In the face of the worldwide trend of granting a greater degree of autonomy to central banks, the compatibility of this scheme with a democratic society has been questioned. In this article, Miguel Urrutia concludes that the independence of the central banks removes the temptation to manage such a powerful instrument as monetary policy in a populist form, and that, on the contrary, it democratizes their oversight, as it subjects them to the surveillance of parliaments, the academy, local and international financial markets, and public opinion. ; Ante la tendencia mundial de otogar un alto grado de autonomía a los bancos centrales, se ha cuestionado la compatibilidad de este esquema con una sociedad democrática. En este trabajo Miguel Urrutia concluye que la independencia de los bancos centrales aleja a la tentación de manejar en forma populista un instrumento tan poderoso como la política monetaria y que, por el contrario, democratiza su contol, pues la somete a la vigilancia de los parlamentos, la academia, los mercados financieros locales e internacionales y la opinión pública.
La institucionalidad de los bancos centrales independientes se ha convertido en uno de los dogmas económicos modernos. Prácticamente, solo se le reconoce al banco central su capacidad para controlar la estabilidad de precios, es decir la inflación. Esta estabilidad es de suma importancia, pues de ella depende la economía para la asignación óptima de los recursos, de la inversión y por lo tanto el crecimiento. Un ambiente inflacionario perturba los mercados y la capacidad de los agentes tomar decisiones correctas. La política monetaria es una materia de alta técnica, que solo puede ser conducida por expertos altamente calificados. Por esta razón, la política monetaria no puede ser dejada en manos de políticos, que toman decisiones no sobre la lógica de Ja técnica monetaria sino sobre las conveniencias políticas que aseguren su continuidad en el poder./ Abstract.The institutionalization of independent central banks has become one of the modern economic dogmas. Practically, it is recognized only to the central bank's ability to control price stability, ie inflation. This stability is of paramount importance, since it depends on the economy to the optimal allocation of resources, investment and hence growth. An inflationary environment disrupts markets and the ability of agents to take right decisions. Monetary policy is a matter of high technique, which can only be conducted by highly qualified experts. For this reason, monetary policy can not be left to politicians who make decisions not on logic but on monetary technique Ja political expediency to ensure their continuity in power
The European Central Bank (ECB) has received a lot of criticism for its too little, too late performance to ease market pressures during the economic crisis. At the same time, the ECB and the Federal Reserve (FED) have managed the new economic realities that have emerged in the international context differently. Despite the criticisms, the European Central Bank is the European Union institution that has assumed more control due to the new model of economic governance of the EU. Why did the Federal Reserve act so nimbly and quickly to calm the markets, while the ECB was so cautious in managing monetary policy? The aim of this paper is to perform a comparative analysis of the management of interest rates and other monetary policy measures undertaken by the Central Bank and the Federal Reserve during the economic crisis, as well as to understand the changes in the context of the ECB and the emergence of its authority within the European Union's economic governance model since 2011. Thus, in order to carry out a scrupulous exposition, we will also limit the time frame of this study to the 2007-2014 period.
Political economists have traditionally been indifferent to the communicative construction of money and central banking in the public sphere. It does not matter to them whether monetary affairs are rendered as a rational game over the preservation of the
Abstract: This paper presents a small open economy model to analyze the role of central bank liquidity management in implementing "unconventional" monetary policies within an inflation targeting framework. In particular, the paper explicitly models the facilities that the central bank uses to manage liquidity in the economy, which creates a role for the central bank balance sheet in equilibrium. This permits the analysis of two "unconventional" policies: sterilized exchange-rate interventions and expanding the list of eligible collaterals accepted at the liquidity facilities operated by the central bank. These policies have been recently implemented by several central banks: the former as a way to counteract persistent appreciations in the domestic currency, and the latter as a response to the recent global financial crisis in 2008. As a case study, the paper provides a detailed account of the Chilean experience with these alternative tools, as well as a quantitative evaluation of the effects of some of these policies
The purpose of this paper is to analize the links between central bank independence and foreign exchange policies, in the light of the recent experience of the major Latin American countries. To that end, the paper stars with a brief review of the literature on the subject. The second section on the paper deals with the different structures or models of central bank and foreign exchange management adopted in Latin America. The third and central part sets up an analytical model which describes the objective function of the authority and derives the expected inflation path for each type of Latin- American central bank model. The paper ends with a section of monetary games illustrating the conflicts that arise between the Government and an independent central bank, when the monetary and foreign exchange policies are not controlled by the same authority.
