegram to Halleck, Secretary of War Stanton wrote, "The President desires to know why you have made no official report to this department respecting the late battles of Pittsburg landing. And whether any neglect or misconduct of General Grant or any other officer contributed to the sad casualties that befell our forces on Sunday." 10 The battle of Shiloh became the first political debacle that militarily opened the door for the Confederacy to take the offensive in the fall of 1862. 9 Nancy Scott Anderson and Dwight Anderson, The Generals: Ulysses. S. Grant and Robert E. Lee, Avenel: New Jersey, 1987. 230. 10 Anderson, The Generals, 241. 8 The most immediate politically charged consequence materialized in Halleck's handling of the advance on Corinth, which exemplified his standard cautiousness with added paranoia of avoiding another repeat of Shiloh. 11 The delicate politically charged caution continued even after the successful capture of Corinth in Halleck's decision to send Buell, over Pope or Grant to seize Chattanooga. Halleck's snail-like cautious advance on Corinth, and the decision to send Buell to Chattanooga, allowed the disorganized Confederate army to withdraw from Corinth, establish a new commander in the form of Braxton Bragg, who in turn brought reorganization, discipline, and professionalization to the Army of Mississippi; which proved to be the genesis of Bragg and Smith having the ability to advance into Tennessee and Kentucky. 12 Military shortcomings turned political disasters in the Eastern Theater during the summer of 1862, soon overshadowed Shiloh, and added dramatic momentum and opportunity to the rise of the Confederate high tide in the war's primary theater. McClellan and his Army of the Potomac, having suffered political harassment in late 1861 into the spring of 1862, began their downward political spiral with the Army of the Potomac's loss of initiative and strategic defeat during the Seven Days Battles on the Peninsula. The setbacks along the James River coupled with the black eye at Shiloh, and the defeat of Federal forces in the Shenandoah Valley in the spring of 1862 had devastating political effects, which left the North and European powers believing that all hope for the Union resided with McClellan and his Army of the Potomac. The proximity of the Union and Confederate capitals made the Eastern theater a hot spot for journalists and policymakers on both sides, who saw the region as the deciding factor in the Civil War's outcome. This army's setback at the gates of Richmond did more to influence how events 11 Larry J. Daniel, Days of Glory: The Army of the Cumberland, 1861-1865, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2006. 85. 12 Thomas Lawrence Connelly, Army of the Heartland: The Army of Tennessee, 1861-1862, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001. 188-194. 9 unfolded in the east in 1862 in both the strategic and political sense, both foreign and domestic. 13 The shortcomings on the Peninsula stymied the Union's hope to quickly end the war while making the voices of "Peace Democrats" louder and the political situation even more delicate. As if the Lincoln Administration did not already have enough burdens, both England and France, whose neutrality was necessary for the Union war effort, began to openly question the North's ability to subdue the South and end the rebellion. 14 Stonewall Jackson's brilliant campaign in the Valley, coupled with the Army of Northern Virginia's ferocious performance on the Peninsula elevated Southern patriotism, and simultaneously dampened Northern morale, convincing many on both sides that Southern victory was achievable. 15 Colonel Charles Marshall, Lee's Assistant Adjutant General believed that Robert E. Lee's emergence onto the scene was the greatest benefit to the Southern cause. He equated Lee's leadership on the Peninsula to that of a color bearer bravely advancing his banner towards the enemy. On political matters Marshall correctly believed that the Northern people were impatient for a speedy victory and that the Federal Government expressed this sentiment in its policy on conducting the war. However, this policy was forcefully and forever altered with the aggressive Lee's emergence onto the scene, whose plan called for carrying on the war indefinitely until the Confederacy achieved victory. Marshall outlined this plan as designed to, "frustrate the enemy's designs; to break up campaigns undertaken with vast expense and with confident assurance of success; to impress upon the minds of Northern people the conviction that they must prepare for a protracted struggle, great sacrifices of life and treasure, with the possibility that all might at last be of no 13 Stephen W. Sears, To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign, New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1992. 355. 14 McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 554-555. 15 Peter Cozzens, Shenandoah 1862: Stonewall Jackson's Valley Campaign, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008. 507-508. 10 avail; and to accomplish this at the smallest cost to the Confederacy." 16 This leadership change at such a critical moment proved to be the dawn of turning Confederate fortunes in the east. Public opinion and political reactions to the Union failure on the Peninsula were mixed; however, strong opposition towards McClellan emerged and created discord among the rival Democrats and Republicans, each of whom found outlets to accuse the other of the responsibility of the campaign's failure. 17 Amid this political turmoil, Lincoln, in an effort to offset the discord introduced Major General John Pope, who only managed to escalate political dissension to a fever pitch with his disastrous Northern Virginia campaign. 18 In the Western Theater, the emergence of Braxton Bragg also came at a critical juncture in juxtaposition with the events occurring in the east. Bragg took command of the Army of Mississippi at one of its darkest hours, and through exemplary organizational skills, reshaped the Army of Mississippi into a professional, disciplined force capable of delivering a lethal blow. With such a force, Bragg was able to look to more risky opportunities that would offset the Union strategic gains in the west and regain Tennessee and perhaps set the stage for Kentucky.19 Private Sam Watkins of the 1st Tennessee recorded the positive change in morale from the melancholy atmosphere at Corinth to when new lifeblood in the army emerged. "We were in an ecstasy akin to heaven. We were happy; the troops were jubilant; our manhood blood pulsated more warmly; our patriotism was awakened; our pride was renewed and stood ready for any emergency; we felt that one Southern man could whip twenty Yankees. All was lovely and 16 Charles Marshall, Lees Aide-De-Camp: Being the Papers of Colonel Charles Marshall Sometime Aide-De-Camp, Military Secretary, and Assistant Adjutant General on the Staff of Robert E. Lee, 1862-1865, Edited by Gary W. Gallagher, and Frederick Maurice, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000. 74. 17 Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 346-347. 18 John J. Hennessy, Return to Bull Run: The Battle and Campaign of Second Manassas. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999. 468-472. 19 Earl J. Hess, Banners to the Breeze: the Kentucky Campaign, Corinth, and Stones River, Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 2010. 19-22. 11 the goose hung high." 20 Although the Confederates had suffered initial setbacks early in 1862, the advantages afforded by conciliation, cautious Federal leadership, and the emergence of Lee and Bragg allowed for a reversal of fortunes. In 1862 Southern patriotism was running high; the idea of independence and the Confederate soldier's superiority was at its wartime peak. 21 Lee's decision to invade Maryland was political in nature. Maryland Campaign historians, Joseph Harsh, Scot Hartwig, Stephen Sears, James Murfin, and Ezra Carman while differing on strategic matters, all agree that Lee's primary purpose was to secure a decisive victory which would gain the South the political victory; either in the form of Northern domestic politics or international recognition and or intervention. The application of political pressure to Lee's offensive outweighs all the deficiencies faced by his army in the logistical realm, and further illustrated his grasp on the delicacy of Northern political division. Clearly, he understood this division and had faith that his smaller, ill-supplied force had a chance to deliver a blow that would fracture the Northern populace and produce an outcome that favored the South. General Lee suggested his understanding of such matters in a letter to President Jefferson Davis while in Dranesville on September 3. "The present seems to be the most propitious time since the commencement of the war for the Confederate Army to enter Maryland.….if it is ever desired to give material aid to Maryland and afford her and opportunity of throwing off the oppression to which she is now subject, this would seem the most favorable." 22 The domestic and foreign political objectives acting as primary motives for the "invasion," were in that instant equal to the strategic goals which accompanied them when 20 Samuel R. Watkins, Company Aytch or A Side Show of the Big Show: A Memoir of the Civil War. Edited by Ruth Hill Fulton McAllister. Nashville, TN: Turner, 2011. 45. 21 Joseph T. Glatthaar, General Lee's Army: From Victory to Collapse, New York: Free Press, 2008. 207; James Longstreet, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Edited by Ned Bradford. New York: The Fairfax Press, 1979. 263. 22 United States War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Vol. 19. Washington: Govt. Print. Off., 1880. 590. 12 defining the military value of the campaign; this is a unique feature to the Maryland Campaign and its condition for victory, while only a secondary task in Kentucky. In contrast historian Edwin Coddington paints a different picture for Lee's purposes in the Pennsylvania Campaign of 1863. Coddington outlined that Lee, in this part of the war, contended with the new Federal doctrine of "hard war" and emancipation, eliminating the decisive battle matched with the political advantage that existed in 1862. Therefore, Lee's only real option was to defeat the Army of the Potomac in detail, earning a strategic victory rather than a political one. 23 Such a task required adequate logistics, and a complete and total battlefield victory, two factors that eluded the Confederacy during the war. Such victory conditions presented to Lee in 1862 were unique and would never materialize again in any substantial form. Political division in the North was at fever pitch in the late summer of 1862; evidence of the discord's depth is apparent in everything from personal letters through Northern news outlets. Robert E. Lee, an avid reader of Northern papers, understood this notion and sought to exploit it. Domestically, Northern Democrats maintained a loud voice in critical regions and states, which only grew more robust and more resilient with each military shortcoming and failure. August and early September saw a heightened level of panic and discouragement in the North, with Pope's defeat and Lee's invasion of Maryland, while at the same time Kirby Smith's Confederate Army of Kentucky demonstrated against Cincinnati. Pennsylvania was understandably the most unnerved due to its proximity to Maryland and vital war infrastructure, and its Republican governor Andrew Curtin's demand for 80,000 troops to defend his state embodied it. Additionally, the mayors of the influential northern cities of Harrisburg, Philadelphia, and 23 Edwin B. Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command, New York: Simon and Schuster. 1968. 6-7. 13 Baltimore were alarmed, fearing their respective city was the target of Lee's advancing legions.24 In Cincinnati, the situation turned somewhat drastic. After destroying the Union forces at Richmond, Kentucky on August 30, Kirby Smith as a result had a clear road to the Ohio River. Understandably Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio all worried what Smith's next move would be while they scrambled to organize bodies of troops. General Lew Wallace arrived in Cincinnati, declared martial law and quickly set about organizing a defense. 25 With panic to the extremity of declaring martial law, the Northern population began to question their ability to win the war openly. Prominent figures such as George Templeton Strong, Samuel Galloway, Reverend Robert Laird Collier, and Senator Garrett Davis, spoke not only for themselves but also for the majority of the people by openly challenging President Lincoln and his administration on their ability to conduct the war. The accusations included Lincoln's unfitness for the Presidency, the constant change of military leadership in the east, which showed instability and was severely hurting morale in the North. Demands also arose that there be a complete reorganization of the Administration. 26 The Lincoln Administration's threat of a draft, unless an additional 300,000 volunteers could be raised created further tension. The idea of a draft disgusted many Northerners; however, with "patriotic" spirit enticed by bounties, nine-month service, and the threat of draft, the ranks of new regiments began to fill in late summer of 1862, only hitting forty-five percent of the intended quota. 27 The Union soldiers themselves cast a gloomy mood over the situation and expressed their views with varying levels of disgust. Lieutenant Elisha Hunt Rhodes of the 2nd 24 David H. Donald, Lincoln, New York, NY: Touchstone, 1996. 373. 25 Vernon L. Volpe, "Dispute Every Inch of Ground": Major General Lew Wallace Commands Cincinnati, September 1862." Indiana Magazine of History 85, no. 2 (1989): 139. 26 Donald, Lincoln, 373. 27 McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 492. 14 Rhode Island expressed in his diary that: "I fear we are no nearer the end of the war than we were when we first landed at Fortress Monroe five months ago." 28 Captain Francis Donaldson of the 118th Pennsylvania captured the mood in Washington: "We are constant witness of the sad plight of the Army of the Potomac, as thousands of Genl. Pope's troops in great demoralization are ever passing the Fort in retreat to Washington. The poor old Army of the Potomac, how I pity it." 29 Captain Henry Pearson of the 6th New Hampshire also expressed his views in the aftermath of Second Manassas: "You need not be surprised if success falls to the rebels with astonishing rapidity." 30 Brigadier General Marsena Patrick's opinion bordered on insurrection: "There is a general feeling that the Southern Confederacy will be recognized & that they deserve recognition." 31 Lieutenant Charles Seton Fleming of the 2nd Florida Infantry, in a letter home to his mother describing the aftermath of the Second Manassas campaign, echoed Patrick's views when he wrote: "Our victory is complete, even the Yankee prisoners acknowledge it." 32 Lieutenant Colonel Henry Hubbell of the 3rd New York wrote in August 1862: "I am not sure that it would not be a good thing to have the rebels get possession of Washington however, as it might waken up the north to the fact that we are having a war in earnest, and not merely playing soldier…. We have got men & means enough in the north to put an end to this war in 90 days, if they would only go at it in earnest and let politics & the nigger alone." 33 28 Elisha Hunt Rhodes, All for the Union: A History of the 2nd Rhode Island Volunteer Infantry in the War of the Great Rebellion. Edited by Robert Hunt Rhodes. Lincoln, RI: A. Mowbray, 1985. 69. 29 Francis Adams Donaldson, Inside the Army of the Potomac: The Civil War Experience of Captain Francis Adams Donaldson. Edited by J. Gregory Acken. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1998. 104. 30 D. Scott Hartwig, To Antietam Creek: the Maryland Campaign of September 1862. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2019. 134-135. 31 Ibid., 134-135. 32 Francis P. Fleming, A Memoir of Captain C. Seton Fleming: of the Second Florida Infantry, C.S.A., Reprint 1985: Jacksonville: Times-Union Publishing House, 1884. 66. 33 Simon P. Newman, "A Democrat in Lincoln's Army: The Civil War Letters of Henry P. Hubbell." The Princeton University Library Chronicle 50, no. 2 (1989): 155-68. 157. 15 Hubbell eluded to the growing discord of racial issues that many Democrats saw as an unnecessary and politically charged motive to a war that was supposed to be strictly for preserving the Union. Nevertheless, this issue began to transform the cause of the war in the summer of 1862, adding only more weight to a very delicate political situation. Hubbell's feelings weren't isolated; instead, the sense that the war was taking on a new front to end slavery infuriated many Northerners. Hubbell's views on racial matters and slavery were not limited to himself, in fact, the stiffest opposition to war that had anything to do with freeing slaves came from the Midwest states; where racism was an epidemic culturally, especially in the Army of the Ohio. The talk of national emancipation led hundreds of men to desert and, in some cases, join the Confederacy. 