The article problematizes dominant understandings of moral rights to territory and rejects the claim that the legitimacy of independence of the former Yugoslav republics can be grounded in the right of their peoples to self-determination, either within ethnic or then-existing administrative boundaries. Instead, the most promising normative justification for a decision to recognize Yugoslav republics as independent states follows from a particular interpretation of the all-affected interests principle in democratic theory, which leads to a radical reconceptualization of the idea of the people, 'its' territory, and the legitimate role of the international community. Adapted from the source document.
According to Paul Kahn, one of the leading American constitutional theorists, the terms 'nation' and 'national sovereignty' are beyond the moral argument. From the perspective of constitutional ontology, the nation is the community of all those who share the 'political eros' love of the nation, who are ready to respond to her call and, if necessary, lay down their lives on the altar of its self-preservation. The moral debate about the limits of nation's state is meaningless, tells us Kahn. The boundaries of all, even liberal states arise through a 'make sacrifices' they 'never just a matter of geography', and therefore 'there is no abstract drawing of borders by some principle of justice. As in the life of the individual, the limits have the same necessity: There is nothing abstract in that necessity.'. Adapted from the source document.
What are the doctrinal implications of international responses to the demise of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY)? Faced with harshly conflicting internal visions of Yugoslav self-determination, the international order - taking direction from the Badinter Commission - reacted in an essentially ad hoc manner against the most manifestly virulent of the competing ethno-nationalisms. In ascribing international legal status to a particular set of constitutionally-established internal boundaries, the Badinter Commission gave a rationale that masked rather than highlighted its departure from existing doctrine, seeking thereby to minimize any implications for the future of sovereignty and s elf-determination. Any effort to invoke the Badinter Commission judgments as evidence of a broader doctrinal transformation, attributing international legal personality to constitutionally-delineated sub-national units more generally, neglects the peculiar context of those judgments and threatens to lend undue support to externally-promoted secessionist projects. Adapted from the source document.
This article firstly focuses on the initial recognition, in the final period of the second Yugoslavia, of the existence of social inequalities, as the first serious symptoms of abandoning the ideology of social equality and socialism as a whole. Moreover, the nationalist mobilization was used as a lever for restoration of capitalism as a typical class society. After that it briefly outlines two post-war periods of structuring social opportunities in societies in the West, and partly also in the East. The first period is designated primarily by egalitarian tendencies, which is manifest in increased popularity of critical and radical trends in social sciences. The second period, which still lasts, is quite opposite in orientation, and this is, in turn, manifest in ever greater relevance of social Darwinism as a discursive foundation of a series of sciences. The next, and largest, part of the article is dedicated to an attempt at explaining the permanence of social inequalities, and the author stresses the inexhaustible character of Rousseau's question regarding the origin of social inequalities. In the present-day quest for an answer to that question, certain similarities are noticeable between (neo) evolutionism and (neo) Marxism. Although Marx himself stressed the correspondence of his conception of class struggles in history with Darwin's conception of struggles for survival in nature, but also took into account the differences (between natural evolution and human history), the conclusion on the identity of their conceptions imposes itself through observations about the constant defeat of the proletariat in age-long struggles against the oppressors, which continue to this very day in the epoch of neo-liberal global capitalism. Reflecting on possibilities of a generally different outcome in the struggles for a more just society, the author finds that there are two interrelated prerequisites to their existence. The first has to do with connecting the theory and practice of liberalism and socialism with the aim of establishing a balance between the mechanisms of individual freedom and competition on the one hand, and social sensitivity or solidarity on the other. The second prerequisite is the construction of a world democratic state. Its political interest and scope of governing would neutralize the key concept (and self-reproduction mechanism) of social Darwinism -- inclusive fitness. Quite simply, the latter means to favour "one's own" group while humiliating or excluding the other. In a society with a globally ruling government, the division between "one's own" and "somebody else's" parts of the world -- the boundaries of which are nowadays all too often shifted to and fro as a consequence of the erratic character of expansion and contraction of the market and the breaking out of conflagrations of war, producing a permanent Hobbesian "state of nature" -- would make way for wisdom of governing and for work of all for the benefit of all. Adapted from the source document.
