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The datafication of society comes with a recalibration of power structures. European states can no longer depend on territorial control to govern (cyber)space, powerful corporations own essential cloud infrastructure, state actors denying the importance of democracy and human rights have crucial roles in supply chains, and users are left without choice when using digital services. This article proposes data autonomy as a value-based framework, in response to this ongoing powershift undermining the European Union's strategic autonomy. In contrast to debates around digital sovereignty and international data flows in data protection law, data autonomy aspires to establish a framework that puts human dignity at its core. Essentially, data autonomy is based on informational self-determination, yet expands it in three dimensions: First, informational selfdetermination remains limited to the citizen-state relationship. The scope of data autonomy expands to private actors, in cases where those are particularly powerful. Secondly, data autonomy expands beyond individual rights and duties, including organizational autonomy as an enabler for individual autonomy. Thirdly, data autonomy addresses harmful inferences resulting from the use of systems based on machine learning or artificial intelligence. Therefore, it is not limited to risks stemming from statically labelled data (e.g., data stored in databases).
Strategic Autonomy, Human Dignity, Digital Sovereignty, Governance, Datafication, Data Ownership, Data Governance, Data Protection, Privacy, Informational Self-Determination

These epigraphs present us with part of the problem that is to be
discussed in this essay. For Spinoza (1632–1677) there is no
metaphysical freedom, except for God/Substance/Nature. The
behavior of individual things, or modes, is completely a
function of causes that bring about the behavior. This might suggest
that there can be no autonomy in any meaningful sense either,
thus aborting at the outset any talk of autonomy in Spinoza. To add to
this problem, "autonomy" is somewhat anachronistic when
applied to Spinoza. The philosophical theory surrounding the concept
of autonomy seems to have developed later, perhaps mostly from Kant
(1724–1804), which is not to say that it did not have parallels
earlier. Kantian metaphysics is certainly different from Spinozistic
metaphysics in allowing for freedom, if nothing else. But even if we
ignore the metaphysics, the structure of a Kantian ethics is different
from a Spinozistic one in its focus on duty and imperatives. One finds
little of that in Spinoza. Consequently, on both metaphysical and
historical grounds, it seems somewhat problematic to speak of Kantian
autonomy in Spinoza.

Alienation, as that concept is handed down in the Marxist tradition, consists in part of lack of autonomy. Some feminists have urged greater autonomy for women, while others have attacked the ideal of autonomy. One can see that both views have much in their favor from a careful reading of Virginia Woolf's To the Lighthouse (New York 1927). The resulting dilemma is resolved by (1) uncovering the concept of persons underlying traditional notions of autonomy -- the concept of persons as separate from one another; & (2) reframing the concept of persons as "being-in-relation." This yields more acceptable concepts of autonomy & of alienation. AA

Considers the alleged incompatibility between individual autonomy and the achievement and subsequent maintenance of an egalitarian society. Argues that it is only where an egalitarian society is in place that a like autonomy can be exercised by each citizen. Discusses the 3 main grounds that have been advanced to show there is such an incompatibility. (Abstract amended)

"Autonomy in Political Philosophy" published on by Oxford University Press.

Abstract
The article presents a 'critique from within' of Peter Benson's book 'Justice in Transactions', while sharing its premise that a theory of contract has to be liberal one. It identifies three problems with Benson's answer to the question of how the relation between freedom and equality in contract law should be understood. It criticizes Benson's Hegelian metaphysics and claims that a principle of mutual recognition and respect between juridical persons does not require that contracts only allow the alienation and appropriation of different things of the quantitatively same value. It demonstrates that Rawls's idea of a 'division of labor' within principles of justice is more plausible than Benson's reformulated account, which loses sight of the premise that a liberal theory of contract must locate the normative foundations of 'contract' in individual rights, and, in addition, is at odds with Rawls's project in 'Political Liberalism' and its concept of public justification.