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For the United States to commit itself in advance to take the side of some other country that becomes involved in an international conflict is an extraordinary step that is justified only under extraordinary circumstances. There needs to be a credible external threat to the country being protected. And there must be enough commonality of interests and values between the United States and the protected state that the difference between that state falling or not falling to external aggression is highly significant for U.S. interests.A possible standard for measuring the appropriateness of security commitments is the grandest such U.S. commitment, under the North Atlantic Treaty. Whatever one may think of NATO's later expansion and out-of-area activities, the circumstances justifying a U.S. security commitment were present when the alliance was created in the late 1940s. The Soviet Union's military had overrun Eastern Europe and converted its states into satellite communist dictatorships. If the then-fragile democracies of Western Europe experienced the same fate, the result would have been disastrous for U.S. interests.Nothing remotely resembling those circumstances exists today in the Persian Gulf region. No Red Army is poised to take over the region. No would-be regional hegemon exists. Certainly not Iran, weakened by sanctions, preoccupied with internal divisions, and facing the disadvantage of being an ethnic and religious minority in a region that is largely Arab and Sunni.Saudi Arabia is the state that has had the most recent go at something approaching regional hegemony. It has employed military force outside its borders to prop up an unpopular regime in Bahrain and, on a much larger scale, to try to impose its will on Yemen through a highly destructive air war. That attempt failed, and Riyadh evidently has come to realize that its security is better served through accommodation rather than a quest for domination.Nor is there anything in the region like the difference, in terms of values and interests, that there was in 1940s Europe between Western democracies and Soviet satellite dictatorships. The Gulf Arab states are absolute monarchies. The only thing in those states that sounds close to democracy is a mostly elected National Assembly in Kuwait, but whenever that body gets too noisy and difficult to suit the ruling regime, the emir simply dissolves it.Despite these circumstances, the Biden administration is extending security guarantees to Gulf states, most recently by signing a Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement with Bahrain. The agreement commits the United States, "in the event of external aggression or the threat of external aggression" against Bahrain, to "immediately meet at the most senior levels to determine additional defense needs and to develop and implement appropriate defense and deterrent responses as decided upon by the Parties, including in the economic, military, and/or political realms."An anonymous administration official took pains to point out that the agreement is not a treaty and therefore does not need approval by the U.S. Senate. But apparently seeking to have it both ways, the official also stated that the agreement is "legally binding."No effort was made to identify what external aggression the parties have in mind. Iran, of course, is the state that automatically gets mentioned as a supposed threat. But the image of Iran mustering a D-Day-like invasion fleet and crossing the gulf to conduct an amphibious invasion of Bahrain is so fanciful as to be absurd (whether or not U.S. warships were in the gulf).Bahrain certainly has had its differences with Iran, probably at least as much as does any other member of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Historical baggage in the relationship includes an old Iranian claim to Bahrain as the "14th province" of Iran, but in recent decades Iran has not tried to act on any such claim. The situation is quite unlike, say, the one involving Taiwan, in which China constantly declares to the world that it considers the island a part of China and periodically uses military saber-rattling to advertise the possibility of an invasion.To the extent the regime in Bahrain faces a security threat, it involves not external aggression but instead internal strife stemming from an unpopular Sunni regime repressing a largely Shia population. The Saudi military intervention in Bahrain in 2011 was intended to help the Bahraini regime suppress an Arab Spring-era popular uprising.The regime oppression and popular discontent continue. This year, Bahraini prisoners conducted a months-long hunger strike to protest harsh conditions in the prison. The hunger strike was suspended when the regime, on the eve of crown prince's trip to Washington to sign the new security agreement, eased some of the conditions. But Bahrain remains a serious violator of human rights.The unlikelihood of any external aggression against Bahrain means the clause in the new agreement that dictates the response to such aggression probably will not be invoked. The disadvantages of the agreement lie principally in two other areas. One involves getting more deeply in bed with an oppressive regime, with everything that implies regarding the U.S. image among, and relations with, the Bahraini population and Shia generally, among others. Many external and internal critics of Bahrain are reportedly angered and disappointed by the agreement. The director of the Britain-based Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy said that Bahraini authorities would interpret the agreement as a "green light" to increase political repression.The other main ill consequence of the agreement is that it runs counter to and undercuts a beneficial trend toward reducing international tensions in the Persian Gulf region. Bahrain's fellow GCC members have all been moving in the direction of warmer, less confrontational, relations with Iran. Kuwait and Oman have long had businesslike relations with Tehran and have at times served as diplomatic intermediaries for others. Similarly with Qatar, which shares with Iran exploitation of a huge gas field. Meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates has been improving its relations with Tehran, and this month Saudi Arabia and Iran exchanged ambassadors as implementation of their agreement earlier this year to restore diplomatic relations.The issue of confrontation versus rapprochement with Iran gets into the larger game that the Biden administration is playing and of which the Bahrain agreement is only a part. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said during the signing ceremony, "We're looking forward to using this agreement as a framework for additional countries that may wish to join us in strengthening regional stability, economic cooperation and technological innovation."The additional country the administration clearly has most in mind is Saudi Arabia, which has identified a security pact with the United States as part of the price it is demanding in return for upgrading its already significant relationship with Israel to full diplomatic relations. The administration evidently hopes the agreement with Bahrain can be a model for the kind of pact that would satisfy the Saudi demand while bypassing likely opposition on Capitol Hill.Despite the effort the administration is putting into brokering an agreement to upgrade relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, it still has not explained how any such agreement would serve either U.S. interests or the cause of peace and stability in the Middle East. In fact, it would do neither, and instead would only prolong and even increase confrontation and instability in the region. To understand why, note the principal Israeli objectives in seeking exchanges of embassies and ambassadors with the Persian Gulf Arab states, with which it is not at war.One objective is to intensify and institutionalize confrontation with, and fear and loathing of, Iran, thereby keeping it as a bête noire that can be blamed for all problems in the region and divert international attention from any problems that involve Israel's conduct. This means more, not less, tension and risk of escalation in the Persian Gulf region. And that is even before considering more of the Saudi regime's price for upgrading relations with the Israelis, including more unrestricted arms sales and help with a Saudi nuclear program.The other Israeli objective is to demonstrate that Israel can enjoy normal relations with regional states while continuing its occupation of Palestinian-inhabited territory. Far from being a "peace" agreement, an upgrading of relations with Saudi Arabia — like the earlier upgrading with Bahrain, Morocco, and the UAE — would be about Israel not making peace with the Palestinians.Given the extreme right-wing nature of the Israeli government, led by a prime minister determined to keep his coalition intact and keep himself away from prosecution for corruption, any gesture toward the Palestinians that Riyadh and Washington could wring out of Israel would be little more than that — a gesture. It is inconceivable that the current Israeli government would do anything substantial that would bring closer a Palestinian state or any other resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.In short, the administration's project of buying an upgrade of Arab relations with Israel is not justified. And thus, neither is the agreement with Bahrain that is one part of that project.