34 Sentiments similar to these echoed across the Union armies and, undoubtedly, were shared by family and friends on the home front. Some individuals turned bitter, and perhaps extreme, which reflected political, ideological, and sectional differences in the North, which under the pressure of a seemingly collapsing system reared its ugly head. The term "invasion" has been used several times thus far, especially by the Union's most publicized general, George McClellan. This term and others related to it divided the minds of many of those who had significant power to dictate the war. Abraham Lincoln, at no point, recognized the Confederacy as a legitimate entity. He always maintained that the Southern States were in rebellion and needed to be brought back into the Union. Interestingly, his senior generals in 1862, mostly Democrats, saw the Confederate offensives as invasions, insinuating their conscious or subconscious recognition that Confederate armies were "foreign invaders" intent on doing harm, which helped fuel the panic, frustration, and seemingly lost Union cause ideology. 35 34 Daniel, Days of Glory, 101. 35 Andrew Pooley, "Shoo-ing the Geese: Lincoln and the Army of the Potomac, 1862-1863." Australian Journal of American Studies 21, no.2 (2002): 86-100. 86-87. 16 Jefferson Davis, the Confederate cabinet, Robert E. Lee, Braxton Bragg, and all the other high-ranking Confederate officers comprehended the growing Northern political disunion. This is evident in the decision to approve a Confederate offensive and the string of strategic goals associated with it. The Army of Northern Virginia, for example, fulfilled its duty of defeating the Federals time and again, completely reversing the tide of the war in the east. As Robert E. Lee sat at his headquarters in the aftermath of Chantilly, it had become abundantly clear that he now possessed the opportunity to strike the decisive blow against whatever Union army would oppose him in Maryland or Pennsylvania, which would likely result in some sort of peace talks. 36 Lieutenant Colonel Edward Porter Alexander Chief of Ordnance in the Army of Northern Virginia saw the picture as clear as Lee. Referring to the army, we wrote: "His [Lee's] army had, that magnificent morale which made them equal to twice their numbers, & which they never lost even to the surrender at Appomattox. And his confidence in them, & theirs in him, were so equal that no man can yet say which was greatest. And no old soldier need ask a prouder record than is implied in that fact. By going into Maryland Gen. Lee could at least subsist his army for a while upon the enemy, & he doubtless hoped, too, for a chance to force the Federal army to come out & fight him under favorable conditions." 37 Confederate officer William Allan, reverberated Alexander's sentiments when he wrote of the Army of Northern Virginia: "its spirit at this time was high. A series of brilliant successes had given it unbounded confidence in itself and its leaders, and the ragged dirty soldiers hailed with joy the advance across the Potomac." 38 The comparison of the Federal and Confederate views as indicated from primary sources, on 36 Hartwig, To Antietam Creek, 52-53. 37 Edward Porter Alexander, Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander. Edited by Gary W. Gallagher, United States: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000. 139. 38 William Allan, The Army of Northern Virginia in 1862, Reprint: Middletown: DE, 2020. 273. 17 leadership and the progress of the war at the beginning of the Maryland Campaign were clearly in favor of the South. The leadership of Don Carlos Buell is a prime example of political dissatisfaction, both on the home front and in the army. While McClellan was unpopular with the Administration, he still held favor with most of his officers, and certainly the rank and file of the army and the nation. Buell, however, faced contention on three similar fronts – The Indiana bloc, the general and field officers of the First Division, and the supporters of Alexander McCook, one of his corps commanders. Much of the disgust with Buell occurred during the Kentucky Campaign. This break in unified efforts favored the Confederate cause, particularly in swaying popular opinion in Kentucky. Republican Indiana newspapers ripped into Buell's leadership, declaring that he was completely mishandling the pursuit of two Confederate armies that were ripping up Kentucky and potentially heading towards Indiana, Ohio, or Illinois. Some newspapers called for his immediate dismissal, and a few even demanded he be shot. 39 When comparing Lee and his army to Buell and his, there formulates a fascinating dissection of the polar extremes in popular and political opinion. Lee and his men were on the top of their game, while Buell's forces were at a low ebb. Using these two examples as the basis of measurement, it becomes apparent that overall, the Confederate forces enjoyed a much higher sense of public support and favorability then their Union counterparts did at that particular moment in the war. Scholars have hotly debated the prospect of European powers, particularly England and France intervening and mediating an end to the conflict. The idea of such a prospect was undoubtedly the primary goal for the Confederate strategy in the autumn of 1862. It is essential to view the idea of European intervention in the simplest of forms. The Southern strategy partly 39 Daniel, 128-129. 18 hinged on it, as can be observed via strategic decisions and public opinion, the North, however, feared the prospect. Intervention and mediation on any level would, in the end, be more beneficial to the South, and the Lincoln Administration would appear as incapable; in short, it would be a disaster for the North and Republicans. 40 The onset of a "cotton famine" and the scandal of the Trent affair occurred amid all the politically charged events in 1862, resulting in the British sending an additional 11,000 men to Canada and forcing Lincoln to tread lightly in foreign political matters. 41 Historian Max Beloff believed that the possibility of British intervention was extremely likely in 1862, mainly due to the North's refusal to make anti-slavery sentiments the basis of their cause, instead still focusing on the preservation of the Union, which only supported the pro-Southern faction in Parliament. 42 An examination of Southern newspapers and other editorials, shows public opinion in the South at the beginning of the war was universal in the belief that Great Britain would be forced, through the power of cotton, to intervene either by raising the blockade or by recognizing the Confederate States as an independent nation or perhaps both. 43 Regardless of the likelihood of actual intervention or recognition, the idea of it greatly influenced Confederate leaders, particularly Lee, who notated such objective goals in his correspondence with Davis. Davis agreed outlining his desires in a communication to Lee on September 7. He reminded Lee that the Confederacy was waging war solely for self-defense. Through the eight points he outlined as the guiding principles for the field armies to abide by, Davis continually revolved his doctrine around political objectives whose chief purpose were to achieve peace with the United States. If the South maintained a self- 40 McPherson, 444. 41 Nelson, A People at War, 166. 42 Max Beloff, "Historical Revision No. CXVIII: Great Britain and the American Civil War." History, New Series, 37, no. 129, (1952): 40-48. 42. 43 Schuyler Dean Hoslett, "The Richmond Daily Press on British Intervention in the Civil War: A Brief Summary." The William and Mary Quarterly 20, no. 1 (1940): 79-83. 80. 19 defense posture, with the objective of peace through battlefield victory; then the likelihood of positive European intervention on their behalf had a much higher probability, which in turn could possibly bring a speedy end to the war with terms that favored the Confederacy. 44 Logistical Concerns and Organizational Components: While the South always lagged behind the North in terms of finance, economy, manufacturing, manpower, and many other logistical concerns, the disparity was narrower in 1862 than in the coming years. As a point of contention, several trends and circumstances in the Union war effort benefited the South more than it aided the Union on the grand stage. Concerning logistics, Clausewitz's maxim states: "The dependence on the base increases in intensity and extent with the size of the Army, which is easy to understand. An Army is like a tree. From the ground out of which it grows it draws it's nourishment; if it is small it can easily be transplanted, but this becomes more difficult as it increases in size….When therefore, we talk of the influence of the base on the operations of an Army, the dimensions of the Army must always serve as the scale by which to measure the magnitude of that influence." 45 This axiom is precisely the predicament of the Northern war effort in the first two years of the war. The logistical portion of this study will examine the condition and availability of uniforms and equipment, quality of weaponry then in circulation, training and experience of soldiers, and finally the ability of each government to produce and supply its troops effectively. A logistical understanding is crucial for understanding the obstacles and conditions faced by the armies and how it dictated their effectiveness on campaign and immediate tactical ability on the battlefield in 1862. The South, as previously stated from the very beginning of the war, was behind its 44 OR, vol 19, 1: 598-599. 45 Clausewitz, On War, 353-354. 20 opponent in logistical matters; however, the North in 1862 was not at the climax in its ability of production and supply, and therefore lacked significantly in certain areas. However, it is essential to note that the limitations of the Federal logistical system by the fall of 1862 were only a few months shy of efficiently supplying the vast number of troops in the field. The first evidence of a marked change in the Union's logistical ability emerged in the Chancellorsville Campaign's genesis, after the winter of 1862-63. 46 Accepting the notion that the Confederate armies were in rough shape logistically; it is important to note that the primary leadership in the field was acutely aware of the shortages. However, the unfolding opportunity demanded a military strike that outweighed logistical concerns. Therefore, an examination into the Federal system's shortcomings is necessary to show the benefits it offered toward the Confederacy. The United States Army in the Antebellum period contained roughly 15,000 men of all arms. Compared with an army of 600,000 men in 1862, it is understandable that there would be significant shortcomings and hurdles to overcome in a nation that, as a rule, did not trust professional armies nor want to foot the bill for one. Nevertheless, the North had a clear advantage when it came to industrialization and manufacturing. Over one million Northerners worked in industrial jobs, ten times more than their Southern counterparts. Furthermore, the North contained roughly 100,000 factories compared to the South's 20,000. 47 Yet, as already pointed out, the prewar army was tiny and supplied with uniforms and equipment solely from the Schuylkill Arsenal in Philadelphia. Additionally, the arsenals producing firearms were limited, with all those existing in the South subsequently seized upon secession, having fewer firearms available to Northern regiments. 48 The North, therefore, would have to raise and equip an army 46 Stephen Sears, Chancellorsville, New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1996. 71-75 47 Matthew S. Muehlbauer and David J. Ulbrich, Ways of War: American Military History from the Colonial Era to the Twenty-First Century. New York: Routledge, 2018. 174-175. 48 Joseph E. Chance, The Second Texas Infantry, From Shiloh to Vicksburg, Austin: Eakin Press, 1984. 16, 24. 21 primarily with outdated weapons and with an industrial system that wasn't geared toward war manufacturing. The North's only saving grace was its economic might. 49 Economically it is crucial to understand that the Union that won the war in 1865, was not the same financial institution nor economy in 1861 and 1862. It was in major part due to the Legal Tender Act of 1862 and the National Currency Act of 1863, that the North was able to pay for the sustainment of the war; yet it took time for these acts to take effect. Therefore, in 1862 financially, the North was undoubtedly at its weakest; many of the state and municipal banks, especially those in border states, had closed their doors, while millions of businesses and private civilians hoarded gold. 50 The Union was only able to field the armies it did in 1861-1862 because of its ability to pay for the conversion and development of machinery needed for equipment, weaponry, and uniforms while relying initially on its prewar militia. Faced with arming a massive army overnight, the United States was forced to arm many of its regiments with outdated firearms, such as the M-1842 Smoothbore musket, and the M-1816 Flintlocks that were converted to percussion, in addition to supplementing itself with foreign weapons, from Britain, Belgium, France, Austria, and others. These weapons except those from Britain, proved to be severely outdated compared to the technology available in the 1860s. The importance of recognizing the sub-standard firearms is their effectiveness on the battlefield and the potentiality of changing the outcome in a crucial moment in a battle. In an era of the rifled musket that was accurate from 250-300 yards, a typical smoothbore musket ranged from 80-100 yards. A significant portion of Federal troops were armed with outdated weapons in the Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns. A focus on any of the principal engagements in that time frame will show that regiments armed 49 McPherson, 442-445. 50 Nelson, 132-133. 22 with such weapons were in certain circumstances ineffective on the immediate tactical plane, and perhaps beneficial to their adversary. The disparity of weapons had begun to improve for the North in 1862; however, the infusion of nearly 300,000 volunteers during the summer of 1862 created a logistical gap once again. Many of the existing regiments in the army still shouldered outdated weapons, and now with legions of new men forming, these troops found themselves supplied with weapons that were unequal to the rigors of Civil War combat. Of this second wave of new recruits, the 12th New Jersey Volunteers serve as an excellent microcosm to examine the Union's logistical deficiencies in the rush to arm new recruits in 1862. Initially, the Jerseymen expected to receive the celebrated Enfield rifle; instead, they ended up with the inferior Austrian Lorenz, which was later exchanged in Washington for the equally outdated 1842 Springfield musket, although they saw this as an improvement over the detested Austrian rifle. 51 While every regiment's experience is different, the new wave and veterans alike in 1862 experienced some level of logistical deficiency that impacted their abelites on campaign or in battle. Aside from weapons, much of the equipment in the Army of the Potomac and the Army of the Ohio at the beginning of the Confederate offensives were at the end of its serviceable life span, due to months of active campaigning, and the inability to properly re-muster the army on a large scale because of the continuity of Confederate aggressiveness, which certainly affected their performance as a cohesive fighting force. Brigadier General Abner Doubleday who commanded a brigade at Second Manassas submitted requisitions to replace equipment and clothing just before the onset of the Maryland Campaign, noted in disgust: "owing to the great number [of other officers] making requisitions, mine were not filled and we were soon obliged to 51 Edward G. Longacre, To Gettysburg and Beyond: The Twelfth New Jersey Volunteer Infantry, II Corps, Army of the Potomac, 1862-1865, Hightstown: Longstreet House, 1988. 24. 23 take the field deficient in everything." 52 This sentiment was backed up by Captain James Wren of the IX Corps, who wrote that the men in his division "looked very bad, being Lousey, Dirty & Almost naked & worn out." 53 The soldiers in the Army of the Ohio were in equally if not worse shape. The vast distances covered by the Western Theater's armies created long supply lines, which fell victim to frequent raids from rebel cavalry. T.J. Wright of the 8th Kentucky Infantry noted in his diary that the Army of the Ohio was: "the hungriest, raggedest, tiredest, dirtiest, lousiest and sleepiest set of men the hardships of this or any other war ever produced." 