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One of the Cold War's commonplaces about Russia was its abiding embrace of authoritarianism. Across the centuries, successive regimes, whether Tsarist or Communist, have been characterised by Western scholars as highly centralised, personalised power structures, with an intolerance of dissidence that too easily descended into barbaric brutality. Living on Europe's farthest edge, Russia's peoples are said to have been bypassed by Enlightenment modernity, the rise of liberal constitutionalism and the gradual entrenchment of individual rights and democratic freedoms. For those commentators inspired by such Cold War thinking, it is a legacy that continues to shape contemporary politics. The assumption is that Putin's reclaiming of the presidency in 2012 is emblematic of an inevitable reversion to authoritarianism. Drawing on research in Russia during the March 2012 election, this article takes a critical look at the plethora of global statistical surveys that point to authoritarian trends under the current regime. It concludes that the conceptual framework underpinning the West's revelations about the descent into authoritarianism in contemporary Russia is neither clear nor convincing.

One of the Cold War's commonplaces about Russia was its abiding embrace of authoritarianism. Across the centuries, successive regimes, whether Tsarist or Communist, have been characterised by Western scholars as highly centralised, personalised power structures, with an intolerance of dissidence that too easily descended into barbaric brutality. Living on Europe's farthest edge, Russia's peoples are said to have been bypassed by Enlightenment modernity, the rise of liberal constitutionalism and the gradual entrenchment of individual rights and democratic freedoms. For those commentators inspired by such Cold War thinking, it is a legacy that continues to shape contemporary politics. The assumption is that Putin's reclaiming of the presidency in 2012 is emblematic of an inevitable reversion to authoritarianism. Drawing on research in Russia during the March 2012 election, this article takes a critical look at the plethora of global statistical surveys that point to authoritarian trends under the current regime. It concludes that the conceptual framework underpinning the West's revelations about the descent into authoritarianism in contemporary Russia is neither clear nor convincing.

Authoritarianism has been an important explanatory concept for more than 60 years and a powerful predictor of social, political, and intergroup attitudes and behaviour. An important impediment to research on authoritarianism has been the length of the measures available, particularly with the contemporary emphasis on the need for social research to use larger, more representative samples and measure multiple constructs across multiple domains. We therefore developed a six-item Very Short Authoritarianism (VSA) scale that equally represented the three content subdimensions and two directions of wording of Altemeyer's widely used Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) scale. Over four samples (N = 1,601) from three countries the VSA scale showed satisfactory internal consistency and the expected hierarchical factor structure with three primary factors loading on a single higher-order factor. Additionally, the scale predicted variables such as nationalism, ethnocentrism, political orientation, political party/candidate support, attitudes towards ingroups or outgroups and anti-minority bias at moderate to strong levels with effects very close to those obtained for much longer established measures of RWA (including Altemeyer's scale). The VSA scale also showed clearly better reliability and validity than a short measure of authoritarian parental values that has been used to measure authoritarianism.

Authoritarianism has been an important explanatory concept for more than 60 years and a powerful predictor of social, political, and intergroup attitudes and behaviour. An important impediment to research on authoritarianism has been the length of the measures available, particularly with the contemporary emphasis on the need for social research to use larger, more representative samples and measure multiple constructs across multiple domains. We therefore developed a six-item Very Short Authoritarianism (VSA) scale that equally represented the three content subdimensions and two directions of wording of Altemeyer's widely used Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) scale. Over four samples (N = 1,601) from three countries the VSA scale showed satisfactory internal consistency and the expected hierarchical factor structure with three primary factors loading on a single higher-order factor. Additionally, the scale predicted variables such as nationalism, ethnocentrism, political orientation, political party/candidate support, attitudes towards ingroups or outgroups and anti-minority bias at moderate to strong levels with effects very close to those obtained for much longer established measures of RWA (including Altemeyer's scale). The VSA scale also showed clearly better reliability and validity than a short measure of authoritarian parental values that has been used to measure authoritarianism. ; peerReviewed ; publishedVersion

This paper was accepted for publication in the journal Global Media and Communication and the definitive published version will be available at https://uk.sagepub.com/en-gb/eur/journal/global-media-and-communication ; Communications are assemblages of infrastructures, materialities and meanings. As such they are integral to the making and intersecting of the material, institutional and discursive undercurrents of neoliberal authoritarian governmentality regimes. However, the existing political communication largely focuses on the discursive dimensions of communications, and disregards how communications partake in the governing of populations through economic, material and institutional practices. By focusing on Turkey's case, here I move beyond this approach and examine the role of communications in the development of neoliberal capital accumulation, authoritarian welfare politics, political repression and the production of popular support. This analysis focuses on information society plans, e-governance and digitisation, liberalisation, de/re-regulation, and the restructuration of ownership and control of communication networks between 2002 and 2016.