Last month, the U.S. announced Operation Prosperity Guardian, a naval coalition aimed at deterring Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Bahrain was the only Arab nation to join. The reasons why — and why other U.S. allies and partners in the region did not — should be of interest to us.Many countries have valid concerns about the Gaza war's further regionalization. The Houthis say they are targeting commercial vessels that are Israeli owned or heading for Israeli ports with missile and drone strikes, and have already hijacked a ship. They vow to continue these attacks until Israel agrees to a ceasefire.The U.S. has been thwarting most of these attacks with their naval-based missile defenses.Much is at stake economically with the Red Sea's security crisis. Separating the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa is the Bab el-Mandeb strait, which links the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea. Roughly 30 percent of all global containers transit the Bab el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal, as does about 12 percent of all world trade. But since the Houthi attacks in the southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden began in October, major shipping carriers have stopped transiting the Suez Canal and have re-routed their vessels around Africa, threatening consumer prices hikes. This disruption to Red Sea trade can seriously harm economies across Europe, which were already contracting before this crisis.Operation Prosperity GuardianThat Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which were the two main states in the Arab military coalition that began fighting the Houthis in 2015, did not join Operation Prosperity Guardian is quite significant. Also notable is the fact that Egypt, a major Arab country with a 930-mile Red Sea coast, refused to join, too. Most Arab states avoided formally joining Operation Prosperity Guardian for several reasons. First, Arab societies are so enraged about Israel's indiscriminate bombing, forced starvation, and displacement of millions of Palestinians in Gaza, that the governments in the region do not want to be seen as complicit by openly siding with Washington, which is clearly funding and arming Israel's operations.Second, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member-states — particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE — want to avoid actions that could trigger a resumption of Houthi attacks on their energy and civilian infrastructure or further destabilize the Red Sea, where many of Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 projects exist. Third, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi fear that joining this security initiative could upset their détentes with Tehran, which sponsors the Houthi movement.Bahrain's Unique PositionBahrain, which the George W. Bush Administration recognized as a Major non-NATO Ally in 2002, made a different calculation. An important factor to keep in mind is that Bahrain hosts the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet. Also, Bahrain and the U.S. signed the Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement, a strategic security and economic pact, in September."Bahrain has long perceived an existential threat from Iran that shapes its security stance, so by providing a home for U.S. assets, Bahrain gains protection and relevance which is another layer beyond the security protection it receives from Saudi Arabia and the UAE," said Steven Wright, an associate professor of international relations at Hamad Bin Khalifa University, in an interview with Responsible Statecraft."Other GCC members seem to have more complex calculations: for Saudi Arabia and UAE, existing efforts to climb down tensions with Iran explains their position," he added.Joseph A. Kéchichian, a senior fellow at the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies in Riyadh, noted that Bahrain, which has a single guided missile frigate and two smaller guided missile ships called corvettes, has not sent these assets to join the task force, at least not yet."Manama's contribution may be similar to Amsterdam's and Canberra's, as The Netherlands and Australia announced that they would send military personnel, but no vessels," he said. "Yet, because Bahrain is the headquarters of the US Navy's Fifth Fleet, as well as the home of the Combined Maritime Forces that coordinate coalition operations in the area, it makes sense for the kingdom to join if only to provide and receive information of actual maneuvers."He suggested that other Gulf Cooperation Coalition (GCC) members would be sharing information vis-a-vis the new task force, although it is unclear how that would occur. "As far as it is known, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which could have deployed naval vessels, opted to stay out of Operation Prosperity Guardian because they disagreed with its narrow objectives," added Kéchichian.Post-Oct. 7 Blowback in BahrainHaving normalized with Israel in 2020, Bahrain has been in an awkward position since October 7. When it comes to relations with Israel, there is a major divide between the Bahraini leadership and its citizenry. This divide has deepened amid the Gaza war.As Gaza's Palestinian death toll steadily rises, Bahraini authorities must contend with increased risks of blowback at home given how unpopular the Abraham Accords are with Bahraini citizens across the country's political spectrum and among diverse civil society groups. As Human Rights Watch recently documented, Bahraini authorities have used oppressive tactics to repress Palestine solidarity protestors across the country."The Al Khalifa monarchy has proven adept historically at subduing dissent through a variety of tools. It seems clear that Bahrain has calculated that involvement in the Abraham Accords serves its overall economic, foreign policy and security interests despite criticism," offered Wright."The bottom line is that the economic perks and U.S. backing is outweighing public opinion objections from its domestic political groups," said Wright.Courtney Freer, a fellow at Emory University, noted to RS that Bahrain's elected lower house of parliament issued a statement in November claiming that the country's ambassador had left Israel and that economic ties between the two states had been severed."It is worth noting that this language is coming from a primarily loyalist parliament, which suggests that such feelings of animosity towards Israel are not just associated with opposition parties, which, in turn, may make it more difficult to ignore," said Freer. "Notably, citizens have become involved in pro-Palestinian protests, and so there is anger, but it is uncertain whether this anger will be translated into political risk for the regime."Bahrain's diplomatic relations with Israel and military alliance with the U.S. may subject the archipelago kingdom to blowback from Iran-aligned actors in the region. But Bahrain abrogating the Abraham Accords or fundamentally changing its relationship with Washington is highly unlikely. Ultimately, Bahrain's leadership seems to assess that such risks of blowback are worth the benefits of normalized relations with Israel and American support."The Al Khalifa monarchy has proven adept at managing domestic dissent through various means, so the risks from Iran within this context will be viewed as manageable. Any public concerns over cooperation with Israel/U.S. is unlikely to seriously challenge its stability and at most is likely to be limited in scale," Wright said."Basically, Bahrain is seeking to be relevant to the U.S. by backing its counter-Houthi maritime initiative," he added. "This allows it to further cement its relationship with both the U.S. and also Israel, given that this is part of an approach to counter Houthi and Iranian geopolitical reach."

Video shows protesters attacking Israel's embassy in Bahrain with molotov cocktails.

Saraya Wa'ad Allah, an Iranian-backed group in Bahrain, calls for additional violence against Israelis in the island kingdom. However, it is unlikely to materialize.
The post Bahraini militia celebrates Hamas-led invasion of Israel, calls for mobilization against Israelis first appeared on FDD's Long War Journal.