54 While it is certain that the Confederates were in equally bad situations logistically, they had the benefit victory behind them in the east, and in Bragg's army's case, high morale. Another major struggle for the Federals in 1862 was the ability to get the supplies to its armies. The reason is not one specific aspect, but rather a compilation of bureaucracy, corruption, and lack of precedent to draw off. McClellan's army on the Peninsula had to be supplied from the sea, Pope in command of the Army of Virginia never took the time to ensure his troops had everything they needed, and Buell's army along with the rest of the western forces contended with long supply lines originating in Cairo Illinois, that were frequently raided by Confederate cavalry. The 16th Maine Infantry is a classic example of the suffering that occurred in a system that was outside its capabilities in 1862. The regiment's adjutant and historian Abner Small wrote: "How those men suffered! Hunger, daily felt, was nothing compared with it. Men of education, of refinement, and wealth, who willingly and cheerfully gave up home, with all its love and comfort, for country, made to feel degraded for want of clothing!" Small then describes 52 Hartwig, 137. 53 Ibid., 137. 54 Kenneth W. Noe, Perryville: This Grand Havoc of Battle. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2011. 89. 24 the horrendous conditions: "…without shelter, without overcoats, shoeless, hatless, and hundreds without blankets; and through all that long, sad, and weary tramp, we were jeered at, insulted, and called the "Blanket Brigade!" 55 While examples like this are on the extreme, the narrative fits when assessing the entire logistical picture of the Army of the Potomac in September 1862. The term logistics also dovetails into organizational tables. Aside from sharing similar shortcomings in the area of supply and outdated weaponry, Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was by far the superior force in leadership, experience, and organization when compared with McClellan's force. By September 2, 1862, nearly 61 percent of Lee's infantry had fought in three or more major battles, and 81 percent fought in two or more. All of his 184 infantry regiments were veterans of at least one battle. Not only were Lee's regiments superior in this regard, but his brigade commanders were highly efficient as well. Twenty-seven of Lee's forty brigades were veterans of two or more major battles, while the remaining thirteen had fought in either the Seven Days or Second Manassas. On the divisional level, the highest official level of organization at that point for the A.N.V.; all of the eleven divisions had seen at least one battle. 56 The Union leadership backed this notion up as well. It was widely accepted, and a point still argued amongst historians, that the Southern fighting man was superior. This mythology has far back as the American Revolution corroboration has its roots in early Confederate victories, particularly at First and Second Manassas, the Shenandoah Valley, and the Seven Days battles. These victories generated an aura of invincibility around the Army of Northern Virginia that transcended into the minds of the Federal troops. 57 In fact Lee, true to form was in the first days of September 1862, the living epithet of Baron De Jomini's maxims, "the general should do 55 Abner Ralph Small, The Sixteenth Maine Regiment in the War of the Rebellion, 1861-1865. London: Forgotten Books, 2015. 38. 56 Joseph L. Harsh, Taken at the Flood Robert E. Lee and Confederate Strategy in the Maryland Campaign of 1862. Ashland: The Kent State University Press, 2013. 39-40 57 Pooley, "Shoo-ing the Geese", 88. 25 everything to electrify his own soldiers, and to impart to them the same enthusiasm which he endeavors to repress his adversaries….in general, a cherished cause, and a general who inspires the confidence by previous success, are powerful means of electrifying an army and conducing to victory." 58 In contrast, McClellan's forces reformed into the Army of the Potomac, could not boast anything near the statistics of the Army of Northern Virginia could. September 1862 was the most disorganized and weakest the Army of the Potomac would find itself in the duration of the war. This school of thought canceled out, at least temporarily, any deficiencies faced by Lee's forces. When George B. McClellan rode out of Washington to take command, he found three very different organizations, each with its own command, divisional, brigade, artillery, cavalry, transportation, and quartermaster structures. Additionally, the newly formed regiments, many of whom were only a few weeks old, were rushed to the front and infused into the disorganized mess. Organizing these separate organizations into one effective command would weeks if not months, McClellan would be forced to do it in a matter of days, while in motion, in addition to planning a short-term strategy to deal with Lee. 59 The chaos of the reorganization is apparent in the 5th New York Volunteers' experience. Historian Brian Pohanka related an instance of the 5th as they passed McClellan on the march toward western Maryland: "As they marched, General McClellan reined up beside the troops of Warren's brigade. 'Well, and how is the Old Fifth this evening?' he asked. 'First rate, General, but we'd be better off if we weren't living so much on supposition." 60 Even though he had the bigger force, the disorganization and confusion associated with the rapidity of the Maryland Campaign denied the general his army's full might 58 Baron De Jomini, The Art of War, Translated by Capt. G.H. Mendell, and Lieut. W.P. Craighill, Radford: Wilder Publications, 2008. 30-31. 59 Hartwig, 133-136. 60 Brian C. Pohanka, Vortex of Hell: History of the 5th New York Volunteer Infantry. Lynchburg, VA: Schroeder Publications, 2012. 369. 26 on the battlefield. In different circumstances these obstacles may have been overcome had McClellan had time to prepare. Robert E. Lee sensed his enemy's weakness and used it as part of his foundation to seek permission from President Davis to invade Maryland. "The two grand armies of the United States that have been operating in Virginia, though now united, are much weakened and demoralized. Their new levies, of which I understand 60,000 men have already been posted in Washington, are not yet organized, and will take some time to prepare for the field." 61 Lee identified that his logistical situation was terrible, however, he recognized the unfolding opportunity in front of him. "The army is not properly equipped for an invasion of an enemy's territory. It lacks much of the material of war, is feeble in transportation, the animals being much reduced, and the men are poorly provided with clothes, and in thousands of instances are destitute of shoes. Still, we cannot not afford to be idle, and though weaker than our opponents in men and military equipment's, must endeavor to harass if we cannot destroy them. I am aware that the movement is attended with much risk, yet I do not consider success impossible, and shall endeavor to guard it from loss." 62 The amount of stock Lee put into the Federals logistical organization is apparent. In fact, if taken as a whole, his reliance on the overall Federal weakness is one of his only justifications for his ill-supplied and smaller force to go on the offensive. Additionally, these logistical matters, both of his own and the Federal weakness, coincide directly with Lee's desire to deliver a decisive blow to the Federals quickly. There was not a better opportunity to do it and expect fruitful results, then while the Army of Potomac was at its weakest moment, structurally, organizationally, numerically, and logistically. 61 OR, vol 19, 1: 590-591. 62 Ibid., 590-591. 27 Lee's conclusion of the ill-preparedness of the new Union regiments applies not only to the troops in his sector but also to those in the Western Theater. Much like Lee's army within reach of Washington, Kirby Smith's small army in Kentucky created a panic and proved Lee's theory on the reliability of new soldiers. Kirby Smith successfully and thoroughly destroyed an equally sized Federal force of raw recruits at Richmond, Kentucky, on August 30, 1862, eliminating them from the military equation. Historian Kenneth Noe termed the battle of Richmond as "the most lopsided Confederate victory of the war, as Kirby Smith's men inflicted casualties so staggering that entire Union brigades ceased to exist." 63 With Smith's incursion into Kentucky, a vacuum of chaos erupted in the region, in particular, Ohio. The microcosm of Cincinnati infuses both the political and the serious logistical problems faced by the North in 1862. Historian Vernon Volpe pointed out, "Although the influx of [Union] volunteers was inspiring, with it came a shortage of arms, ammunition, and other equipment needed to outfit the troops properly." 64 This example was echoed across the entire Kentucky region in 1862. Although McClellan's army outnumbered Lee with a total of roughly 87,000 men, twenty percent of his infantry were raw, having been in the army just a handful of weeks and had not even come close to mastering the level of proficiency needed in drill and tactics to be effective on a Civil War battlefield. 65 Even though the Federals were able to put fresh regiments into the field, it became an issue of quantity versus quality. The unfortunate story of the 118th Pennsylvania Volunteers is a classic case in point of these raw troops' ineffectiveness. Arriving to the Army of the Potomac just a few days before the battle of Antietam, the men prepared to enter their first engagement on September 19 at Shepherdstown. Their regimental historian 63 Noe, Perryville, 39. 64 Volpe, "Dispute Every Inch of Ground", 146. 65 Hartwig, 139. 28 wrote: "The teachings of the battalion-drill near Sharpsburg on the previous day [September 18] now had practical application." The 118th's Colonel stated in his official report that: "We returned their fire as fast as possible, but soon found that our Enfield rifles were so defective that quite one-fourth of them would not explode the caps." 66 The 118th's story, while extreme is not unique, another raw Federal regiment the 128th Pennsylvania found itself in an even worse circumstance, owing to its lack of training. The 128th Pennsylvania arrived at the army just days before as well and were assigned to the newly organized XII Corps, which itself contained some of the highest proportions of raw troops. During the battle of Antietam, the new regiment found itself in Miller's Cornfield and due lack of basic drill unable to maneuver itself back onto its brigade in the face of onrushing Confederates. Officers and sergeants from experienced neighboring outfits were sent to try and move the bewildered regiment all to no avail. In the end, the 128th was left to its fate and was nearly destroyed, having no effect on the enemy and only weakening their own brigades' position. 67 Stories similar in nature can be found across the Army of the Potomac on every sector of each battlefield during the Maryland Campaign, each in the midst of their own mishaps allowing the Confederates a level of superiority while hindering their supporting elements an opportunity to exploit any gains. Don Carlos Buell's Army of the Ohio experienced similar circumstances with green regiments as its eastern counterpart. In a letter to Kirby Smith, Bragg detailed his understanding that Buell's men were in rough shape and utterly demoralized. These circumstances, Bragg believed, offered the South a greater benefit of success. 68 The raw, ill-trained, ill-equipped, and completely unprepared 105th Ohio, 123rd Illinois, and 21st Wisconsin infantry regiments were 66 Survivors' Association 118th (Corn Exchange) Regt., P.V., History of the Corn Exchange Regiment 118th Pennsylvania Volunteers,62. 67 Stephen W. Sears, Landscape Turned Red. New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1994. 206. 68 United States War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Vol. 16: Part 2. Correspondence, Washington: Govt. Print. Off., 1880. 754. 29 all glaring examples of this shortcoming. The 123rd Illinois found itself in a similar predicament as the 128th Pennsylvania at Antietam, exposed and on its own, and fell victim to veteran Confederate troops bearing down on them. The 105th Ohio, equally as green, found itself thrown into the breach in the midst of the 123rd Illinois collapse. Private Ayre of the 105th remarked: "…could not form into a proper line and after going through several maneuvers in order to do so we became mixed and confused." In similar fashion to the 123rd Illinois, the 105th Ohio was quickly stampeded by their Confederate attackers. 69 Much like the inferiority of outdated weapons, untrained, raw troops could not perform to a tactically sufficient level to keep par with the rapid pace and constantly changing conditions of a Civil War battlefield. While plenty of experienced units did exist in the Union armies, it is clear the inexperienced ones created more problems, affording the Confederate forces golden opportunities to exploit immediate tactical advantages they likely would not have had, had they been fighting experienced, or even trained troops. On the other side of the coin, the copious amounts of raw units severely hampered any notion gaining a decisive victory or rapidly following up a pursuit. This is evident in the in the results of Antietam and Perryville, both of which were Confederate tactical victories, and the speed at which Lee and Bragg's armies were pursued. The armies' organization is important when looking to understand the advantages and disadvantages and how this affected a particular side's likelihood of victory. The experience level and the amount of subpar weaponry in both the armies of the Potomac and Ohio was only one issue, their organizational structure in both leadership and how its units were grouped confounded their problems and offered the Confederates another edge over their opponent pushing the scale further in favor in the equation of obtaining a victory. As previously stated, the 69 Stuart W. Sanders, Maney's Confederate Brigade at the Battle of Perryville, Charleston: The History Press, 2014. 53-54. 30 Army of the Potomac during the Maryland Campaign was a conglomeration of several different organizations. It contained the II, V, and VI Corps the original Army of the Potomac, the re-designated I and XII Corps, the Army of Virginia, and the newly dubbed IX that had served on the North Carolina coast. Although there were certainly experienced troops and leaders in each of these components, they each spoke a different organizational "language." 70 George McClellan certainly had the most difficult task of any field commander regarding the organization of his army. Not only did he have three different organizations to mold together as a cohesive fighting force, but he also had the additional struggle of doing it on the fly in a military and national emergency. Therefore, although the Army of the Potomac was a potent fighting force, and managed to engage the Confederates, its capabilities in terms of operational effectiveness were severely limited. Buell's circumstances were much more appealing. His Army of the Ohio had remained intact as a cohesive fighting force since its formation; however, he received additional reinforcements from Grant, and a host of new regiments, diluting its effectiveness as an organization. The Army of the Ohio's real organizational issues manifested in the senior leadership's quirks, rivalries, and lack of cohesion. 71 The use of cavalry in both McClellan and Buell's forces paled in comparison to the South. This issue stemmed from the Federal government's inability to recognize the importance of that specific branch early in the conflict. Overwhelmingly, the cavalry found its commands broken apart and scattered across the army, acting in various guard and staff related duties. Those commands retained to perform the primary tasks of nineteenth-century, reconnaissance, screening, and raids were too few and spread out to have any significant impact on the outcome 70 Hartwig, 133-135. 71 Steven E. Woodworth, Nothing but Victory: The Army of the Tennessee, 1861-1865. New York: Vintage, 2005. 216. 31 of the Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns. 72 Although they lacked in cavalry ability the Federals were unquestionably superior in artillery. Union guns, although far superior to that of the South were severely flawed organizationally in 1862. Circling back to the theme of different organizational structures in McClellan's force, the arrangement of this branch varied, causing communication issues, and leadership vacuums. In common with the cavalry, the prominent artillery structure in 1862 in both the Army of the Potomac and Army of the Ohio, lacked a unified system of command; instead, most batteries were the responsibility of brigade commanders or divisional commanders. Therefore, at critical moments batteries could only take orders from infantry commanders and were presented with the difficult task of coordinating mass firing on specific targets. 