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This essay proposes that Hume's non-substantialist bundle account of minds is basically correct. The concept of a person is not a metaphysical notion but a forensic one, that of a being who enters into the moral and normative relations of civil society. A person is a bundle but it is also a structured bundle. Hume's metaphysics of relations is argued must be replaced by a more adequate one such as that of Russell, but beyond that Hume's account is essentially correct. In particular it is argued that it is one's character that constitutes one's identity; and that sympathy and the passions of pr.

Main description: This essay proposes that Hume's non-substantialist bundle account of minds is basically correct. The concept of a person is not a metaphysical notion but a forensic one, that of a being who enters into the moral and normative relations of civil society. A person is a bundle but it is also a structured bundle. Hume's metaphysics of relations is argued must be replaced by a more adequate one such as that of Russell, but beyond that Hume's account is essentially correct. In particular it is argued that it is one's character that constitutes one's identity; and that sympathy and the passions of pride and humility are central in forming and maintaining one's character and one's identity as a person. But also central is one's body: a person is an embodied consciousness: the notion that one's body is essential to one's identity is defended at length. Various concepts of mind and consciousness are examined - for example, neutral monism and intentionality - and also the concept of privacy and our inferences to other minds.

The dynamics of both the General Factor of Personality and the personality biological indicators, as a consequence of a stimulus, can be described with a short‐term dynamic model (the response model). The invariance of the response model at both levels of description (psychological and biological) leads to deduce the bridge model with which psychological and biological levels of description can be related. The bridge model is the key tool to deal with the body–mind problem. An application case is presented setting up an experimental design with two subjects. The General Factor of Personality, c‐fos and glutamate dynamics are evaluated as a consequence of a methylphenidate dose intake. The response and bridge models are validated with the outcomes of the application case. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

AbstractRecent studies of Asian religious traditions have critiqued Western philosophical understandings of mind–body dualism and furthered the productive notion of mind–body continuum. Based on intensive fieldwork among two kinds of devotional groups of Bengal—claimants to an orthodox Vaishnavism, who focus on participating in the erotic sports of the Hindu deity-consort Radha-Krishna in imagination and a quasi-tantric group, which claims to physically apprehend Radha-Krishna's erotic pleasures through direct sexual experience—I demonstrate that, although these devotional groups stress on combating theologies, with emphases respectively on the 'mind' and the 'body', in their narrations of religious experiences, however, both groups allude to rarefied phenomenological states of cognition and embodiment. So, while influenced by ideas of (mental) 'purity' and (bodily) 'actuality', respectively, practices of both groups rely on similar states of mind–body continuum. So I argue that the mind–body complex has intensely nuanced articulations in the discursive and experiential domains of these non-Western religious contexts. Through my analyses of the texts and embodiments of these opposed devotional groups, I show that theology gets both organically entangled with as well as challenged by phenomenological experiences. I further argue that explorations in the tenor of religious studies sharply enrich the anthropology of religiosities. Also, such engagements between theology and anthropology have been relatively lacking and need more emphasis in studies of contemporary South Asian religions.

Western sociology of the body, despite its attempt to create a somatic approach to human existence, inevitably shares many of the rationalistic and Cartesian assumptions of wider Western sociology. A contrasting, and in many ways radically different approach is that found in both classical and contemporary Japanese thought. In this article two major contemporary Japanese theorists of the body - Ichikawa Hiroshi and Yuasa Yasuo - are introduced and their work examined as distinctive, and in the West virtually unknown, contributions to body analysis. Their views are briefly contrasted with some of the major themes of Western, and in particular British, sociology of the body and the implications of their work for future investigation of the human body are sketched out.