The threat of COVID-19 has triggered nationalism, prejudice and support for anti-democratic political systems around the world. Authoritarianism—an individual's orientation toward social conformity and individual autonomy—shapes interpretations of and responses to threat. We drew on theories of authoritarianism and threat to propose that authoritarians and libertarians will interpret the threat of COVID-19 in distinct ways. An online survey of 368 Scottish nationals was administered via the Prolific platform. Original measures of realistic and symbolic threat from COVID-19 were included, along with an established measure of the authoritarian predisposition. Linear regression analyses showed that COVID-19 was perceived primarily as a realistic threat to physical and material well-being; however, authoritarians were more likely than others to interpret the novel coronavirus as a symbolic threat to their prevailing values. Our findings contribute to understanding the psychology of pandemic-era attitudes and behaviours and provide insight into possible political consequences of the coronavirus threat. The results also demonstrate how considering authoritarians' subjective construal of threats can resolve questions in the authoritarianism and threat literature and advance theory.
The threat of COVID‐19 has triggered nationalism, prejudice and support for anti‐democratic political systems around the world. Authoritarianism—an individual's orientation toward social conformity and individual autonomy—shapes interpretations of and responses to threat. We drew on theories of authoritarianism and threat to propose that authoritarians and libertarians will interpret the threat of COVID‐19 in distinct ways. An online survey of 368 Scottish nationals was administered via the Prolific platform. Original measures of realistic and symbolic threat from COVID‐19 were included, along with an established measure of the authoritarian predisposition. Linear regression analyses showed that COVID‐19 was perceived primarily as a realistic threat to physical and material well‐being; however, authoritarians were more likely than others to interpret the novel coronavirus as a symbolic threat to their prevailing values. Our findings contribute to understanding the psychology of pandemic‐era attitudes and behaviours and provide insight into possible political consequences of the coronavirus threat. The results also demonstrate how considering authoritarians' subjective construal of threats can resolve questions in the authoritarianism and threat literature and advance theory.
In Digital Demagogue: Authoritarian Capitalism in the Age of Trump and Twitter, communication and media scholar Christian Fuchs plunges into the depths of new media with an eye for the reemergence of authoritarianism, albeit in a refashioned form, and armed with a rich tradition of well-articulated critical theory. Fuchs presents a clear and explicit question to arm his analysis, namely: What is authoritarian capitalism and how is it communicated through social media? Using the contemporary parameters of the candidacy and presidency of Donald Trump, along with the complex phenomenon that is its supporting ideology, he explores the relationship between political communication and new nationalism to expose the dangerous marriage between authoritarianism and capitalism in prominent positions of power. This review charts Fuchss unique journey through critical theory and digital texts while responding to its ambitions both as a revitalized account of the critical theory tradition and as a cautionary tale of contemporary political movements. I primarily present his book as a sobering examination of the problematic entanglement of radical capitalism, authoritarian politics, and rapid communication strategies while remaining optimistic that it will influence several scholars to apply his theories as a potential strategy for positive liberation and/or contestation moving forward. ; Published version
Modern rule of law and post-war constitutionalism are both anchored in rights-based limitations on state authority. Rule-of-law norms and principles, at both domestic and international levels, are designed to protect the freedom and dignity of the person. Given this "thick" conception of the rule of law, authoritarian practices that remove constraints on domestic political leaders and weaken mechanisms for holding them accountable necessarily erode both domestic and international rule of law. Drawing on political science research on authoritarian politics, this study identifies three core elements of authoritarian political strategies: subordination of the judiciary, suppression of independent news media and freedom of expression, and restrictions on the ability of civil society groups to organize and participate in public life. According to available data, each of these three practices has become increasingly common in recent years. This study offers a composite measure of the core authoritarian practices and uses it to identify the countries that have shown the most marked increases in authoritarianism. The spread and deepening of these authoritarian practices in diverse regimes around the world diminishes international rule of law. The conclusion argues that resurgent authoritarianism degrades international rule of law even if this is defined as the specifically post-Cold War international legal order.
Modern rule of law and post-war constitutionalism are both anchored in rights-based limitations on state authority. Rule-of-law norms and principles, at both domestic and international levels, are designed to protect the freedom and dignity of the person. Given this "thick" conception of the rule of law, authoritarian practices that remove constraints on domestic political leaders and weaken mechanisms for holding them accountable necessarily erode both domestic and international rule of law. Drawing on political science research on authoritarian politics, this study identifies three core elements of authoritarian political strategies: subordination of the judiciary, suppression of independent news media and freedom of expression, and restrictions on the ability of civil society groups to organize and participate in public life. According to available data, each of these three practices has become increasingly common in recent years. This study offers a composite measure of the core authoritarian practices and uses it to identify the countries that have shown the most marked increases in authoritarianism. The spread and deepening of these authoritarian practices in diverse regimes around the world diminishes international rule of law. The conclusion argues that resurgent authoritarianism degrades international rule of law even if this is defined as the specifically post-Cold War international legal order.
