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The subject of interest of this paper is the joint campaign of the Macedonian king Perdiccas II and the famous Spartan military leader Brasidas against the Lyncestian ruler Arrhabaeus I, seen in the wider context of the longstanding Peloponnesian War. Macedonia and Sparta were endangered in front of the same enemy - Athens, which led to the approximation of their interests. The Macedonian king strove for gradual unification of Macedonia with all the Macedonian tribes and elimination of the Athens pressures on the northern Aegean coast, while the primary goal of Sparta was, however, to acquire the Athenian allies on its side. This text analyzes the course of the campaign and the joint Macedonian-Spartan military operations, which, in their ending, due to incongruity and misunderstanding, led to a temporary interruption of the Macedonian-Spartan alliance. It was actually a campaign of two armies, without a joint command, with different military organization or, mildly speaking - a weak coordination, which at the same time, besides the current common interests, clearly reflects the opposition of the two different policies of the Macedonian Kingdom and Sparta in their wider strategy of action in the Peloponnesian War. The paper turns to the records of Thucydides as the only historical source for the campaign, but at the same time, it turns to the topography of the ground where military operations took place based on the latest archaeological research. Key words: Perdiccas II, Brasidas, Arrhabaeus I, Peloponnesian War, Macedonian Kingdom

The subject of interest of this paper is the joint campaign of the Macedonian king Perdiccas II and the famous Spartan military leader Brasidas against the Lyncestian ruler Arrhabaeus I, seen in the wider context of the longstanding Peloponnesian War. Macedonia and Sparta were endangered in front of the same enemy - Athens, which led to the approximation of their interests. The Macedonian king strove for gradual unification of Macedonia with all the Macedonian tribes and elimination of the Athens pressures on the northern Aegean coast, while the primary goal of Sparta was, however, to acquire the Athenian allies on its side. This text analyzes the course of the campaign and the joint Macedonian-Spartan military operations, which, in their ending, due to incongruity and misunderstanding, led to a temporary interruption of the Macedonian-Spartan alliance. It was actually a campaign of two armies, without a joint command, with different military organization or, mildly speaking - a weak coordination, which at the same time, besides the current common interests, clearly reflects the opposition of the two different policies of the Macedonian Kingdom and Sparta in their wider strategy of action in the Peloponnesian War. The paper turns to the records of Thucydides as the only historical source for the campaign, but at the same time, it turns to the topography of the ground where military operations took place based on the latest archaeological research. Key words: Perdiccas II, Brasidas, Arrhabaeus I, Peloponnesian War, Macedonian Kingdom

Neorealism and some versions of realism seek to furnish nomothetic theories of the international system at the same time that they also strive to prescribe policy for political leaders. Insofar as practical advice is insufficiently articulated by means of either nomothesis or the structural theoretical framework that (neo-)realist paradigms supply, these two aspirations seem contradictory. This essay is an examination of what contemporary realism and, especially, neorealism require to make practical wisdom available for practitioners. It argues that narrative, which is exemplified in the so-called classical realism of Thucydides, remains a crucial component of practical realism and neorealism.

Neorealism and some versions of realism seek to furnish nomothetic theories of the international system at the same time that they also strive to prescribe policy for political leaders. Insofar as practical advice is insufficiently articulated by means of either nomothesis or the structural theoretical framework that (neo-)realist paradigms supply, these two aspirations seem contradictory. This essay is an examination of what contemporary realism and, especially, neorealism require to make practical wisdom available for practitioners. It argues that narrative, which is exemplified in the so-called classical realism of Thucydides, remains a crucial component of practical realism and neorealism.

Dieses Zitat des Melierdialoges, der den erfolglosen Versuch Athens im Jahre 419 v. Chr., Melos in den Attisch-Delischen Seebund zu zwingen, zum Inhalt hat, zeigt die Bedeutung der gemeinsamen ethnischen Zugehörigkeit von Lakedaimoniern und Meliern. Das gemeinsame Dorertum lässt Thukydides u. a. auch Brasidas (5,9,1-2) und Hermokrates (4,61,2-4) in ihren Reden als Argument für politische bzw. militärische Zusammenarbeit nutzen.

International audience ; This paper argues that the central chapters of Book 4 of Thucydides show the failure of Athens'political initiatives during the summer of 424 BC. In these chapters, Thucydides shows that Athens acceptsinvitations from weak democratic factions in Megara and Boeotia in hopes of imposing new politicalarrangements: the strategy both relies on political affiliations and has political aims. It also has politicaloutcomes, since Athens fails twice in a row, and both attacks result in the consolidation of hostile andoligarchical regimes. The Spartan commander Brasidas was therefore certainly important for Athens' failures,but not their central cause. ; Cet article soutient que les chapitres centraux du livre IV de Thucydide montrent l'échec desinitiatives politiques d'Athènes durant l'été 424 av. J.-C. Thucydide montre dans ces chapitres qu'Athènesaccepte les invitations de factions démocratiques faibles de Mégare et de Béotie dans l'espoir d'imposer denouvelles dispositions politiques, que sa stratégie repose à la fois sur des affiliations politiques et sur desobjectifs politiques, et qu'elle avait des conséquences politiques, puisque Athènes échoue deux fois de suite,et que ses deux attaques aboutissent à la consolidation des régimes hostiles et oligarchiques. Ainsi, la causecentrale des échecs d'Athènes n'est pas le commandant spartiate Brasidas, même s'il eut son importance.

