The article analyzes the problem of central bank independence a historical, theoretical, and practice terms. The independence of the arguments raised, disclosed in its essence, defines the limits of independence, the transparency of the operation in question. Accessible to the conclusion that the central bank should be independent from the government, while its activity in combination with the legislative and executive state institutions. The study examined the context of changes in European economic and monetary union within the independence dimension of the European System of Central Banks in format. Determined that under these conditions in some areas of the national central banks have independence, the other – the European Central Bank uses the services of national central banks, in addition to another – the European Central Bank is fully independent.
The article analyzes the problem of central bank independence a historical, theoretical, and practice terms. The independence of the arguments raised, disclosed in its essence, defines the limits of independence, the transparency of the operation in question. Accessible to the conclusion that the central bank should be independent from the government, while its activity in combination with the legislative and executive state institutions. The study examined the context of changes in European economic and monetary union within the independence dimension of the European System of Central Banks in format. Determined that under these conditions in some areas of the national central banks have independence, the other – the European Central Bank uses the services of national central banks, in addition to another – the European Central Bank is fully independent.
The article analyzes the problem of central bank independence a historical, theoretical, and practice terms. The independence of the arguments raised, disclosed in its essence, defines the limits of independence, the transparency of the operation in question. Accessible to the conclusion that the central bank should be independent from the government, while its activity in combination with the legislative and executive state institutions. The study examined the context of changes in European economic and monetary union within the independence dimension of the European System of Central Banks in format. Determined that under these conditions in some areas of the national central banks have independence, the other – the European Central Bank uses the services of national central banks, in addition to another – the European Central Bank is fully independent.
The article analyzes the problem of central bank independence a historical, theoretical, and practice terms. The independence of the arguments raised, disclosed in its essence, defines the limits of independence, the transparency of the operation in question. Accessible to the conclusion that the central bank should be independent from the government, while its activity in combination with the legislative and executive state institutions. The study examined the context of changes in European economic and monetary union within the independence dimension of the European System of Central Banks in format. Determined that under these conditions in some areas of the national central banks have independence, the other – the European Central Bank uses the services of national central banks, in addition to another – the European Central Bank is fully independent.
The study aims to explain why European banks had different positions towards establishing the EU banking union. Most of the academic publications dedicated to analyze the very recently implemented EU financial sector reforms give particular attention to explaining why different EU member states opposed the creation of a full banking union as it was proposed by the European Commission while there is a lack of academic discussions raising the question of how to explain that European banks also had different positions towards the implementation of single supervisory and resolution mechanisms. The research poses the question of how to explain different banks' positions towards the creation of the EU banking union. While some international banks were strongly promoting the new supranational supervisory and resolution mechanisms which would be applied to the whole EU banking sector the others voiced strong opposition to the points of governance and application scope of proposed EU banking sector reforms. The overall aim of the study is to give the possible explanation of why different banks had different positions towards shaping the EU banking union. The study is based on the hypothesis that highly internationalized banks preferred greater European regulatory harmonization in the banking supervision and resolution (creating single supervisory and resolution mechanisms which would include all euro zone banks, supranational governance of banking resolution and high degree of risk sharing) while low internationalized banks preferred more the national regulatory autonomy. The research is based on the theoretical framework suggested by A. Spendzharova. The author argues that the level of bank internationalisation is an important determinant of the extent to which governments were prepared to endorse European solutions in banking supervision and resolution or prefer the national regulation. The proposed framework of the analysis has been applied to analyse countries' positions but it has not been applied to explain banks' preferences on the proposed elements of the EU banking union. The conducted analysis revealed that the internationalisation level alone cannot fully explain the positions of the banks on the creation of the EU banking union. The analysis of 20 biggest European banks varying from global to local banks revealed that despite being internationalized differently the majority of the banks supported the creation of the common supervisory and resolution mechanisms which would be applied to all euro zone banks. Even banks having a low internationalisation level supported the creation of the proposed EU banking union and vice versa. It can be also noted, that the majority of the banks voiced the support for the supranational governance of the single resolution mechanism but opposed the high degree of risk sharing – the creation of the ex ante resolution fund.
