Flexibility in Federal Budget Execution
In: Public budgeting & finance, Band 3, Heft 2, S. 83-101
ISSN: 1540-5850
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In: Public budgeting & finance, Band 3, Heft 2, S. 83-101
ISSN: 1540-5850
In: Public budgeting & finance, Band 3, S. 83-101
ISSN: 0275-1100
In: Economica, Band 20, Heft 79, S. 291
In: Monitoring of Russia's Economic Outlook: Trends and Challenges of Socio-economic Development. Moscow. IEP. 2021. No. 3, pp. 3-5
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In: Public administration review: PAR, Band 24, Heft 2, S. 97
ISSN: 1540-6210
In: International affairs, Band 29, Heft 3, S. 356
ISSN: 1468-2346
In: The American review of public administration: ARPA, Band 2, Heft 1, S. 20-27
ISSN: 1552-3357
In: Public budgeting & finance, Band 6, Heft 1, S. 33-49
ISSN: 1540-5850
In: State and local government review: a journal of research and viewpoints on state and local government issues, Band 35, Heft 1, S. 48-56
ISSN: 0160-323X
Local budget analysts may have a policy or control orientation during budget execution. Policy-oriented analysts execute the budget but also follow an active work plan, conducting policy analysis, program evaluation, & management improvement studies. In contrast, control-oriented analysts simply execute the budget. Previous research has found that the views of budget directors influence a budget office's orientation toward policy or control. This article finds that orientation is better explained by how the budget office is structured; the views of the elected board & city manager; budget staff size & experience; & analysts' nonpolicy-oriented responsibilities. To engage budget analysts more usefully during budget execution, city managers are advised to require a formal work plan, avoid assigning nonpolicy duties to analysts, appoint budget directors to direct the activities of budget offices, & locate budget analysts in finance departments. 3 Tables, 8 References. Adapted from the source document.
In: National civic review: promoting civic engagement and effective local governance for more than 100 years, Band 66, Heft 6, S. 284-290
ISSN: 1542-7811
In: State and Local Government Review, Band 35, Heft 1, S. 48-56
ISSN: 1943-3409
Most countries are committed to the provision of quality health services to all, without risk of financial hardship. Adequate budget provisions are an important, yet insufficient requirement in this pursuit. The budget also needs to be implemented in full and with regard to efficiency and accountability. While this is widely acknowledged, there is no systematic evidence on how well the health budget is implemented and literature remains thin on how budget execution practices relate to health financing functions and service delivery. This report is the first in a series of publications on the topic following an active World Health Organization and World Bank collaboration. It aims to define concepts, characteristics and trends in health sector budget execution. The report first calls for clarity in use of terminology. It helps to differentiate between 'budget execution rates' and 'budget execution practices'. The former refers to the share of the budget being executed. The latter to processes on how well the budget is executed. Both aspects are equally important. Not implementing the budget in full is a lost opportunity, efficiency and accountability concern and undermines the health sector's ability to deliver services. It also undermines prospects for increased fiscal space going forward. To identify trends and patterns in over and underspending, the report draws on previously unexplored PEFA annex and World Bank BOOST data. This reveals the following: Health budget execution rates are inversely related to levels of income and maturity of PFM systems. Health budget under-execution is particularly pervasive in LMICs where the budget is executed at around 85-90 percent. Some countries have chronic budget execution problems where the budget is executed at a rate below 85 percent across consecutive years. In LMICs, the health budget is systematically implemented at a lower rate than the general government budget. This means, that governments are effectively deprioritizing health during budget implementation. For Sub-Saharan Africa countries in the sample, the average health budget was 6.7 percent of the general government budget. Health spending as a share of general government spending was half a percentage point less at 6.2 percent. In some countries this is much more pronounced, where health is deprioritized by 2-3 percentage points of general government spending during implementation. The health budget was also implemented at a lower rate than the education budget in most countries at an average rate of 4 percentage points. Underspending in some categories often occurs concurrently with overspending on other expenditure items. While the wage and salary budget tend to be implemented in full, this is less so for goods and services or the capital budget. This can leave health workers without the necessary supplies or support infrastructure to provide quality services and invariably lead to inefficiencies.
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The present research aims to determine the prevailing factors and indicators such as institutional, social, organizational, political and personal limitations that act by restricting the execution of the PNAEQW (National School Feeding Program Qaliwarma) budget. We worked with indications of the positivist paradigm, a quantitative approach, with a type of substantive research of descriptive-explanatory design. Probability sampling was used to calculate the sample that consisted of 139 workers from the PNAEQW headquarters to whom a questionnaire validated by Cronbach's alpha (0.944) was applied. The logistic regression test was used for the research result, determining that the factor with the greatest weight is the political one with a B = 1.338, opposite to what had been proposed in the research hypothesis. It was concluded that the political factor is limiting of budget execution and risk.
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