Nach dem Angriff der USA und Großbritanniens auf Huthi-Einrichtungen in Jemen hat die Bundesregierung zusammen mit anderen Staaten das Recht auf Selbstverteidigung gegen die Bedrohung der Schifffahrt im Roten Meer betont. Die am frühen Freitagmorgen veröffentlichte gemeinsame Erklärung gibt es jetzt auch in einer deutschen Fassung: Angriffe der Huthi auf Handels­schiffe im Roten Meer – Gemeinsame Erklärung von 10 Ländern 12.01.2024 – Pressemitteilung Gemeinsame Erklärung der Regierungen Australiens, Bahrains, Dänemarks, Deutschlands, Kanadas, der Niederlande, Neuseelands, der Republik Korea, des Vereinigten

Bill is joined by CDR Salamander to discuss the coalition announced today by U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin during his trip to the Middle East. The coalition — made up of the UK, Bahrain, Canada, France, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Seychelles and Spain in partnership with the US — was formed with the objective of "ensuring freedom of navigation in the Red Sea" following the recent uptick in Houthi aggression and attacks in the southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden area.
The post Generation Jihad Ep. 128 — Operation Prosperity Guardian, the Houthis, and CDR Salamander first appeared on FDD's Long War Journal.

An American envoy and a Bahraini academic posed for the camera at a Washington hotel in October 2020, grinning ear to ear. They held a copy of an agreement between the U.S. State Department and the King Hamad Global Center for Peaceful Coexistence to combat antisemitism in Bahrain. Ellie Cohanim, then the U.S. assistant special envoy to monitor and combat antisemitism, called it "a model for a society that actively espouses religious freedom, tolerance and diversity of peoples."Thousands of miles away, in Bahrain itself, Sheikh Zuhair Jasim Abbas was sitting in a solitary confinement cell. His family had not heard from him since July. They would not again for several more months. According to a UN panel, the Shi'a Muslim cleric was allegedly beaten, starved, sleep-deprived, chained, attacked with water hoses, forbidden from using the bathroom, threatened with execution, and prevented from practicing his religious rituals.The Abraham Accords, the diplomatic agreements between Israel, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates, have been hailed as a victory for religious tolerance. The image of Muslims and Jews dancing together has convinced American policymakers from both parties that peace is breaking out across the Middle East. The Biden administration is reportedly offering the Saudi government a huge bribe — perhaps even a commitment to go to war on the kingdom's behalf — to get Saudi Arabia into the Abraham Accords as well.New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman seems to sum up the Biden administration's logic: that a Saudi-Israeli agreement would "open the way for peace between Israel and the whole Muslim world" and "dramatically reduce the Muslim-Jewish antipathy born over a century ago with the start of the Jewish-Palestinian conflict."But the Abraham Accords are attached to a social order that is deeply unequal, divided along ethnic and religious lines. While Israel allows foreign Muslims to visit Jerusalem, it rules over millions of Palestinians against their will. (That conflict is more about nationalism in the here and now than "Muslim-Jewish antipathy.") And while some monarchies in the Persian Gulf are beginning to embrace foreigners of different religions, those same states — especially Bahrain — treat their native Shi'a Muslims as a potential fifth column.For the past few years, some of the Gulf monarchies have been engaged in a project to replace Israel with Iran as the main enemy of the Arab masses. On one hand, these countries have repressed pro-Palestine activism and promoted an image of Palestinians as parasitic ingrates. On the other hand, they have encouraged fears of Iranian power, often conflating Iran with Shi'a Muslims as a whole. Israel has encouraged both prejudices as part of its outreach to Middle Eastern publics. Rather than a victory for religious tolerance, the Abraham Accords are the culmination of an attempt by Israel and its new Gulf allies to rearrange their official enemy lists.In 2018, as Israel was beginning direct talks with Emirati and Bahraini diplomats, Israeli military spokesperson Avichay Adraee turned into a fountain of anti-Shi'a incitement. Quoting medieval Sunni scholars, Adraee claimed on video that Shi'a Muslims are "fundamentally hypocrites and liars who invent falsehoods to ruin Islam." A few months later, he complained that Iran is "transforming citizens into Shi'a" across the Arab world.After the Abraham Accords were signed, Adraee ranted that Sunni Palestinians who prayed alongside Shi'a were leaving the fold of Sunni Islam: "How do these 'believers' justify praying behind those who stab the back of the Sunni world?" The spirit of Muslim-Jewish reconciliation, with its emphasis on interfaith photo ops, clearly does not apply to Sunni-Shi'a relations.It's worth noting that, although Iran is the largest Shi'a-majority state, most Shi'a Muslims live outside of Iran, in India, Pakistan, and the Arab world. And religious Shi'a have been at the forefront of resisting the Iranian theocracy, both inside and outside Iran. However, casting all Shi'a as Iranian agents serves a political purpose. Unrest in areas like eastern Saudi Arabia or Bahrain, where the majority of the population is Shi'a, can be dismissed as foreign terrorism, rather than a case of Arab citizens demanding equal rights. In the words of one Saudi commentator, Arabs who embrace Shi'a identity politics "have sadly become Persian."While trying to terrify Sunnis about the Iranian menace, the Israeli government has also worked to turn Iranians against Palestinians. Last year, when a few Iranian protesters were filmed stomping on a Palestinian symbol, the Israeli foreign ministry loudly promoted that image. The ministry's Persian-language account is filled with sarcastic jokes about the "oppressed Palestinians," along with claims that "they teach hatred and violence" to their children.As the Abraham Accords were finalized, the Gulf states that moved closer to Israel also began to take more of an anti-Palestinian line. Americans celebrated, and rightfully so, when Saudi television or the Emirati school system presented a more sympathetic view of Jews. At the same time, however, Saudi and Emirati media figures got louder about what they considered Palestinian "treachery." In the words of a Saudi soap opera character, the average Palestinian is an ingrate who "doesn't appreciate you standing by him, who curses you day and night — more than the Israelis." Given the heavy censorship that Saudi and Emirati media are subject to, this change in tone must have reflected official policy. Just as political concerns led Gulf states to tone down anti-Jewish prejudice, different political concerns could lead them to tone down other prejudices. At times when Israeli authorities aggressively asserted their sovereignty over Islamic holy sites — especially under the ultra-nationalist Israeli government elected in 2022 — the Gulf has returned to a more pro-Palestine tone. After Saudi Arabia mended ties with Iran earlier this year, Saudi authorities loosened restrictions on Shi'a pilgrims, and prominent Saudi propagandist Hussain al-Ghawi embraced Shi'a as his Muslim brothers. Ironically, American media did not celebrate the Saudi-Iranian pact as the dawn of religious harmony, but instead raised the alarm that Washington was losing its influence in the region.The American cultural understanding of the Middle East is centered on Israel, and anti-Palestinian racism is normalized in U.S. politics. On the other hand, Washington views Sunni-Shi'a sectarianism as a geopolitical game. During the occupation of Iraq and the decades of war that followed, U.S. policymakers treated "Sunni" and "Shi'a" like pieces on a chessboard, debating which side to favor at any given time. Instead of seeing this sectarianism as a terrible policy failure, U.S. politicians blamed Muslims' own attachment to "tribalism" and "conflicts that date back millennia," as former President Barack Obama put it.And so the Abraham Accords help flatter American elites. Israel and its Gulf allies can make a big show of overcoming Muslim-Jewish tensions — which Americans see as the central moral question of the Middle East — with U.S. support. The other prejudices involved in maintaining the system simply don't register on Americans' radar.Other states are starting to appeal to the West through the same strategy. Azerbaijan is fighting a brutal ethnic conflict against Armenia. Meanwhile, the Azerbaijani government has made a big show of hosting foreign Christian and Jewish delegations. Those guests often go on to praise Azerbaijan as an oasis of Muslim tolerance — rather than a secular nationalist dictatorship whose ethnic hatred of Armenians outweighs any religious concern.It's noble to want American diplomats to resolve conflicts and promote harmony between religions. But the Abraham Accords are intentionally misleading in that regard. Under the guise of peacemaking, the alliance helps authoritarian governments maintain divisions, albeit among communities that U.S. elites don't care about. The real path to peace comes through justice and mutual respect, not simply rearranging enemy lists.