The study aims to explain why European banks had different positions towards establishing the EU banking union. Most of the academic publications dedicated to analyze the very recently implemented EU financial sector reforms give particular attention to explaining why different EU member states opposed the creation of a full banking union as it was proposed by the European Commission while there is a lack of academic discussions raising the question of how to explain that European banks also had different positions towards the implementation of single supervisory and resolution mechanisms. The research poses the question of how to explain different banks' positions towards the creation of the EU banking union. While some international banks were strongly promoting the new supranational supervisory and resolution mechanisms which would be applied to the whole EU banking sector the others voiced strong opposition to the points of governance and application scope of proposed EU banking sector reforms. The overall aim of the study is to give the possible explanation of why different banks had different positions towards shaping the EU banking union. The study is based on the hypothesis that highly internationalized banks preferred greater European regulatory harmonization in the banking supervision and resolution (creating single supervisory and resolution mechanisms which would include all euro zone banks, supranational governance of banking resolution and high degree of risk sharing) while low internationalized banks preferred more the national regulatory autonomy. The research is based on the theoretical framework suggested by A. Spendzharova. The author argues that the level of bank internationalisation is an important determinant of the extent to which governments were prepared to endorse European solutions in banking supervision and resolution or prefer the national regulation. The proposed framework of the analysis has been applied to analyse countries' positions but it has not been applied to explain banks' preferences on the proposed elements of the EU banking union. The conducted analysis revealed that the internationalisation level alone cannot fully explain the positions of the banks on the creation of the EU banking union. The analysis of 20 biggest European banks varying from global to local banks revealed that despite being internationalized differently the majority of the banks supported the creation of the common supervisory and resolution mechanisms which would be applied to all euro zone banks. Even banks having a low internationalisation level supported the creation of the proposed EU banking union and vice versa. It can be also noted, that the majority of the banks voiced the support for the supranational governance of the single resolution mechanism but opposed the high degree of risk sharing – the creation of the ex ante resolution fund.
The study aims to explain why European banks had different positions towards establishing the EU banking union. Most of the academic publications dedicated to analyze the very recently implemented EU financial sector reforms give particular attention to explaining why different EU member states opposed the creation of a full banking union as it was proposed by the European Commission while there is a lack of academic discussions raising the question of how to explain that European banks also had different positions towards the implementation of single supervisory and resolution mechanisms. The research poses the question of how to explain different banks' positions towards the creation of the EU banking union. While some international banks were strongly promoting the new supranational supervisory and resolution mechanisms which would be applied to the whole EU banking sector the others voiced strong opposition to the points of governance and application scope of proposed EU banking sector reforms. The overall aim of the study is to give the possible explanation of why different banks had different positions towards shaping the EU banking union. The study is based on the hypothesis that highly internationalized banks preferred greater European regulatory harmonization in the banking supervision and resolution (creating single supervisory and resolution mechanisms which would include all euro zone banks, supranational governance of banking resolution and high degree of risk sharing) while low internationalized banks preferred more the national regulatory autonomy. The research is based on the theoretical framework suggested by A. Spendzharova. The author argues that the level of bank internationalisation is an important determinant of the extent to which governments were prepared to endorse European solutions in banking supervision and resolution or prefer the national regulation. The proposed framework of the analysis has been applied to analyse countries' positions but it has not been applied to explain banks' preferences on the proposed elements of the EU banking union. The conducted analysis revealed that the internationalisation level alone cannot fully explain the positions of the banks on the creation of the EU banking union. The analysis of 20 biggest European banks varying from global to local banks revealed that despite being internationalized differently the majority of the banks supported the creation of the common supervisory and resolution mechanisms which would be applied to all euro zone banks. Even banks having a low internationalisation level supported the creation of the proposed EU banking union and vice versa. It can be also noted, that the majority of the banks voiced the support for the supranational governance of the single resolution mechanism but opposed the high degree of risk sharing – the creation of the ex ante resolution fund.
The study aims to explain why European banks had different positions towards establishing the EU banking union. Most of the academic publications dedicated to analyze the very recently implemented EU financial sector reforms give particular attention to explaining why different EU member states opposed the creation of a full banking union as it was proposed by the European Commission while there is a lack of academic discussions raising the question of how to explain that European banks also had different positions towards the implementation of single supervisory and resolution mechanisms. The research poses the question of how to explain different banks' positions towards the creation of the EU banking union. While some international banks were strongly promoting the new supranational supervisory and resolution mechanisms which would be applied to the whole EU banking sector the others voiced strong opposition to the points of governance and application scope of proposed EU banking sector reforms. The overall aim of the study is to give the possible explanation of why different banks had different positions towards shaping the EU banking union. The study is based on the hypothesis that highly internationalized banks preferred greater European regulatory harmonization in the banking supervision and resolution (creating single supervisory and resolution mechanisms which would include all euro zone banks, supranational governance of banking resolution and high degree of risk sharing) while low internationalized banks preferred more the national regulatory autonomy. The research is based on the theoretical framework suggested by A. Spendzharova. The author argues that the level of bank internationalisation is an important determinant of the extent to which governments were prepared to endorse European solutions in banking supervision and resolution or prefer the national regulation. The proposed framework of the analysis has been applied to analyse countries' positions but it has not been applied to explain banks' preferences on the proposed elements of the EU banking union. The conducted analysis revealed that the internationalisation level alone cannot fully explain the positions of the banks on the creation of the EU banking union. The analysis of 20 biggest European banks varying from global to local banks revealed that despite being internationalized differently the majority of the banks supported the creation of the common supervisory and resolution mechanisms which would be applied to all euro zone banks. Even banks having a low internationalisation level supported the creation of the proposed EU banking union and vice versa. It can be also noted, that the majority of the banks voiced the support for the supranational governance of the single resolution mechanism but opposed the high degree of risk sharing – the creation of the ex ante resolution fund.
