Suchergebnisse

Argues that although technology can occasionally favor military offense or defense, perceptions of relative ease of offense and defense have little effect on decisions to initiate war; based on case studies of emergence of railroads, development of artillery and small arms, innovation of the tank, and the nuclear revolution, 19th-20th centuries.

Ethics and Security: New Issues and Contexts for Decision Making -- Part 1: Freedom from Fear: Humanitarianism and Military Security -- Part 2: Security across Borders -- Part 3: Freedom from Want: Development, Gender, and Environment -- Part 4: Regional Security: Countries and Areas -- Conclusion: Moving Forward with Ethics and Security -- Questions for Discussion.

<i>The project aims at applying qualitative and quantitative methods to create a model of
the international balance of power in 2050. This allows to create more accurate forecasts
of future security environment development and its implications. For the purpose, the
authors use a computational model developed by Professor Mirosław Sulek, the Polish
pioneer of powermetrics research. Fundamentals of the interdisciplinary model can be
found in international relations theories, security studies methods, cybernetics and physics.
The authors are directly involved in developing this field of research and their intention is
to share initial results of their work.</i>

International anarchy and the security dilemma make cooperation among sovereign states difficult. Transformations of balance-of-power systems into concerts tend to occur after large antihegemonic wars. Such wars undermine the assumptions supporting a balance-ofpower system and alter the actors' payoffs in ways that encourage cooperation. The logic developed in "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma" holds: largely because of the increased costs that will be incurred if the grand coalition breaks up, states have greater incentives to cooperate with each other, fewer reasons to fear the consequences of others' defections, and fewer reasons to defect themselves. Cooperation is further facilitated by mechanisms that increase each state's ability to see what others are doing, and to gain "timely warning" of the possibility that the others will defect.