73 While it may seem trivial, such inefficiency in employment and "bureaucratic red tape" of military organization prevented the cavalry and artillery from performing at its maximum potential which no doubt contributed to the shortcomings of the Union armies in 1862. The Confederate military organization also had its flaws; however, as previously noted, the experience level of Confederate forces as a whole were much higher and able to adapt to a situation more efficiently. Partly this had to do with the smaller size of the forces overall, and the Confederate authorities' choice to disperse recruits and conscripts across seasoned units rather than raise new organizations. The cavalry of J.E.B. Stuart, John Hunt Morgan, and Nathan Bedford Forrest for instance were vastly superior to their Federal counterparts in every respect. These commands were led well, centralized, and overall contained extremely efficient horsemen, which had proven themselves time and again on the battlefield. 74 Confederate artillery was 72 Hartwig, 155-158. 73 Curt Johnson and Richard C. Anderson, Jr., Artillery Hell: The Employment of Artillery at Antietam, College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1995. 53; Daniel, 146, 148-150. 74 Hartwig, 88-90; Hess, Banners to the Breeze, 24. 32 generally inferior in respect to quality of mechanics, yet, the branch retained a slight advantage over its foes in its organization. Lee's artillery was organized on the divisional level, allowing for easier deployment, and concentrated fire, as the Army of Northern Virginia, did not have a corps structure during this time, division commanders held greater authority in placement and employment of artillery. Furthermore, several groups of divisions fell under an unofficial "wing" structure, allowing Jackson and Longstreet to concentrate guns further. 75 Bragg organized his army different than Lee's army. Bragg operated with two wings or corps, broken down into several divisions. His army maintained an organized and effective cavalry force; however, their weakest point was the artillery. Only fifty-six guns accompanied the Army of Mississippi into Kentucky compared to Buell's 147 guns. These Confederate guns like the Federals were assigned to individual brigades, same as its Federal counterpart, eliminating opportunities to converge fire effectively. 76 Understanding the organizational structure of an army allows for a realistic understanding of what that force is capable of; how it moves in the larger scheme of a campaign; and the benefits and challenges of its employment on the tactical level. Assuming the forces involved were all organized in the same fashion, with identical structures is detrimental in interpreting the ebb and flow of battles and campaigns. A clear picture of how a field army operates through an organizational table is, therefore, paramount. Using Lee and McClellan as examples illustrate the nature of this point. In the Maryland Campaign, Lee was able to give more direct orders to independent division commanders, therefore reducing somewhat the natural confusion begot of transferring and disseminating orders through multiple tiers of officers. On the other hand, McClellan had to give orders to "wing" commanders, who then cut the orders to corps 75 Johnson, Artillery Hell, 41-47. 76 Noe, 370-373, 381-382. 33 commanders then down to the divisional level, doubling the amount of personalities the orders had to go through compared to Lee's forces. It is clear from watching the battles of Antietam and Perryville's tactical evolution that the commanding generals' intent was time and again ineffectually carried out due to communication breakdown and misinterpretation of orders on both sides. Having only scratched the surface of the organizational components of only four of the principal armies involved in the fall of 1862, it becomes clear that each differed in how it chose to conduct its internal operations. However, it is equally apparent from this brief examination, that Confederate forces in the fall of 1862 were better organized and tactically more efficient than their Federal counterparts in Maryland and Kentucky, therefore lending an edge to overall Confederate success and perhaps victory. Strategic Considerations: The strategic components are unquestionably the most important when ascertaining why the fall of 1862 was the Confederacy's high tide. Having looked at the political, logistical, and organizational components and internalizing how each affected the grand design of Confederate strategy in 1862, this section will now tie these components together and shed light on how each influenced strategic decision and guided the final results of the campaigns. A clear understanding of what strategy is necessary to further examine this section. Clausewitz defines strategy as: "the employment of the battle as the means towards the attainment of the object of the War." 77 The "attainment of the object" is the crucial cog in accepting the purpose and direction of operations in Maryland and Kentucky. The strategic composition of these campaigns was different in what they sought to obtain as their achievable goal. Lee's objective was political in its foundation; his 77 Clausewitz, 133. 34 campaign didn't revolve around the occupation of land or control of any specific feature; instead, it sought a climactic battle with a decisive battlefield victory in which Lee was willing to risk his army in a desperate gamble. 78 Bragg and Smith's Kentucky incursions were much more multilayered on an operational platform. While some sort of showdown battle was necessary for the west, it was not the immediate goal, only a potentiality; instead, the relief and re-establishment of Tennessee was paramount with a secondary objective of the "liberation" of Kentucky. The second tier of goals included the control of rail and river systems as a means to eliminate the Union's ability to supply its forces and occupy any portion of the Upper or Deep South. The most significant strategic gain for the South in 1862 existed in Tennessee and Kentucky. Proof of this importance is shown through the fact that six of the seven Confederate field armies would make this region their primary objective in the fall of 1862. These six armies included the commands of Generals' Braxton Bragg, Kirby Smith, Earl Van Dorn, Stirling Price, William Loring, and Humphrey Marshall. Confederate control and or occupation of Tennessee and Kentucky offered benefits and a platform for victory that the remaining Confederate states collectively couldn't offer. Having been the first state to fall under Federal control, Tennessee's recapture would be a major morale boost for the Confederacy nationally and particularly to the large amount of Tennessee regiments that made up Bragg's army. The most significant benefit, however, resided in Tennessee's industrial capability, as it contained the ability to produce more raw items for the war effort then the rest of the Confederacy combined. 79 Confederate control 78 Harsh, 25; OR, vol 19, 1: 598-599. 79 Connelly. 5-15. The importance of Tennessee to the Confederacy is undeniable. Connelly argues that the region was the largest concentrated area for the production of war materials in the Confederacy. The region by 1864 had produced 22,665 pounds niter. Additionally, the area contained a significant source of lead, and was the chief producer of gunpowder in 1861. Tennessee also contained a vast number of factories that repaired old weapons, manufactured new small arms, cartridges, percussion caps, and other equipment. By the fall of 1861, Nashville plants alone turned out 100,000 percussion caps daily, with some 1,300,000 caps produced weekly. The region boasted on the two major Confederate sources of livestock, the other being 35 would, therefore, help in stabilizing the struggling logistical and economic constraints faced in the South. Additionally, the state's rail system would allow for the re-establishment of a direct connection to North Carolina and Virginia and the ability to ship supplies and material to the Confederate forces in the east. Conversely, the loss of Tennessee would be a major blow to Union morale, as its loss would have undone and nullified the Federal campaigns in 1861 and early 1862. 80 Kentucky also offered significant gains for the South. It was generally believed, particularly by the Confederate government's higher echelons, that the majority of Kentuckians were sympathetic to the Southern cause and would rally to Confederate banners if field armies were able to move into the region and strategically hold it. Logistically Kentucky offered a substantial increase for the South, particularly in animals, forage, and transportation options. Like Tennessee, Kentucky contained major river systems and rail lines that would drastically increase movement for the South and partially cut off the mid-west states from the rest of the Union. Politically, Kentucky, a vital border state under Confederate control, could be crippling to Northern domestic and foreign political views. In theory, this political aspect played on a successful campaign in Maryland, another vital border state. More immediately, Kentucky offered the western Confederate armies an opportunity to turn the war from one of defense to one poising them on the edge of invasion of critical Northern states, Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana. Such a turn in the circumstances would be devastating for the Union, particularly politically. The Illinois town of Cairo on the Mississippi River, in 1862 was serving as the logistical launch point for the Union armies in the west; prolonged Confederate control of Kentucky would likely force the Shenandoah Valley in Virginia. More pork was raised in Tennessee save Missouri than any other state. Agriculturally, Middle Tennessee in 1860 produced an average of more than a million bushels of corn making it a leader amongst its sister states. 80 Connelly, 3-6. 36 the Federals to find an alternative method of supplying the troops in Corinth and other points in the Southern heartland. As long as the Federals controlled these regions, they would continue to pin the Confederacy in the Deep South denying them of access to vital infrastructure, maneuvering room, and favorable victory conditions. Braxton Bragg and Kirby Smith had to go on the offensive if they were to alleviate the situation by the very nature of the circumstances. As Lee's army with Richmond, their backs were on the doorstep of the Deep South, and they had no room to maneuver. Fortunately for the South, the western offensive was born out of an opportune moment of Halleck's caution that was strategically seized upon by Confederate commanders. In the necessity of the moment, launching an offensive like Lee during the Seven Days battles was the only beneficial option and a necessary risk if the war was going to be taken off the doorstep of the Deep South. Robert E. Lee on the other end of things saw himself and his army as the most important entity in the Confederacy at that moment. In his mind, the only scenario for Confederate victory rested in his hands alone. He showed this belief in dispatches and letters throughout the campaign in an effort to orchestrate movements across the Confederacy to complement his objective. In a letter to Jefferson Davis, he noted his desire to see his suggestion on what he felt Loring's command should do in the Kanawha Valley, in an effort to support his operation. 81 Lee did not stop with Loring; however, days prior, he communicated his victory at Manassas and planned offensive to Braxton Bragg and requested that Bragg pass the information along to Kirby Smith for further coordination. It was Lee's desire that these western armies gain similar victories to his at Manassas, that when added together may be enough to secure Southern 81 OR, vol 19, 1: 594. 37 victory.82 Lastly, he demonstrated his understanding of the confused state of Federal forces in Washington and the need to seize the initiative before the opportunity was lost. Like Kentucky, Maryland was a vital border state, not for its potentiality in resources, but rather for its geographic relation to Washington. Any serious Confederate incursion into the state would be life-threatening to the Union, and therefore demanded desperate measures on the part of Northern armies to repel such an advance. 83 Lee's leadership has been often criticized during the Maryland Campaign from historians and even shocked his subordinates, Jackson, and Longstreet. 84 Lee was certainly aggressive and was known for taking risks; however, he was not a foolish man, and never committed his army to a disaster, at least not one he foresaw. Comparing his stratagem throughout the rest of the war, it's probable to conclude that his movements were well thought out, with the least amount of risk generated from the objective demands of the campaign. Even in moments of reaction to McClellan, Lee always retained the initiative in Maryland. In the aftermath of Seconded Manassas and Chantilly, it was the opinion of many in both military and civilian leadership that a final showdown somewhere north of the Potomac River was all that was needed for Confederate victory. 85 If Lee was a poker player, he was taking his hand and going all in, he could only hope the Federals floundered. General Longstreet understood the gravity of the moment when he wrote: "When the Second Bull Run campaign 82 OR, vol 19, 1: 589. 83 Ezra A. Carman, The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, Vol. I: South Mountain. Edited by Thomas G. Clemens, El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2012. 19-21. Carman was present at the battle of Antietam and dedicated his life to research and study of the Maryland Campaign in the post war years. Carman's work was able to capture not only the historical timeline of events, but offered an emotional aspect not seen in other works. This emotional component while subtle is an important tool in internalizing the mindset of Union soldiers and perhaps the North itself. 84 James Longstreet, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Edited by Ned Bradford. New York: The Fairfax Press, 1979. 265. Longstreet claims that aside from himself, that General Jackson was also taken back from the boldness of Lee's designs on the Maryland Campaign, while at a meeting in Frederick MD, September 9th. 85 Harsh, 60-63. Multiple historians have agreed on this point. James Murfin considered the battle of Antietam to be the most important battle in American history, and one of the most decisive in world history. Ezra Carman portrays the campaign as requiring desperate action for the North, while Scot Hartwig, Stephen Sears and James McPherson center on the political undertone. 38 closed, we had the most brilliant prospects the Confederates ever had. We then possessed an army which, had it been kept together, the Federals would never have dared attack." 86 Lee's confidence in his army was surely the determining factor in his choice to assume the offensive into Maryland, and no doubt behind his reasoning to push the army as hard as he did in the maneuvering and fighting that took place in Maryland. The General expressed his confidence in the men and the importance of the offensive in General Order No. 102. on September 4: "This army is about to engage in most important operations." He further outlines the necessity of respecting private property, and the desire for his commands to lighten their supply encumbrance to allow them to move quickly and efficiently. 87 When coupling the logistical and organizational shortcomings, the political factors reinforced by his troops' confidence and his in them proved to be the energy from which the Maryland Campaign was executed. The offensives themselves presented each of these commanders a complicated set of obstacles and decisions to overcome while ensuring they offered the best possible benefit to their cause with the least amount of risk towards their army. This is certainly one of the most challenging aspects of being a commander in charge of any offensive-minded campaign. Johnston at Shiloh, Burnside at Fredericksburg, Hooker at Chancellorsville, and Hood in Tennessee all failed to capitalize on this principle. The fact that Lee and Bragg achieved the scale of operational measures they did is a testament to their leadership and ability to seize control and direction of a developing situation. If the argument is to be maintained that the Maryland and Kentucky campaigns provided the South the best chance the South had of winning the war, then proof of this claim must lay within the strategic composition of the campaigns themselves. If taken in this context, then it must be understood that every move Lee, Bragg, and 86 Longstreet, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, 263. 87 OR, vol 16, 2: 592. 