Suchergebnisse

This study focuses on the complex relationship between the government and central banks in Britain and France.

Andreas Steiner assesses the relationships between global imbalances, financial crises, and central bank policies, with a specific focus on their reserves. His combination of a strictly international perspective with an analysis based on empirical research enables him to develop an analytical model that emphasizes interactions among individual central banks. With this innovative approach Steiner develops a new method for defining an optimal demand for reserves. By means of its framework through which issues of global disequilibria can be addressed, Global Imbalances, Financial Crises, and Central Bank Policies describes implications for financial reforms that might ultimately be more important than its empirical findings

In recent years central bankers have placed new emphasis on communication with financial markets and the general public. They have done this not only through the traditional channel of monetary policy pronouncements but also by increasing the quantity of information they make public. Yet as central banks strive to provide more and clearer information about the outlook for the economy, they must balance their capacity to steer economic expectations with their natural caution about committing to future monetary policy paths. This volume offers a variety of perspectives on the economic implications of increased central bank communication. - Contributors offer theoretical analyses of the effect of central bank communication on the general macroeconomic environment; consider a variety of novel empirical approaches to the issue; and analyze communication, decision making, and governance practices of the Greenspan-era U.S. Federal Reserve, the fledgling European Central Bank, and a variety of smaller central banks, including those of the Czech Republic, Sweden, England, and New Zealand.

"The Japanese economy, once the envy of the world for its dynamism and growth, lost its shine after a financial bubble burst in early 1990s and slumped further during the Global Financial Crisis in 2008. It suffered even more damage in 2011, when a severe earthquake set off the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. However, the Bank of Japan soldiered on to combat low inflation, low growth, and low interest rates, and in many ways it served as a laboratory for actions taken by central banks in other parts of the world. Masaaki Shirakawa, who led the bank as governor from 2008 to 2013, provides a rare insider's account of the workings of Japanese economic and monetary policy during this period and how it challenged mainstream economic thinking"--Publisher.

"This book comprises the papers presented and discussed at the SAA conference, held 24-25 November 2008. It offers an exchange of views on technical and implemental issues of financial models relevant for strategic asset allocation"--Provided by publisher

There is little doubt that the Bank of Canada and Canadian monetary policy have been subjected to more public criticism since 1954 than at any other time since the Bank began operations in 1935. The force and the persistence of the criticism may in part be explained by a coincidence of events which included a move toward severe monetary restraint, a change of governor at the Bank of Canada, two national elections, and a change in government. Public criticism has for the most part concerned itself with the degree of monetary restraint or monetary ease in the economy generally and in specific sectors, with the timing of changes in policy and with the appropriateness of policy in the light of economic conditions. This paper will let those matters rest. Rather it will try to determine whether in a more fundamental sense the Bank's operations are in some respects open to criticism.There would appear to be four important aspects to the Bank of Canada's approach to central banking: the Bank's interpretation of its role in the allocation of capital; its conception of the mechanism by which monetary policy becomes effective and of the bounds within which monetary management must operate; its method of making quantitative monetary controls more effective; and its emphasis on the use of moral suasion. The third section will include an examination of the new Bank Rate.