In this chapter I ponder the tridimensional relationship between crime fiction, authoritarian regimes and world literature, exploring the extent to which it is possible to understand "the circulation and translation of ideas, themes, and concerns about crime and policing across and between national traditions, while attempting to pay due attention to specifi c sociocultural and institutional contexts" (Pepper 2016 : 10– 11). To this end, I will focus on two groups of authoritarian regimes: Communist (mostly Eastern Bloc, but also Cuba), and Latin American military dictatorships.

Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) has been conceptualized and measured as a unidimensional personality construct comprising the covariation of the three traits of authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism. However, new approaches have criticized this conceptualization and instead viewed these three "traits" as three distinct, though related, social attitude dimensions. Here we extend this approach providing clear definitions of these three dimensions as ideological attitude constructs of Authoritarianism, Conservatism, and Traditionalism. These dimensions are seen as attitudinal expressions of basic social values or motivational goals that represent different, though related, strategies for attaining collective security at the expense of individual autonomy. We report data from five samples and three different countries showing that these three dimensions could be reliably measured and were factorially distinct. The three dimensions also differentially predicted interpersonal behaviour, social policy support, and political party support. It is argued that conceptualizing and measuring RWA as a set of three related ideological attitude dimensions may better explain complex sociopolitical phenomena than the currently dominant unidimensional personality based model.

The traditional view held by development theorists, which tends to be based on Western Liberal Democracies, is that authoritarianism operates in direct opposition to development. This project seeks to reassess the relationship between development and authoritarianism by studying the case of China. China has been under the authoritarian rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) since 1949. Since then, China has seen explosive growth and made progress on the path towards development. This was made possible by modern changes to authoritarianism, such as increased discourse and the launching of development programs, which are collectively referred to as New Authoritarianism. Through New Authoritarianism, China has discovered an alternate path towards the expectations of development theorists. Three different schools of thought inform these expectations: modernization, dependency theory, and a global systems theory. This project first outlines and, through a pattern matching framework, analyzes those expectations, then argues the extent to which China has met them. This analysis reveals that New Authoritarianism has put China on a different path towards an outcome similar to what development theorists would expect, justifying a reevaluation of authoritarianism and development's relationship.

This introduction offers an overview of the key works in this edited volume on authoritarian regimes. This edited volume explains how authoritarian regimes were studied in the past and how this may contrast with how authoritarian regimes are studied today. This compilation also examines the newest trends in authoritarianism in the 21st century and showcases interesting works on elections, media pluralism and regime hybridity. The volume also highlights the challenges posed by authoritarian regimes to the international order and the growing influence of authoritarian regimes.

The recent comparative literature on authoritarian institutions has been tracing the consequences formal institutions bear on the longevity of authoritarian rule. Striving to explain transitions from electoral authoritarian regimes, the present paper shifts emphasis from the presence of institutions (multiparty elections) to the political dynamics and structural contexts that surround them. Under which conditions, it asks, are authoritarian multiparty elections more likely to reproduce the authoritarian status quo? Under which conditions are they prone to produce democratizing outcomes? And under which are they vulnerable to provoke interruptions of the electoral cycle? Drawing upon the larger literature on democratic transitions, the paper proposes a simple (non-formal) decision-theoretic framework that emphasizes the pivotal role of electoral uncertainty, vital interests, and repressive capacities. In its empirical part, it explores the sources of electoral authoritarian transition trajectories on the basis an original dataset that covers (almost) the universe of authoritarian elections in the world from 1980 through 2002. ; Elecciones multipartidistas tienden a aumentar la longevidad de regímenes autoritarios, pero también contienen el potencial de provocar cambios democratizadores y rupturas autoritarias. El presente documento examina tanto las condiciones estructurales como las dinámicas políticas que influyen en las trayectorias de regímenes electorales autoritarios. Apoyado en la literatura comparada sobre transiciones democráticas, el documento enfatiza tres factores explicativos: la incertidumbre electoral, los intereses vitales de los actores y las capacidades coercitivas del Estado. En su parte empírica, explora las fuentes de diferentes trayectorias de régimen basado en una base de datos original de elecciones autoritarias en el mundo (1980-2002).