Both the Jewish and Muslim countries, including Israel and
Palestine, live in the Middle Ages, as they define the community for a religious
allegiance. Like the kingdoms and empires of several centuries ago, they live
in permanent hostility, mutual condemnation, and recurrent wars for the annihilation
of the enemy.

The Abraham Accords in 2020 tried,
once again, to make peaceful coexistence viable. A few Arab and Muslim
countries, Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan have recently recognized the state
of Israel, following the example of former peace treaties signed by Egypt and
Jordan, moving thus from Middle Ages religious wars to nineteenth-century diplomacy. Saudi Arabia, the remnant and continuator of the Arabian Empire, as its name suggests, and the wealthiest Middle Eastern country, was also at the hedge of recognizing Israel.

Iran, which is not Arab but Persian,
Muslim but Shi'a, and the potential second power in the Middle East, could not
accept such isolation. Also, Iran's fanatic rulers were facing internal
protests, in particular from women fed up of segregation and controls, and saw
an external operation as a way to change the focus. Even better if it would not
be done directly but through Gaza's Hamas, Iran's operational agent.

They also estimated that Israel
was in a huge internal crisis, with five elections in less than three years, a
minority government, and internal mass protests, including for the political
manipulation of the judiciary. Then, Hamas stroke a criminal, provocative attack.
Yet, against Hamas' calculation, Netanyahu saw it as the opportunity to escape
from his internal crisis: he called for national unity, hired two generals and
former ministers of defense as partners in a new war cabinet, and stroke back.

Saudi Arabia hesitates, it may
even consider a cut of oil production or a rise in prices. The United States
and its Western allies risk a new catastrophic Middle East conflict. For at
least three main players, external war is a way to tame internal struggles: for
Iran, Israel, and the United States.

The cost, of course, is mass death
and destruction.

Despite the White House parsing whether the U.S. is in a "war" or not, the Pentagon is mulling whether to extend the deployment of an existing Amphibious Ready Group now stationed in the Middle East, according to reports, as attacks by the Houthis and subsequent retaliations increase.According to Military.com, the group includes the USS Bataan, USS Carter Hall, and USS Mesa Verde and has been "operating in the Middle East and the Mediterranean since the summer." ARG also includes aircraft and about 2,000 Marines as part of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, according to the online magazine. As Naval warships with anti-missile batteries have been engaging directly with Houthis in the Red Sea, the USS Bataan has been "trawling the waters of the Red Sea, Strait of Hormuz and Mediterranean as a warning to disruptive actors in the area while being ready to help in an emergency."The ARG was supposed to be replaced by the Boxer ARG, but reports indicate that the amphibious group is not "ready" (this has been fueled by speculation since the summer that the lead ship, the USS Boxer, was experiencing mechanical problems and had been docked for the last year).An extended tour would mean the Marines on the USS Bataan would be in the region for upwards of a year before going home.All told, the U.S military has about 30,000 service members currently deployed in the Middle East, which includes its permanent bases in Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain. The USS Ford carrier group returned to the U.S. this month on regular rotation, leaving the USS Eisenhower carrier strike group in the Red Sea with about 7,500 personnel. The White House, despite nearly a dozen retaliatory attacks against the Houthis by the U.S. military over the last week, does not want to characterize the situation as "war," which has some in the press corps "perplexed," according to Miltiary.com. "We don't seek war," said White House spokesperson Sabrina Singh last Thursday. "We are not at war with the Houthis." "I don't know that there's any purpose served by being too cute about the way you talk about it," former Navy captain and RAND researcher Brad Martin told Military.com. "It's definitely combat, and it is definitely something that could become a much larger combat. ... Whether or not it is at the level that we would call a war is sort of an academic distinction."The magazine noted that the Navy has awarded medals including a rare Combat Action Ribbon to sailors on the USS Carney, which was involved in shooting down Houthi strikes in October. At the time, it was reported that the Houthis were not attacking U.S. ships directly. From reporter Konstantin Toropin: Navy officials have, so far, been unwilling to provide the citation behind the Combat Action Ribbon to Military.com, and they have yet to offer an explanation for why it cannot be made public.When (Pentagon spokesman Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder) was asked whether the award signified that Navy ships are considered in combat while conducting seemingly defensive operations in the Red Sea, he replied that "the admiral's actions speak for themselves in terms of recognizing the crew ... so let's leave it at that."

