Suchergebnisse

New legislative provisions on "symmetric" access regulation are due to be introduced in Denmark, in the context of the transposition of the 2018 EU Electronic Communications Code. Symmetric access obligations under the Code are obligations that apply to all operators, and not only to operators found to have "Significant Market Power". In this report, the state of competition on the Danish broadband market is analyzed. we assess the impact that different forms of "symmetric" wholesale access regulation may have on the investment incentives of broadband operators in Denmark, as well as the potential effects on competition and consumer outcomes. ; Study for Energistyrelsen ; Neue gesetzliche Bestimmungen zur "symmetrischen" Zugangsregelung sollen in Dänemark im Rahmen der Umsetzung des europäischen Kodex für die elektronische Kommunikation (EKEK) von 2018 eingeführt werden. Dabei handelt es sich um Zugangsverpflichtungen, die für alle Betreiber gelten, und nicht nur für Betreiber, die als SMP-Betreiber eingestuft wurden. In der Studie untersuchen wir die Wettbewerbssituation auf dem dänischen Breitbandmarkt und bewerten die Auswirkungen, die verschiedene Formen der "symmetrischen" Regulierung des Zugangs auf der Vorleistungsebene auf die Investitionsanreize von Breitbandnetzbetreibern in Dänemark haben können. Darüber hinaus untersuchen wir die potenziellen Auswirkungen auf den Wettbewerb und die Ergebnisse für die Verbraucher.

This paper gives a survey of the current state of competition in the German Broadband access market. Existing regulations and their impact on the deployment of high-speed Internet access are evaluated. It is argued that facilities-based competition is preferable to open-network regulations. The most prospective candidate as an independent network capable of generating facilities-based competition in Germany is the cable-broadcasting network. The current developments in the cable industry and the expectations for its success in the short to medium term lead to the conclusion that in the short run at least, there is a need for unbundling regulation to foster competition. Improvements to the current open-network regulation-practices in Germany are suggested.

The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act provides $7.2 billion primarily for broadband grant programs to be administered by two separate agencies: the National Telecommunications and Information Administration of the Department of Commerce and the Rural Utilities Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. This report is over the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, the implementation of the Broadband programs, and issues related to the implementation.

This paper analyses the determinants of broadband Internet access prices in a group of 15 EU countries between 2008 and 2011. Using a rich panel dataset of broadband plans, we show the positive effect of downstream speed on prices, and report that cable and fibre-to-the-home technologies are available at lower prices per Mbps than x DSL technology. Operators'marketing strategies are also analysed as we show how much prices rise when the broadband service is offered in a bundle with voice telephony and/or television, and how much they fall when download volume caps are included. The most insightful results of this study are provided by a group of metrics that represent the situation of competition and entry patterns in the broadband market. We show that consumer segmentation positively affects prices. On the other hand, broadband prices are higher in countries where entrants make greater use of bitstream access and lower when they use more intensively direct access -local loop unbundling-. However, we do not find a significant effect of inter-platform competition on prices.

This paper investigates the relationship between electoral incentives, institutions and corruption. We assume that voters use a yardstick criterion. The incumbent provides a public good and extracts rent, which are financed by imposing a distortionary tax. We demonstrate the possibility that yardstick competition itself fails to restrict rent seeking. We complement the static setting with a dynamic scenario where each incumbent politician faces an election after a finite, fixed term. Under relative performance evaluation, dynamic incentives impose more restriction on rent appropriation in comparison to the static case.

This report discusses the Implementation and issues related to Broadband Infrastructure Programs in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.

The relationship between competition and performance–related pay has been analyzed in single–principal–single–agent models. While this approach yields good predictions for managerial pay schemes, the predictions fail to apply for employees at lower tiers of a firm's hierarchy. This paper describes a principal multi-agent model of incentive pay that analyzes the effect of changes in the competitiveness of markets on lower tier incentive payment schemes. The results explain why the payment schemes of agents located at low and mid tiers are less sensitive to changes in competition when aggregated firm data is used.