Mexico's Oil Boom
In: Current history: a journal of contemporary world affairs, Band 80, Heft 463, S. 49-52
ISSN: 1944-785X
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In: Current history: a journal of contemporary world affairs, Band 80, Heft 463, S. 49-52
ISSN: 1944-785X
In: Current history: a journal of contemporary world affairs, Band 80, Heft 463, S. 49-52,86-88
ISSN: 0011-3530
World Affairs Online
In: The new leader: a biweekly of news and opinion, Band 56, S. 5-7
ISSN: 0028-6044
In: Current History, Band 45, Heft 5, S. 54-58
ISSN: 1944-785X
In: Armed forces journal international, Band 134, Heft 3/5820, S. 18-19
ISSN: 0196-3597
World Affairs Online
In: Challenge: the magazine of economic affairs, Band 14, Heft 6, S. 5-8
ISSN: 1558-1489
In: Current history: a journal of contemporary world affairs, Band 16, Heft 94, S. 326-330
ISSN: 1944-785X
In: Current history: a journal of contemporary world affairs, Band 52, Heft 7, S. 9-11
ISSN: 1944-785X
In: Far Eastern survey, Band 6, Heft 24, S. 281-281
In: Current History, Band 46, Heft 5, S. 23-28
ISSN: 1944-785X
In: Current History, Band 38, Heft 5, S. 633-636
ISSN: 1944-785X
We show that political booms, measured by the rise in governments' popularity, predict financial crises above and beyond other better-known early warning indicators, such as credit booms. This predictive power, however, only holds in emerging economies. We show that governments in emerging economies are more concerned about their reputation and tend to ride the short-term popularity benefits of weak credit booms rather than implementing politically costly corrective policies that would help prevent potential crises. We provide evidence of the relevance of this reputation mechanism.
BASE
We show that political booms, measured by the rise in governments' popularity, predict financial crises above and beyond other better-known early warning indicators, such as credit booms. This predictive power, however, only holds in emerging economies. We show that governments in emerging economies are more concerned about their reputation and tend to ride the short-term popularity benefits of weak credit booms rather than implementing politically costly corrective policies that would help prevent potential crises. We provide evidence of the relevance of this reputation mechanism.
BASE
In: Jane's defence weekly: JDW, Band 8, Heft 24, S. 1415-1436
ISSN: 0265-3818
World Affairs Online