The main goal of this paper is to explain the rise of competitive authoritarianism in Erdoğan's Turkey. The recent literature has mainly focused on the taxonomical debate about the type of regime established by Erdoğan, dealing only rarely with the factors explaining the Turkish autocratization. Building on Levitsky and Loxton's framework, which underlines the catalyst role played by the election of populist leaders for the rise of competitive authoritarianism in Latin America, the analysis identifies the interactions among Erdoğan's populism and threats and opportunities provided by both domestic and international environments as the major cause explaining Turkish autocratization. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) has been conceptualized and measured as a unidimensional personality construct comprising the covariation of the three traits of authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism. However, new approaches have criticized this conceptualization and instead viewed these three "traits" as three distinct, though related, social attitude dimensions. Here we extend this approach providing clear definitions of these three dimensions as ideological attitude constructs of Authoritarianism, Conservatism, and Traditionalism. These dimensions are seen as attitudinal expressions of basic social values or motivational goals that represent different, though related, strategies for attaining collective security at the expense of individual autonomy. We report data from five samples and three different countries showing that these three dimensions could be reliably measured and were factorially distinct. The three dimensions also differentially predicted interpersonal behaviour, social policy support, and political party support. It is argued that conceptualizing and measuring RWA as a set of three related ideological attitude dimensions may better explain complex sociopolitical phenomena than the currently dominant unidimensional personality based model.

Since the culmination of the Genocide of 1994, Rwanda has become one of the fastest growing economies in the world, while also showing great improvements on human development indicators. This has made Rwanda a brilliant example of post-conflict reconstruction. At the same time, the nation-state has been led by a single party government that works under a framework of a nominal multi-party democracy. While a large part of Rwanda's post-conflict development has been made possible by the government in power, this paper argues that Rwanda is developing towards a completely authoritarian state structure. Development is concentrated in very few regions of the country, votes are occasionally rigged, large amount of power is concentrated in a few hands, and there is a constant war that is partly sponsored by Rwanda. All of these factors have a central figure above them: President Paul Kagame. While the West continues to praise Rwanda for the remarkable strides it has made on human development indicators and in liberalising its economy, it fails to ignore the many serious issues that plague the nation-state. Rwanda's story of development cannot be sustained if structural changes are not implemented in Rwanda in the near future.

This study analyses the linkage between authoritarianism and three indicators that describe one's general cognitive orientation towards the world of politics: political knowledge, general interest in politics, and interest in the election campaign. Individuals high in authoritarianism are hypothesized to be less politically competent and less interested in politics, due to their resistance to adopting new information and to changing the adopted beliefs. This hypothesis is based on the classical description of the authoritarian personality, but it has not been adequately empirically verified yet. The data are taken from a post-election public opinion survey conducted in 2012 after the presidential and parliamentary elections, on a random sample of voting age citizens of Serbia (N = 1568). The results show that authoritarianism and the level of political knowledge are significantly and negatively correlated, even after controlling for the basic socio-demographic variables. The intensity of political interest is not significantly correlated with authoritarianism. Additional comparison of the misinformed and uninformed groups (those who provided incorrect answers, and those who answered "don't know", respectively) did not support the view that authoritarian persons are more inclined to erroneously guess an answer than to simply say "don't know". The study concludes that the association between political knowledge and authoritarianism is based on deeper psychological roots, while the (lack of) association with political interest is likely to be context-dependent.

Fictional literature portraying the descent of the United States into dictatorship is assessed critically and divided into three cultural-historical phases, each specific in class modality. Ignatius Donnelly's Caesar's Column (1890) and Jack London's The Iron Heel (1907) project a plutocracy violently imposed to forestall working-class revolution. Sinclair Lewis's It Can't Happen Here (1935) and other mid-century novels envision a demagogic American authoritarianism, with working-class and lower-middle-class grievances exploited to amass personal power. In the Cold War and neoliberal eras, class recedes from salience in Margaret Atwood's The Handmaid's Tale (1985) and Philip Roth's The Plot Against America (2004). Despite Atwood's brilliant evocation of totalitarian patriarchy and the extraordinary interiority of Sherwood Anderson's Marching Men (1917), the novels of American authoritarianism are on the whole characterized by aesthetic implausibility, one-sided apprehension of authoritarianism's class dynamics, and failure to treat white supremacy as central.