Dada la ubicuidad de la guerra en la realidad helénica antigua en general y, en particular, en la formación del líder político, la figura de Cleón en las Historiae descolla como inusual. El objetivo del presente artículo es identificar y analizar los recursos a los que recurre el enunciador-historiador para representar el êthos del político en términos de su participación militar. Nuestra hipótesis es que su caracterización como "el más persuasivo" (Tucídides 3.36.6, 4.21.3) implicaría una actitud irónica. En este sentido, su capacidad oratoria estaría restringida al ámbito de la pólis y no parece tener palabras para sus soldados en el campo de batalla cuando se enfrenta con los espartanos en Esfacteria y, mucho menos, en la preanunciada derrota de Anfípolis. En este sentido, la descripción de Cléon es eminentemente política y su participación militar es menoscabada por el enunciador-historiador, en contraste con las de Demóstenes y Brásidas. ; Given the ubiquity of war in the Ancient Hellenic reality in general and, in particular, in the training of political leaders, the Thucydidean Cleon stands out as unusual. This article aims to identify and analyze the resources with which the historian represents the politician's êthos in terms of his military participation. The hypothesis is that his characterization as "the most persuasive" (Thucydides 3.36.6, 4.21.3) entails an ironic attitude towards him. In a sense, his oratorical ability seems restricted to the pólis : he does not look like he has any words to offer to his soldiers on the battlefield when he faces the Spartans at Sphacteria and, much less, at the foretold defeat in Amphipolis. On this matter, Cleon's description is eminently political and his military participation is diminished by the historian, in contrast to those of Demosthenes and Brasidas. ; Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación

International audience ; Les émissions, par Clazomènes, de tétradrachmes à types personnels au milieu du IIe s. av. J.-C. figurant au droit Zeus Sôter Épiphanès et au revers une amazone ne peuvent être mises en relation avec la victoire d'Eumène II sur les Galates en 166. Ces monnaies, frappées à l'occasion de panégyries, célébraient une épiphanie salvatrice de Zeus Sôter, peut-être au cours de la guerre qui opposa Prusias II à Attale II. Abstract Summary-Small hoards buried north of the frontiers of the kingdom of Macedonia that contain heavy tetrobols of Perdikkas II, of the Chalcidic League and Acanthus may be related with the military operations of Brasidas and his allies, among which the Macedonian king, the Chalcideans of Thrace and Acanthus, against Arrhabaeus of Lynkos.

International audience ; Act on private basis in diplomacy of one's own city. The example of Nicias' peace in Thucydides. During the diplomatic exchanges related at the beginning of the fifth book, Thucydides shows two explicit private interventions using words connected with idia. First, two ephores, Cleoboulos and Xenares, make private propositions. Then, an Athenian, Alcibiades sends a private messenger. Whereas these two actions are unique in the fifth book, because Thucydides' vocabulary is specific, some other citizens express opinions different from the majority decisions. Some of themact against the policy of their City. Self-interest may incite some citizens to participate in civicaction, and the private sphere might be a space where citizens have an influence on policy. ; Au cours des échanges diplomatiques rapportés au début du livre V, Thucydide signale par l'emploi de mots de la famille d'idia deux interventions privées explicites. Il s'agit de l'intervention de deux éphores lacédémoniens, Cléoboulos et Xénarès, puis celle d'un Athénien, Alcibiade. Si ces deux exemples sont uniques pour le livre V, en raison du vocabulaire employé par Thucydide,ils ne sont pas isolés. D'autres citoyens expriment des opinions et passent à l'acte, alors même que la majorité de leurs concitoyens a choisi une autre ligne politique. L'intérêt privé apparaît comme un moteur de l'action civique, et la sphère privée comme un espace dans lequel des citoyens peuvent influer sur le politique.

International audience ; Act on private basis in diplomacy of one's own city. The example of Nicias' peace in Thucydides. During the diplomatic exchanges related at the beginning of the fifth book, Thucydides shows two explicit private interventions using words connected with idia. First, two ephores, Cleoboulos and Xenares, make private propositions. Then, an Athenian, Alcibiades sends a private messenger. Whereas these two actions are unique in the fifth book, because Thucydides' vocabulary is specific, some other citizens express opinions different from the majority decisions. Some of themact against the policy of their City. Self-interest may incite some citizens to participate in civicaction, and the private sphere might be a space where citizens have an influence on policy. ; Au cours des échanges diplomatiques rapportés au début du livre V, Thucydide signale par l'emploi de mots de la famille d'idia deux interventions privées explicites. Il s'agit de l'intervention de deux éphores lacédémoniens, Cléoboulos et Xénarès, puis celle d'un Athénien, Alcibiade. Si ces deux exemples sont uniques pour le livre V, en raison du vocabulaire employé par Thucydide,ils ne sont pas isolés. D'autres citoyens expriment des opinions et passent à l'acte, alors même que la majorité de leurs concitoyens a choisi une autre ligne politique. L'intérêt privé apparaît comme un moteur de l'action civique, et la sphère privée comme un espace dans lequel des citoyens peuvent influer sur le politique.