Die Business Judgement Rule
In: Stiftung & Sponsoring: das Magazin für Non-Profit-Management und -Marketing, Heft 5
ISSN: 2366-2913
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In: Stiftung & Sponsoring: das Magazin für Non-Profit-Management und -Marketing, Heft 5
ISSN: 2366-2913
In: Schriften des Ernst-Jaeger-Instituts für Unternehmenssanierung und Insolvenzrecht 1
In: Gleißner, W. (2021): Unternehmerische Entscheidungen. Haftungsrisiken vermeiden (§ 93 AktG, Business Judgement Rule), in: Controller Magazin, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Januar/Februar 2021), S. 17-23.
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In: Gleißner, W. (2021): Entrepreneurial Decisions. Avoiding liability risks (Section 93 AktG, Business Judgement Rule), in: Controller Magazin, Vol. 45, No. 1, January/February 2021, pp. 16-23
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In: Studienreihe wirtschaftsrechtliche Forschungsergebnisse 76
In: Schweizer Schriften zum Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht Band 345
Limited company as a legal entity (rechtspersoon / legal person) is a Limited Liability Companywhose setting is subject to the realm of private law (Law No. 40 Year 2007 on Limited LiabilityCompanies, but its capital from the separated state wealth is subject to the legal sphere of public law -Law Number 17 Year 2003 on State Finance). Main objective of the State-owned Enterprise as LimitedCompany is doing business with the profit as final target. Business carries the risk of loss, meaning itdoes not always generate benefit. Problems arise when the business decisions taken by the board ofdirectors turn out to bring loss. The problems can be in the forms of the laws to regulate the State-ownedEnterprise, the concept of the separation of state assets, and, the accountability setting of the Board ofDirectors.One of the central government's objectives is to increase the common wealth. In order to fulfill thatobjective, the government needs to create economic growth through government capital at State-ownedEnterprise. Government equity participation to State-owned Enterprise can be performed by usinggovernment budget which is separated from national wealth on the basis of provision mechanism appliedat corporate regulations. The separated national wealth will be converted as State-owned Enterprisecapital when the fund has been deposited. In this case, the government is the share holder in which theshares are the national wealth.The defence of State-owned Enterprise Board of Directors when the company losses is applyinggood faith, duty of care, and duty of loyalty which is regulated through Law of Limited Company 95 No. 5. ; Limited company as a legal entity (rechtspersoon / legal person) is a Limited Liability Companywhose setting is subject to the realm of private law (Law No. 40 Year 2007 on Limited LiabilityCompanies, but its capital from the separated state wealth is subject to the legal sphere of public law -Law Number 17 Year 2003 on State Finance). Main objective of the State-owned Enterprise as LimitedCompany is doing business with the profit as final target. Business carries the risk of loss, meaning itdoes not always generate benefit. Problems arise when the business decisions taken by the board ofdirectors turn out to bring loss. The problems can be in the forms of the laws to regulate the State-ownedEnterprise, the concept of the separation of state assets, and, the accountability setting of the Board ofDirectors.One of the central government's objectives is to increase the common wealth. In order to fulfill thatobjective, the government needs to create economic growth through government capital at State-ownedEnterprise. Government equity participation to State-owned Enterprise can be performed by usinggovernment budget which is separated from national wealth on the basis of provision mechanism appliedat corporate regulations. The separated national wealth will be converted as State-owned Enterprisecapital when the fund has been deposited. In this case, the government is the share holder in which theshares are the national wealth.The defence of State-owned Enterprise Board of Directors when the company losses is applyinggood faith, duty of care, and duty of loyalty which is regulated through Law of Limited Company 95 No. 5
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In: Europäische Hochschulschriften v.5704
Mit der vorliegenden Abhandlung liegt erstmals eine umfassende Untersuchung der Relevanz der <I>Business Judgement Rule </I>gemäß 93 Abs. 1 S. 2 AktG für die Vorstandsuntreue vor. Die Untersuchung erstreckt sich sowohl auf die Frage des Bestehens einer entlastenden (strafausschließenden) als auch einer belastenden (strafbegründenden) Relevanz. Der Autor unterscheidet dabei nach unmittelbarer und mittelbarer Relevanz. Im Zentrum der Arbeit steht die Herleitung einer mittelbar belastenden Relevanz in Form einer Indizwirkung für den Fall eines Verstoßes gegen einzelne Kriterien der <I>Busi
In: Europäische Hochschulschriften
In: Reihe 2, Rechtswissenschaft 5704
In: KTS-Schriften zum Insolvenzrecht Band 57
In: Abhandlungen zum Deutschen und Europäischen Gesellschafts- und Kapitalmarktrecht Band 128
In: Schriften zum Sozialrecht Band 40
In: Nomos eLibrary
In: Arbeits- und Sozialrecht
Die Frage des Geschäftsleiterermessens, auch Business Judgment Rule (§ 93 Abs. 1 S. 2 AktG) genannt, ist nicht nur in jüngerer Zeit eines der meistdiskutierten Themen des Gesellschaftsrechts. Die Diskussion strahlt auch auf die gesetzlichen Krankenkassen aus, die – anders als andere Sozialversicherungsträger sowie die übrigen Körperschaften des öffentlichen Rechts – im Wettbewerb zueinander stehen. Die praktische Bedeutung ist im Zusammenhang mit den zahlreichen Fällen einer Inanspruchnahme von Vorstandsmitgliedern wegen Pflichtverletzungen in jüngerer Zeit noch gewachsen.Das Werk arbeitet Gemeinsamkeiten und strukturelle Unterschiede der Innenhaftungssysteme von Vorständen von Aktiengesellschaften sowie Krankenkassen heraus. Im Mittelpunkt der Untersuchungen steht die Frage nach der Übertragbarkeit der Business Judgment Rule auf den Krankenkassenvorstand.Der Autor richtet sich gleichermaßen an Leser aus der Wissenschaft und aus der Praxis
In: Socialʹno-političeskie nauki: mežvuzovskij naučnyj recenziruemyj žurnal, Band 12, Heft 4, S. 97-102
Goal. In the article we research applicability of business judgement rule to actions of a majority shareholder taking in the account specificities of non-public commercial corporations. Analysis of application of the rule to a majority shareholder's actions in view of non-public corporation's legal nature was conducted only in the Peeples' paper [13]. However, this analysis fails to take into the account ability of shareholders of corporations to apply informal sanctions against each other. The goal of this article is to supplement current understanding of legal nature of non-public corporation and to elaborate additional grounds for application of the rule. Inferences. In the article we confirm the conclusion that justification of application of the rule in non-public corporations has specificities derivative from the legal nature of such corporations. Besides that, we conclude that the rule's application may depend upon ability of shareholders to deter opportunistic behavior by informal sanctions. Value. The article for the first time proves that the legal nature of non-public corporations depends not only upon trust between shareholders, but from their ability to apply informal sanctions as a mean of protection from opportunistic behavior of a counteragent. Given this, we suppose that the state's role in protection of rights and interests of minority shareholders may be decreased.
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Working paper