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In: Defense electronics: incl. Electronic warfare, Band 28, Heft 4, S. 11-35
ISSN: 0194-7885
In: Defense electronics: incl. Electronic warfare, Band 27, Heft 4, S. 10-46
ISSN: 0194-7885
In: Defense electronics: incl. Electronic warfare, Band 26, Heft 4, S. 19-58
ISSN: 0194-7885
Introduction: Most PES transactions involve three distinct stakeholder groups: buyers, sellers, and intermediaries. Each of these groups can consist of individuals, organizations, even governments. This brief summarizes important characteristics of these groups, including their motivations to enter into a PES transaction. ; PES-1 (Payments for Environmental Services Associate Award)
BASE
In: Understanding Economics Ser
Every day, people make choices about what to buy and sell, from food to electronics. This accessible resource introduces, explores, and explains who the buyers and sellers are as well as how people decide what they need and want and how the marketplace is changing with technological advances. Readers are provided with an overview of the marketplace and its participants. This book explores key economic concepts, like scarcity, resources, incentives, supply, demand, and market structures while providing readers with strategies for making smart buying and selling decisions
In: American economic review, Band 112, Heft 6, S. 1949-1984
ISSN: 1944-7981
Information plays a crucial role in mechanism design problems. A potential complication is that buyers may be inattentive, and so their information may endogenously and flexibly depend on the offered mechanism. I show that it is without loss of generality to consider contour mechanisms, which comprise triplets of allocation probabilities, prices, and beliefs, and are uniquely determined by a single such point. The mechanism design problem then reduces to Bayesian persuasion along the optimal contour. This reduction has significant implications for both the implementation of the optimal mechanism and the revenues that can be achieved. (JEL C11, D11, D82, D83)
In: The journal of development studies: JDS, Band 37, Heft 2, S. 177
ISSN: 0022-0388
In: Defense electronics: incl. Electronic warfare, Band 28, Heft 4, S. 10
ISSN: 0194-7885
In: Defense electronics: incl. Electronic warfare, Band 27, Heft 4, S. 9
ISSN: 0194-7885
In: Defense electronics: incl. Electronic warfare, Band 26, Heft 4, S. 16-18
ISSN: 0194-7885
SSRN
Working paper
In: International Journal of Physical Distribution & Materials Management, Band 11, Heft 2/3, S. 128-134
The case that the industrial buyer is a risk avoider is not difficult to sustain. Every buying organisation, to a greater or lesser degree, demonstrates symptoms of such behaviour every day. Among these symptoms, the most apparent to the observer is the tendency to retain established suppliers even when competitive alternatives are available. Clearly, to take on a new supplier involves some aspect of risk of failure—even if only of a "teething trouble" nature. A second symptom in production organisations is that which is implied in the statement "we must keep the line moving". One consequence of this is the tendency to maintain raw material and component inventory levels which err on the high side. In flow production situations involving expensive capital equipment, for example, it is reasonably easy to defend such behaviour. As one Materials Manager put it: "If I stop the line for one hour it costs this company £x,000. There would need to be remarkable cost savings to interest me in changing our present level of stocks or our major suppliers". Another symptom is a tendency to over‐specify, or to pay "a little more" to ensure that the supplier performs within the required parameters.
In: International Journal of Physical Distribution & Materials Management, Band 10, Heft 7, S. 474-478
In the West, at least, monopolies are generally thought to be threatening. An illustration of this concern about the potential consequences of a dominant presence in a market is the fact that most Western countries have introduced anti‐monopoly legislation. Rightly or wrongly, the presence of a monopolist suggests to many that the purchaser of goods or services from such an organisation will not get value for his money. It is often argued that the monopolist will seek to make unnecessarily large profits, or that he will be inefficient and in turn that this will result in his selling prices being higher than they ought. Little attention is usually paid in such discussion to what the economists call "non‐price variables". However, by implication at least, in this respect too, the seller is thought to perform at a lower level than he might under competition (for example, specification, delivery and service).