Last year's Hamas-led incursion into southern Israel and the subsequent Israeli war on Gaza, which has killed roughly 35,000 Palestinians, have impacted relationships within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) — members appear to be moving closer together. As the Gaza war expands into Lebanon, Yemen, the Red Sea, and elsewhere, and while Iran and Israel's hostilities brought the region into uncharted waters earlier this month, the monarchies on the Arabian Peninsula are strengthening ties within the larger Gulf Arab family.In a historical context, this makes complete sense. To understand why, it is useful to first go back to the chaotic period of the late 1970s and early 1980s.For the Persian Gulf's Arab monarchies, 1979 was a terrifying year. To varying degrees, the Western-backed Gulf Arab leaders saw both Iran's Islamic revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as dangerous developments. By 1981, the six conservative Gulf Arab states — Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) — came together to bolster their collective security by establishing the GCC.Over the decades, the GCC states have put their ideological and geopolitical differences aside in the interest of growing Gulf Arab unity, particularly during periods of increased instability. Cases include the 1990/91 Kuwaiti crisis, the 2010/11 Arab Spring uprisings, the meteoric rise of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in mid-2014, and the Taliban's return to power in 2021. By the same token, at times of greater stability in the region and fewer threats to the Gulf Arab monarchies, internal divisions and differences between the GCC members have tended to elevate to the surface.It was no coincidence that the first GCC crisis broke out in March 2014. At that time, the revolutionary tide of the Arab Spring had largely dissipated and the counter-revolutionary Gulf Arab states — Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain — felt the need to pressure Qatar into abandoning the pro-revolutionary and Islamist-friendly policies that shaped Doha's approach to many of the 2010/11 uprisings which shook the Arab world. Yet, that GCC spat ended later that year after ISIL had usurped large portions of Iraq and Syria. Then, the second GCC crisis, which was an outcome of basically the exact same issues that led to the first GCC crisis, erupted in mid-2017 when ISIL was significantly less powerful.Although the Gulf Arab states — unlike Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria — do not share land borders with Israel-Palestine, all six GCC members are extremely worried about the situation in Gaza and its ramifications for the wider region, including the Persian Gulf. Among the Gulf Arab monarchies, there is much common cause and shared concerns about further regionalization of the Gaza war. These concerns have led to Gulf Arab officials becoming increasingly frustrated with U.S. leadership in the region and the Biden administration's refusal to pressure Israel into agreeing to a ceasefire."[The] war in Gaza has unified GCC [states] in terms of moral, political, and diplomatic solidarity with Gaza and the Palestinians," said Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, a Dubai-based Emirati political scientist, in an interview with RS. "Israel has become a killer machine in Gaza for the past 200 days and this is to nobody's liking in the Arab Gulf states," he added.There are important domestic ramifications to consider too. Officials in the Gulf Arab monarchies fear the potential for the Palestinian cause to mobilize and/or radicalize their own citizens in ways that could upset the status quo in GCC states and the wider region. Palestine-related protests in Egypt and Jordan have potential to fuel significant unrest in those two countries, whose stability is vitally important to the Gulf Arabs.Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) recently spoke by phone with the president of the UAE Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) and the emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim. In these two conversations, the Gulf Arab leaders discussed the heightening of regional tensions and threats to stability and security in the Middle East. MbS, MbZ, and Emir Tamim all agreed on the need to mitigate security risks and take measures to prevent the region's crises from spiraling out of control.On April 22, Oman's Sultan Haitham paid his first visit to the UAE since he became his country's head of state in January 2020. While in Abu Dhabi, Sultan Haitham and MbZ discussed a host of issues at the bilateral, regional, and global levels. During Sultan Haitham's visit, companies from Oman and the UAE signed $35.12 billion worth of deals in various sectors such as transport and energy. The Omanis and Emiratis are focused on advancing their countries' economic integration through various projects and initiatives, most notably the Etihad Rail which links Oman's Sohar port to Abu Dhabi.The GCC states have come a long way in terms of mending fences since the historic al-Ula summit of January 2021 officially ended the Emirati- and Saudi-led blockade of Qatar. Indeed, it was not long ago when a phone call between MbS and Emir Tamim, or between MbZ and the Qatari emir, would have created many headlines given the extent to which Saudi-Qatari and Emirati-Qatari relations had deteriorated. "The Gaza war has brought Qatar and the UAE closer," Abdulla told RS.These past rifts within the GCC were not only about Qatar. The UAE and Oman were having their share of problems in bilateral affairs throughout Sultan Qaboos's final decade on the throne. Yet, Sultan Haitham's recent visit to the UAE underscored how the leadership in both Muscat and Abu Dhabi are focused on both playing their diplomatic cards to try to bring regional crises under control while also pushing ahead with their economic transformations at home through ambitious visions aimed at eliminating their economic dependence on hydrocarbons.In all GCC states, there is an understanding that more discussions between their leaders and growing levels of inter-GCC cooperation across a host of domains is necessary to achieve progress on both fronts. The Gulf Arab monarchies realize that this is not a time for internal divisions and friction between the different royal families to prevent the six GCC members from reaching their potential through greater Gulf Arab unity.GCC states have strengthened their relationships with each other since October 7 because "there needed to be coordination given that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE are playing leadership roles in this conflict," said Aziz Alghashian, a fellow with the Sectarianism, Proxies & De-sectarianisation project at Lancaster University.Nonetheless, while the GCC members are bolstering their cooperation as Israel's war on Gaza rages, some experts believe that competition between the Gulf Arab states vis-à-vis Gaza might emerge after the dust settles and the post-war phase begins in the Palestinian enclave."There is potential that it could be turbulent in the future once there is a real process of addressing the day after in Gaza and that could [relate to] aspects of burden sharing [and] aspects of competition," Alghashian said. "So, there is that to look out for in the future. Maybe it's speculative for now, but I don't think we should count it out."