39 Smith, along with the supporting roles of Loring, Marshall, Price, and Van Dorn were calculated if not on a grand scale, certainly on an individual level. Unlocking the purpose of the maneuvers, and their relation to strategic success will illustrate the continually changing dynamics and environment of each campaign, and how these generals continually altered their designs to fit the goals of their strategic objectives. The evolving strategic situation in the months leading up to the campaigns created the conditions under which the operations in Maryland and Kentucky were governed. Understanding the Confederate forces' strategic focus for needing to assume the offensive will outline the gravity and weight they placed on the outcome of these fall campaigns. The most measurable strategic potential in 1862 existed in the Western Theater. As already stated, the economic and logistical importance of this region necessitated an aggressive action on behalf of the South if the Confederacy was to survive. The first attempt at recovering control of Tennessee occurred in April with the battle of Shiloh. While tactically a Confederate failure, the aftermath of the fighting created adverse reactions from the Northern press and transposed into Halleck's overall cautious and slow pursuit towards Corinth. Halleck, after taking Corinth, was faced with limited choices on where to move next. Due to political and doctrinal restrictions of conciliation and Halleck's theory on war, the massive Union army was not able logistically to move into the Deep South. The only real move available to the Federal forces in the summer of 1862, was a lateral one east towards Chattanooga. 88 With Bragg at Tupelo and Kirby Smith's small command at Chattanooga, the path of success for an aggressive officer to take Chattanooga, a major supply hub for the South, was wide open. Halleck foiled this opportunity by sending Buell's command to accomplish the task. The slow-moving cautious Buell initially created consternation among 88 Daniel, 86. 40 Confederate leadership, yet once the pace of his progress was realized, the same trepidation turned into an opportunity. 89 Clausewitz described the potential for a reciprocal effect to take place should an army go on the offensive; however, he counterweighs that thought with pointing out that an army in a precarious position with the opportunity to gain a substantial amount should jump on the opportunity if one should be presented. 90 Certainly, Bragg and Smith applied a variation of this maxim into their decision to go on the advance. The term "invasion" is the defining ideology that bound both major theaters of war and other Confederate objectives in the fall of 1862. Clausewitz wrote that even if the complete overthrow of the enemy is impossible, which it was for the Confederacy, then the only other real option of winning a war is to conquer a portion of the enemy territory. In conquering the enemy territory, the invader has the opportunity to weaken the enemy's resources, crippling their ability to sustain an army. By carrying the war in enemy territory, the conditions will further the enemy's expense and ultimately lead to peace negotiations. 91 The term "invasion" generates a delicate question concerning what an invasion actually is, and how it fits into the American context, particularly in the political spectrum in 1862. Baron De Jomoni, whose military maxims were dominant in nineteenth-century America, distinguished what an "invasion" actually is. Breaking down the idea of an offensive, he wrote that: "…an invasion occurs against a great state whose whole or significant portion of territory is attacked. If only a province or moderate line of defense is attacked, then it is an offensive, and if such actions are limited only to a confined operation, then it is termed an initiative." 92 Indeed then, if taken in this context, 89 Connelly, 200-201. 90 Clausewitz, 707. 91 Clausewitz, 706. Neither of the primary Confederate armies had the ability to "conquer" Federal territory. However, the last part in reference to Clausewitz maxim was the adaptation applied by the Confederacy in its strategic goals. 92 Jomini, The Art of War, 54. The difference in the definition in understanding the purpose of the Confederate objective is critical. Many historians point to the Army of Northern Virginia's strategic goals as fitting into the framework of an 41 Confederate efforts militarily were an offensive and an invasion only in the political spectrum. Although the press and even the top military minds used the term invasion quite frequently in the North, there is nothing in the Confederate strategic framework of 1862, that fit the definition of invasion, Lee himself in a letter to Jefferson Davis on September 4, used the term expedition implying that his foray had a specific purpose and would be short. 93 Due to logistics alone, Confederate forces across the board could not sustain the long-term goals of an invasion. However, the Clausewitzian maxim of a "strategical attack" was within reach and achievable according to the conditional logistical framework. Much of the success for the Confederates relied on the superiority of its troops, and the avoidance of exhausting itself with an over achievement of objectives. 94 The window of opportunity was narrow, operationally because of logistics, but more importantly, because of politics. The two most significant benefits afforded to the Southern cause in 1862 were the Congressional fall elections and European superpowers. If Confederate forces could score a major political victory in the east, and both a strategic reversal coupled with a political coup in the west, then perhaps Northern voters would come to resent the war and vote for "Peace Democrats" in November, and more advantageously draw England and France in as mediators or some other influential role, to end the war. It is apparent that the pressure to act decisively if not at least aggressively before November was of paramount importance. While it is debated as to how far the European powers would intercede, what is certain is that the Confederacy banked part of its strategic decisions both politically and militarily on intervention. 95 Just as apparent was the frustration and delicate invasion, yet when looking at that particular army's logistics and Lee's strategic goals only the Jominian maxim of offensive fits the framework. 93 OR, vol 16, 2: 591-592. 94 Clausewitz, 601. 95 McPherson, 534-535. 42 statesmanship which had to be executed on behalf of the Union to convince the English mainly that the war was nothing more than a rebellion that the Republic could put down on its own. 96 However, this did not appear to be the scene in the late summer of 1862 with Union defeats and setbacks continually piling up. Lee retained the initiative by keeping the enemy guessing what his next move and true objective was. According to Henry McClellan, J.E.B. Stuart's adjutant, that as late as September 13, Federal forces maintained the: "utmost uncertainty regarding Lee's movements and intentions." 97 Lee designed his army's movements to draw out the Federals from Washington. By crossing at Leesburg, his army was initially east of the Catoctin Mountains and a direct threat to Washington and Baltimore, it was this crossing point that directly forced the disorganized Army of the Potomac to leave the defenses prematurely, and more importantly to force Lincoln's hand in placing McClellan back in overall command. 98 The key to the Army of Northern Virginia's movements was speed and mobility, thus the reasoning for Lee's series of orders, which included provisions for shoeless Confederates to remain at Winchester, a lightening of supplies, and an insistence that straggling be strictly forbidden. Lee's next major objective after crossing the Potomac River was to move on Frederick. A Confederate presence in a substantial pro-Union area was a direct insult to the North, and would only further press the Army of the Potomac to hurry faster in order to "repel the invasion" and "save the nation"; while most importantly for the Confederates, continually limit the progress of McClellan organizing his army into a capable force on the battlefield. 96 Nelson, 163-168. 97 H.B. McClellan, The Life and Campaigns of Major-General J.E.B. Stuart: Commander of the Cavalry of the Army of Northern Virginia, Edison: The Blue & Grey Press, 1993. 113. 98 Harsh, 98; OR, vol 16, 2: 604-605. Letter from Lee to Davis on September 12 justifying is reasoning for crossing his army east of the mountains. 43 Lee's grand strategy was working so far; his movements northward from Richmond had stripped the Atlantic states of their Union occupiers to concentrate on Lee's Confederate force, while at the same time sending the Federal strategy of war into complete chaos as they scrambled to deal with the offensive. Lee believed that if he launched an unrelenting offensive, the Federals would be compelled to abandon their widely scattered smaller campaigns, which were gradually eating away the frontiers of the Confederacy; and, as a result, be forced to concentrate their columns in response to his initiatives. 99 Lee's movement into the western part of the state, via Frederick and into the Middleton and Pleasant valleys, opened the Shenandoah Valley up momentarily, which assisted Loring's advance in western Virginia, by isolating the small Federal commands in that region. In addition to freeing up Loring to make an offensive, Lee's army in western Maryland split the Federal war effort in half. The Army of the Potomac was now confined in environs around Washington, while Federal forces in the Western Theater had no direct route to reinforce McClellan. 100 The simultaneous advance of Lee, Loring, Marshall, Smith, and Bragg effectively drove a wedge between the Union field armies, while Price and Van Dorn's forces kept Grant fixed at Corinth. 101 Bragg and Smith's columns made their march through eastern and middle Tennessee and into Kentucky at an incredible speed, leaving Buell's army to have to hustle to catch up. 102 Kirby Smith realized the opportunity in front of him early on and moved his men forward roughly the same time Lee's men were preparing to destroy John Pope's forces near Manassas, beginning the Kentucky Campaign. Union Brigadier General George W. Morgan's command held the vital Cumberland Gap, which historian Earl Hess christened the "Gibraltar of the West." 99 Harsh, 116. 100 Hartwig, 162-163. 101 Harsh, 96-97; Hess, 31-35. 102 Hess, 57,62,64. 44 The Gap itself served as a platform for the Federals to invade East Tennessee, and as long as it remained in Federal hands, the Deep South, particularly Chattanooga and Atlanta, would be under constant threat. 103 Reducing this garrison was the first lynchpin in breaking Federal control and regaining Tennessee for the South. Smith, now free to maneuver feinted around the gap and threatened the supply lines, forcing a Federal withdrawal; he then turned his legions northward and moved into Kentucky. Smith moved through the eastern part of the state and pushed Heth's division as far as Covington, directly across from Cincinnati, sending that city and southern Ohio into a panic. 104 With Smith's small army running almost unmolested in Kentucky, Bragg's larger army moved through Middle Tennessee via Sparta feinting towards Nashville, forcing the Federals to concentrate there, while strategically widening the gap between Buell's command and Southern forces in Kentucky. Bragg, before departing to Chattanooga, left behind roughly 35,000 men in two separate commands under generals Stirling Price and Earl Van Dorn. These commands had a twofold objective. Their primary objective was to contain the Army of the Tennessee at Corinth, and once Bragg and Smith were in position, launch an offensive of their own against Grant, defeat him, and then rapidly march to connect with Bragg's army. 105 Bragg and Smith exposed the weakness in the Federal policy of limited war with its preoccupation of taking landmarks and reliance on cumbersome supply lines and within less than a months' time-reversed almost a year of Union progress in the west, in respect to subjugating the Upper South. Unlike John Bell Hood's offensive into Tennessee in late 1864, which, while certainly an emergency, did not deviate Sherman from his plans of marching to the sea. 106 In 103 Hess, 7-8. 104 Volpe, "Dispute Every Inch of Ground", 141. 105 Noe, 29. 106 Eric A. Jacobson and Richard A. Rupp, For Cause and for Country: A Study of the Affair at Spring Hill and the Battle of Franklin, Eric A. Jacobson, 2013. 42. 45 1862, this simply was impossible for Federal forces. Sherman operated under a "hard war" doctrine that allowed him to subsist off the land and changed his objective from key city centers to making war on the Southern people, through the destruction of their local economy, food subsistence, and ability subsist in a normal capacity. 107 Sherman effectively narrowed the war to the immediate doorstep of the Southern People. As a result the individual citizen was forced to deal with their own survival, and naturally the bigger picture of the Confederacy became less important. Union forces in 1862 did not have the same conditional framework, and by default, would be forced to pursue any Confederate force and meet it on the battlefield. Even though the fall of 1862 didn't produce the hoped-for victory conditions, strategically, the Confederates were more successful in this period than at any other part of the war. The results of this success were more apparent in the Western Theater than in the east. However, certain components in the Eastern Theater changed as well. The most significant measurable success emerged in time bought for the Confederacy, and a prolonged timetable for the Northern plan of war. In the summer, Federal plans in the west called for the capture of Vicksburg and Chattanooga, the latter of which was in progress when the offensive started. 108 It is highly probable that if able, the Federal forces would have moved on Vicksburg in the summer of 1862, and perhaps forced its capitulation much sooner. 109 However, this is only speculation, yet, the reality is this operation was certainly delayed by the events that occurred in Kentucky and the aggressive nature of Price and Van Dorn. Kentucky was only one variable in stymieing the Federal drive toward Vicksburg. Just as important were the aggressiveness of Price and Van Dorn at the battles of Iuka and Corinth in October. Although Confederate defeats, the outcome of 107 Charles Royster, The Destructive War: William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and the Americans, New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc. 321-328. 108 McPherson, 511-512. 109 Woodworth, Nothing but Victory, 243-244. 46 these battles managed to temporarily check the Federals, prompting an end to any realistic campaign season in Mississippi. At least for the foreseeable future, the Mississippi River remained open by way of Vicksburg, and Union strategy incomplete, in which case was Price and Van Dorn's big contribution. 110 Bragg and Smith failed to hold Kentucky and or convert her into a Confederate state. However, as the logistic concerns show, the state's complete occupation, with the available forces, was genuinely impossible. In all the engagements that had taken place, the Southerners had the better day. Kirby Smith's army completely routed Federal forces at Richmond in August, and Bragg's army captured the garrison at Munfordville. Before and during the campaign John Hunt Morgan's cavalry had wreaked havoc in Kentucky, capturing supplies, disrupting communications, and pushing to the Ohio River virtually unchallenged. 111 Even Kentucky's principle battle at Perryville was the better day tactically for the Confederates. More than anything, Kentucky showed the weakness of Buell, limited war, and the Union's inability to protect vital territory adequately under a conciliation policy. While in the end Bragg and Smith left, they did so generally unmolested, which showed Buell's unwillingness to fight another pitched battle. Therefore, this aftermath was certainly nothing for the Union to be proud of. In truth Buell did not drive Bragg and Smith out of Kentucky, rather the limitations of logistics and the realization of strategic objectives forced the Confederates back to Tennessee. 112 Although Braxton Bragg is surrounded by much controversy and sharp opinions on his leadership capabilities, one must look past emotion and see the facts as they present in the strategic element. While indeed, the Confederates failed to hold Kentucky, they did succeed in 110 Woodworth, 239-240. 111 Hess, 12. 112 Noe, 333. 47 regaining portions of Tennessee. In particular, Middle Tennessee by way of Murfreesboro, which sat astride the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, and was seen as the key to the wealthy Stone, Duck, and Elk River valleys. 113 Historian Thomas Connelly pointed out, which was already previously noted, that Tennessee was by far the most critical state in terms of manufacturing to the South. Although the entire state wasn't in Confederate hands, over two-thirds of it was, and most importantly, the opportunity to secure the very vital Nashville and Mississippi River corridor remained a possibility for a future campaign. 