Different parts of State territory on land, sea and in the airspace are explained first. The concept of territorial sovereignty is envisaged through principles of its all-inclusiveness and its exclusivity, subject to many exceptions and restrictions imposed either by rules of general international law or by specific treaty obligations that can be assumed by a State. The concept of State servitudes was not assimilated in the practice of international courts and tribunals. Besides, it can be the cause of some misconceptions and confusion in public international law. Within the explanation of territorial boundaries are discussed the so-called natural boundaries such as boundary rivers and lakes and mountain boundaries, as well as the artificial boundaries. Follow explanation of the principle of "uti possidetis, of procedures of fixing boundaries and of special legal scope of boundary treaties in international law. (SOI : PM: S. 74)
This dissertation treats the competence of Constitutional courts in settling the disputes of jurisdictional conflicts, both in theoretical and historical as well as practical, sense. It is common knowledge that the Constitutional court is the most efficient mechanism for protecting the constitutionally determined separation of power. The role of the Constitutional Court is especially significant with regard to the fact that the separation of power does not exclude the possibility of interweaving jurisdiction of different levels of state power. By settling disputes of jurisdictional conflicts, the Constitutional Court gains competence for the determination of clear boundaries of state power organs in terms of their constitutional authorisation. Given the fact that the jurisdictional conflict is mainly motivated by political agenda, the Constitutional Court must settle an originally political dispute by implementing the constitutional norms. The jurisdictional conflicts are a common competence of Constitutional courts. They are a direct representation of the government, or the constitutionally determined separation of power. A distinction between horizontal and vertical disputes can consequently be made. Various factors cause these disputes, including the following: state power, government, political parties system, level of democratic development, the level of precision of constitutional norms determining the boundaries of state power, etc. The constitutional disputes of jurisdictional conflicts should, however, be thought of in a broader sense as well. The Constitution commonly views these disputes as a separate jurisdiction of Constitutional courts. If the disputes of jurisdictional conflicts are regarded as a factual violation of constitutionally proclaimed separation of power, then the other constitutional disputes can be seen as an infringement of the power separation principle as well. In that way the Constitutional court indirectly settles a competence dispute while simultaneously carrying out normative control, its basic duty. Assuming that the separation of power is based on the idea of preventing the abuse of state power by guaranteeing the fundamental rights and freedoms, one can say that, while deciding on the protection of rights and freedoms proclaimed by the Constitution, the Constitutional court indirectly protects the power separation principle. The matter of jurisdictional conflicts can decided upon by the court when the court is asked to give an interpretation of the constitutional provisions. If the fact that this jurisdiction is a necessary consequence of federal division of the state is exempted, one can say that in the countries without federal division the settling of competence disputes, also represents a separate jurisdiction of Constitutional courts. The guiding principle for all the countries was the fact that the abuse of power or the realisation of its separation (or balance) can only be reached through the operating system of an independent and unbiased institution, as the Constitutional court itself is. An analysis of various countries' Constitutions and the practice of Constitutional courts in settling competence disputes has shown that Constitutional courts have made a significant contribution to the realisation of power separation, especially in the transitional processes of non-democratic regimes to democratic ones. Naturally the real effects of the constitutional jurisprudence depend on the political climate-the relationship between the political institutions and the one these have with the Constitutional court, as well as their willingness to abide by its decisions-and this is a fact one should not neglect.