Since November, the Houthis in Yemen have launched scores of missile and drone attacks on vessels in the Gulf of Aden and the southern Red Sea in reaction to the U.S.-backed Israeli war on Gaza. Ansarallah, the dominant Houthi militia, also hijacked the Japanese-operated and partly Israeli-owned Galaxy Leader on November 19.On December 19, the Pentagon responded by establishing Operation Prosperity Guardian, a mostly Western security initiative aimed at deterring the Houthis from disrupting shipping near the Bab el-Mandeb, the narrow straight separating Yemen from the Horn of Africa. About 30 percent of all global containers and approximately 12 percent of world trade transit the Bab el-Mandeb.Yet Operation Prosperity Guardian failed to deter Ansarallah from continuing its missile and drone strikes. The group has said consistently that these attacks on vessels off Yemen's coast will end if and only when Israel ceases its attacks on Gaza. Rather than using U.S. leverage to persuade the Israeli government to agree to a ceasefire in Gaza, the Biden administration, along with the UK, has carried out over the past week a series of airstrikes against Houthi targets across Yemen while continuing to supply Israel with bombs and other weaponry to continue its Gaza campaign. The Pentagon was keen to emphasize that this month's U.S.-UK strikes against Ansarallah targets in Yemen took place outside Operation Prosperity Guardian's framework.These strikes, the first direct U.S. military intervention against the Houthis since October 2016, are escalating regional tensions in ways that are unsettling Washington's closest Arab allies and partners in the Persian Gulf.Apart from Bahrain, which joined Australia, Canada, and the Netherlands in playing nonoperational roles in these American-British strikes, the other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have refused to participate. And most of them have expressed concern about Washington and London's escalation. Even before January 11, when the first wave of strikes took place, some Gulf Arab officials warned explicitly against such military action.During a joint press conference with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken on January 7, Qatari Foreign Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani made clear his concerns. "We never see a military action as a resolution," he asserted, adding that protecting shipping lanes through "diplomatic means" would be the "best way possible." Nine days later, while addressing the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Sheikh Mohammed warned that military strikes against the Houthis would fail to contain Ansarallah's operations. "We need to address the central issue, which is Gaza, in order to get everything else defused... If we are just focusing on the symptoms and not treating the real issues, [solutions] will be temporary," he said.Shortly after the U.S.-UK strikes, Kuwait also expressed "grave concern and keen interest in the developments in the Red Sea region following the attacks that targeted sites in Yemen."As for Oman, which has often served as a key mediator and geopolitical balancer in the region, its foreign ministry declared that Muscat "can only condemn the use of military action by friendly countries" and warned that the U.S.-UK strikes risk worsening the Middle East's perilous situation. "We denounce the resort to military action by [Western] allies while Israel persists in its brutal war without accountability," read a statement from the ministry.Saudi Arabia's high stakesBut the GCC member most concerned about the escalating tensions in the Gulf of Aden, southern Red Sea, and Yemen is likely Saudi Arabia. Late last year, Riyadh asked the Biden administration to show restraint when responding to Ansarallah's attacks on vessels off Yemen's coast. After the U.S. and UK strikes began, the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs called for "avoiding escalation" while noting that Riyadh was monitoring events with "great concern."In an interview with RS, Mehran Kamrava, a professor of government at Georgetown University in Qatar, explained that "[t]his statement indicates Saudi efforts to encourage de-escalation and at the same time to ensure its short- and medium-term diplomatic interests by signaling its concern to all the parties involved, including the U.S. and Britain.""The Saudis are concerned and for good reason," according to Aziz Alghashian, a fellow at Lancaster University in Britain. "The Saudi ruling elite want to avoid being caught in the middle of regional and international conflicts," he told RS.Among other things, the Saudis want their nearly two-year-old truce with the Houthis to be preserved. The kingdom is also determined to ensure that the Saudi-Iranian détente, that was mediated by Oman, Iraq, and China last March, remains on track. The view from Riyadh is that the U.S.-UK military intervention in Yemen threatens to undermine both interests."The Saudi concern is that attacks on shipping in the Red Sea, and U.S. and UK attacks on Yemen bring Iran and the Houthis closer together and that Iran [will] become more directly involved in Houthi [operations]," according to Kamrava. "By attacking Yemen, the U.S. and UK have already escalated the Gaza war beyond Palestine. Saudi Arabia would want to do whatever it can to contain a further escalation as it may spill over into its own borders and to result in a radicalization of domestic political sensibilities."The Saudi leadership recognizes that the kingdom would be in a much more vulnerable position if the ongoing regional crisis were unfolding during the 2016-20 period, when tensions between Riyadh and Tehran were sky high. Due to their recent détente, the kingdom perceives the Iranian threat to the kingdom as far more manageable. "The escalation of regional tension due to the war on Gaza and the subsequent escalation of tensions in the Red Sea are examples of why the Saudi-Iranian normalization deal struck last March is strategically [valuable to Riyadh]," said Alghashian.Ultimately, with Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman, better known as MbS, at the helm, the Saudi leadership wants to prioritize its Vision 2030 — the kingdom's ambitious economic diversification agenda. A successful Vision 2030 requires stability in Saudi Arabia and its neighborhood. It's within this context that the Saudi government renormalized diplomatic relations with Iran last year, embraced opportunities for rapprochement with Qatar and Turkey in 2021/22, and engaged the Houthis in talks about a permanent truce.With NEOM, a futuristic metropolis, and other Vision 2030 projects based along Saudi Arabia's Red Sea coast, officials in Riyadh are gravely concerned about how the Gaza war, the related Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea, and U.S.-UK retaliation could destabilize this body of water and the surrounding territory. Further escalation by any of the parties is a scenario that the Saudi government wants to avoid at all costs.To ensure that Ansarallah does not resume its attacks against Saudi Arabia, Riyadh has tried to distance itself from this month's U.S.-UK military strikes in Yemen. However, given Manama's participation, however nominal, in Washington and London's attacks on Houthi targets, as well as its normalized relationship with Israel, the possibility that the Houthis may retaliate by targeting the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet, which is based in Bahrain, can't be dismissed. Given the extent to which protecting Bahrain's national security has been a high priority for Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states, such a scenario risks serious damage to Riyadh's interests.As Kamrava observed, targeting U.S. interests on the Arabian Peninsula by the Houthis, or "some of the loose grouplets within them," could constitute an "extremely dangerous development and a conflagration that would be difficult to contain."

The Pentagon is marshaling a new international task force to combat Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, and not a moment too soon, it would seem, as it has been expending millions of dollars in munitions to intercept the militants' drones and missiles since Oct. 7.

But is it essentially expanding the "target set" for the Houthis, who are clearly bent on proving their own strength (with, of course, Iranian backing) and scoring political points against Israel? Will this task force, named Operation Prosperity Guardian, bring the U.S. one step closer to a regional war that will, in the end, cost Americans much more?

According to the Department of Defense, the Houthis have conducted 100 drone and ballistic missile attacks since Oct. 7, targeting cargo vessels involving more than 35 flags from different nations in the Red Sea, including U.S Navy destroyers. Most have been intercepted, though some have hit their targets, causing minor injuries and damage. But with the hijacking of one ship, plus the major disruptions to shipping (the Houthis are blocking an estimated $10 billion in cargo a day) and resulting price hikes, the situation has put security in the region on high alert.

It is also costing the United States a pretty penny to act as the key defender of these predominant global shipping lanes. Each munition used to shoot down the Houthi missiles and drones costs between $1 million and $4.3 million and the ships cannot reload at sea and will have to return to port — perhaps Djibouti? — to reload if the kinetic activity goes on much longer, according to experts that talked to Responsible Statecraft this week.

According to experts, the US Carney and US Mason destroyers (also joined by U.K. warships in some cases) could be using a mix of RIM66 SM-2 and RIM66 SM-6 interceptors as well as ESSM Sea Sparrows to take down the drones. The Carney is outfitted with SM-3s as well, but it is not clear that they are being used. This is all part of a "layered defense" that deploys different interceptors depending on the threat. The missiles mentioned so far in numerous interception reports have been the SM-2 and the Sparrows.

