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This is a first for Indonesia: Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH) is the only household-targeted social assistance initiative to have designed randomized impact evaluation into the initial allocation of the program. This brings three major benefits for policymakers: 1) the evidence available for evaluating the impacts of the PKH program on household welfare is extensive and sound; 2) the program design and the impact analysis design have generated additional excitement, both nationally and internationally, about the program, its goals and social assistance initiatives in general; and 3) the results and underlying data will be made publicly available, which has already spurred interest in additional evaluations that will stock the shelves of social assistance policy research libraries. PKH's success in delivering real benefits to the very poor and in changing behaviors deserves further support and encouragement. PKH's initial weaknesses in implementation and delivery deserve continuing attention and thoughtful solutions for greater effectiveness. The Government of Indonesia (GOI) plans on expanding the PKH program to as many as three million households; while it is doing so, it should continue to refine implementation, coordinate and collaborate with affiliated service providers in health, education, and local government services, and continue developing a corps of organized, enthusiastic, and skilled facilitators who can assist very poor households in achieving healthier behaviors.

During the past decade, the use of conditional cash transfer programs to increase investment in human capital has generated considerable excitement in both research and policy forums. This article surveys the existing literature, which suggests that most conditional cash transfer programs are used for essentially one of two purposes: restoring efficiency when externalities exist or improving equity by targeting resources to poor households. The programs often meet their stated objectives, but in some instances there is tension between the efficiency and equity objectives. The overall impact of a program depends on the gains and losses associated with each objective.

The Bantuan Langsung Tunai (BLT) program had a clear and modest objective: supplement consumption for poor households facing unprecedented price increases. In 2005 subsidy cuts raised household fuel prices by an average of over 125 percent with 88, 186, and 105 percent increases in gasoline, kerosene, and solar (diesel) fuels respectively. BLT, a direct cash transfer in four installments over one year, funded from the implied budgetary savings from subsidy reductions, was in many respects the most significant Government of Indonesia (GOI) response to these programmed increases in fuel prices. It was targeted to the poor households who were benefiting least from the old subsidy regime and most at risk from the negative impacts on consumption from price increases. A mostly-similar BLT was introduced again in 2008 when international crises in both financial markets and in food prices combined with another domestic reduction to fuel subsidies. BLT provided just-in-time cash assistance to households affected by an economic shock. BLT added cash amounts to a household's budget equal to approximately 15 percent of regular expenditures in 2005. These transfers were more than enough to cover increased expenditure on fuels. Benefits continued for one year as shocks from government policy reverberated through the rest of the macro-economy, allowing beneficiaries time to readjust spending patterns to new relative prices.

This paper discusses the nature & political impact of two anti-poverty programs, Bolsa Familia in Brazil & Oportunidades in Mexico. These programs are two examples of a new brand of anti-poverty programs, known as conditional cash transfer schemes (CCTs). Under CCTs, a government gives cash to poor households in exchange for the beneficiaries fulfilling certain conditions, such as ensuring that their children maintain a given level of school attendance, bringing their children to health clinics for regular visits, etc. CCTs aim to alleviate poverty in the short-term, through the redistribution of wealth by cash transfers, & in the long-term, by building up human capital among the poor through improved education, health, & nutrition. President Luiz Ignacio Lula da Silva initiated Bolsa Familia in Brazil in 2003, & President Vicente Fox of the Partido Accion Nacional (PAN) initiated Oportunidades in Mexico in 2002. This paper investigates the relationship between the federal government & the beneficiaries of these programs, specifically aiming to uncover to what extent the programs can be used -- and are being used -- for political gain. It concludes with a comparison of the impact of the respective programs on the most recent presidential elections in Brazil & Mexico. Adapted from the source document.

This paper discusses the nature & political impact of two anti-poverty programs, Bolsa Familia in Brazil & Oportunidades in Mexico. These programs are two examples of a new brand of anti-poverty programs, known as conditional cash transfer schemes (CCTs). Under CCTs, a government gives cash to poor households in exchange for the beneficiaries fulfilling certain conditions, such as ensuring that their children maintain a given level of school attendance, bringing their children to health clinics for regular visits, etc. CCTs aim to alleviate poverty in the short-term, through the redistribution of wealth by cash transfers, & in the long-term, by building up human capital among the poor through improved education, health, & nutrition. President Luiz Ignacio Lula da Silva initiated Bolsa Familia in Brazil in 2003, & President Vicente Fox of the Partido Accion Nacional (PAN) initiated Oportunidades in Mexico in 2002. This paper investigates the relationship between the federal government & the beneficiaries of these programs, specifically aiming to uncover to what extent the programs can be used -- and are being used -- for political gain. It concludes with a comparison of the impact of the respective programs on the most recent presidential elections in Brazil & Mexico. Adapted from the source document.

This open access book asks whether cash-transfer programs for very low-income households promote social and economic citizenship and, if so, under what conditions. To this end, it brings together elements that are too often considered separately: the transformation of social and economic citizenship rights in a market-centered context, and the increasing popularity of cash transfer as an instrument both of social policy and humanitarian action. We link these by juxtaposing theoretical treatment of citizenship and inclusion with concrete policy case studies set in contemporary Turkey. Cases are taken both from domestic social policy and international relief efforts aimed at Syrian refugees. Theoretical discussion and case studies lead to the conclusion that cash transfer programs can promote economic and social inclusion – if deployed at an appropriate scale; if sufficient financial, technical, and social resources are available; and if program design and implementation promotes market inclusion of beneficiaries both as consumers and workers.