This article deals with the property tax reform that was carried out in Lithuania as well as in other Eastern and Central European countries since the 1990s. Since the beginning of the 1990s most countries of this region have reshaped their national systems from command to free market economy, created a stabile market and some of them joined the European Union. Most of the new EU Member States from Eastern and Central Europe have taken much effort to make their national taxation more consistent and attractive for investors. In particular, these countries have already diminished or consider diminishing the rates of corporate, income and some other taxes. On the other hand, the decreased revenue should be collected from other sources. In this context, property taxes are supposed to be a proper alternative to reimburse the loss of revenue. Furthermore, property taxes are also appreciated due to their nonfiscal functions (e.g.role of property taxation for sustainable urbanisation, effective use of land, land improvement). Major economic and legal reforms in Eastern and Central European countries since the 1990s as well as their implication to the reform of property taxation are observed in this article. The author elucidates privatization, restitution (reestablishment of property rights), reforms of national tax systems, local governance, etc. It is concluded that not all the anticipated reforms have been carried out as quickly as they were planned. The protracted reform of modernisation of property taxes was partly stipulated by undeveloped real estate markets, lack of relevant data, delayed reestablishment of property rights as well as some other objective factors. On the other hand, the politicians were afraid to loose political support if they increase a tax burden. Moreover, lack of consistent national strategies on local taxes and local governance has contributed to successful finalization of property taxation.
This article deals with the property tax reform that was carried out in Lithuania as well as in other Eastern and Central European countries since the 1990s. Since the beginning of the 1990s most countries of this region have reshaped their national systems from command to free market economy, created a stabile market and some of them joined the European Union. Most of the new EU Member States from Eastern and Central Europe have taken much effort to make their national taxation more consistent and attractive for investors. In particular, these countries have already diminished or consider diminishing the rates of corporate, income and some other taxes. On the other hand, the decreased revenue should be collected from other sources. In this context, property taxes are supposed to be a proper alternative to reimburse the loss of revenue. Furthermore, property taxes are also appreciated due to their nonfiscal functions (e.g.role of property taxation for sustainable urbanisation, effective use of land, land improvement). Major economic and legal reforms in Eastern and Central European countries since the 1990s as well as their implication to the reform of property taxation are observed in this article. The author elucidates privatization, restitution (reestablishment of property rights), reforms of national tax systems, local governance, etc. It is concluded that not all the anticipated reforms have been carried out as quickly as they were planned. The protracted reform of modernisation of property taxes was partly stipulated by undeveloped real estate markets, lack of relevant data, delayed reestablishment of property rights as well as some other objective factors. On the other hand, the politicians were afraid to loose political support if they increase a tax burden. Moreover, lack of consistent national strategies on local taxes and local governance has contributed to successful finalization of property taxation.
Water security of is a emerging paradigm, is also increasingly used both in political theory and practice. Water security is connected with all other security sectores. Central Asia water security is connected with ecological, economic and energy security. Since the end of the Cold War in IR literature was the predicted water wars in XXIst century. In this master's thesis used scientifical research information shows, that the extreme of water wars, or the extreme of water peace are only theoretical. Even if water security is an issue of existential importance, particularly in transboundary waters case and hydropolitical security complexes. Central Asian water security forms the region state's international relations. Constructivist theory explains that water security is what particular country sees it. Central Asia hydropolitical relations are dynamic, so the concept of water security. New theoretical research matrix for transboundary waters TWINS and its application to Central Asia shows, that water here is securitized. Securitized transboundary waters can deepen conflict and cooperation. Hydropolitical security complex can be researched trough various international relations theories, in case of Central Asia analysing balance of power and rise of hydrohegemony. Hydrohegemony power is based on four pillars: the geographical, material, bargaining and ideational powers. Central Asia countries are competing for hydrohegemony positions. After World Bank support for CASA-1000 and Rogun Dam projects, negotiating, geographical, ideological powers are accumulated in the upper reaches of Central Asian transboundary waters. Tajikistan can become a hydrohegemony with support from third countries and international organizations.