According to the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance (as of 2022), the SM-2 costs $2.1 million per unit; the SM-6 costs $4.3 million; and the ESSM Sea Sparrows costs $1.7 million. The destroyers are also fitted with the Rolling Airframe missile, which cost $905,000 in 2022. One source suggested, however, not to assume the high end of the cost, adding that the U.S. Navy was likely cleaning out their old stocks and not using the latest versions of these interceptors.

The Pentagon spent $12.3 billion on its missile defense programs in 2022 and $24.7 billion on its missiles and munitions. There is a lot in the stockpile. Plus the countries called into the new task force will have their own capabilities. They include, according to Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, the United Kingdom, Bahrain, Canada, France, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Seychelles and Spain. Interestingly it does not include NATO ally Turkey, or Saudi Arabia (which of course is currently tied to a ceasefire in its own conflict with the Houthis in Yemen).

Maybe cost isn't the most urgent concern, then. Others who have spoken to RS said the threat of escalation — that the U.S. is close to engaging in an all-out war in the Red Sea at a time when its energy and resources are stretched in Ukraine and in sending Israel everything it asks for in the Gaza conflict — is key right now. Our Navy fleets — and U.S. troops/sailors in the region — are in harm's way, and it is important for the American people to assess if what happens next is truly in the national interest.The Houthis have said they will target the ships and U.S. Navy in the Red Sea until Israel stops its bombardment of Palestinians in Gaza. If this video is any indication, the new Operation Prosperity Guardian is going to have its hands full, and millions more dollars in U.S. missile interceptors will be expended before this situation is resolved.

Iran has told the United States that it will attack Israel directly unless the Biden administration secures a ceasefire in Gaza, according to an Arab diplomatic source who spoke with Jadeh Iran.
The ultimatum follows an Israeli attack on an Iranian diplomatic facility in Damascus last week. The source told Jadeh Iran that a ceasefire could also lead to progress on other aspects of the U.S.-Iran relationship. This comes following mediation by Oman between the U.S. and Iran.
The Iranian government has yet to confirm the news, and the Biden administration has flatly denied it. But if true, this reporting suggests a few important points.
First, it is clear that Iran wants to avoid a direct confrontation with Israel, but it cannot avoid it unless it secures a big win in the region. Tehran may suspect that a ceasefire is already in the offing, allowing it to use that as a pretext to both take credit for ending the war and avoid getting into a shootout with Israel.
But significant questions surround such an approach. We have heard for months that a ceasefire is close. Even if that is what the Iranians believe, setting this red line forces them to act if a ceasefire doesn't materialize. If they don't act on it, they will lose face twice: First, because Israel struck their consulate to begin with and, second, for having failed to move the U.S. even after threatening to strike Israel.
Second, this is very risky, but also rather clever. If the threat compels President Biden to finally put material pressure on Israel in order to avoid a regional war, Iran can take some credit for having saved the people of Gaza. If Biden dismisses the threat, Iran can point to not only a history of restraint vis-a-vis deadly Israeli strikes against Iranian targets in Syria and Lebanon, but also a willingness to hold its fire in return for Biden implementing a binding United Nations Security Council demand for a ceasefire, which also aligns with overwhelming global public opinion.
Third, this suggests that Iran may have figured out how to target Israel in a way that is proportionate and does not provide Israel with grounds for further escalation. Striking Israeli consulates or embassies in the region carries tremendous political risks. Striking the embassy in Baku, for instance, would unravel the very sensitive management of Iranian-Azeri relations in the midst of rising tensions in the Caucasus.
Attacking the embassy in Amman could unravel one of Iran's regional priorities: normalizing relations with Egypt and Jordan. Striking the Israeli embassy in Bahrain could unravel the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement. Striking Abu Dhabi would jeopardize the favorable and functioning modus vivendi Iran has with the UAE. And striking supposedly Israeli targets in Iraqi Kurdistan would be less than proportionate since those targets are not recognized as Israeli diplomatic premises.
Iran's options in the region are limited precisely because it has prioritized improving relations with its Arab neighbors. A more isolated Iran would have less to lose.
This may push Iran toward another option: a strike on Israel proper. This would, of course, be extremely risky, mainly because of the difficulty of calibrating a proportionate response (and impact) that doesn't provide Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with the chance to force Biden to go along with further escalation. Tehran's actions could compel Biden to repeat his disastrous "bearhug"of Israel.
In this scenario, Iran would likely strike with a barrage of ballistic missiles. But, given Tehran's lack of experience with Israel's air defenses, it would likely have to fire off a large number to ensure that some would evade Israeli interceptions. If too many get through, however, the response would end up being disproportionate and could give Netanyahu an excuse to start a regional war. If none of the missiles get through, Iran will have further undermined its own deterrence.
It remains unclear how Biden will react to this Iranian threat. Of course, the optics of acting under Iranian duress are unacceptable to him. But he could also press Netanyahu for a ceasefire due to Israel's many other unacceptable transgressions and claim that the Iranian dimension had no impact on him.
Alternatively, he could say that he acted to save Israel from a disastrous war that the country's highly unpopular prime minister was unwisely seeking to drag Israel and the U.S. into. Either way, the long list of strategic reasons why Biden must secure a ceasefire has just grown even longer — and that much more urgent.