Despite growing concerns expressed by international organisations about the deterioration of democracy in Vučić's Serbia, the country has been neglected by the literature on the 'crisis of democracy'. Using a combined qualitative/quantitative research strategy for detecting changes in regime types, including various V-DEM measures and over three dozen indicators provided by the competitive authoritarian framework, the analysis confirms the recent regression of Vučić's Serbia to competitive authoritarianism. The peculiar features of the Serbian case—a double transition to and from democracy in less than two decades—appear to support a pessimistic outlook for the future of democracy. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
This correlational study investigated the link between authoritarian attitudes, psychosocial trauma, and attachment insecurity in the context of a significant community and personal threat – the recent economic crisis in Greece. The study utilised a large community sample and five self-report measures - Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale-S, Social Group Attachment Scale, Relationship Questionnaire, Perceived Cohesion Scale, and Impact of Events Scale-R. It was hypothesised that authoritarianism would be independently linked with insecurity in two types of bond (person-to-person and person-to-state) via the experience of post-traumatic stress and perceptions of social cohesion. Structural Equation Modelling indices suggested that the model had a very good fit. ; open access article
Among many arguments for constitutional changes presented in the wake of the 2020 campaign for the popular vote in Russia, there was the idea that "cementing" Russia's political landscape for the sake of the regime's durability would serve as a tool for improvement of quality of governance. This argument, in a way, followed the essential point of Mancur Olson describing many autocrats across the globe as "roving bandits" with their short-term time horizons and incentives for predatory behavior. To what extent may the constitutional extension of the time horizon of Russia's authoritarian regime contribute to conversion of Russia's state officials and top managers from the "roving" to the "stationary" model, in Olson's terms? On the basis of previous research, I argue that the nature of Russia's political regime-electoral authoritarianism under personalist rule-prevents such a trajectory of further evolution. Indeed, the set of constitutional changes adopted in Russia in July 2020 is likely to preserve bad governance as a mechanism of maintenance of politico-economic order, as intentionally built and developed during the post-Soviet period. While certain technocratic solutions for Russia's governance, aimed at "fool-proofing", may avert the risks of major disasters, under conditions of durable authoritarianism the use of these devices will not result in major advancements in the quality of governance. Rather, they may contribute to further decay and aggravation of the numerous vices of bad governance. ; Peer reviewed
If the lesson of the global response to the Coronavirus is that humanity itself is the problem, then Anthropocene Authoritarianism looks set to pose a larger long-term challenge to our ways of life than the virus itself. With politics suspended, societies under lockdown, parliaments closed and States of Emergency in force globally (Runciman, 2020), many commentators have turned to Foucauldian-inspired understandings of biopolitics and population control to analyze contemporary events (Horvat, 2020; Agamben, 2020a; Demetri, 2020; Singh, 2020; Sotiris, 2020). Biopolitics has become a key concept in critical discourses of security governance in the last two decades (Rose, 2007; Esposito, 2008; Dillon, 2015). Deriving from the work of Foucault, at the heart of biopolitical thought is the relationship of politics to life as both the basis of governance and as an object to be secured (Foucault, 2007; 2008). For Foucault, 'life' was a way of articulating an 'outside' to the human world of politics, an outside that appeared natural but was, in fact, a malleable construct (Lemke, 2011).
Se propone aquí una caracterización de la forma de ser autoritaria que, a juicio del autor, ha predominado, hasta ahora, en los modos de relación propios de la sociedad colombiana. Esta caracterización se ha realizado por contraste con la forma de ser democrática, la cual aparece, por lo tanto, como trasfondo y alternativa de lo dicho. ; This text is intended to present a characterization of the authoritarianism that, at the author's opinion, has prevailed to date in the relationship modes observed in the Colombian society. This characterization has been made in contrast with the democratic system which appears as background and alternative of what has been said.
This text is intended to present a characterization of the authoritarianism that, at the author's opinion, has prevailed to date in the relationship modes observed in the Colombian society. This characterization has been made in contrast with the democratic system which appears as background and alternative of what has been said. ; Se propone aquí una caracterización de la forma de ser autoritaria que, a juicio del autor, ha predominado, hasta ahora, en los modos de relación propios de la sociedad colombiana. Esta caracterización se ha realizado por contraste con la forma de ser democrática, la cual aparece, por lo tanto, como trasfondo y alternativa de lo dicho.