Contents: Introduction / Gerald Epstein -- Part I. Finance, macroeconomic policy and central banking: from Volcker to Trump -- 1. 'Domestic stagflation and monetary policy: The Federal Reserve and the hidden election' / in Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers (eds), the hidden election: Politics and economics in the 1980 presidential campaign, New York, NY, USA: Pantheon Books, 1981, 141-95 -- 2. 'Federal Reserve behavior and the limits of monetary policy in the current economic crisis' / in Robert Cherry, Christine d'Onofrio, Cigdem Kurdas, Thomas R. Michl, Fred Moseley and Michele I. Naples (eds), The imperiled economy: Book I: Macroeconomics from a left perspective, chapter 23, New York, NY, USA: The union for radical political economics, 1987, 247-55, references -- 3. 'Trumponomics: Should we just say "no"?', challenge, 60 (2) 2017, 104-21 -- Part II. Capitalists, workers and Wall Street: The fight for the Federal Reserve -- 4. 'Federal Reserve politics and monetary instability' / in Alan Stone and Edward J. Harpham (eds), The political economy of public policy, chapter 9, Beverly Hills, CA, USA: Sage Publications, 1982, 211-40 -- 5. 'The Federal Reserve-treasury accord and the construction of the postwar monetary regime in the United States' / with Juliet B. Schor, social concept, 7 (1), July, 1995, 7-48 -- 6. 'monetary policy, loan liquidation, and industrial conflict: The Federal Reserve and the open market operations of 1932' / with Thomas Ferguson, Journal of economic history, xliv (4), December, 1984, 957-83 -- 7. 'Corporate profitability as a determinant of restrictive monetary policy: Estimates for the postwar United States' / with Juliet B. Schor, in Thomas Mayer (ed.), The political economy of American monetary policy, chapter 4, New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1990, 51-63 -- Part III. The political economy of central banking: Analytical and empirical perspectives -- 8. 'Contested terrain' / in Louis-Philippe Rochon and Sergio Rossi (eds), the Encyclopedia of central banking, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2015, 105-7 -- 9. 'Macropolicy in the rise and fall of the golden age' / with Juliet B. Schor, in Stephen A. Marglin and Juliet B. Schor (eds), The golden age of capitalism: Reinterpreting the postwar experience, chapter 3, Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1990, 126-52, references -- 10. 'Political economy and comparative central banking', review of radical political economics, 24 (1), March, 1992, 1-30 -- 11 'A political economy model of comparative central banking' / in Gary Dymski and Robert Pollin (eds), New perspectives in monetary macroeconomics: Explorations in the tradition of Hyman P. Minsky, chapter 9, Ann Arbor, MI, USA: The University of Michigan Press, 1994, 231-77 -- 12. 'Profit squeeze, rentier squeeze and macroeconomic policy under fixed and flexible exchange rates', economies et sociétés, 25 (3), November/December, 1991, 219-57 -- 13. 'The rise of rentier incomes in OECD countries: Financialization, central bank policy and labor solidarity' / with Arjun Jayadev, in Gerald A. Epstein (ed.), Financialization and the world economy, chapter 3, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2005, 46-74 -- Part IV. Inflation targeting vs. Developmental central banking -- 14. 'Financialization, rentier interests and central bank policy', 2002, 1-43 -- 15. 'Central banks as agents of economic development', / Ha-Joon Chang (ed.), Institutional change and economic development, chapter 6, New York, NY, USA: United Nations University Press and London, UK: Anthem Press, 2007, 95-113 -- 16 'Developmental central banking: Winning the future by updating a page from the past', review of Keynesian economics, 1 (3), Autumn, 2013, 273-87 -- 17. 'Achieving coherence between macroeconomic and development objectives' / in Joseph E. Stiglitz and Martin Guzman (eds), contemporary issues in macroeconomics: Lessons from the crisis and beyond, IEA conference volume 155-ii, chapter 11, Basingstoke, UK and New York, NY, USA, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, 148-59 -- Part V. The Federal Reserve and the great financial crisis of 2007-2008 -- 18. 'Have large scale asset purchases increased bank profits?' / with Juan Antonio Montecino, Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET) working paper no. 5, December, 2014, 1-25 -- 19. 'The political economy of QE and the Fed: Who gained, who lost and why did it end?' / with Juan Antonio Montecino, Political Economy Research Institute (PERI) working paper number 408, November, 2015, 1-25 -- 20. 'The impact of quantitative easing on income inequality in the United States', November, 2018 -- Part VI. Reforming the Federal Reserve -- 21. 'Statement on monetary policy' / testimony prepared for the House Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, July 19th, 1983, 1-11 -- 22. 'A debate with Robert Pollin: Should Congress control the Federal Reserve?' / with Robert Pollin, Dollars & sense, 136, May, 1988, 12-17, 22 -- 23. 'Reforming the Federal Reserve for the 21st century', 2018 -- Index.