Un tema que ha sido ampliamente debatido en la literatura económica es el relacionado con la independencia del Banco Central. Se cree que un Banco Central, política y económicamente independiente, favorece las tasas de inflación relativamente bajas y estables. El artículo analiza el procedimiento que debería aplicarse para medir el grado de autonomía, legal y efectiva, del Banco de la República (Banco Central de Colombia), así como sus efectos sobre el ciclo político según la metodología adoptada por Alex CUKIERMAN (2006) ; One issue that has been widely debated in economic literature is related to the independence of the Central Bank. It is believed that a central bank, politically and economically independent, favors inflation rates relatively low and stable. In the present investigation is the procedure to be applied to measure the degree of autonomy, legal and effective, the Bank of the Republic (Central Bank of Colombia) and its effects on the political cycle according to the methodology adopted by Alex CUKIERMAN (2006)
Tradicionalmente, los economistas políticos han sido indiferentes a laconstrucción comunicativa del dinero y la banca central en la esferapública. Esta no les importa cuando los asuntos monetarios se conviertenen un juego racional encaminado a preservar el valor de la monedao toman la forma de un juego de moral medieval. Este artículo sugiereque la economía política de la independencia del banco central exigealejarse de dicha práctica. Argumenta que la coordinación comunicativadel juego monetario es esencial para saber de qué manera los bancoscentrales independientes pueden lograr la efi ciencia institucional ypor qué no enfrentan un trade-off entre efi ciencia institucional ylegitimidad democrática. Sugiere, en particular, que un banco centralinstitucionalmente efi ciente no puede actuar más que como un agentede empoderamiento comunicativo para la audiencia proporcionándole elcontexto local para sus actividades. ; Tradicionalmente, los economistas políticos han sido indiferentes a la construcción comunicativa del dinero y la banca central en la esfera pública. Esta no les importa cuando los asuntos monetarios se convierten en un juego racional encaminado a preservar el valor de la moneda o toman la forma de un juego de moral medieval. Este artículo sugiere que la economía política de la independencia del banco central exige alejarse de dicha práctica. Argumenta que la coordinación comunicativa del juego monetario es esencial para saber de qué manera los bancos centrales independientes pueden lograr la efi ciencia institucional y por qué no enfrentan un trade-off entre efi ciencia institucional y legitimidad democrática. Sugiere, en particular, que un banco central institucionalmente efi ciente no puede actuar más que como un agente de empoderamiento comunicativo para la audiencia proporcionándole el contexto local para sus actividades.
We'll see different aspects of the history of Central Bank and its international evolution. Later we will outline broadly the normative history of the Central Bank of Chile and its current normative configuration. After that, we will try to analyze legal basis of Central Bank, considering history and practice of this bank. Furthermore, we will critically analyze the discussion of its institutional design, especially its independence, as an administrative agency to show that it has set aside some topics like the analysis of its internal functioning and several important aspects of the Bank, especially as a limiting institution and its role in the political achievement of its objectives. Finally, we will conclude with some challenges to analyze ; Nos adentramos en la historia de banco Central, para ver su evolución a nivel internacional. Luego esquematizaremos en términos generales la historia normativa del Banco Central de Chile y su configuración normativa actual. Con esto, intentaremos analizar el fundamento jurídico del Banco central, considerado la historia y práctica del Banco. Además, analizaremos críticamente la discusión de su diseño institucional, en especial su autonomía, como agencia administrativa para mostrar que esta ha dejado de lado el análisis de su funcionamiento interno y varios aspectos importantes del Banco, en especial como órgano limitador y su papel en la consecución política de sus objetivos. Por último, concluiremos con algunos desafíos que deja el análisis.
From the signature of the constitution of 1991, the Colombian Bank of the Republic is constituted as legal person of public law which must watch for the maintenance of the acquisitive capacity of the currencyii. This implies that the monetary politics will produce under the criterion of ranges in the goals of inflation. But at the end of 2006 and beginning of 2007, the external agents who perceive the signs of the Central Banking, formulated the following question: the interventions of the central banking seem to be appearing towards a change of aim, or will they be systematic mistakes that are given to the interior of the decisions of the bank? And latter originated, for the contradictory effects that these cause to the national economy. This is the question that will try to be solved along this document, analyzing the impact of the implementation of these policies inside the economy, during different periods of time, which represent different conjunctures and presenting opinions derived from experts in the topic. ; Desde la firma de la Constitución de 1991, el Banco de la República colombiano se constituye como persona jurídica de derecho público que debe velar por el mantenimiento de la capacidad adquisitiva de la monedai . Esto implica, que la política monetaria operará bajo el criterio de rangos en las metas de inflación. Pero a finales del 2006 y principios del 2007, los agentes externos que perciben las señales de la Banca Central, se formulan la siguiente pregunta: ¿Las intervenciones de la Banca Central parecen estar apuntando hacia un cambio de objetivo, o serán errores sistemáticos los que se están dando al interior de las decisiones del banco?, originada esta última, por los efectos contradictorios que estas causan a la economía nacional. Esta es la pregunta que se buscará resolver a lo largo de este documento, analizando el impacto de la implementación de estas políticas dentro de la economía, durante diferentes periodos de tiempo, que representan coyunturas diferentes y presentando opiniones derivadas de expertos en el tema. ; Desde a assinatura da constituição de 1991, o Banco da República Colombiano é constituído como pessoa jurídica de direito público que deve velar pela manutenção da capacidade aquisitiva da moedaiii. Isto implica que a política monetária operará sob o critério de categorias nas metas de inflação. Mas ao final de 2006 e princípio de 2007, os agentes externos que percebem os sinais da Banca Central, formulam a seguinte pergunta: As intervenções da banca central parecem estar apontando para uma mudança de objetivo, ou serão erros sistemáticos os que estão dando no interior das decisões do banco?, originada esta última, pelos efeitos contraditórios que estas causam à economia nacional. Esta é a pergunta que se tentará resolver no decorrer deste documento, analisando o impacto da implantação destas políticas dentro da economia, durante diferentes períodos de tempo, que representam conjunturas diferentes e apresentando opiniões derivadas de expertos no tema.