This PhD thesis compares Egypt and Syria's authoritarian political systems. While the tendency in social science political research treats Egypt and Syria as similarly authoritarian, this research emphasizes differences between the two systems with special reference to institutions and co-optation. Rather than reducibly understanding Egypt and Syria as sharing similar histories, institutional arrangements, or ascribing to the oft-repeated convention that "Syria is Egypt but 10 years behind," this thesis focuses on how events and individual histories shaped each states current institutional strengthens and weaknesses. Specifically, it explains the how varying institutional politicization or de-politicization affects each state's capabilities for co-opting elite and non-elite individuals. Beginning with a theoretical framework that considers the limited utility of democratization and transition theoretical approaches, the work underscores the persistence and durability of authoritarianism. Chapter two details the politicized institutional divergence between Egypt and Syria that began in the 1970s. Chapter three and four examines how institutional politicization or de-politicization affects elite and non-elite individual co-optation in Egypt and Syria. Chapter five discusses the study's general conclusions and theoretical implications. This thesis's argument is that Egypt and Syria co-opt elites and non-elites differently because of the varying degrees of institutional politicization in each governance system. Rather than view one country as more politically developed than the other, this work argues that Syria's political institutions are more politicized than their Egyptian counterparts. Syria's political arena is, thus, described as politicized-patrimonialism. Syria's politicized-patrimonial arena produces uneven co-optation of elites and non-elites as they are diffused through competing institutions. Conversely, the Egyptian political arena remains highly personalized as weak institutions and individuals are manipulated and molded according to the president's ruling clique. This is referred to as personalized-patrimonialism. As a consequence, Egypt's political establishment demonstrates more flexibility in ad hoc altering and adapting its arena depending on the emergence of crises. This study's theoretical implications suggest that, contrary to modernization and democratization theory's adage that institutions lead to a political development, politicized institutions within a patrimonial order actually hinder regime adaptation because consensus is harder to achieve and maintain. It is within this context that Egypt's de-politicized institutional framework advantages its top political elite. In this reading of Egyptian and Syrian politics, Egypt's personalized political arena is more adaptable than Syria's. These conclusions do not indicate that political reform is a process underway in either state.
Decades of violent yet competitive party politics in Bangladesh have been usurped by authoritarian consolidation under the ruling Awami League. Both mainstream 'civil society' and political opposition have been largely suppressed, left unable to wage the protests typical of the county's politics. It is then striking that recent years have nonetheless seen significant urban unrest in the form of student led movements, coalescing around issues of injustice. Such social movements are neglected in the study of authoritarian durability, yet appear in practice to pose a serious threat to the ruling party. To understand this threat, this article examines two cases from 2018: the movements for reform to civil service quotas, and improved road safety. It argues such movements must be read in light of Bangladesh's history, where students have played a major role in confronting authoritarian rule. In particular, they pose two threats: first, they have the potential to undermine the ruling party's legitimacy and create a moment of crisis on which the opposition could capitalise; second, they can exacerbate tensions between interest groups on whom the ruling party rely to maintain power. Responding to such threats is thus crucial for the ruling party to maintain their grip on power.
This essay reviews the following works: Securing Sex: Morality and Repression in the Making of Cold War Brazil. By Benjamin A. Cowan. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016. Pp. ix + 311. $34.95 paperback. ISBN: 9781469627502. Contracultura: Alternative Arts and Social Transformation in Authoritarian Brazil. By Christopher Dunn. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016. Pp. xi + 251. $29.95 paperback. ISBN: 9781469628516. Hotel Mexico: Dwelling on the '68 Movement. By George F. Flaherty. Oakland: University of California Press, 2016. Pp. ix + 299. $34.95 paperback. ISBN: 9780520291072. Speaking of Flowers: Student Movements and the Making and Remembering of 1968 in Military Brazil. By Victoria Langland. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013. Pp. ix + 307. $28.95 paperback. ISBN: 9780822353126. Rebel Mexico: Student Unrest and Authoritarian Political Culture during the Long Sixties. By Jaime M. Pensado. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013. Pp. xi + 213. $32.00 paperback. ISBN: 9780804797252. A Persistent Revolution: History, Nationalism, and Politics in Mexico since 1968. By Randal Sheppard. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2016. Pp. vii + 359. $39.95 paperback. ISBN: 9780826358370.
This four-part exploratory essay examines the nature of the state and democracy in Sri Lanka between 2004 and 2015 through the lens of four issues central to the discipline of comparative politics: state formation; economic growth and political development; derailment of democracy; and democratic transition. Section one explores whether the insights found in English-language scholarship about the state and state building hold relevance for the nature of the state in Sri Lanka between 2004 and 2015. The second section inquires into the relationship between economic growth and political development in Sri Lanka. Section three considers the ways in which democracy was compromised during the reign of Mahinda Rajapaksa's regime. Lastly, the fourth section investigates whether the 2015 democratic transition from Mahinda Rajapaksa to Maithripala Sirisena was an elite- or mass-driven process.
