Includes bibliographies. ; [v. 1] Statutes and related materials selected and annotated by Hans Aufricht. Pref. by Per Jacobsson. -- v. 2. Europe; statutes and related materials selected and annotated by Hans Aufricht with the assistance of Jane B. Evensen. Pref. by Pierre-Paul Schweitzer. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; conv lwr.
We analyze the effect of central bank transparency on cross-border bank activities. Based on a panel gravity model for cross-border bank claims for 21 home and 47 destination countries from 1998 to 2010, we find strong empirical evidence that a rise in central bank transparency in the destination country, on average, increases cross-border claims. Using interaction models, we find that the positive effect of central bank transparency on cross-border claims is only significant if the central bank is politically independent. Central bank transparency and credibility are thus considered complements by banks investing abroad.
We analyze the effect of central bank transparency on cross-border bank activities. Based on a panel gravity model for cross-border bank claims for 21 home and 47 destination countries from 1998 to 2010, we find strong empirical evidence that central bank transparency in the destination country on average increases cross-border claims. Using interaction models, we find that the positive effect of central bank transparency on cross-border claims is only significant if the central bank is politically independent. Central bank transparency and credibility are thus considered as complements by banks investing abroad.
Many countries have implemented reforms on their Central Banks granting them more independence from political influences. This can be attributed to the recent research in this area which showed that making the Central Banks more independent is a very good means of achieving lower inflation/price stability in a country. Empirical work supporting this theory shows that there is a significant relationship between inflation and Central Bank Independence but not necessary enough to really bring down inflationary problems. Using data for 6 countries over the period of 1997-2011, result supports this theory but it also shows that other control variable needs to be added for better explanation, and also CBI should be part of policies and strategies to help fight and control inflation in these countries and not necessary the only solution as other policies need to be adopted by their Government and Central Banks. Keywords: Central Bank Independence, Inflation, Budget Surplus ; ÖZ : Birçok ülkede, Merkez Bankalarını politik baskılardan daha bağımsız hale getirme yolunda reformlar yapılmıştır. Bu reformların sebebi, bu alanda yapılan çalışmaların merkez bankalarının bağımsız hale getirilmelerinin enflasyon/ fıyat istikrarında olumlu katkısının olduğunu göstermesidir. Bu alandaki empirik çalışmalar enflasyon ile Merkez Bankası bağımsızlığı arasında istatiksel olarak önemli bir ilişki olduğunu göstermektedir. Yine de bu ilişki enflasyon sorununu tamamen çözecek büyüklükte olmayabillir. Bu çalışmada da 6 ülkededen 1997 ile 2011 yılları arasındaki veriler kullanılmış, ve panel veri çalışması sonucunda enflasyon ile Merkez Bankası bağımsızlığı arasında ters bir ilişki olduğu gözlemlenmiştir. Anahtar Kelimeler: Merkez Bankası Bağımsızlığı, Enflasyon, Bütçe Açığı/ Fazlalığı, Para Arzı ; Master of Science in Economics. Thesis (M.S.)--Eastern Mediterranean University, Faculty of Business and Economics, Dept. of Economics, 2015. Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Çağay Coşkuner.
In: Ozili, P.K. (2024). Artificial intelligence in central banking: benefits and risks of AI for central banks. In Industrial Applications of Big Data, AI, and Blockchain. IGI Global.