The Biden administration is currently considering going where no other president has gone before: offering a formal security guarantee to Saudi Arabia and helping the kingdom develop a civilian nuclear program in return for Riyadh normalizing relations with Israel. President Biden and his team argue that the United States has a national security interest in brokering such a deal, even if that means massive and unprecedented concessions to Riyadh. Biden and his team are wrong. Entering into a mutual security agreement with Saudi Arabia would represent a catastrophic miscalculation. A security guarantee for Saudi Arabia would entrap Washington as Riyadh's protector despite a fundamental disconnect between the interests and values of the United States and the kingdom.Saudi Arabia seeks increased security commitments in return for formally normalizing relations with Israel, a country with which it is already strategically aligned. This is part of a deliberate strategy by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) to exploit growing fears in Washington that the United States is losing influence in the Middle East relative to other actors such as Russia or China. As the Wall Street Journal reported, "in private, Saudi officials said, the crown prince has said he expects that by playing major powers against each other, Saudi Arabia can eventually pressure Washington to concede to its demands for better access to U.S. weapons and nuclear technology."And yet, though Russia and China have expanded their respective footprints in the Middle East, neither Moscow nor Beijing can fill an American void in the Middle East, nor do they desire to. States within the region are aware of the limitations facing Russia and China. Saudi Arabia and other U.S. regional partners have cultivated Washington's anxiety about losing its position relative to Russia or China and are pressing for major policy concessions, resulting in a type of "reverse leverage." The pinnacle of this reverse leverage strategy is the peekaboo game MbS is playing with the United States over whether Saudi Arabia will join the so-called Abraham Accords. Since the introduction of the Accords in 2020 by President Donald Trump – which witnessed Israel formally normalize relations with Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), later expanded to also include Sudan and Morocco – U.S. and Israeli officials have been determined to add Saudi Arabia to the mix.The Abraham Accords have become the new "lodestar" of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Through these series of normalization deals, the United States hopes to create a more formal coalition through which it believes it can best advance its interests, namely by maintaining its regional influence amid Russian and Chinese "encroachment" while also allocating more attention to other global theaters such as Eastern Europe and the Pacific.However, regional actors are increasingly using the Accords as a mechanism to keep the United States entangled in the region as the continued guarantor of their security. The Arab states that joined the Abraham Accords were granted considerable policy concessions for doing so without any serious debate as to whether such tradeoffs served the interests of the United States. They interpret the Accords as a mechanism for maintaining the regional status quo – with more concrete and integrated U.S. security guarantees undergirding it. This is precisely the lens through which Riyadh views its possible entry into the Abraham Accords: as a way to pressure the United States into granting the kingdom sweeping concessions and guaranteeing Washington remains its ultimate protector over the long term. Washington's ongoing support for actors like Saudi Arabia has resulted in a vicious cycle: by committing itself to propping up the underlying sources of regional instability, the United States repeatedly finds itself having to confront challenges that are largely the product of its own presence, policies, and partners in the Middle East. Making things even more obscene, Washington may be deepening its commitment to these illiberal states at a time when it has become clear that the region hardly matters to U.S. national security. The United States must decide whether it will continue underwriting actors such as Saudi Arabia and the artificial status quo in the Middle East, or whether it will recognize the failures of its own policies and limit its involvement to a level commensurate with U.S. interests.

Israel's war on Gaza has significantly internationalized with its expansion into the Red Sea since November. This body of water, which is critical from the standpoint of global trade, is consequently becoming increasingly militarized.
Members of NATO have been divided in their responses to the Red Sea security crisis. Some states in the Transatlantic alliance have favored a more militaristic approach to dealing with Houthi missile and drone attacks against commercial and merchant vessels. But others have warned that such action only risks escalating tensions.Beginning on January 12, the U.S. and UK — with nonoperational support from Australia, Bahrain, Canada, and the Netherlands — began bombing dozens of Houthi targets in various parts of Yemen. Additional rounds of bombing followed, and Washington and London are continuing these strikes against Ansarallah. However, France, Italy, and Spain have notably refused to take part in those U.S.-led military operations while instead opting for a more diplomatic approach to the Red Sea security crisis. Turkey says 'no' to bombing the Houthis The NATO member most staunchly opposed to such Western military intervention against Ansarallah is Turkey. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan went as far as accusing Washington and London of "trying to turn the Red Sea into a sea of blood." Erdogan's remark should be at least partly understood within the context of Turkish domestic politics at a time in which much of the general public is angry about Israel's industrial slaughter in Gaza. Particularly in the Turkish social media sphere there is a "rising tendency to glorify the Houthi war against Israel," said Betul Dogan-Akkas, an assistant professor of international relations at Ankara University, in an interview with RS. She explained that there is a general lack of knowledge among the general Turkish public about the Houthis but also a shared belief that state and non-state actors should support Gaza, which many Turks perceive the Houthis to be doing.Dogan-Akkas added that Erdogan has been keen to criticize some of Turkey's traditional Western allies for not taking any action against Israel in response to its behavior in Gaza since October while using, what Ankara sees as, disproportionate force against the Houthis in response to their maritime attacks.Although Erdogan's statements are frequently intended for domestic consumption, Turkey's president and high-ranking officials in Ankara seem gravely concerned about U.S.-UK military action in the Red Sea worsening regional tensions that could risk bringing NATO into a much larger conflict."It is not [in] Ankara's interests for the crisis to escalate, and Turkey would not benefit from a collective effort to attack Houthi targets given Erdoğan's desire to remain equidistant from the sides of the conflict," Batu Coşkun, a political analyst who specializes in Turkish affairs at the Sadeq Institute, told RS. "These concerns are likely being brought up by Turkish officials in NATO meetings as well.""Turkey is not directly party to the growing hostilities in the Red Sea and has in essence adopted a position of active neutrality. The government was even quick to downplay an incident where Houthi linked pirates boarded and detained a Turkey bound vessel," he added.Turkey, as a maritime power with vested interests in Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, has high stakes in the outcome of the Red Sea security crisis and militarization. Turkey's economy has been paying a price for increased freight costs with large container ships rerouting to avoid the Red Sea altogether because the Houthi maritime attacks.
Trade between Turkey and Far East countries such as China, which is Turkey's number one supplier of goods, must now go around South Africa and through the Strait of Gibraltar instead of through the Bab al-Mandab. Also, India, Malaysia, and South Korea make the list of Turkey's top 20 import partners.Enter SomaliaLast month, Turkey and Somalia signed the Framework Agreement for Defence and Economic Cooperation, which is a 10-year pact that purportedly involves Ankara in developing, training, and equipping the Somali naval forces while establishing Turkey as the protector of Somalia's coastline and ultimate maritime security guarantor. Building on that agreement, Turkey and Somalia signed an inter-governmental energy cooperation deal on March 7, which will further boost bilateral relations and increase Turkey's role in the Horn of Africa.Ankara and Mogadishu's defense and economic cooperation will reach new heights with Ankara having "expansive and unlimited" control in Somalia, according to one Mogadishu-based analyst. From a regional standpoint, Turkey is set to step up its activities as an increasingly influential actor in the Gulf of Aden's security landscape, which, as Coşkun explained, means that "Turkish maritime assets will now be present in proximity to the escalating crisis in the Red Sea."As Red Sea security continues to suffer from the Gaza war's expansion, Ankara will probably continue pursuing policies aimed at sparing Turkey from becoming excessively entangled. Ankara's participation in Western-led initiatives aimed at "deterring" Ansarallah from more missile and drone strikes against ships is highly unlikely. Rather than aligning with Washington and London against the Houthis, Turkey will attempt to balance itself between the various actors in Yemen and the Red Sea while also positioning Ankara as a defender of the Palestinians in Gaza."Amid insecurity in the Red Sea, Ankara benefits from being an actor that all parties are seeking to engage with. Turkey remains tethered to the Transatlantic alliance by virtue of a unified security architecture. However, [Turkey] sits at a somewhat unique position where its regional relations remain equally significant," Coşkun told RS.