114 The primary focal point in the interpretation of the Kentucky Campaign is the Confederate failure to remain within that state. However, the key phrase narrows down to opportunity and potential. If taken in this context, the Confederate forces in July were backed into a corner. However, come October, these same forces had managed to throw the Federal forces off balance and regain a significant portion of lost territory, changing the entire atmosphere and flow of the Western Theater. In short, the success of the Kentucky Campaign is that it allowed the Confederates to move from the verge of defeat to a position where the fate of the Western Theater was up in the air, which only a decisive campaign would bring to a conclusion. 115 The fall of 1862 was the last chance the Confederates had at securing Tennessee permanently during the war. While the Western Theater was more significant in terms of strategic gain and leverage, the Eastern Theater added its own momentous shift in the flow of events. Unlike the west, the Eastern Theater was very narrow, as it existed in the space between Richmond and Washington. In strategic terms, the region was harrowing regarding maneuvering room and logistical sustainment. In one sense, Lee and his army were successful in pushing the Army of the Potomac 113 Peter Cozzens, No Better Place to Die: The Battle of Stones River, Chicago: University of Illinois, 1990. 8. 114 Connelly, 16-22. 115 Cozzens, No Better Place to Die, 12-14; Hess, 116. 48 away from the gates of Richmond, along with wrecking the Army of Virginia, while lastly temporarily clearing the smaller theaters, such as the coast and Shenandoah Valley of Federal forces. 116 While this situation may have provided an opportunity in the west, it meant little or nothing in the east. The fact is, Lee understood his primary objective either consisted of breaking the Northern will to fight through battlefield victory or by the complete destruction of the Union army. 117 Lee's primary objective in Maryland was to bate the Federal forces into a showdown fight. He was successful in this mission by just crossing over the Potomac River. The location of Washington in the southern portion of Maryland across from Alexandria made an incursion in Maryland a threat for the Federal government. 118 Unlike the west, where a fair amount of effort was required for Bragg and Smith to march their armies the distance required to Kentucky, the Army of Northern Virginia did not have to move far to accomplish its mission. Another key component to Lee's strategic objective was the lack of overhead in its long-term goal. Unlike the Western Theater, there was no pressure for Lee to specifically secure any particular region, as the Confederacy in the east had not lost any of its production capabilities nor any significant amount of land to Federal occupation. Therefore, the Confederate movements' direction wasn't necessarily guided by a specific purpose, but rather by the necessity of strategic gains which were designed to draw out the Army of the Potomac in a state of haste and unpreparedness. However, whereas the Kentucky Campaign had different aspects of measurable success, the 116 Harsh, 19-20. 117 Murfin, 63-64. 118 Harsh, 23; Murfin, 36-40; McPherson, 555-556. All the major historians who focus on the Maryland Campaign point to this as a major component to deterring the outcome and purpose of Lee's strategy. 49 Maryland Campaign had none, only a single purpose that demanded a climactic clash to determine its outcome. 119 At no other point in the war did Lee have such an advantage and control of the initiative. Arguably, his combination of subordinate officers was the best in their position as a whole than at any other point. His army was operating off a long track of victory, the length of which they would not experience again. 120 And most importantly, the Maryland Campaign was truly the only time in which Lee would have direct control of the flow of events; in Richmond, he had acted out of desperation, in Northern Virginia, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, the Overland Campaign and Petersburg he counteracted his opponents moves, and at Gettysburg, he committed to a battle that was dictated by the Federals. In September of 1862, Lee was the composer of the campaign and the master of ceremonies, he and he alone decided when and where the climactic battle would be fought. 121 All too often, the argument arises that the Army of the Potomac moved quicker than Lee expected, and caught him off guard, forcing him to settle and fight an unprepared battle at Sharpsburg. This theory would make sense if Lee's strategic objectives were multilayered like Bragg or Smith. Nevertheless, this theory doesn't match up to his sole objective of a decisive engagement. As seen with logistical circumstances, Hagerstown was likely the limit for the army in terms of range, Lee, therefore, had decided to make the principle stand somewhere in that area. 122 Two factors make this apparent, the choice to reduce Harpers Ferry and Martinsburg, which are necessary for military doctrine, and the choice to have the army lay around Frederick 119 OR, vol 16, 2: Correspondence between Robert E. Lee and Jefferson Davis, September 8, 1862; Harsh, 119; Alexander, Fighting for the Confederacy, 139. 120 Hartwig, 126-127. 121 Harsh, 57-59. 122 Carman, The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, Vol. I ,108-111; Harsh, 190; Hartwig, 116-117; Murfin, 113. All of these sources for reasons ranging from realistic logistical concerns to Lee's strategic initiative point towards the area of Hagerstown as the realistic goal of the Confederate offensive. 50 for several days. 123 If the plan had been to fight somewhere else or keep the Federals at a distance, these two factors fit the mold. The truth is that Lee wanted a fight, and he wanted it quick, the geography of Western Maryland affords a great opportunity to a defending army, which was Lee's primary tactical vision. 124 Looking at the scope of the Army of Northern Virginia's movements in the campaign, there a few abundantly clear facts that warrant Lee's strategic designs. It's already been stated that Lee's intention was to draw out the Army of the Potomac, which he did by simply crossing into Maryland, and ushered the emergency by crossing east of the mountains. 125 The next key was the layover or taunting of the Federals by having his army remain in Frederick for several days. The decision to reduce the Harpers Ferry garrison, while militarily necessary, also doubly acted as part of the "national emergency" which further put pressure on McClellan and his army to move with haste. 126 The battle of South Mountain, while a Confederate defeat, opened the way for the Federals to move over the range and meet Lee on the ground of his choosing. 127 South Mountain is interesting, particularly for strategic reasons. The choice to leave one division under D.H. Hill to hold the three passes stretched over ten miles indicates that Lee didn't intend to stop the Federals there and expected them to take the position. A decisive battle along the South Mountain range would not have been beneficial for Lee to meet his objectives. His army would not have been able to counterattack effectively due to terrain, and maneuvering room would have been limited. Although Lee initially considered scrapping the campaign due to the longer than expected siege of Harpers Ferry, once the garrison did fall, he was able to 123 Harsh, 147-150; Hartwig, 211-212, OR, vol 16, 2, 603 (Special Orders 191) 605-608. 124 Allan, 201-205; Harsh, 98-99; Marshall, 148-150. 125 Marshall, 146. 126 Brian Matthew Jordan, Unholy Sabbath: The Battle of South Mountain in History and Memory September 14, 1862, New York: Savas Beatie, 2012. 80-85. 127 Jordon, Unholy Sabbath, 301. 51 concentrate his forces in the area of Sharpsburg. 128 It may not be that Lee specifically wanted to fight at Sharpsburg, but the lay of the land and the tactical and strategic components of it, offered natural terrain on which to fight a decisive battle. 129 The Antietam battlefield offered several very strong defensive opportunities. First was the Antietam Creek, which was wide and deep enough to stop infantry from crossing unless over a bridge. The terrain, particularly on the southern end of the battlefield, is very suitable for a defending force, along with the ground near the center of the battlefield. On the northern end, the terrain is its weakest for defense; however, the entire battlefield, especially the northern end, is very suitable for artillery employment. Lee's position at Antietam Creek was without question formidable. 130 Whereas the events in Kentucky were one of maneuver, Maryland hinged on the tactical climax. Therefore, both forces needed to clash and soundly defeat the other to end the campaign. The battle of Antietam itself ended in a draw, and the opposing lines virtually remained the same. 131 Having realized the day after the engagement that McClellan wasn't likely to attack again, and understanding that his position offered no benefits for his army to attack, Lee promptly withdrew back into Shepherdstown, Virginia, (West Virginia) intending to regroup his army and re-crossing the Potomac River near Williamsport to again sue for a decisive battle. The Confederate's were blocked by several determining factors though, the two primary factors being McClellan's choice to move the VI Corps north towards Hagerstown to block a crossing, and a large amount of straggling that has taken place since the start of the 128 Allan, 320. 129 Harsh, 301-303. 130 Phillip Thomas Tucker, Burnside's Bridge: The Climatic Struggle of the 2nd and 20th Georgia at Antietam Creek, Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2000. 47-54. 131 Ezra Carman, The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, Vol. 2: Antietam. Edited by Thomas G. Clemens, El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2012. 501. 52 campaigning that had severely reduced Lee's army from upwards of 70,000 men down to roughly 45,000. 132 While Lee did not thrash McClellan's army at Antietam to the extent his strategic objectives called for, the opportunity for a Confederate political victory was not entirely gone. In fact, Lee's offensive convinced Britain and France that Northern armies could never restore the Union, and they contemplated mediation, which would have constituted de facto recognition of the Confederacy. 133 Moving away from the narrow view of Lee and Maryland it is important to note that Bragg's army had achieved a significant victory on September 17 at Munfordville the same day the battle of Antietam was raging. While Lee's army was more or less locked in a stalemate in Maryland, the western Confederate forces still very much retained the initiative in Kentucky. If a successful outcome in Kentucky occurred, perhaps that would be enough to enhance the stalemate at Antietam into a negative outcome for the Union. 134 Lee did not wait in position along Antietam Creek, for events to develop in Kentucky, he didn't have to. By simply moving back across the river and McClellan's inability to pursue for logistical reasons, Lee still very much posed a serious threat, especially with re-crossing into Maryland if need be. Looking at the outcome of the Maryland Campaign and the factors involved in the forces' genetic composition, Lee's army achieved all that could reasonably be expected of it. Certainly, due to its size, it would be impossible to annihilate the Army of the Potomac, yet, by remaining together and gaining the tactical victory, that would have to be enough. 135 132 Murfin, 306. 133 McPherson, 546. 134 Earl J. Hess, Braxton Bragg: The Most Hated Man in the Confederacy, University of North Carolina Press, 2016. 63. 135 Ezra Carman, The Maryland Campaign of September 1862. Vol. III: Shepherdstown Ford and the End of the Campaign. Edited by Thomas G. Clemens, El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2012. 20-21. 53 Truly then the lynchpin of the 1862 Confederate offensive rested on the shoulders of Bragg and Smith. 136 Lee's offensive and climatic battle of Antietam would have held little or no importance if the events west of the Appalachian's hadn't been taking place in the manner they were. The ultimate failure of Bragg and Smith in Kentucky was their inability to link their armies together. The process involved in making this happen didn't occur until it was too late. 137 Regardless of why this juncture of uniting these armies didn't occur, the important point was that they retained the initiative until the battle of Perryville. Unlike Lee, Bragg and Smith didn't necessarily have to defeat Buell or Wright's local forces, but rather they just needed to exist in Kentucky. Smith's forces had cleared out Morgan and what pitiful resistance Wright was able to scrape together. Buell's army lingered exhausted and timidly in the western part of the state. Bragg and Smith controlled in theory over two-thirds of the state in the last weeks of September into October. 138 The high tide of the Confederacy occurred not at Antietam, but in the days before Perryville. Up until this date, the South had been successful in relieving Richmond, Chattanooga, Vicksburg, the Carolina coast, Shenandoah Valley, western Virginia, and Northern Virginia of any significant Federal occupation, or military operations. The Confederate armies were at its maxim of manpower, at least in theory, if not in actual employment and contained men who were wholly more experienced than their counterparts. Most importantly, the South had been successful universally of maintaining a Confederate wide offensive initiative. When looking at the battles of South Mountain, Richmond, Munfordville, Antietam, and Harpers Ferry, only 136 Hess, Braxton Bragg, 64. 137 Noe, 328-329. 138 Daniel, 128-129; Hess, 62-64; Noe, 104. 54 South Mountain had been a Federal victory and Antietam a draw, while the rest were complete decisive Confederate victories. The battle of Perryville long considered the principal battle of the Kentucky Campaign was neither decisive nor climatic. 139 The battle itself was fought only by portions of the armies, on ground that held no real strategic value to the overall goals of the campaign. However, the legacy of Perryville resides in Bragg's choice to withdraw his army from Kentucky in its aftermath. Leaving aside Bragg's personality, leadership issues, and his subordinates, the important aspect to look at is what was actually accomplished by his army. It's already been stated that Bragg and Smith's offensive knocked the Federal plan of war back a few pegs and opened up at two-thirds of Tennessee for the foreseeable future. Confederate goals upon entering Kentucky were unclear and varied in design between Bragg and Smith. 140 Perhaps the largest draw was establishing the state as Confederate, which they quickly understood wasn't a popular option amongst the people. That being the case, Confederate field armies could only subsist for so long in hostile territory until they would, by necessity, be forced to withdraw to friendly Tennessee. 141 Therefore, without the support of the majority of Kentuckians to endorse a Confederate government, the continuation of a Southern army within the state offered no benefit to the Confederacy. 142 Bragg and Smith's only true strategic failing was their inability to link together and deliver a decisive blow against Buell. If looked at in the context of the genetics of an ocean wave, the advance into Kentucky was the last little bit of the wave that rolls into the edge of the beach. It neither has the momentum nor the power to damage anything of significant strength. However, the break or 139 Noe, 343. 140 Hess, 56-57. 141 Connelly, 228; Noe, 334. 142 Noe, 336. 55 impact of the wave that occurs just before hitting shore tends to denote the power of the temporary effects inflicted within that particular wave's life span. Sticking with the ocean wave analogy, the Confederate wide offensive in the fall of 1862 was the last ocean wave before the tide changed. The lifespan of the Confederacy would perish in the calm time between the next high tide. Conclusion: The interpretations of the Civil War, its key moments, critical players, and even the purpose of the conflict, vary in many different extremes, platforms, and algorithms. Surely there were other critical moments of the war, in which the Confederacy could have theoretically changed the outcome or moments in which Union forces could have ended the war much sooner. The progress of the war is a fascinating storyline of complete unpreparedness through a series of excruciating growing pains that led to the high efficiency of conducting war. Looking at the grand scope of the conflict, particularly the logistics of the opposing sides, even the most novice student of the struggle can recognize that the Confederacy was severely behind in every aspect and shouldn't have waged war. 143 However, the fact remains they did, and the reality is any Southern hope for victory resided in the slowness, unpreparedness, and political deadlock of the North's ability to wage war. The true window in which to view why the fall of 1862 was the Southern high tide occurs in the aftermath of the campaigns themselves. The first and most critical component was the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation. The bold political move forever changed the direction and intent of the war. For the South, it had devastating consequences, as it eliminated 143 McPherson, 312-316. 