Predmet doktorske disertacije je problem konstituisanja političkog tela u demokratskim teorijama. Ovaj se problem u savremenoj analitičkoj političkoj teoriji uobičajeno razmatra kao problem ograničenja demosa, odnosno pitanje kako je moguće demokratski ograničiti demos, dok se u kontinentalnoj političkoj teoriji pre razmatra kao pitanje konstituisanja demosa odnosno kao jedan od paradoksa politike i demokratije. Metodološki se rad priklanja drugom načinu razmatranja ovog pitanja. Zastupam stanovište da je demokratsko konstituisanje demosa logički nerešiv problem te da, umesto pokušaja da se on trajno reši, treba razotkriti paradokse utemeljivačkih priča i hronični nedostatak legitimnosti na ma koji način ograničenog političkog tela. Produktivnije je misliti o načinima da se početne nepravde prema isključenima isprave ili ublaže i da se sastav političkog tela (demosa) naknadno legitimiše demokratskim rekonstituisanjem. Tvrdi se da se političko telo može demokratski rekonstituisati putem ne samo izvanrednih već i svakodnevnih političkih momenata tokom kojih se pregovaraju i osporavaju veze između narodnog suvereniteta i ljudskih prava. Takve situacije osporavanja i pregovaranja su one kada se obnavlja članstvo starim članovima ili priznaje članstvo novim članovima, o čemu se obično misli kao o kompozicionoj dimenziji demosa koja odgovara na pitanje ko je pasivni član, odnosno gde su spoljašnje granice političkog tela. Postoje takođe i situacije redefinisanja političkog identiteta i pokretanja kolektivne akcije što je način da se razmotri performativna dimenzija demosa odnosno unutrašnje granice političkog tela - ko može biti aktivni član i koliki je jaz između demosa i političkog tela. Performativna dimenzija demosa fokusira se na načine na koje demos zahteva priznanje da je demos i istovremeno proizvodi, otelotvoruje sebe, kao političko telo u nastajanju. ; The topic of this doctoral dissertation is the problem of constitution of the body politic in democratic theories. In contemporary analytic political theory this problem has been most commonly dealt with as the boundary problem that asks how to delimit the demos democratically, but in continental political theory it is rather considered as an issue of constitution of the demos and as one of the political and democratic paradoxes. This study has embraced the second methodological approach in tackling this issue. I contend that the original constitution of the demos by democratic means is logically impossible so instead of a quest for a permanent solution of this problem, the paradoxes of the stories of founding as well as chronic legitimacy deficit of any bounded bodies politic should be exposed. It is more productive to rethink the ways to remedy or mitigate the initial injustices committed toward the excluded from the demos and to legitimize the recomposition of the body politic (demos) via subsequent democratic reconstitution. It is argued that political body can be democratically reconstituted not just during extraordinary but also during ordinary, everyday political moments, when relations between popular sovereignty and human rights are negotiated and contested. The opportunities for these contestations and negotiations are situations of restoration of membership for the old members and recognition of membership to the new members, usually understood as situations addressing the compositional dimension of demos that responds to the question who is the passive member, and where should the external boundaries of the demos be drawn. But there are also situations when political identity can be redefined, especially when collective action is initiated, opportunities when performative dimension of the demos is activated, and which informs us about struggles concerning the internal boundaries of the demos - who can be an active member and how deep is the gap between the demos and the body politic. Performative account of the demos focus on the ways in which the demos demands recognition as the demos and at the same time enacts itself as an emerging body politic.
