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"Rational Choice Theory in Political Decision Making" published on by Oxford University Press.

Preface -- Acknowledgements -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Fuzzy Social Choice -- 1.1 The Purpose and Plan of the Book -- 1.2 General Concepts -- 1.2.1 Sets -- 1.2.2 Subsets -- 1.2.3 Relations -- 1.2.4 Fuzzy Intersection and Union -- 1.2.5 Residuum -- References -- Classical Social Choice Theorems -- 2.1 Arrows Theorem -- 2.2 Discussion -- 2.3 Gibbard-Sattherthwaite Theorem -- 2.4 The Median Voter Theorem -- 2.5 The Maximal Set -- References -- Rationality of Fuzzy Preferences -- 3.1 The Structure of Fuzzy Preference Relations -- 3.2 Consistency of Fuzzy Preferences and the Fuzzy Maximal Set -- 3.3 Empirical Application I: Deriving an FWPR from a Fuzzy Preference Function -- References -- Arrow and the Aggregation of Fuzzy Preferences -- 4.1 Fuzzifying Arrow's Conditions -- 4.1.1 Transitivity -- 4.1.2 Weak Paretianism -- 4.1.3 Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives -- 4.1.4 Dictatorship -- 4.2 Making and Breaking Arrow's Theorem -- 4.3 Empirical Application II: The Spatial Model and Fuzzy Aggregation -- References -- Characteristics of Strategy-Proof Fuzzy Social Choice -- 5.1 Fuzzy Choice and Manipulation -- 5.2 Fuzzy Social Choice: Definitions and Concepts -- 5.2.1 Fuzzifying ASB II -- 5.2.2 Relaxing the Conditions of Abdelaziz et. al. -- 5.3 Findings -- 5.4 Implications for the Spatial Model -- 5.5 Conclusions -- References -- Fuzzy Black's Median Voter Theorem -- 6.1 The Structure of Fuzzy Rules and Strict Preference -- 6.2 Basic Definitions and Concepts -- 6.3 New and Old Fuzzy Voting Rules -- 6.4 Single-Peaked Preferences and the Maximal Set -- 6.5 Extending Black's Median Voter Theorem -- 6.6 An Application -- 6.7 Conclusions and Spatial Models -- References -- Representing Thick Indifference in Spatial Models -- 7.1 Stability and Thick Indifference in Individual Preferences

Contents -- 1 Non-monotonic Voting Methods: An Overview -- Abstract -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 Types of Monotonicity Failure -- 1.3 The Plan of the Book -- References -- 2 Descriptions of the Voting Methods to Be Analyzed -- Abstract -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Five Voting Methods Susceptible to Types of Monotonicity Failure Under Both Fixed and Variable Electorates -- 2.2.1 Plurality with Runoff (P-R) -- 2.2.2 Alternative Vote (AV -- aka Instant Runoff Voting -- Ranked Choice Voting) -- 2.2.3 The Coombs Method (Cf. Coombs 1964, pp. 397-399 -- Straffin 1980 -- Coombs et al. 1984) -- 2.2.4 The Dodgson Method (Cf. Black 1958, pp. 222-234 -- McLean and Urken 1995, pp. 288-297) -- 2.2.5 The Nanson Method (Cf. Nanson 1883 -- McLean and Urken 1995, Chap. 14) -- 2.3 Eight Voting Methods Susceptible to Types of Monotonicity Failure Under Variable Electorates -- 2.3.1 Successive Elimination (Cf. Farquharson 1969) -- 2.3.2 Bucklin's Method (Cf. Hoag and Hallett 1926, pp. 485-491 -- Tideman 2006, p. 203) -- 2.3.3 Majority Judgment (Cf. Balinski and Laraki 2007a, b, 2010) -- 2.3.4 Copeland's Method (Copeland 1951) -- 2.3.5 Black's Method (Black 1958, p. 66) -- 2.3.6 Kemeny's Method (Kemeny 1959 -- Kemeny and Snell 1960 -- Young and Levenglick 1978 -- Young 1988, 1995) -- 2.3.7 Schwartz's Method (Schwartz 1972, 1986) -- 2.3.8 Young's Method (Young 1977) -- 2.4 Five Main Procedures that Are not Susceptible to Any Monotonicity Failure -- 2.4.1 Plurality (or First Past the Post) Voting Procedure -- 2.4.2 Approval Voting (Brams and Fishburn 1978, 1983) -- 2.4.3 Borda's Count (Cf. de Borda 1784 -- Black 1958 -- McLean and Urken 1995, pp. 83-89) -- 2.4.4 Range Voting (Smith 2000) -- 2.4.5 The Minmax Procedure -- References -- 3 Some Theoretical Results on Monotonicity-Related Properties of Voting Rules -- Abstract -- 3.1 Smith's (1973) Theorem