56 any dream of European intervention, and essentially made the Confederacy an island left to its own. The proclamation also bled into the second crucial component, which truly had its roots at the beginning of 1862; however, it had become fully developed by the closing days of 1862, and that is the abandonment of "limited war" principals and the acceptance of "hard war" doctrine. 144 Militarily the South would never mount such a broad offensive again nor one with so much potential to gain from it. Lee's Pennsylvania Campaign in 1863, while more famous, did not have the potential as nine months prior when he crossed into Maryland. 145 Lee in June of 1863 was acting independently, while Confederate armies in the west were giving ground rapidly and losing Vicksburg. 146 Even with Confederate victory at Chickamauga, Bragg nor his predecessors could ever mount an effective counterthrust to regain vital Tennessee. 147 Hood's Tennessee Campaign in 1864 offered the closest opportunity; however, his cause was pyrrhic and traded the destruction of Georgia for the hope of gaining Tennessee. 148 The commencement of the Overland Campaign in 1864 saw the end of Lee's ability to mount a counterattack that had won for him on previous battlefields. With his numbers dwindling, and the Union's production capabilities at its height, continuing supply of reinforcements, and Grant's power to coordinate multiple armies upon Lee, forced the Confederate leader to dance to the tune of Grant's strategy. 149 144 McPherson, 567. 145 Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign, 4-8. 146 Edwin C. Bearss and J. Parker Hills, Receding Tide: Vicksburg and Gettysburg the Campaigns that Changed the Civil War, National Geographic Society, 2010. 266. 147 Steven Woodworth, Six Armies in Tennessee: The Chickamauga and Chattanooga, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998. 144. 148 Jacobson, For Cause and for Country, 524. 149 Gordon C. Rhea, The Battle of the Wilderness May 5-6, 1864, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1994. 9-10, 12-13, 22. 57 The Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns were episodes that the Union could not afford to lose. Certainly, Union armies, especially in the east, met multiple setbacks, defeats, and disasters throughout the war; however, a loss at this critical juncture in each theater would have produced devastating consequences from which the North could not recover. The brilliance of these campaigns resides in the fact that neither side could afford a negative outcome, and a victorious outcome for either side had the power and capabilities to change the entire trajectory of the war. The Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns do not have a true decisive victor in respect to the definition, yet, the rate at which the Union declared victory and the rapidity with which it instituted new measures both politically and militarily showed the emergency the events in the fall of 1862 produced for the North. 150 An acceptance of that notion coupled with political density, logistical pitfalls, organizational hurtles, and strategic objectives, will clearly indicate that the fall of 1862 in the course of the Maryland and Kentucky Campaigns, along with their supporting offenses was the high tide of the Confederacy, and the moment the Civil War changed trajectory in both political and military senses, which was the beginning of the Confederacy's defeat. 150 Muehlbauer, Ways of War, 197-200. 58 Bibliography Secondary Sources: Anderson, Nancy Scott and Dwight Anderson. The Generals: Ulysses. S. Grant and Robert E. Lee. Avenel: New Jersey, 1987. Bearss, Edwin C. and J. 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The article analyzes the process of becoming veksylolohichnyh traditions of the Cossack state (XVI – XVIII). Ukrainian Cossacks represented the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the XVI – XVIII centuries. Formed on the basis of state-forming forces (first Zaporizhzhya Bazavluk January 1590 – in 1638 and Cossack State Khmelnytskoho 1648 – 1657) from the end of the XVI century. became known Zaporizhia Army. By Cossack watches KLEYNOD, that character troops pertained regimental flags, centesimal icons hetman Bunchuk; Military music – drums; Cossack attributes of power – mace Hetman, colonels pernachi; Rush military judges, clerks ink.At first glance, this vast list of subjects for understanding and have irregular, random. But it reflects a concept, general requirements and aspirations to develop their own Cossack culture of the people – writing (scribes ink), Justice (Rush military judges), spirituality (music – drums), state (attributes Cossack power – mace Hetman, colonels pernachi) and Orthodox state (flags with symbols that reflect the essence of the aspirations of the Ukrainian Cossacks).History of prapornytstva Cossack army and origin veksylolohichnyh tradition meets the basic stages of formation of the Cossack state. Note that in pervogo Cossacks flags received. The emphasis on the fact of receipt of flags from different sources – from kings of the Commonwealth or of Muscovy, Russian Empire, the Ottoman Empire, Crimean Khanate, the Habsburg Empire, and even both at once a sign of their presence on the content of a pattern. Hiring of the European, and not just the Army, Cossack detachments received flags as symbols of mercenary. This shows the impact on the development of the Cossack state's own system of symbols in prapornytstvi other traditions of Ukrainian Cossacks – European, Moscow, Asian. During the Liberation War XVII. Cossack regiments at their own expense "stroyily", ie produced their flags of various sizes, formats and colors.So awarded the Cossack army flags of other countries have symbols of states and wore a sign of subordination, membership Cossack troops those countries. Cossacks honor bestowed flags. However, they had their own preferences, which were based on folk traditions. It turned out well during the war, proving the historical sources and preserved in museums originals flags.Significant prosperity acquired Ukrainian military in prapornytstvo legendary Cossack hetman day of the second half XVII. During the long years of constantly enrich, strengthen national features in form and content, the creation of regimental, centesimal banners, flags for military campaigns. Among the heraldic symbols that they used the Cossacks on their banners – sun, moon, crescent, six-, seven-, vosmykonechni stars, weapons, circles depicting saints. As an example, the 36 flags of the regiments Zaporozhian first half of the seventeenth century. Image 9 times find Michael, Theotokos – 8, Nicholas – 7, George – 3 [16, 747].Obverse and centesimal regimental flags had been a new logo – knight Cossack with a gun in yellow (golden) shield on a blue field panel, reverse – regimental or squadron emblem corresponding to the specified color image. Only after the abolition in 1764 Cossack with a gun disappears from government seals, but later appears as a sign of the Kuban Cossacks Black Sea [33, 11].Prapornytstva Cossack traditions have evolved and during the eighteenth century. In 1709 Cossack regiments and Cossacks huts that remained loyal to Ivan Mazepa, had their own flags, "Eagle archangel and Ukraine Zaporozhye povivaly of the army" [32, 128]. In 1712 Peter I issued the act whereby regiments had flags to produce the Armory in the Kremlin. In the Cossack prapornytstvo all nastiylyvishe penetrates Moscow heraldic tradition. During the second half of the XVIII century. to some extent continued "unification" colors and images on the banners of Cossack regiments. It can be explained by the design of the Cossacks as a specific part of the Russian army at the time, which contributed to relative institutionalization flags samples for this kind of armed forces. In the second half of the eighteenth century. there was an established system images on regimental and centesimal signs: national emblem – the double-headed eagle, the national emblem – a Cossack with a musket and arms of regimental and centesimal cities. Striking evidence of this is the flag Domontovskloyi hundreds Pereyaslav Regiment [1, 283].Thus, the Cossacks historiography symbols indicates the presence of sufficient historical sources and artifacts that reveal the theme of the origin and development veksylolohichnyh traditions of Cossack troops in XVI – XVIII centuries. Symbols Cossack state, which found reflection in the flags passed a difficult way of evolution. First, the foundation were taken heraldic symbols of the Polish-Lithuanian state – the Commonwealth. Later in the Russian cossack banners appear, Austrian, Turkish state symbols. Employing Cossacks for military campaigns, monarchs gave them jewelry, which then remained in the camp. This stage of the use of symbols of the protectors. During the Liberation War 1648 – 1654 рр. Cossacks produced their own idea of symbols and colors flags, flags of different colors used with the image of stars, crosses, month, or hetman territorial emblems. The second half of the eighteenth century. became Ukrainian Cossack era heyday own prapornytstva. ; В статье анализируется процес становления вексилологических традиций Казацкой державы (XVI–XVIII ст.). На основе историографии доказывается, что на вексилологию казацкого войська имели влияние традиции Европы, Московского царства и Османской империи. Вместе с этим утверждается, что вексилологические традиции казачества приобрели черты самостоятельного явления, базирующегося на культурных основах украинского народа. Этот процесс полностью зависел от конкретных исторических обстоятельств развития Казацкой державы. ; У статті аналізується процес становлення вексилологічних традицій Козацької держави (XVI–XVIII ст.). На основі історіографії означеної наукової проблеми доводиться, що на прапорництво козацького війська мали вплив вексилологічні традиції Європи, Московського царства та Османської імперії. Водночас стверджується, що вексилологічні традиції козацтва набули самостійних рис, що базувалися на культурних засадах українського народу. Цей процес цілком залежав від конкретних історичних обставин розвитку Козацької держави.

Trieste è stata, per un certo periodo di tempo, un privilegiato punto di osservazione sui principali fatti del mondo, in quanto sede di importanti compagnie di navigazione e di assicurazioni che fondavano i loro traffici e i loro interessi sulla raccolta e l'analisi puntuale della situazione internazionale. Infatti il giornalista triestino Silvio Benco dimostra notevole attenzione per la "geopolitica", una disciplina che si afferma alla fine del XIX secolo come strumento di interpretazione dei fatti della politica internazionale in relazione alla geografia terrestre. Grazie agli strumenti scientifici della geopolitica, egli è in grado di esaminare la trasformazione degli equilibri internazionali nei primi 50 anni del XX secolo, prestando attenzione ad alcuni aspetti molto importanti: la corsa agli armamenti delle grandi potenze europee per ottenere il predominio marittimo con spese così pesanti da pregiudicare l'economia dei singoli Stati; l'affermazione di nuove potenze (Giappone e Stati Uniti) che si contendono l'Oceano Pacifico e il declino dell'Impero russo messo in crisi dalla grave situazione interna; il declino dell'Europa dove i sistemi politici sembrano troppo fragili ed incapaci di dare vita ad una società realmente democratica, in essi prevalgono le spinte autoritarie e l'ascesa delle caste militari in pieno accordo con i circoli finanziari e industriali; la crisi balcanica che accelera il processo di dissoluzione dell'Impero austro-ungarico e dell'Impero ottomano, aprendo un pericoloso varco negli equilibri dell'Europa sud orientale. Infine, dopo la seconda guerra mondiale, Silvio Benco ripone molta fiducia nella possibilità di costruire un nuovo spirito europeo in considerazione degli errori che hanno portato ad un conflitto più terribile del precedente. Benco è consapevole che l'Europa ha esaurito il suo ruolo storico rinunciando da tempo alla cultura e allo spirito liberale, il continente sembra escluso dal futuro. La maggiore preoccupazione di Benco è la perdita di identità: egli è attratto dal progresso e dalla modernità ma guarda con diffidenza i grandi movimenti di massa che sembrano non controllabili. ; U određenom povijesnom razdoblju Trst je bio istaknuto mjesto za promatranje glavnih svjetskih događanja jer je bio sjedište važnih pomorskih i osiguravateljskih kompanija koje su temeljile svoj promet i interese na prikupljanju podataka i raščlambi međunarodne situacije. Tršćanski je novinar Silvio Benco pokazivao znatan interes za geopolitiku, disciplinu koja se krajem XIX. stoljeća potvrdila kao sredstvo za tumačenje događanja u međunarodnoj politici u odnosu na zemljopisne okolnosti. Zahvaljujući znanstvenom instrumentariju geopolitike bio je u stanju razmatrati promjene međunarodne ravnoteže u prvih pedeset godina XX. stoljeća posvećujući pozornost pojedinim vrlo važnim gledištima: utrci u naoružanju velikih europskih sila kako bi postigle pomorsku prevlast uz tako velike troškove da su naškodili gospodarstvu pojedinih država; potvrđivanju novih sila (Japana i Sjedinjenih Američkih Država) koje su se otimale za Tihi ocean i opadanju Ruskoga Carstva upaloga u krizu zbog teškoga unutarnjeg stanja; slabljenju Europe u kojoj su politički sustavi pokazivali krhkost i nesposobnost da oživotvore stvarno demokratsko društvo i u kojoj su prevladavala autoritarna stremljenja i uspon vojnih staleža u punoj suglasnosti s financijskim i industrijskim krugovima; balkanskoj krizi koja će ubrzati proces raspadanja Austro-Ugarskog i Osmanskog Carstva otvarajući opasnu pukotinu u ravnoteži Jugoistočne Europe. Konačno, poslije Drugoga svjetskog rata Silvio Benco vjerovao je u mogućnost izgradnje novoga europskoga duha s obzirom na pogreške koje su dovele do toga sukoba koji je bio strašniji od prethodnoga. Benco je bio svjestan da je Europa iscrpila svoju povijesnu ulogu odrekavši se odavno kulture i liberalnoga duha, da je kontinent izgledao isključen iz budućnosti. Glavna je Bencova preokupacija bila gubitak identiteta: bio je znatiželjan prema napretku i modernosti, ali je s nepovjerenjem gledao na velike masovne pokrete, za koje nije smatrao da ih je moguće držati pod nadzorom. ; At a certain point in history, Trieste was a crucial place for observing main political events due to its role as a centre of important naval and insurance companies which based their trade and interests on collecting data and analyzing the international affairs. Silvio Benco, a journalist from Trieste, showed interest for geopolitics, a discipline which proved to be a useful instrument for analyzing international political events in regard to geographical circumstances at the end of the 19th century. Thanks to the scientific instruments of geopolitics, he was able to investigate the changes in the international balance of the first half of the 20th century, giving much attention to certain important aspects: the arms race of great European countries over the domination of the sea which resulted in an expense so large that it damaged the economies of certain countries, the appearance of new political powers (Japan and United States of America) which fought over the domination of Pacific, the decline of Russian Empire which was in deep crisis because of hard inner turbulence, the weakness of European countries, whose political systems were becoming more fragile and were unable to properly shift towards democratic societies and were dominated by authoritarianism and the rise of military class with the full approval of financial and industrial circles; the crisis of Balkans which will accelerate the decline of Austrian-Hungarian Empire and Ottoman Empire, revealing a dangerous crack in the balance of South-East Europe. Finally, after Second World War, Silvio Benco believed that a new European spirit could be created considering the mistakes which created a conflict even more terrifying than the one before. Benco was aware that Europe's historical role had faded when it gave up its culture and liberal spirit, that the continent was excluded from the process of creating the future. Benco's main concern was the loss of identity: he was curious to see what the progress and modern times shall bring, but he did not trust the great mass movements, he believed they could not be kept under control.

