Suchergebnisse

Ob es die "umweltfreundlichen" Geländewagen sind, das Gefasel von "kriegsähnlichen Zuständen", die "Phrasendrescherei" von Bankern und Managern oder die verschwurbelten Theorien esoterischer Alternativmediziner - wir werden mit Blödsinn und Halbwahrheiten auf Schritt und Tritt bombardiert und zugetextet. Die beiden "Zeit"-Journalisten Hürter und Rauner vermitteln in ihrem höchst unterhaltsam geschriebenen, aber sehr informativen Buch Wissenswertes über die "Geschichte des Bullshits". Sie stellen dar, wo überall uns Bullshit im Alltag begegnet, analysieren Sinn und Absicht der "Bullshitter" und warum man uns alle ständig für dumm verkaufen will. Ganz im Stil des Titels von Philosophieprofessor Harry G. Frankfurt ("Bullshit", BA 6/06), aus dem auch oft zitiert wird, gehen Hürter und Rauner aufgeblähten Sprachkonstrukten und leeren Worthülsen des Humbugs auf den Grund, die nie ganz gelogen, aber auch nie ganz wahr sind. - Aktueller Titel für das tägliche Leben; mit umfangreichem Literaturverzeichnis. Thematisch ähnlich z.B. auch M. Baumanns: "Kein Bullshit

I precede the 'provocation' —a word I first heard used by my colleagues Gordon Asher and Leigh French—below with the following caveats. First, I produced this provocation as part of a workshop on Critical Pedagogy that Gordon Asher, Leigh French and I co-organised preceding a day conference on Critical Pedagogies. Second, the provocation that follows, like those of Asher and French, sought to spark off debate; it used David Graeber's rhetorical argument about paid work today, with its explicit use of the 'b' word, to encourage academics at the event to re-contextualise regimes of accountability in the university that they are experiencing and to consider how critical pedagogy could help them do so. Finally, I have been lucky enough to leave full time employment when voluntary redundancy was on offer (being already off work on stress-related sick leave, for the first and last time in my full-time, paid working life). This allowed me to stop being a wage slave and become, instead, as one of my colleagues put it, like Tony Benn who left Parliament to take up politics; I was leaving the university to take up education.

The crisis in Darfur led to one of the most powerful advocacy campaigns in recent US history. Responding to intense political pressures from this campaign, the US engaged Sudan in a heated public confrontation, increasingly echoing the rhetoric of an advocacy campaign that was surprisingly indifferent to realities on the ground in Darfur. This article examines how the exceptional mobilization around Darfur affected US policy and diplomatic outcomes, using the case to explore larger theoretical questions around deception and truthfulness in International Relations. There was a curious disconnect between the exceptionally strong language US leaders used during the crisis, and the failure of these public claims, promises and threats to achieve the desired diplomatic outcomes. Such strong language should have bolstered US arguments to persuade allies to support measures against Sudan, given the US bargaining leverage with Sudan, and opened opportunities for activists to rhetorically entrap US officials into defending the norms they publicly invoked. Instead, I argue that US leaders bullshitted their way through the crisis in response to advocacy and the demands it generated. Far from being a harmless form of moral posturing, this complicated US diplomatic efforts and undermined the prospects for a political solution in Darfur. [Reprinted by permission; copyright Sage Publications Ltd. & ECPR-European Consortium for Political Research.]

The crisis in Darfur led to one of the most powerful advocacy campaigns in recent US history. Responding to intense political pressures from this campaign, the US engaged Sudan in a heated public confrontation, increasingly echoing the rhetoric of an advocacy campaign that was surprisingly indifferent to realities on the ground in Darfur. This article examines how the exceptional mobilization around Darfur affected US policy and diplomatic outcomes, using the case to explore larger theoretical questions around deception and truthfulness in International Relations. There was a curious disconnect between the exceptionally strong language US leaders used during the crisis, and the failure of these public claims, promises and threats to achieve the desired diplomatic outcomes. Such strong language should have bolstered US arguments to persuade allies to support measures against Sudan, given the US bargaining leverage with Sudan, and opened opportunities for activists to rhetorically entrap US officials into defending the norms they publicly invoked. Instead, I argue that US leaders bullshitted their way through the crisis in response to advocacy and the demands it generated. Far from being a harmless form of moral posturing, this complicated US diplomatic efforts and undermined the prospects for a political solution in Darfur.