The topic of this doctoral dissertation is the problem of constitution of the body politic in democratic theories. In contemporary analytic political theory this problem has been most commonly dealt with as the boundary problem that asks how to delimit the demos democratically, but in continental political theory it is rather considered as an issue of constitution of the demos and as one of the political and democratic paradoxes. This study has embraced the second methodological approach in tackling this issue. I contend that the original constitution of the demos by democratic means is logically impossible so instead of a quest for a permanent solution of this problem, the paradoxes of the stories of founding as well as chronic legitimacy deficit of any bounded bodies politic should be exposed. It is more productive to rethink the ways to remedy or mitigate the initial injustices committed toward the excluded from the demos and to legitimize the recomposition of the body politic (demos) via subsequent democratic reconstitution. It is argued that political body can be democratically reconstituted not just during extraordinary but also during ordinary, everyday political moments, when relations between popular sovereignty and human rights are negotiated and contested. The opportunities for these contestations and negotiations are situations of restoration of membership for the old members and recognition of membership to the new members, usually understood as situations addressing the compositional dimension of demos that responds to the question who is the passive member, and where should the external boundaries of the demos be drawn. But there are also situations when political identity can be redefined, especially when collective action is initiated, opportunities when performative dimension of the demos is activated, and which informs us about struggles concerning the internal boundaries of the demos - who can be an active member and how deep is the gap between the demos and the body politic. Performative account of the demos focus on the ways in which the demos demands recognition as the demos and at the same time enacts itself as an emerging body politic. ; Predmet doktorske disertacije je problem konstituisanja političkog tela u demokratskim teorijama. Ovaj se problem u savremenoj analitičkoj političkoj teoriji uobičajeno razmatra kao problem ograničenja demosa, odnosno pitanje kako je moguće demokratski ograničiti demos, dok se u kontinentalnoj političkoj teoriji pre razmatra kao pitanje konstituisanja demosa odnosno kao jedan od paradoksa politike i demokratije. Metodološki se rad priklanja drugom načinu razmatranja ovog pitanja. Zastupam stanovište da je demokratsko konstituisanje demosa logički nerešiv problem te da, umesto pokušaja da se on trajno reši, treba razotkriti paradokse utemeljivačkih priča i hronični nedostatak legitimnosti na ma koji način ograničenog političkog tela. Produktivnije je misliti o načinima da se početne nepravde prema isključenima isprave ili ublaže i da se sastav političkog tela (demosa) naknadno legitimiše demokratskim rekonstituisanjem. Tvrdi se da se političko telo može demokratski rekonstituisati putem ne samo izvanrednih već i svakodnevnih političkih momenata tokom kojih se pregovaraju i osporavaju veze između narodnog suvereniteta i ljudskih prava. Takve situacije osporavanja i pregovaranja su one kada se obnavlja članstvo starim članovima ili priznaje članstvo novim članovima, o čemu se obično misli kao o kompozicionoj dimenziji demosa koja odgovara na pitanje ko je pasivni član, odnosno gde su spoljašnje granice političkog tela. Postoje takođe i situacije redefinisanja političkog identiteta i pokretanja kolektivne akcije što je način da se razmotri performativna dimenzija demosa odnosno unutrašnje granice političkog tela - ko može biti aktivni član i koliki je jaz između demosa i političkog tela. Performativna dimenzija demosa fokusira se na načine na koje demos zahteva priznanje da je demos i istovremeno proizvodi, otelotvoruje sebe, kao političko telo u nastajanju.
The "May Declaration" of the Yugoslav Club (Vienna, 1917), regardless of its original intent, enabled various political parties and groups in the South Slav areas of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy to promote the "Yugoslav idea" and work toward the creation of a unified Yugoslav state. In Croatia, as well as in Bosnia and Hercegovina, the most vociferous advocates of the "May Declaration" were members of the Croatian Catholic Seniorate, the leading organization within the Croatian Catholic movement. In Bosnia and Hercegovina, the Franciscans were the leading proponents of the "May Declaration" alongside the Seniorate. The greatest opposition to the "May Declaration" was voiced by the "Frankist-Rightist" circle centered around Archbishop Josip Stadler. Especially prominent among this group was Ivo Pilar, author of the "Memorandum" (July 1917), wherein he called for the creation of a "united administrative territory," or, the political unification of Croatian lands elevated to the status of a "condominium" relative to both component halves of the Monarchy. In his "Declaration" (November, 1917), Archbishop Stadler and his supporters came out in favour of the unification of "Croatian historical lands" within the boundaries of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, but on the basis of a subdualistic formula. Considering the existence of the dualistic system in the Monarchy a historic reality, they believed that this was the best possible resolution of the problem of political/constitutional fragmentation of the Croatian lands. The dissolution of Austria-Hungary and the formation of the Kingdom of Serbs , Croats and Slovenes rendered irrelevant the demands voiced in Stadler's "Declaration". Symbolically, the death of the Archbishop occurred at precisely the same time as these ominous events befell the Croat people. (SOI : CSP: S. 71f.)