Nella storia della cartografia del Ducato di Modena tre sono le opere fondamentali che hanno apportato significative variazioni tecniche e di rappresentazione del territorio: quella del matematico ed astronomo Giovanni Antonio Magini all'inizio del 1600, quella dell'abate Domenico Vandelli intorno alla metà del 1700 ed infine quelle del Maggiore del Genio Austro-Estense Giuseppe Carandini nella prima metà dell'800. Sull'opera di quest'ultimo si incentra la presente relazione prendendo in esame sia la produzione cartografica "ufficiale" dell' Ufficio Topografico Estense dal Carandini diretto (che dal 1815 alla metà del secolo produsse un lavoro di rilievo e di elaborazione cartografica del territorio estense di altissimo livello), sia le mappe "derivate" più o meno palesemente da queste. All'inizio della scaletta espositiva viene presentata, come novità assoluta, la prima carta prodotta dall' Ufficio Topografico: la mappa degli Estensi Dominii, accuratissimo rilievo dell'intero Ducato basantesi sul sistema geodetico francese, a scala 1:100.000 che, data per dispersa durante i moti risorgimentali, è stata recentemente (e fortunosamente) ritrovata. La mappa, divisa in quattro spezzoni ed incollata su tela, presenta un solo foglio stampato (dove per altro è presente il frontespizio) mentre gli altri sono manoscritti e testimonia la grande competenza tecnica raggiunta in pochi anni dai militari Estensi. Le capacità operative dimostrate suscitarono il plauso degli Austriaci al punto da invitare gli ufficiali del Genio modenese alla realizzazione della grande carta in scala 1:28.800 dei possedimenti Imperiali in Italia e degli Stati satelliti (Parma, Modena e Toscana). Da questo ponderoso lavoro derivò anche la Carta militare del Ducato di Modena, meglio conosciuta come "carta Carandini" (presente in un unico esemplare presso l'archivio storico dell'IGM a Firenze), nonché una sua riduzione "commerciale", la Carta topografica del Ducato di Modena in scala 1:86.400 edita a Vienna nel 1842 ed aggiornata nel 1849, anch'essa oggetto di presentazione di questo lavoro. Frattanto i moti risorgimentali del 1848 permisero ai Piemontesi di venire in possesso dei rilievi Estensi mettendoli in grado di produrre una mappa, a fini essenzialmente militari, dove era presente anche il territorio del Ducato di Modena: la Carta topografica della Lombardia e dei Ducati di Parma e Modena, in scala sempre 1:86.400. Le altre opere derivate dalla "carta del Carandini", oggetto del presente lavoro, sono la Carta degli Stati Estensi, datata 1847, inserita nella Statistica degli Stati Estensi di C. Roncaglia, ed una meravigliosa carta manoscritta del Ducato al suo tramonto in scala 1:115.200, la Carta Topografica dimostrante i territori dello Stato di Modena, sconosciuta alle bibliografie, opera di un incisore operante a Modena intorno al 1850, Gaetano Raffo. ; In the history of the cartography of Duchy of Modena the fundamental works having introduced meaningful technical variations in the representation of the territory are just three: the first one is by the mathematician and astronomer Giovanni Magini in the beginning of 1600, the second one is by Domenico Vandelli around in the middle of 18 century and finally the works of the Genio Austro-Estense Corp by Major Giuseppe Carandini in the first middle of1800. On the work of this last one is focused the present relationship which is taking on examination both the "official" cartographic production of the Topographical Office of Estense Army (which from 1815 to the middle of century produced an high-level work of relief and cartographic elaboration of the territory), as the "derived" maps from these works. In the beginning of this report, as absolute novelty, I'm glad to introduce the first produced map by Estense Topographical Office: the map of the Estensi Dominii in Italia, an accurate scale 1:100.000 relief of the whole Duchy of Modena based on the French geodetic system. This work, lost during the fights of Italian Risorgimento, has recently been found again. The map is divided into four massive dissected linen-backed sections and is printed just only in the first part (where the frontispiece is in), while the other ones are manuscripts. This chart testify the great technical competence reached in few years by Estense Topographical Office. These operational abilities aroused the applause of the Austrians till to persuade to invite the officers of the Estense Genio Corp in the team which was working to the realization of the great map (scale 1:28.800) of the Imperial possessiones in Italy and of the satellites States (Parma, Modena and Tuscany). From this ponderous work derived also the military Mappa del Ducato di Modena (Map of the Duchy of Modena), better known as "Carta Carandini" (jus tkept in an only copy in IGM in Florence), as well as a reduction of it printed in Vienna in 1842 and adjourned in 1849 as a "commercial" copy: the Topographical Map of the Duchy of Modena (scale 1:86.400). In the meantime the 1848 Italian fights allowed the Sabaudian Army to get hold of the reliefs of Estense Topographical Office, allowing them in order to produce a military map showing the territory of the Duchy of Modena too: the Carta Topografica della Lombardia e dei Ducati di Parma e Modena (Topographical map of the Lombardy and of the Duchies of Parma and Modena, (always scale 1:86.400). The other works derived by "Carta Carandini", and shown in this work, are: the Carta degli Stati Estensi, (Map of the Estenses states) dated 1847, inserted in Statistica degli Stati Estensi by C. Roncaglia and a marvelous manuscript map of the Duchy in its sunset (scale 1:115.200): the Carta Topografica dimostrante i territori dello Stato di Modena, (Topographic map showing the Modena state territories) unknown to the bibliographies, engraved by Gaetano Raffo, an engraver who worked in Modena around 1850.

The economic concept has not been as widely disseminated and as poorly defined as the concept of competition. According to schools of thought, competition is either a dynamic process leading to innovation or a market structure ensuring low prices and homogeneous products. Those two visions, which are contradictory between them, are used together to promote the benefits of a standard which makes competition the cornerstone of harmonious self-regulation of markets. However, there is a real 'triangle of incompatibilities', since the three objectives assigned to competition policy, namely productive emulation, efficient self-regulation and maximising consumer welfare, appear to be incompact among themselves. The clarification of the concept of competition could therefore be an opportunity to call into question the neoclassical market design and its supply curve. ; Rarely an economic concept has been so much ill-defined and yet promoted than the concept of competition. Depending on the school of thought, competition means either a dynamic process that creates innovations or a market structure that assures low prices and homogeneous products. But these various conceptions, mutually contradictory, are used together in order to praise the benefits of a norm that makes competition the pivot for a harmonious self-regulation of markets. There is however a clear "impossible trinity" in this vision, as the three objectives of productive emulation, effective self-regulation and consumer maximization appear mutually incompatible. Moreover, clarifying the concept of competition may help to question the Neoclassical conception of markets and its supply curve. ; The economic concept has not been as widely disseminated and as poorly defined as the concept of competition. According to schools of thought, competition is either a dynamic process leading to innovation or a market structure ensuring low prices and homogeneous products. Those two visions, which are contradictory between them, are used together to promote the benefits of ...

__Nederlandse Samenvatting__ De markt is bij uitstek de plek waar het individu vrij kan zijn. Dat is ook het standaardbeeld van het gedachtegoed van de Oostenrijkse School van de Economie. In zijn dissertatie 'The Viennese students of Civilization: Humility, Culture and Economics in Interwar Vienna and Beyond' betoogt Erwin Dekker dat die school, bekend van onder andere Friedrich Hayek, Joseph Schumpeter en Carl Menger, vrijheid niet ziet als het ontbreken van beperkingen, maar als een culturele verworvenheid. Individuen kunnen alleen vrij zijn, zo betogen de Oostenrijkers, doordat er gedeelde normen en instituties zijn die de vrijheid mogelijk maken. De verzameling van normen en instituties is voor hen de beschaving. Die beschaving en haar instituties zoals markten kunnen alleen floreren als ze worden ondersteund door een bredere cultuur. Die steun brokkelt echter snel af gedurende het interbellum. De Weense studenten van de beschaving analyseren die 'revolte' tegen de beschaving, gevoed door het socialisme en het fascisme. Socialisten zijn er ten onrechte van overtuigd dat de economie te plannen, en de maatschappij maakbaar is. Aan de rechterzijde wordt er juist betoogd dat het juk van de beschaving te groot is en het individu beperkt. Daartegen ontwikkelen de Oostenrijkers hun visie van vrijheid en markten als culturele verworvenheden. Die verworvenheden zijn niet natuurlijk, noch te plannen, ze zijn de min of meer onbewuste uitkomst van menselijke interactie. Die visie ontstaat binnen de rijke Weense cultuur van het interbellum, die vooral plaatsheeft in de intellectuele kringen. In die levendige gesprekscultuur worden de Weense economen uitgedaagd om een betrokken en brede analyse te ontwikkelen. Wat dat betreft staan ze ver af van de moderne economen gericht op theoretische marktmodellen die vooral in gesprek zijn met andere academici. Zo bezien kan de Weense traditie ons nog veel leren, zeker in een tijd waarin de acceptatie van veel van onze culturele instituties verre van vanzelfsprekend is. ; In this dissertation it is argued that the scholars who are usually known under the banner Austrian Economists are better understood as the Viennese students of Civilization. By understanding the group of scholars, consisting of Carl Menger, Friedrich von Wieser, Joseph Schumpeter, Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek among others, as Viennese students of Civilization we are better able to understand their unique contribution. Contrary to many economists - both then and now - the Viennese students of civilization consider the economy not as a self-regulating natural order, or a system which can be planned, but as cultural process. Just like language and law, markets emerge and develop from human interaction. When the Viennese conceive of the market as a cultural process it means for them that the market has important cultural effects and is sustained by what we could call a market culture. In this dissertation the cultural effects of the market are explored especially as they relate to restraint; the central element of civilization for the Viennese scholars. It is argued that restraint is considered the central feature of civilization by a wider group of Central European scholars including Freud, Malinowski and Elias. The Viennese students of civilization, especially Wieser, Mises and Hayek argue that they live in a particularly unrestrained age. This has fueled opposition to market and other cultural processes which are not rationally constructed. The acceptance and cultivation of the market comes at a cost they argue; this cost they call the 'strain of civilization'. That cost is primarily the restraint of our innate instincts. Civilization requires the acceptance of certain norms, of individual responsibility, the acceptance of differences and inequality. This price to be paid is termed 'the strain of civilization'. This price however is no longer accepted by social scientists who preach unrestrained rationalism. And it is no longer accepted by mass political movements such as socialism and fascism which promise they can relieve the people of this strain. Particularly during the interwar period the Viennese students of civilization feel that their civilization is in acute danger. They analyze this revolt, and their own role in this process. Initially their response is largely passive and accepting. This attitude is characteristic of a Viennese cultural trait known as 'therapeutic nihilism'. The social scientist, or rather student, can study the large cultural processes, but they are outside his or her control. Stronger yet, the Viennese students believe that many of their contemporaries are under the illusion that they could predict the course of society, and ultimately of history. This outsider-perspective, however, is seriously challenged during the Interwar period, especially during the rise of fascism. The Viennese intellectuals increasingly realize that they bear a responsibility toward their culture, and they might even possibly have some influence on its fate. This puts them in an awkward position. Their work is becoming more political and idealistic, features which they had criticized in the work of others. Especially Hayek's 'The Road to Serfdom' and Popper's 'The Open Society and its Enemies' are examples of this tension; the tension between the realization of the limited power of the scholar, and the desire to defend a civilization under pressure. In their work they apologize to their colleagues for the political nature of their work, but they feel obliged to write this work, which they consider 'their war effort'. Ultimately, although reluctantly, they engage in an attempt to draw up ideals and plans for the future. They regain some hope, in part because they no longer write for a Continental but for an Anglo-Saxon audience. It is also in this sense that Hayek and Popper are engaged in a new kind of liberalism, one that is resistant to mass political movements and the desire to throw off cultural restraints. This dissertation draws heavily on the cultural histories of fin-de-siècle and interwar Vienna. It shows similarities in the problems faced by artists, novelists, scientists and politicians in Vienna. Such similarities sometimes were sometimes incidental, but they also arose out of the interactions in the Viennese circles. In the partly overlapping circles broad intellectual conversations were stimulated and this greatly contributed to the creativity of the contributions emerging out of Vienna, especially during the interwar period. It is argued that the prominence of these circles partly accounts for the fact that the Viennese students of civilization crossed many interdisciplinary boundaries, and that their intellectual concerns were as much driven by social and political issues as it was by scientific concerns.