Water security of is a emerging paradigm, is also increasingly used both in political theory and practice. Water security is connected with all other security sectores. Central Asia water security is connected with ecological, economic and energy security. Since the end of the Cold War in IR literature was the predicted water wars in XXIst century. In this master's thesis used scientifical research information shows, that the extreme of water wars, or the extreme of water peace are only theoretical. Even if water security is an issue of existential importance, particularly in transboundary waters case and hydropolitical security complexes. Central Asian water security forms the region state's international relations. Constructivist theory explains that water security is what particular country sees it. Central Asia hydropolitical relations are dynamic, so the concept of water security. New theoretical research matrix for transboundary waters TWINS and its application to Central Asia shows, that water here is securitized. Securitized transboundary waters can deepen conflict and cooperation. Hydropolitical security complex can be researched trough various international relations theories, in case of Central Asia analysing balance of power and rise of hydrohegemony. Hydrohegemony power is based on four pillars: the geographical, material, bargaining and ideational powers. Central Asia countries are competing for hydrohegemony positions. After World Bank support for CASA-1000 and Rogun Dam projects, negotiating, geographical, ideological powers are accumulated in the upper reaches of Central Asian transboundary waters. Tajikistan can become a hydrohegemony with support from third countries and international organizations.
The doctoral dissertation analyses the recent overhaul of the EU banking policy framework in 2012–2016 with the aim of answering two interrelated questions. First, why did the euro area member states decide to surrender national control over their banking systems by creating a banking union despite the fact that similar proposals had been constantly rejected in the past? Second, what accounts for the content of the established banking union? The research argues that the European sovereign debt crisis and, more specifically, its Spanish episode in the first half of 2012 were a necessary but insufficient condition for the European leaders' historic decision. Building on a deterministic interpretation of punctuated equilibrium theory, the author explains the creation of the banking union by three intervening factors: interdependence of the euro area member states that led to changes in the EU banking policy image held by the governments of the largest euro area states, and the politicisation of the related banking policy-making venue. Having showed that the content of the final agreements corresponded to the identified 'preventive' banking union type, the author argues that it can be best explained by the interaction of preference intensity of member states and political legitimacy of their national positions. Accordingly, the research explains the content of the banking union by the exposure of German banks' to the most stressed Southern euro area member states at the start of negotiations and the German government's 'rhetorical entrapment' at later stages. It is also argued that the entire EU bargaining process was facilitated by 'constructive ambiguity' related to the finality of the banking union.
The doctoral dissertation analyses the recent overhaul of the EU banking policy framework in 2012–2016 with the aim of answering two interrelated questions. First, why did the euro area member states decide to surrender national control over their banking systems by creating a banking union despite the fact that similar proposals had been constantly rejected in the past? Second, what accounts for the content of the established banking union? The research argues that the European sovereign debt crisis and, more specifically, its Spanish episode in the first half of 2012 were a necessary but insufficient condition for the European leaders' historic decision. Building on a deterministic interpretation of punctuated equilibrium theory, the author explains the creation of the banking union by three intervening factors: interdependence of the euro area member states that led to changes in the EU banking policy image held by the governments of the largest euro area states, and the politicisation of the related banking policy-making venue. Having showed that the content of the final agreements corresponded to the identified 'preventive' banking union type, the author argues that it can be best explained by the interaction of preference intensity of member states and political legitimacy of their national positions. Accordingly, the research explains the content of the banking union by the exposure of German banks' to the most stressed Southern euro area member states at the start of negotiations and the German government's 'rhetorical entrapment' at later stages. It is also argued that the entire EU bargaining process was facilitated by 'constructive ambiguity' related to the finality of the banking union.
The doctoral dissertation analyses the recent overhaul of the EU banking policy framework in 2012–2016 with the aim of answering two interrelated questions. First, why did the euro area member states decide to surrender national control over their banking systems by creating a banking union despite the fact that similar proposals had been constantly rejected in the past? Second, what accounts for the content of the established banking union? The research argues that the European sovereign debt crisis and, more specifically, its Spanish episode in the first half of 2012 were a necessary but insufficient condition for the European leaders' historic decision. Building on a deterministic interpretation of punctuated equilibrium theory, the author explains the creation of the banking union by three intervening factors: interdependence of the euro area member states that led to changes in the EU banking policy image held by the governments of the largest euro area states, and the politicisation of the related banking policy-making venue. Having showed that the content of the final agreements corresponded to the identified 'preventive' banking union type, the author argues that it can be best explained by the interaction of preference intensity of member states and political legitimacy of their national positions. Accordingly, the research explains the content of the banking union by the exposure of German banks' to the most stressed Southern euro area member states at the start of negotiations and the German government's 'rhetorical entrapment' at later stages. It is also argued that the entire EU bargaining process was facilitated by 'constructive ambiguity' related to the finality of the banking union.
